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| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Karakostas, G. | en |
| dc.contributor.author | Viglas, A. | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-11-24T17:23:16Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2015-11-24T17:23:16Z | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0302-9743 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://olympias.lib.uoi.gr/jspui/handle/123456789/12724 | - |
| dc.rights | Default Licence | - |
| dc.title | Equilibria for networks with malicious users | en |
| heal.type | journalArticle | - |
| heal.type.en | Journal article | en |
| heal.type.el | Άρθρο Περιοδικού | el |
| heal.identifier.secondary | <Go to ISI>://000188242500071 | - |
| heal.language | en | - |
| heal.access | campus | - |
| heal.recordProvider | Πανεπιστήμιο Ιωαννίνων. Σχολή Θετικών Επιστημών. Τμήμα Μαθηματικών | el |
| heal.publicationDate | 2003 | - |
| heal.abstract | We consider the problem of characterizing user equilibria and optimal solutions for selfish routing in a given network. We extend the known models by considering malicious behaviour. While selfish users follow a strategy that minimizes their individual cost, a malicious user will use his flow through the network in an effort to cause the maximum possible damage to this cost. We define a generalized model, present characterizations of flows at Wardrop equilibrium and prove bounds for the ratio of the social cost of a flow at Wardrop equilibrium over the cost when centralized coordination among users is allowed. | en |
| heal.journalName | Algorithms and Computation, Proceedings | en |
| heal.journalType | peer reviewed | - |
| heal.fullTextAvailability | TRUE | - |
| Appears in Collections: | Άρθρα σε επιστημονικά περιοδικά ( Ανοικτά). ΜΑΘ | |
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