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https://olympias.lib.uoi.gr/jspui/handle/123456789/10854Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Kontogiannis, S. | en |
| dc.contributor.author | Spirakis, P. | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-11-24T17:01:00Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2015-11-24T17:01:00Z | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0302-9743 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://olympias.lib.uoi.gr/jspui/handle/123456789/10854 | - |
| dc.rights | Default Licence | - |
| dc.subject | dynamics | en |
| dc.subject | number | en |
| dc.title | Counting stable strategies in random evolutionary games | en |
| heal.type | journalArticle | - |
| heal.type.en | Journal article | en |
| heal.type.el | Άρθρο Περιοδικού | el |
| heal.language | en | - |
| heal.access | campus | - |
| heal.recordProvider | Πανεπιστήμιο Ιωαννίνων. Σχολή Θετικών Επιστημών. Τμήμα Μηχανικών Ηλεκτρονικών Υπολογιστών και Πληροφορικής | el |
| heal.publicationDate | 2005 | - |
| heal.abstract | In this paper we study the notion of the Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS) in evolutionary games and we demonstrate their qualitative difference from the Nash Equilibria, by showing that a random evolutionary game has on average exponentially less number of ESS than the number of Nash Equilibria in the underlying symmetric 2-person game with random payoffs. | en |
| heal.journalName | Algorithms and Computation | en |
| heal.journalType | peer reviewed | - |
| heal.fullTextAvailability | TRUE | - |
| Appears in Collections: | Άρθρα σε επιστημονικά περιοδικά ( Ανοικτά) | |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kontogiannis-2005-Counting Stable Strategies.pdf | 198.64 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open Request a copy |
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