EVANGELIA KARAGIANNOPOULOU

REVIEWING THE APPROACHES TO MOTIVATION AND BEHAVIOUR REGULATION.
THE MEDIATING ROLE OF SELF AND SOCIAL GONTEXT.

The study of motivation is concerned with how behaviour is energised, sustained, directed and stopped. Brody (1980) reports that despite the fact that motivational questions dominated American psychology for the first half of the century, a comprehensive theoretical framework does not yet exist in the area of human motivation. Research is gradually getting to theories and approaches to the understanding of individuals' actions through the study of factors which guide or mediate certain patterns of behaviour. In these terms, the concept of self has recently been studied as a system which personalises motivation transforming motive into the very personal activity of goal setting (Markus and Nurius, 1987). Goals are seldom held in total abstraction. Instead, a goal is represented as the individual him/herself achieving that goal. In this tradition, self functions as the link between the social environment and individual's action 'since people experience their worlds and define themselves in terms of their socio-cultural contexts' (Oyserman and Markus, 1993, p. 188). The socio-cultural contexts seem to give rise to the self and these contexts, in turn, are created and maintained by particular perspectives on self developing a sequence of one's behaviour (Oyserman and Markus, 1993).

A brief history of motivation research

The early motivation theories are built on associative bonds and reinforcements. The dominant approaches to motivation during the 1940s and 1950s viewed behaviour as regulated by stimulus-response associated bonds that developed through reinforcement processes. Hull (1943) proposed that the occurrence of a particular res-

ponse is a multiplicative function of drive and habit strength.
'Drives' were viewed as the effects of tissue deficits that act
upon the nervous system as a persisting stimulus. Drive-re-
lated stimuli were said to activate behaviour aimed at redu-
cing the physiological imbalances. The end result of this motiva-
tional sequence is a consummatory responce that reduces the
physiological need and brings about learning. 'Habits' were defined
as the amount of reinforced practice an animal has had in making
the response previously (the strength of associations linking stimu-
lus conditions to particular response). Over time, such drive-indu-
ced learning gradually shapes behaviour into an economical pursuit
of goal objects (Pervin, 1990).

Operant behaviour theory assigned an important role to exter-
nal stimuli as the key determinants of behaviour and, like Hullinan
theory, rejected all explanations of action in terms of internal forces
such as thoughts and feelings (Skinner, 1953). It was assumed either
that environmental events elicit directly as in a reflexive response,
or that certain actions are strengthened by environmental events in
the past (Mook, 1987).

A further step to motivation concerns theories about psycholo-
gical needs and goal selection (choices). Drive reduction-based theo-
ries of motivation held a pre-eminent position especially in Ameri-
can psychology until critics took aim at their central proposition:
that drive reduction acts as a reinforcer and promotes learning. In
fact, Harlow's experiential work with monkeys convinced him that
it was more likely that drive state *inhibits* rather than facilitates le-
arning. In place of the hypothesis that learning is a means of drive
reduction, Harlow suggested (1953) that primate learning is prima-
rily driven by curiosity since monkeys solved puzzles when non in-
ternal drive was present and motivation to learn was provided sim-
ply by the presence of the puzzle.

White (1959) offered a very different picture of human motiva-
tion; he insisted that humans instead of seeking to reduce tension by
satisfying physiological needs, cherish the experience of raised ten-
sion and mild excitement. Indeed, he argued that humans have an
innate tendency to strive to exercise and extent their capabilities.
He also referred to the energy behind this tendency as 'competence
motivation' and to the corresponding affect as feelings of efficacy.
Other significant theorists such as Murray (1938), Maslow (1949)
and Lewin (1951) shared his view of humans as proactive organisms

who are motivated to extent their capabilities and to interact with their enviroment effectively. Maslow for exemple, developed the pyramid of human needs emphasising the hierarchy in the satisfaction of them leading to self-actualisation. Murray (1938) proposed a theory of motivation that highlighted the role of psychological rather than physiological needs. He argued that psychological needs (motives) function as organising forces that guide mental, verbal and physical process along a certain course. He defined these psychological needs as enduring features of personality that energise, direct and select behaviour and experience. He carried out extensive research on four out of the forty psychological needs he identified: achievement, affiliation, power, self-determination.

Cognition to the associative theories of motivation is introduced by Lewin who argued that cognitions rather than 'drive-response associative links' are the key building blocks of motivated behaviour. Lewin (1951) proposed that people behave when they have intentions or goals and that they persist until they have carried out their intentions, even trivial or nonsensical ones. The importance of motives, goals and values as major components of personality has been obvious to many theorists (e.g. James, 1910; Tolman, 1932). Lewin introduced the relationship between the self and motivation. He noted that environmental events 'are not neutral to us in our role as active beings ...they challenge us to certain activities' (1951, p. 117). The intensity with which events challenge us varies from 'irresistible attraction to 'mild inclination', depending on the internal situation of a person. This variation in challenge or attraction has been referred to as 'valence' or 'value' of an object or event. A number of motivational theories have employed the concepts of expectancies and valence as the fundamental principle of motivated behaviour. Expectancy-value theories assume thet one's tendency to perform a particular activity is a joint fuction of the strength of one's expectancies that these actions will lead to specific outcomes and the subjectively perceived values of the outcomes.

Furthering the expectancy value concepts, theorists as Julian Rotter (1966), Walter Mischel (1973) and Alfred Bandura (1977) promoted the social cognitive approach to motivation. Such an approach argues that expectancies of future reinforcements than one's own history of past reiforcements (argued by Skinner, 1953) provide the motivational impetus for behaviour. The central proposition of these approaches is that the regulation of behaviour is guided by

people's self-imposed goals and the consequences that ensue from them. In the same stream, theorists such as Atkinson and Birch (1978) view motives as 'dispositions' within an individual to strive to approach a particular class of positive incentives (goals) or to a- void a particular class of negative incentives (threats). Besides the self-imposed goals, Bandura (1977, 1982) also assigns a central role to efficacy beliefs in determining whether particular goals will be pur- sued and achieved. Perceived 'self-efficacy' refers to judgements of how well one can perform actions required to deal with a prospecti- ve situation. In Bandura's view, it is not sufficient merely to expect that particular outcomes covary with particular behaviours; one must also believe that one is capable of carrying out the requisite action.

The later approaches indicate a shift of focus on psychological needs and /or goals. Lesser importance is gradually attached to the earlier emphasis on associative bonds and reinforcement processes in the study of human motivation. As mentioned above, the focus on psychological needs derives primarily from Murray's work, whe- reas it can be suggested that current goal theories have their origins in the work of Kurt Lewin. Theories built on psychological needs and goals share the belief that people's thoughts, feelings and desires play a dominant role in the regulation o behaviour. Overall, the the- ories of Lewin and Bandura are, of course, also very much concerned with the role of expectations and goal setting in motivation. But they are primarily concerned with task-specific goal setting and pro- ximal goals as goads and behaviour. In contrast, the most recent the- ories of motivation, on which this paper focuses, examine motivati- on not as a set of specific goals but as a reflection of individual's conceptions of *self*, of what individuals hope to accomplish with their lives and the kind of people they would like and not like to become (Markus and Nurius, 1987).

Reviewing the literature concerning the role of self in indivi- dual's action, one will identify other aspects of self than the present or actual self, starting with Freud(1925) who conceptualised the ego ideal as the child's conception of what the parents think is morally right. For Horney (1950) neurosis occurs when the idealised self be- comes too powerful and takes the place of the real self as the focus of the individuals' thoughts, feelings and actions. Rogers (1951) de- scribed the ideal self as what the individual thinks he or she sho- uld be and conceived one's level of self-regard as a function of how

far one perceives s/he stands from the idead self. James (1910) was also directly concerned with conceptions of the self beyond the here and now self. He argued about the 'social me' and distinguished it from the 'immediate present me' and the 'me of the past'. Lacte on Rosenberg (1979) theorised that there are important differences among desired selves and distinguished between fantasy or glorified idealised images of the self and the more realistic committed self-images which reflect what the individual actually believes s/he could become. However, he did not work on the negative possibilities as opposed to desired selves.

The link between the self-concept and action is implicit in the theorising of Mead (1934) who argued that having a self implied the ability to rehearse possible courses of action depending on an evaluation of the other persons' reactions and then being able to adjust to one's following actions accordingly.

This type of role-taking involves creating potential selves and occurs whenever one is the target of evaluation or expectation.

, Other theorists ditectly approached the relation between identity and motivation. Recently, Stryker (1987) contends that identities continually seek validation and that most important behaviour is in the service of confirming particular identities. He also argued that the more important the identity the more it is in need for validation. The basic unit of the dynamic self then becomes not an attribute or a feature which is a summary or an integration of past behavioural regularity but rather a possible self which reveals the direction that action will take.

The idea of motivation in terms of goal setting and the regulation of behaviour is further explored in recent theories (e.g. Markus and Nurius, 1986; Higgins et al, 1985) where images of self as parts of the self-sustem, function as a mediating factor in the prediction of individual's behaviour. Markus and Nurius (1986) developed the concept of possible selves which is based on the idea of individuals' conception of what is possible for him/her in the context of what one would like to become and what one is afraid of becoming. This is related to concepts of self-knowledge, self-concept and cognition. Individual's belief of what is likely to experience is related to representations of self concerning certain aspects of life which provide a direction and impetus for action, change and development. The inclusion of a sense of what is possible within the self-concept allows it to become dynamic. The role of possible selves as representations of

self in the self-concept and their function as parts of the working self-concept seems to throw light to the motivation explaining how conceptions of self act as incentives. The *working self-concept* is the functional self-concept of a particular activity. It is that set self-conceptions that are presently accessible in thought and memory. It can be viewed as a continually active, shifting array of available self-knowledge. Therefore the self-concept appears malleable because the contents of the working self-concept change according to what subset of selves was active just prior to the activity, to what has been invoked by the individual as a result of an experience and to what has been elicited by the social situation at a given time(Markus and Kunda, 1986). This is of particular importance since motivation is getting the form of conscious process under the control of the individual. The main suggestion of Oyserman and Markus (1990a, 1990b) study on motivation is that a given possible self will have maximal motivational effectiveness when it is offset or balanced by the countervailing possible self in the same domain. Desire for the positive goal is an incentive as is the wish to avoid something unpleasant. Also, these representations of self are built upon the reality of the individual experience. In these terms interventions may be built on the idea of development of positive representations of selves where negative ones ere established.

Such an approach to motivation illuminates an unanswered question of motivation theorising about how the abstract, nebulous entity called a motive is transformed into the very personal activity of goal setting and into the concrete intentions and plans of which we are more or less aware. The contribution of the concept of possible selves to more traditional views of motivation is to suggest that some of the dynamic elements of personality may be carried in specific cognitive representations of the self in future states and the one's actions may be shaped by attempts to realise or avoid these states (Markus and Nurius, 1987).

Personalised motivation, self, social context and regulation of behaviour

The latter mentioned approach to motivation seems to illuminate the role of the immediate environment, social context in the development of individuals' representations of selves, 'possible selves' (Markus and Nurius, 1986), 'ideal selves', 'ought selves' (Higgins et

al, 1985) and 'desired selves' (Schlenker, 1985), since it is based on the personalised nature of motivation. This follows Nuttin's (1984) argument that motivation is not just an instinctual, impersonal unconscious process. Nuttin particularly emphasised the idea of personalised motivation and criticised approaches (i.e. Freud's) which stressed the instinctual and unconscious nature of human motivation. He argued for the need to personalise motivation and for the value of studying how motivation is transformed into the activity of goal setting and into the concrete intentions and aims of which we are more aware. Possible selves work by personalising the goal, that is, by making the goal one's own or, in Lewin's terms, putting a piece of the self in the general space. Cognitively, affectively, somatically, the task representation and the self-representation become one, which may then serve to decrease the psychological distance between one's current state and the desired state.

From research on goal gradients (Miller, 1944), we know that animals approaching the goal box speed up because of the increased presence of goal-related cues. Similarly, those individuals with a clear image, conception or sense of themselves in a future state (e. g. successful on a given task) will have accessible more cues relevant to this future state, and this will enhance goal related performance (Markus and Ruvolo, 1989).

Schlenker (1985) has also individualised motivation by postulating 'desired selves' that are determined by situational constraints and by the anticipated audience for the behaviour and that process information in the setting. Nurius (1991) reports that possible selves provide structural content and form to what Mead (1934) described as one's anticipated future and to the 'I want' dimension of self-reflection. More recently, Markus (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Markus and Oyserman, 1989) has developed the concept of the 'interpersonal self, parsimoniously allowing an understanding of a wide variety of cultural and gender differences in the extent to which others are included in the self. Such an approach recognizes the importance of understanding how people think about themselves and their environment for making sense of human behaviour. These theories provide a link between the self and social environment since they reflect the extent to which the self is socially embedded and constrained. For example, the significance of possible selves is related to their function as incentives for future behaviour and to their

ability to provide an evaluative and interpretative context for the current view of self (Markus and Nurius, 1986).

According to Cantor et al. (1986) people are assumed to have a diverse repertoire of possible selves that can be viewed as the cognitive manifestations of their enduring goals, aspirations, values, motives and threats. The pool of possible selves derives from the categories made salient by the individual's sociocultural and historical context and from models, significant others, images and symbols provided by the media and by the individual's immediate social experiences. Social norms and mores and the possibilities encapsulated in the roles played by others in one's social environment are likely to indicate certain representations of the self/selves others would like him/her to become (Oyserman and Markus, 1990a; Oyserman and Saltz, 1993). These 'possible' or 'ought' selves include prescriptions for things the individual ought or ought not to be or to become (Higgins, Klein & Strauman, 1985; Cantor et al., 1986). Such representations of self thus have the potential to reveal the intensive and constructive nature of the self, but they also reflect the extent to which the self is socially determined and constrained (Elder, 1980; Markus and Ruvolo, 1989).

Given the social nature of the self, it is likely that only selves that others validate as possible will become part of one's identity. Hence, the plausibility of particular desired selves or possible selves may be thought of as the outcome of interpersonal interactions in which these selves are negotiated (Cantor and Zirkel, 1990; Oyserman and Saltz, 1993). Oyserman et al. (1995) in a study relating to the school persistence of African-American students reported that gendered African-American identity schemas are central for school persistence. According to the researchers, these schemas are viewed as the scaffolding within which balanced possible selves in the achievement domain are generated and strategies for their attainment sketched out. Gendered African-American identity schemas, are likely to also have a more direct impact on one's subjective sense of what is probable and plausible for the self (Markus, 1977). As such these gendered identities seem to be the lenses or prisms through which adolescents make sense of the world. The links between gender, social context and behaviour can be understood in tems of one scanning his/her everyday social contexts within the vocabulary of his/her emerging identity. As such, current action is scripted by

what is viewed as a good, importat and plausible outcome within one's context.

Cantor and Zirkel (1990) identify the role of culture as the context in which personality is observed, without which behaviour has no meaning and without meaning behaviour has no purpose. They emphasise that the cultural context provides important information for making judgements about constructs like 'social structure' and 'social adjustment'. In these terms general processes creating relationships between personality and goal-directed behaviour, adjustment and adaptation to important life changes (e.g. divorce) can best be studied with detailed knowledge of the specific contexts in which these relationships unfold over the life-span. Thus behaviour is thought to be created by a person in a particular context, and it is not necessarily expected to hold for other times and other contexts. Schlenker and Weigold (1989) report that people are seen to negotiate an identity that is consistent both with desired images of the self and with situational goals and demands. Individuals work toward achieving possible selves that account both for self-schemas and for the particular demands likely to be encountered (Markus and Nurius, 1986).

Empirical evidence of individuals' appraisal of the social context emerges from Frable's work on stigmatisation (Frable et al, 1990) which indicates group membership as a basis for self-definition which implies the role of a certain social environment on deviant people's behaviour. Participants in the study were classified as fat people, gays, lesbians, ethnic groups, and rape and incest survivors. With regard to self processes, her work suggests that people who have a concealable stigma have a more dispositional view of self and view themselves as more unique, even on dimensions irrelevant to their stigma, than do those who are not stigmatised or whose behaviour is conspicuous (e.g. fat). Both positive and negative deviants were likely to be mindful in their initial contacts with strangers. She suggests that making friends is particularly stressful and unpredictable for marginal people and mindfulness gives them a control on social exchange by reacting to each successive stage of social interaction.

Similarly, Skinner (1988) and George Herbert Mead (1934) note that no distinction can be made between social and personal identity. Deaux (1992) acknowledges that personal meanings are constructed in and dependent on the social context.

Thus one's personal identity cannot be separated from the social context in which it develops. Breakwell (1986) points out that personal identity could be considered as the relatively permanent residue of each assimilation to and accommodation of a social identity. These theories follow Showers and Cantor's (1985) suggestion that individuals construct interpretations according to the structures embedded in a situation. The theory of social perception is guided by opportunities for action in the environment (McArthur and Baron, 1983) and much of the literature indicates that the norms and standards for judgement in different settings affect the way people evaluate themselves and others (Carlston, 1980; Higgins and Lurie, 1983). Nurius (1991) points out that the self-system shapes and personalises motivation. Yet the social and cultural environment shapes the self, including what conceptions of possibility the person will likely embrace or construct as well as how these conceptions are made salient, affirmed, and elaborated in the context of social interactions. To a great extent, the social environment determines the opportunity and support structure for individual adaptation and change, and provides the models, images and symbols for framing these end states and efforts. Nurius also suggests that 'who we are' is contingent upon our roles, relationships, and the reflected appraisals of credible and valued others, so too are our conceptions of our possible selves-both positive and negative. In this line of thinking Oyserman and Markus (1993) suggest that one makes sense of him/herself in terms of the characteristics valued by the immediate environments in which one lives. The self-concept then can be considered a locus of socio-cultural influence. It receives and organises the diverse messages that are communicated by one's varius contexts. These messages concern what matters in the world and more generally, how to be an appropriate or valued member within a given context (Kirkpatrick and White, 1985; Shweder, 1990). The self that integrates and personalises these various messages functions as an orienting, mediating and interpretative framework giving shape to what people are motivared to do, how they feel, what they notice and think about, as well as their overt actions (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Shweder and Miller, 1991). Oyserman and Markus (1993) also suggest that individuals embedded in contexts that provide conflicting contradictory or negative messages must struggle to find a balance between the negative selves thrust upon them and the positive senses of self they would like to create. Pamberton (1992) has recently

described this identity work for Afro-Americans and argues that confronting the meanings that others provide can be a full time task, leaving little room for self-constructed individuality.

Nurius (1991) reports that possible selves reflect ways in which the self is socially determined and constrained. The parameters for the possible selves one will contemplate, develop, and maintain depend greatly on the nature of one's social environment. This could include cultural and social identity variables as well as social structural constraints and opportunities. Individuals in one's social environment, provide information on what attributes roles and abilities are valued and also set evaluation standards regardings the extent to which individuals possess any given attribute. The more consistent and the longer the duration of such social evaluations, the more likely an individual is to adopt others' perspectives on the self and to incorporate this conception into his/her decision making, coping and striving behaviours. According to this line of thought Curry et al. (1994), who studied the effects of life domains on girls' (in their late adolescence) possible selves, reported that females' underepresentation in the higher status jobs relates to a different set of cognitions and a wider range of life domains that they consider, the dual responsibility of having a career and maintaining the home and family (Curry and McEwen, 1989), than do similarly qualified boys. It became apparent that the possible selves they reported regarding family and career were mainly influenced by the social environment to which they belonged (their mother's experiences, traditional gender identity implying their commitment to family rather than career and the peripheral importance of paid work). Also, Josephs et al. (1992) reported that women are more likely to have a sociocentric or connected self schema in which relationships with other people are crucial and are included within the self, while men are relatively more likely to have an individualistic separate schema with 'other' distinct from self. Similar to these findings are those from a study conducted by Oyserman, Gant and Ager (1995). As mentioned above, they investigated the school performance of African-American students in relation to possible selves focused on current and plausible future self descripptors. Though females were more likely to have balanced possible selves in the achievement domain, having these selves was especially advantageous for males. This was related to the content of their identity. For females, viewing achievement as part of a socially contextualised identity improved performance. For males,

ponse is a multiplicative function of drive and habit strength.
'Drives' were viewed as the effects of tissue deficits that act
upon the nervous system as a persisting stimulus. Drive-re-
lated stimuli were said to activate behaviour aimed at redu-
cing the physiological imbalances. The end result of this motiva-
tional sequence is a consummatory responce that reduces the
physiological need and brings about learning. 'Habits' were defined
as the amount of reinforced practice an animal has had in making
the response previously (the strength of associations linking stimu-
lus conditions to particular response). Over time, such drive-indu-
ced learning gradually shapes behaviour into an economical pursuit
of goal objects (Pervin, 1990).

Operant behaviour theory assigned an important role to exter-
nal stimuli as the key determinants of behaviour and, like Hullinan
theory, rejected all explanations of action in terms of internal forces
such as thoughts and feelings (Skinner, 1953). It was assumed either
that environmental events elicit directly as in a reflexive response,
or that certain actions are strengthened by environmental events in
the past (Mook, 1987).

A further step to motivation concerns theories about psycholo-
gical needs and goal selection (choices). Drive reduction-based theo-
ries of motivation held a pre-eminent position especially in Ameri-
can psychology until critics took aim at their central proposition:
that drive reduction acts as a reinforcer and promotes learning. In
fact, Harlow's experiential work with monkeys convinced him that
it was more likely that drive state *inhibits* rather than facilitates le-
arning. In place of the hypothesis that learning is a means of drive
reduction, Harlow suggested (1953) that primate learning is prima-
rily driven by curiosity since monkeys solved puzzles when non in-
ternal drive was present and motivation to learn was provided sim-
ply by the presence of the puzzle.

White (1959) offered a very different picture of human motiva-
tion; he insisted that humans instead of seeking to reduce tension by
satisfying physiological needs, cherish the experience of raised ten-
sion and mild excitement. Indeed, he argued that humans have an
innate tendency to strive to exercise and extent their capabilities.
He also referred to the energy behind this tendency as 'competence
motivation' and to the corresponding affect as feelings of efficacy.
Other significant theorists such as Murray (1938), Maslow (1949)
and Lewin (1951) shared his view of humans as proactive organisms

who are motivated to extent their capabilities and to interact with their enviroment effectively. Maslow for exemple, developed the pyramid of human needs emphasising the hierarchy in the satisfaction of them leading to self-actualisation. Murray (1938) proposed a theory of motivation that highlighted the role of psychological rather than physiological needs. He argued that psychological needs (motives) function as organising forces that guide mental, verbal and physical process along a certain course. He defined these psychological needs as enduring features of personality that energise, direct and select behaviour and experience. He carried out extensive research on four out of the forty psychological needs he identified: achievement, affiliation, power, self-determination.

Cognition to the associative theories of motivation is introduced by Lewin who argued that cognitions rather than 'drive-response associative links' are the key building blocks of motivated behaviour. Lewin (1951) proposed that people behave when they have intentions or goals and that they persist until they have carried out their intentions, even trivial or nonsensical ones. The importance of motives, goals and values as major components of personality has been obvious to many theorists (e.g. James, 1910; Tolman, 1932). Lewin introduced the relationship between the self and motivation. He noted that environmental events 'are not neutral to us in our role as active beings ...they challenge us to certain activities' (1951, p. 117). The intensity with which events challenge us varies from 'irresistible attraction to 'mild inclination', depending on the internal situation of a person. This variation in challenge or attraction has been referred to as 'valence' or 'value' of an object or event. A number of motivational theories have employed the concepts of expectancies and valence as the fundamental principle of motivated behaviour. Expectancy-value theories assume thet one's tendency to perform a particular activity is a joint fuction of the strength of one's expectancies that these actions will lead to specific outcomes and the subjectively perceived values of the outcomes.

Furthering the expectancy value concepts, theorists as Julian Rotter (1966), Walter Mischel (1973) and Alfred Bandura (1977) promoted the social cognitive approach to motivation. Such an approach argues that expectancies of future reinforcements than one's own history of past reiforcements (argued by Skinner, 1953) provide the motivational impetus for behaviour. The central proposition of these approaches is that the regulation of behaviour is guided by

people's self-imposed goals and the consequences that ensue from them. In the same stream, theorists such as Atkinson and Birch (1978) view motives as 'dispositions' within an individual to strive to approach a particular class of positive incentives (goals) or to a-void a particular class of negative incentives (threats). Besides the self-imposed goals, Bandura (1977, 1982) also assigns a central role to efficacy beliefs in determining whether particular goals will be pursued and achieved. Perceived 'self-efficacy' refers to judgements of how well one can perform actions required to deal with a prospective situation. In Bandura's view, it is not sufficient merely to expect that particular outcomes covary with particular behaviours; one must also believe that one is capable of carrying out the requisite action.

The later approaches indicate a shift of focus on psychological needs and /or goals. Lesser importance is gradually attached to the earlier emphasis on associative bonds and reinforcement processes in the study of human motivation. As mentioned above, the focus on psychological needs derives primarily from Murray's work, whe-reas it can be suggested that current goal theories have their origins in the work of Kurt Lewin. Theories built on psychological needs and goals share the belief that people's thoughts, feelings and desires play a dominant role in the regulation o behaviour. Overall, the theories of Lewin and Bandura are, of course, also very much concerned with the role of expectations and goal setting in motivation. But they are primarily concerned with task-specific goal setting and proximal goals as goads and behaviour. In contrast, the most recent theories of motivation, on which this paper focuses, examine motivation not as a set of specific goals but as a reflection of individual's conceptions of *self*, of what individuals hope to accomplish with their lives and the kind of people they would like and not like to become (Markus and Nurius, 1987).

Reviewing the literature concerning the role of self in individual's action, one will identify other aspects of self than the present or actual self, starting with Freud (1925) who conceptualised the ego ideal as the child's conception of what the parents think is morally right. For Horney (1950) neurosis occurs when the idealised self becomes too powerful and takes the place of the real self as the focus of the individuals' thoughts, feelings and actions. Rogers (1951) de-scribed the ideal self as what the individual thinks he or she sho-uld be and conceived one's level of self-regard as a function of how

far one perceives s/he stands from the idead self. James (1910) was also directly concerned with conceptions of the self beyond the here and now self. He argued about the 'social me' and distinguished it from the 'immediate present me' and the 'me of the past'. Lacte on Rosenberg (1979) theorised that there are important differences among desired selves and distinguished between fantasy or glorified idealised images of the self and the more realistic committed self-images which reflect what the individual actually believes s/he could become. However, he did not work on the negative possibilities as opposed to desired selves.

The link between the self-concept and action is implicit in the theorising of Mead (1934) who argued that having a self implied the ability to rehearse possible courses of action depending on an evaluation of the other persons' reactions and then being able to adjust to one's following actions accordingly.

This type of role-taking involves creating potential selves and occurs whenever one is the target of evaluation or expectation.

Other theorists ditectly approached the relation between identity and motivation. Recently, Stryker (1987) contends that identities continually seek validation and that most important behaviour is in the service of confirming particular identities. He also argued that the more important the identity the more it is in need for validation. The basic unit of the dynamic self then becomes not an attribute or a feature which is a summary or an integration of past behavioural regularity but rather a possible self which reveals the direction that action will take.

The idea of motivation in terms of goal setting and the regulation of behaviour is further explored in recent theories (e.g. Markus and Nurius, 1986; Higgins et al, 1985) where images of self as parts of the self-sustem, function as a mediating factor in the prediction of individual's behaviour. Markus and Nurius (1986) developed the concept of possible selves which is based on the idea of individuals' conception of what is possible for him/her in the context of what one would like to become and what one is afraid of becoming. This is related to concepts of self-knowledge, self-concept and cognition. Individual's belief of what is likely to experience is related to representations of self concerning certain aspects of life which provide a direction and impetus for action, change and development. The inclusion of a sense of what is possible within the self-concept allows it to become dynamic. The role of possible selves as representations of

self in the self-concept and their function as parts of the working self-concept seems to throw light to the motivation explaining how conceptions of self act as incentives. The *working self-concept* is the functional self-concept of a particular activity. It is that set self-conceptions that are presently accessible in thought and memory. It can be viewed as a continually active, shifting array of available self-knowledge. Therefore the self-concept appears malleable because the contents of the working self-concept change according to what subset of selves was active just prior to the activity, to what has been invoked by the individual as a result of an experience and to what has been elicited by the social situation at a given time (Markus and Kunda, 1986). This is of particular importance since motivation is getting the form of conscious process under the control of the individual. The main suggestion of Oyserman and Markus (1990a, 1990b) study on motivation is that a given possible self will have maximal motivational effectiveness when it is offset or balanced by the countervailing possible self in the same domain. Desire for the positive goal is an incentive as is the wish to avoid something unpleasant. Also, these representations of self are built upon the reality of the individual experience. In these terms interventions may be built on the idea of development of positive representations of selves where negative ones ere established.

Such an approach to motivation illuminates an unanswered question of motivation theorising about how the abstract, nebulous entity called a motive is transformed into the very personal activity of goal setting and into the concrete intentions and plans of which we are more or less aware. The contribution of the concept of possible selves to more traditional views of motivation is to suggest that some of the dynamic elements of personality may be carried in specific cognitive representations of the self in future states and the one's actions may be shaped by attempts to realise or avoid these states (Markus and Nurius, 1987).

Personalised motivation, self, social context and regulation of behaviour

The latter mentioned approach to motivation seems to illuminate the role of the immediate environment, social context in the development of individuals' representations of selves, 'possible selves' (Markus and Nurius, 1986), 'ideal selves', 'ought selves' (Higgins et

al, 1985) and 'desired selves' (Schlenker, 1985), since it is based on the personalised nature of motivation. This follows Nuttin's (1984) argument that motivation is not just an instinctual, impersonal unconscious process. Nuttin particularly emphasised the idea of personalised motivation and criticised approaches (i.e. Freud's) which stressed the instinctual and unconscious nature of human motivation. IIe argued for the need to personalise motivation and for the value of studying how motivation is transformed into the activity of goal setting and into the concrete intentions and aims of which ,we are more aware. Possible selves work by personalising the goal, that is, by making the goal one's own or, in Lewin's terms, putting a piece of the self in the general space. Cognitively, affectively, somatically, the task representation and the self-representation become one, which may then serve to decrease the psychological distance between one's current state and the desired state.

From research on goal gradients (Miller, 1944), we know that animals approaching the goal box speed up because of the increased presence of goal-related cues. Similarly, those individuals with a clear image, conception or sense of themselves in a future state (e. g. successful on a given task) will have accessible more cues relevant to this future state, and this will enhance goal related performance (Markus and Ruvolo, 1989).

Schlenker (1985) has also individualised motivation by postulating 'desired selves' that are determined by situational constraints and by the anticipated audience for the behaviour and that process information in the setting. Nurius (1991) reports that possible selves provide structural content and form to what Mead (1934) described as one's anticipated future and to the 'I want' dimension of self-reflection. More recently, Markus (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Markus and Oyserman, 1989) has developed the concept of the 'interpersonal self, parsimoniously allowing an understanding of a wide variety of cultural and gender differences in the extent to which others are included in the self. Such an approach recognizes the importance of understanding how people think about themselves and their environment for making sense of human behaviour. These theories provide a link between the self and social environment since they reflect the extent to which the self is socially embedded and constrained. For example, the significance of possible selves is related to their function as incentives for future behaviour and to their

ability to provide an evaluative and interpretative context for the current view of self (Markus and Nurius, 1986).

According to Cantor et al. (1986) people are assumed to have a diverse repertoire of possible selves that can be viewed as the cognitive manifestations of their enduring goals, aspirations, values, motives and threats. The pool of possible selves derives from the categories made salient by the individual's sociocultural and historical context and from models, significant others, images and symbols provided by the media and by the individual's immediate social experiences. Social norms and mores and the possibilities encapsulated in the roles played by others in one's social environment are likely to indicate certain representations of the self /selves others would like him /her to become (Oyserman and Markus, 1990a; Oyserman and Saltz, 1993). These 'possible' or 'ought' selves include prescriptions for things the individual ought or ought not to be or to become (Higgins, Klein & Strauman, 1985; Cantor et al., 1986). Such representations of self thus have the potential to reveal the intensive and constructive nature of the self, but they also reflect the extent to which the self is socially determined and constrained (Elder, 1980; Markus and Ruvolo, 1989).

Given the social nature of the self, it is likely that only selves that others validate as possible will become part of one's identity. Hence, the plausibility of particular desired selves or possible selves may be thought of as the outcome of interpersonal interactions in which these selves are negotiated (Cantor and Zirkel, 1990; Oyserman and Saltz, 1993). Oyserman et al. (1995) in a study relating to the school persistence of African-American students reported that gendered African-American identity schemas are central for school persistence. According to the researchers, these schemas are viewed as the scaffolding within which balanced possible selves in the achievement domain are generated and strategies for their attainment sketched out. Gendered African-American identity schemas, are likely to also have a more direct impact on one's subjective sense of what is probable and plausible for the self (Markus, 1977). As such these gendered identities seem to be the lenses or prisms through which adolescents make sense of the world. The links between gender, social context and behaviour can be understood in tems of one scanning his /her everyday social contexts within the vocabulary of his /her emerging identity. As such, current action is scripted by

what is viewed as a good, importat and plausible outcome within one's context.

Cantor and Zirkel (1990) identify the role of culture as the context in which personality is observed, without which behaviour has no meaning and without meaning behaviour has no purpose. They emphasise that the cultural context provides important information for making judgements about constructs like 'social structure' and 'social adjustment'. In these terms general processes creating relationships between personality and goal-directed behaviour, adjustment and adaptation to important life changes (e.g. divorce) can best be studied with detailed knowledge of the specific contexts in which these relationships unfold over the life-span. Thus behaviour is thought to be created by a person in a particular context, and it is not necessarily expected to hold for other times and other contexts. Schlenker and Weigold (1989) report that people are seen to negotiate an identity that is consistent both with desired images of the self and with situational goals and demands. Individuals work toward achieving possible selves that account both for self-schemas and for the particular demands likely to be encountered (Markus and Nurius, 1986).

Empirical evidence of individuals' appraisal of the social context emerges from Frable's work on stigmatisation (Frable et al, 1990) which indicates group membership as a basis for self-definition which implies the role of a certain social environment on deviant people's behaviour. Participants in the study were classified as fat people, gays, lesbians, ethnic groups, and rape and incest survivors. With regard to self processes, her work suggests that people who have a concealable stigma have a more dispositional view of self and view themselves as more unique, even on dimensions irrelevant to their stigma, than do those who are not stigmatised or whose behaviour is conspicuous (e.g. fat). Both positive and negative deviants were likely to be mindful in their initial contacts with strangers. She suggests that making friends is particularly stressful and unpredictable for marginal people and mindfulness gives them a control on social exchange by reacting to each successive stage of social interaction.

Similarly, Skinner (1988) and George Herbert Mead (1934) note that no distinction can be made between social and personal identity. Deaux (1992) acknowledges that personal meanings are constructed in and dependent on the social context.

Thus one's personal identity cannot be separated from the social context in which it develops. Breakwell (1986) points out that personal identity could be considered as the relatively permanent residue of each assimilation to and accommodation of a social identity. These theories follow Showers and Cantor's (1985) suggestion that individuals construct interpretations according to the structures embedded in a situation. The theory of social perception is guided by opportunities for action in the environment (McArthur and Baron, 1983) and much of the literature indicates that the norms and standards for judgement in different settings affect the way people evaluate themselves and others (Carlston, 1980; Higgins and Lurie, 1983). Nurius (1991) points out that the self-system shapes and personalises motivation. Yet the social and cultural environment shapes the self, including what conceptions of possibility the person will likely embrace or construct as well as how these conceptions are made salient, affirmed, and elaborated in the context of social interactions. To a great extent, the social environment determines the opportunity and support structure for individual adaptation and change, and provides the models, images and symbols for framing these end states and efforts. Nurius also suggests that 'who we are' is contingent upon our roles, relationships, and the reflected appraisals of credible and valued others, so too are our conceptions of our possible selves-both positive and negative. In this line of thinking Oyserman and Markus (1993) suggest that one makes sense of him/herself in terms of the characteristics valued by the immediate environments in which one lives. The self-concept then can be considered a locus of socio-cultural influence. It receives and organises the diverse messages that are communicated by one's varius contexts. These messages concern what matters in the world and more generally, how to be an appropriate or valued member within a given context (Kirkpatrick and White, 1985; Shweder, 1990). The self that integrates and personalises these various messages functions as an orienting, mediating and interpretative framework giving shape to what people are motivared to do, how they feel, what they notice and think about, as well as their overt actions (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Shweder and Miller, 1991). Oyserman and Markus (1993) also suggest that individuals embedded in contexts that provide conflicting contradictory or negative messages must struggle to find a balance between the negative selves thrust upon them and the positive senses of self they would like to create. Pamberton (1992) has recently

described this identity work for Afro-Americans and argues that confronting the meanings that others provide can be a full time task, leaving little room for self-constructed individuality.

Nurius (1991) reports that possible selves reflect ways in which the self is socially determined and constrained. The parameters for the possible selves one will contemplate, develop, and maintain depend greatly on the nature of one's social environment. This could include cultural and social identity variables as well as social strucctural constraints and opportunities. Individuals in one's social environment, provide information on what attributes roles and abilities are valued and also set evaluation standards regardings the extent to which individuals possess any given attribute. The more consistent and the longer the duration of such social evaluations, the more likely an individual is to adopt others' perspectives on the self and to incorporate this conception into his/her decision making, coping and striving behaviours. According to this line of thought Curry et al. (1994), who studied the effects of life domains on girls' (in their late adolescence) possible selves, reported that females' underepresentation in the higher status jobs relates to a different set of cognitions and a wider range of life domains that they consider, the dual responsibility of having a career and maintaining the home and family (Curry and McEwen, 1989), than do similarly qualified boys. It became apparent that the possible selves they reported regarding family and career were mainly influenced by the social environment to which they belonged (their mother's experiences, traditional gender identity implying their commitment to family rather than career and the peripheral importance of paid work). Also, Josephs et al. (1992) reported that women are more likely to have a sociocentric or connected self schema in which relationships with other people are crucial and are included within the self, while men are relatively more likely to have an individualistic separate schema with 'other' distinct from self. Similar to these findings are those from a study conducted by Oyserman, Gant and Ager (1995). As mentioned above, they investigated the school performance of African-American students in relation to possible selves focused on current and plausible future self descripptors. Though females were more likely to have balanced possible selves in the achievement domain, having these selves was especially advantageous for males. This was related to the content of their identity. For females, viewing achievement as part of a socially contextualised identity improved performance. For males,

it is the ability to visualise the self as achieving or failing to achieve that is particularly motivating. In terms of links between possible selves and social representations of selves, Oyserman, Gant and Ager (1995), propose a socially contextualised model of the self. The authors suggest that achievement should be conceptualised and occurring within the context of being African-American. It was indicated that achievement related possible selves were mediated by endorement of individualism for White Americans but of collectiveness for African - Americans. These dominated the strategies they used to approach these possible selves. This suggests the mediation of one's representations of selves by elements of their identity related to a certain social group.

Conclusively, research on links between self and motivation introduces the mediating role of social environment in individuals' certain patterns of behaviour. Such an approach may contribute to further understanding of motivation through the lens of socially orinted perceptions.. Motivation seems to be a psychological process which is socialy embedded, based on the everyday life. Oyserman and Markus (1993) report that individual psychological processes are culturally mediated, in that they develop within historical context and are based in everyday activities which have practical meaning to the individual.

One makes sense of him/herself in terms of the characteristics valued by the immediate environments in which one lives. The starting point of self-knowledge concerns Mead's (1934) concept of the 'looking-glass' self, where it is argued that what we know about ourselves does not develop outside of our interactions with others leading to the determinant role of the social interactions and the social context in the goals set by individuals. The environments where one lives, are social products embedded within the larger society. The self-concept then can be considered as a locus of sociocultural influeluence. It receives and organises the diverse messages that are communicated by one's various contexts, for example, one's gender context, one's birth cohort context, and one's ethnic group context. The self that integrates and personalises these various messages seems to be an agentic factor, a mediating and interpretative framework giving shape to what people are motivated to do, how they feel and think about, as well as their overt actions (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Shweder and Miller, 1991; Oyserman and Markus, 1993).

Theories concerning self as the regulator of one's behaviour focus on messages about how to be a person, how to be a self, or more generally 'how to be' that various sociocultural contexts provide. All major sociocultural contexts provide such messages either explicitly or implicitly. Such an approach to motivation seems to provide links between psychology and aspects of sociology keeping alive the debate between the micro- and macro- level of analysis in the two disciplines respectively indicating that psychologists' focus on a micro-level is mediated by social macro-level dominant conceptions values and attitudes. Motivation, which has been consisered by the majority of psychologists as a 'pure' rather asocial psychological issue studied by theories which were perceived to apply across culture, seems to be socially embedded, since differences in the sociocultural contexts mean that the content of the self-concept will differ guiding similar patterns of activity. Yet, the impact of social groups on the self is not limited to differences in content of the self-concept. A connection to one or another of these social groups through ascription or achievement may influence the very process of self and identity formation and the resulting structure of the self and identity (Hughes and Demo, 1989; Markus et. al, 1990; Oyserman and Markus, 1993).

REFERENCES

Atkinson, J. W., and Birch, D. (1978). *An introduction to motivation* (rev. ed.). Van Nostrand, NY.

Bandura, A. (1977). Self-efficacy: Toward a unifying theory of behavioral change. *Psychological Review*, 84, 191-215.

Bandura, A. (1982). The self and mechanisms of agency. In J. Suls (Ed.), *Psychological perspectives on the self* (Vol. 1, pp. 3-40). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Breakwell, G. (1986). Identity and social structure. In *Coping with threatened identities*. London: Methuen.

Brody, N. (1980). Social motivation. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 31, 143-168.

Cantor, N., Markus, H., Niedenthal, P. (1986). On motivation and the Self-Concept. In Sorrentino, R., Higgins, T. *Handbook of motivatin and cognition, foundations of social behaviour* (Ed.), New York: Guilford Press.

Cantor, N., and Zirkel, S. (1990). Personality, Cognition, and Purposive Behavior. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), *Handbook of personality theory and research*. New York: Guilford Press.

Carlston, D. (1980). The recall and use of trait and events in social inference processes. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 16, 303-328.

Curry, C., Trew, K., Turner, I., and Hunter, J. (1994). The effects of life-domains on girls' possible selves. *Adolescence*, 29 (113) 133-149.

Curry, C. A., and McEwen, A. (1989). The "Wendy House" syndrome: A teenage version. *Research in Education*, 41. 53-60.

Deux, K. (1992). Personalizing Identity and Socializing Self. In G. Breakwell. (Ed.,), *Social identity and the self concept*. London: Surrey University Press.

Elder, G. H., (1980). Adolescence on historical perspective. In J. Adelson (ed.), *Handbook of adolescent psychology*. New York: Wiley.

Frable, D., Blackstone. T., and Scherbaum, C. (1990). Marginal and Mindful: Deviants in Social Interactions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 59 (1), 140-149.

Harlow, H. F. (1953). Mice, monkeys, men and motives. *Psychological Review*, 60, 23-32.

Higgins, E., Klein, R., and Strauman, T. (1985). Self-concept discrepancy theory: A psychological model for distinguishing among different aspects of depression and anxiety. *Social Cognition*, 3, 51-76.

Higgins, E., and Lurie, L. (1983). Context, categorisation and recall The 'change-of-standard' effect. *Cognitive Psychology*, 15, 525-547.

Horney, K. (1950). *Neurosis and human growth*. New York: Norton.

Hull, C. L. (1943). *Science and Human behavior*. New York: Macmillan.

Hughes, M., and Demo, D. H. (1989). Self-perceptions of Black Americans: Self-esteem and personal efficacy. *American Journal of Sociology*, 95, 132-159.

James, W. (1910). *Psychology: The briefer course*. New York: Henry Holt & CO.

Josephs, R. A., Markus, H., and Tafarod, R. W. (1992). Gender differences in the source of self- esteem. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 63, 391-402.

Kirkpatric, J., and White, G. M. (1985). Exploring ethnopsychologies. In White, G.M., and Kirkpatrick, J. (Eds.), *Person, Self, and experience: Exploring pacific ethnopsychologies.*
Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lewin, K. (1951). Intention, will and need. In D. Rapaport (Ed.). *Organization adn pathology of thought* (pp. 95-153).

Markus, H. (1977). Self-schemata and processing information about the self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35 (2) 63-78.

Markus, H., Cross, S., and Wurf, E. (1990). The role of the self-system in competence. In R. J. Sternberg and J. Kolligian, Jr. (Eds.). *Competence considered* (pp. 205-225). Yale New Haven CT: University Press, New Haven.

Markus, H., and Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the Self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. *Psychological Review*, 98, 224-253.

Markus, H., and Kunda, Z. (1986). Stability and Malleability of the Self-Concept. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 51(4), 858-866.

Markus, H., Nurius, P. (1986). Possible Selves. *American Psychologist,* 41 (9), 954-969.

Markus, H., and Nurius, P. (1987). Possible Selves. The interface between motivation and the self-concept. In K. Yardley, and T. Honess (Eds.), *Self identity: Psychological ¡persepctives.* New York: Wiley and Sons Ltd.

Markus, H., and Oyserman, D. (1989). Gender and thought. The role of the self-concept. In M. Crawford, and M. Hamilton (Eds.), *Gender and thought.* New York: Wiley.

McArthur, L., and Baron, R. (1983). Toward an ecological theory of social perception. *Psychological Review,* 90, 215-238.

Mead, G. (1934). *Mind, self* and *society: from the standpoint of a social behaviorist* (C. W. Morris, ed.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962 (reprint).

Miller, N. E. (1944). Experimental studies on conflict. In J. McV. Hunt (Ed.). *Personality and behaviour disorders* (Vol. 1). New York: Ronald.

Mischel, W. (1973). Toward a cognitive social learning reconceptualization of personality. *Psychological Review,* 80, 252-283

Mook, D. G. (1987). *The organization of action.* New York: Norton.

Murray, H. A. (1938). *Explorations in personality.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Nurius, P. (1991). Possible selves and social support: Social cognitive resources for coping and striving. In J. Howard, and P. Callero (Eds.), *The self-society dynamic: Cognition, emotion and action.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Nuttin, J.R. (1984). *Motivation, planning, and action: A relational theory of behavior dynamics.* Hillsdale. NJ. Erlbaum.

Oyserman, D., Gant, L., and Ager, J. (1995). A Socially Contextualized Model of African American Identity: Possible Selves and School Persistence. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 69(6), 1216-1232.

Oyserman, D., and Markus, H. (1923). The sociocultural Self. In J. Suls. *Psychological perspectives of the self.* (Vol. 4). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Oyserman, D., and Saltz, E. (1993). Competence, delinquency, and attempts to attain possible selves. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 65 (2), 360-374.

Oyserman, D., and Markus H. (1990a). Possible Selves and Delinquency. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 59(1), 112-125.

Oyserman, D., and Markus, H. (1990b). Possible Selves in Balance: Implications for Delinquency. *Journal of Social Issues,* 46(2), 141-147.

Pamberton, G. (1992). *The hottest water in Chicago: On family, race, time, and American culture.* Boston, MA: Faber and Faber.

Pervin, L. (Ed.). (1990). *Handbook of personality theory and research.* New York: Guilford.

Rogers, C. (1951). *Client-centred therapy: Its current practice, Implications, and theory.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Rosenberg, M. (1979). *Conceiving the self.* New York: Basic Books.

Rotter, J.B. (1966). Generalised expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. *Psychological monographs,* 80 (1, Whole No. 609).

Schlenker, B. R. (1985). Identity and self-identification. In B.R. Schlenker (Ed.), *The self in social life.* New York: McGraw-Hill.

Schlenker, B.R., and Weigold, M.F. (1989). Goals and the self-identification process: Constructing desired identities. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), *Goal concepts in personality and social psychology.* Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Showers, C., and Cantor, N. (1985). Social Cognition: A look at motivated strategies. *Annual Review of Psychology,* 36, 275-305.

Shweder, R. A. (1990). Cultural Psychology: What is it? In J. W. Stigler, R. A. Shweder, and G. Hedt (Eds), *Cultural psychology. Essays on comparative human development.* Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Shweder, R. A., and Miller, J. G. (1991). The social construction of the person: How is it possible? In R. A. Shweder (Ed.), *Thinking through cultures: Expeditions in cultural psychology.* Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press.

Skinner, B. F. (1953). *Scienec and human behavior.* New York: Macmillan.

Skinner, M. (1988). On the relevance of G.H. Mead to the social identity theory of intergroup relations. Paper presented in the

sumposium. Reflections on mind, self and society: The contribution of George Herbert Mead. At *Meeting* of Eastern Psychological Association, Buffalo, April. Cited in Deaux, K. (1992).

Stryker, S. (1987). Identity theory: Developments and extensions. In K. Yardley and T. Honess (Eds.). *Self and Identity*. New York: Wiley.

Tolman, E.C. (1932). *Purposvie behavior* in *animals and men*. Appleton - Century, NY. Cited in Markus, H. and Nurius, P. (1986)

White, R.W. (1959). Motivation reconsidered: The concext of compettnce *Psychological Review* 66, 267-333.

Evangelia Karagiannopolou
University of Ioannina

NEW APPROCHES TO MOTIVATION AND BEHAVIOUR REGULATION.
THE MEDIATING ROLE OF SELF AND SOCIAL CONTEXT.

ABSTRACT

Research on motivation mainly concerns motivational theories built on associative bonds and reinforcements and more recently theories focused on psychological needs and goal selection. Recent theorists argue for the need to personalise motivation and for the value of studying how motivation is transformed into the activity of goal setting and into the concrete intentions and plans of which we are aware. According to these theories, the self integrates and personalises the messages of the enviromment and functions as an orienting, mediating and interpretative framework giving shape to what people are motivated to do, how they feel, what they notice and think about, as well as their overt actions. In this line of thinking, motivation is socially-culturally mediated since the self is developing within a certain historical context. Such an approach seems to contribute to understanding motivation not through studying a set of specific goals but as a reflection of individuals' conceptions of self, of what individuals hope to accomplish with their lives, and the kind of people they would like and not like to become.

Ε. ΚΑΡΑΓΙΑΝΝΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ

ΒΙΒΛΙΟΓΡΑΦΙΚΗ ΕΠΙΣΚΟΠΗΣΗ ΤΩΝ ΘΕΩΡΗΤΙΚΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΡΕΥΝΗΤΙΚΩΝ ΠΡΟΣΕΓΓΙΣΕΩΝ ΓΙΑ ΤΑ ΚΙΝΗΤΡΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΗ ΡΥΘΜΙΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΣΥΜΠΕΡΙΦΟΡΑΣ. Ο ΔΙΑΜΕΣΟΛΑΒΗΤΙΚΟΣ ΡΟΛΟΣ ΤΟΥ ΕΑΥΤΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥ ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΚΟΥ ΠΛΑΙΣΙΟΥ

ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΗ

Στον παρόν άρθρο επιχειρείται μια βιβλιογραφική επισκόπηση των ερευνών και θεωριών που αφορούν τα κίνητρα, καταλήγοντας στην ανάδειξη του διαμεσολαβητικού ρόλου του κοινωνικού πλαισίου στη μελέτη της έννοιας του κινήτρου. Η βιβλιογραφία για τα κίνητρα έλκει την καταγωγή της από τις μπιχεβιοριστικές μελέτες που ανέδειξαν τη σχέση S-R, στον αντίποδα της έννοιας των ενστίκτων ως κινητήριας δύναμης και του «ιδεώδους του εγώ», όπως διατυπώθηκαν από την ψυχαναλυτική προσέγγιση. Πρόσφατες μελέτες αφορούν την έννοια του εαυτού ως παράγοντα που διαμεσολαβεί μεταξύ κινήτρου και πράξης / δράσης ερμηνεύοντας και οργανώνοντας τις πληροφορίες του περιβάλλοντος προς μια συγκεκριμένη κατεύθυνση. Σε αυτό το πλαίσιο σημαντική είναι η προσέγγιση του κινήτρου σε προσωπική, ατομική βάση. Το άτομο κατευθύνεται προς συμπεριφορές τις οποίες σημασιοδοτεί ως επιθυμητές και μη, πιθανές και μη ή συμπεριφορές που «οφείλει» ή «δεν οφείλει», που «πρέπει» ή «δεν πρέπει» να υιοθετήσει. Η πορεία από τα κίνητρα προς συγκεκριμένες μορφές δράσης αφορά μια σειρά γνωστικών, συνειδητών διεργασιών καθώς κανείς μετατρέπει το κίνητρο σε στόχους και στη συνέχεια σε πλάνα και στρατηγικές για την εκπλήρωση αυτών των στόχων και καταλήγει στην υιοθέτηση συγκεκριμένων μορφών συμπεριφοράς. Σε ένα τέτοιο θεωρητικό πλαίσιο, η σημασιοδότηση της περιβαλλοντικής πληροφορίας φαίνεται να διαφοροποιείται από άτομο σε άτομο ανάλογα με το μικρο- και μακροκοινωνικό πλαίσιο στο οποίο ζει. Το άρθρο αναδεικνύει την ανάγκη απομάκρυνσης της έννοιας του κινήτρου από την απολιτισμική προσέγγιση όπως υπήρχε μέχρι τώρα στην διεθνή βιβλιογραφία. Μέσω της έννοιας του εαυτού ως παράγοντα που καθορίζει το κίνητρο σε ατομικό επίπεδο, όπως αυτό προκύπτει από σύγχρονες μελέτες, αναδεικνύεται η ανάγκη μελέτης των κοινωνικών και πολιτισμικών παραγόντων καθώς ο εαυτός αναπτύσσεται ιστορικά στο χρόνο και το χώρο, στο εκάστοτε κοινωνικο-πολιτισμικό πλαίσιο.