Praxis and eudemonia in Nicomachean Ethics (Master thesis)
By studying Nicomachean Ethics, we have the opportunity to realize Aristotle's interest in human morality, the means of conquering moral virtue and the inaccessible course of man toward eudemonia. Morality for Aristotle is not a separate kind of science. It is part of political science, and particularly the "study of human nature". Nicomachean Ethics, as a project, has a consultative and motivational character. The philosopher urges man to act morally, exploring and demonstrating how he will be educated in moral acting. The aim of the present work is to highlight the course of thought of Aristotle, who shapes the virtuous man, so that he leads to the achievement of an almost divine happiness, through his actions.In the first chapter of this study, basic Aristotelian concepts are shown, such as the “telos”, the “exis” and the “virtue”. The second chapter deals with the “proairesis” and moral responsibility of the individual, while he acts. The concepts of “ekousion”, “akousion” and “proairesis” are studied in the context of human action. In the third chapter we focus on ethical virtues. Particular reference is made to the moral virtue of justice.The fourth chapter mentions mental virtues and examines the virtue of wisdom, which, although intellectual virtue, presupposes ethics. In the fifth and final chapter, the course of synthesis of the present work and the attempt to approach and interpret the Aristotelian eudemonia is completed, while the connection of the human act with the achievement of happiness is expounded.
|Institution and School/Department of submitter:||Πανεπιστήμιο Ιωαννίνων. Φιλοσοφική Σχολή. Τμήμα Φιλοσοφίας, Παιδαγωγικής και Ψυχολογίας|
|Subject classification:||Αριστοτέλης, 384-322|
|Appears in Collections:||Διατριβές Μεταπτυχιακής Έρευνας (Masters)|
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|Μ.Ε. ΣΚΑΛΙΔΟΥ ΒΕΡΟΝΙΚΑ 2019 (ΕΞΩΦΥΛΛΟ).pdf||193.66 kB||Adobe PDF||View/Open|
|Μ.Ε. ΣΚΑΛΙΔΟΥ ΒΕΡΟΝΙΚΑ 2019.pdf||1.06 MB||Adobe PDF||View/Open|
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