Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://olympias.lib.uoi.gr/jspui/handle/123456789/11349
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dc.contributor.authorTsakiris, N.en
dc.contributor.authorMichael, M. S.en
dc.contributor.authorHatzipanayotou, P.en
dc.date.accessioned2015-11-24T17:05:36Z-
dc.date.available2015-11-24T17:05:36Z-
dc.identifier.urihttps://olympias.lib.uoi.gr/jspui/handle/123456789/11349-
dc.rightsDefault Licence-
dc.subjectCross-border Pollutionen
dc.subjectStrategic Environmental Policyen
dc.subjectPublic Abatementen
dc.titleStrategic Environmental Policies under Public Good Provisionen
heal.typejournalArticle-
heal.type.enJournal articleen
heal.type.elΆρθρο Περιοδικούel
heal.languageen-
heal.accesscampus-
heal.recordProviderΠανεπιστήμιο Ιωαννίνων. Σχολή Οικονομικών και Κοινωνικών Επιστημών. Τμήμα Οικονομικών Επιστημώνel
heal.publicationDate2011-
heal.abstractIn this paper it is examined the importance of public finance to the ranking in terms of environmental quality, of three environmental policy instruments: emission taxes, emission permits, and emission quotas. The set-up is a general equilibrium, two large open economies model with production generated cross-border pollution, private and pubic pollution abatement. Within this model, we show that when both countries use environmental taxes strategically, and the tax revenues are used to finance public abatement activities instead of lump-sum distributed, then non-cooperative emission tax setting does not induce " a race to the bottom" . Moreover, in the case of emission permits and when their revenues finance public abatement, then strategic choice of emission permits leads both countries to " a race to the top" .en
heal.journalTypepeer reviewed-
heal.fullTextAvailabilityTRUE-
Appears in Collections:Άρθρα σε επιστημονικά περιοδικά ( Ανοικτά) - ΟΕ

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