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ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΚΗ ΣΧΟΛΗ

ΔΩΔΩΝΗ

Φ. Π. Ψ

ΜΕΡΟΣ ΤΡΙΤΟ

ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΟΝΙΚΗ ΕΠΕΤΗΡΙΔΑ ΤΟΥ ΤΜΗΜΑΤΟΣ
ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΣ ΠΑΙΔΑΓΩΓΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΨΥΧΟΛΟΓΙΑΣ



ΤΟΜΟΣ ΤΡΙΑΚΟΣΤΟΣ

ΙΩΑΝΝΙΝΑ 2001





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Τα άρθρα του τόμου αυτού δημοσιεύονται με την προσωπική ευθύνη των συγγραφέων τους ως προς το περιεχόμενο και τη μορφή. Απαγορεύεται κάθε μορφής αναδημοσίευση χωρίς τη γραπτή άδεια του Τμήματος Φ.Π.Ψ. του Πανεπιστημίου Ιωαννίνων.



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
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Μέρος Επιστημονική Επετηρίδα του Τμήματος Ιστορίας-Αρχαιολογίας
Πρώτο: της Φιλοσοφικής Σχολής του Πανεπιστημίου Ιωαννίνων.

Μέρος Επιστημονική Επετηρίδα του Τμήματος Φιλολογίας της Φιλο-
Δεύτερο: σοφικής Σχολής του Πανεπιστημίου Ιωαννίνων.

Μέρος Επιστημονική Επετηρίδα του Τμήματος Φιλοσοφίας, Παιδαγω-
Τρίτο: γικής και Ψυχολογίας της Φιλοσοφικής Σχολής του Πανεπιστημίου
Ιωαννίνων.



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PANAGIOTIS NOUTSOS

"POLITISCHER VERSTAND" ODER "SOZIALER VERSTAND"? DAS DILEMMA BEI ROSA LUXEMBURG

Erstmals gebraucht Karl Marx die Begriffe "politischer Verstand" und "sozialer Verstand" im Sommer 1844 bei seinem Aufenthalt in Paris und in seiner Zeit als Redakteur der Zeitschrift *Vorwärts* gebraucht. Zu diesem Zeitpunkt geht Marx von der Kritik der Politik (die er bereits in *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie* formuliert hatte) zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie über, die in den sog. *Ökonomisch-philosophischen Manuskripten* (April-August 1844) ihren Niederschlag fand. Als wichtigste Quellen dieser Thematik wäre an Hegels Unterscheidung von "bürgerlicher Gesellschaft" und "politischen Staat" zu erinnern, aber auch an die von der "Linken" der französischen Revolution (Babeuf) formulierte Position, dass die "Revolution nicht vollendet sei" und die Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz lediglich eine "Gleichheit auf dem Papier" darstelle.

In *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie* stellte Marx fest, dass Hegel den Staat als Ausgangspunkt nahm und den Menschen in einen "versubjektivierten" Staat verwandelt. Die "Demokratie" dagegen beginne beim Menschen und verwandle den Staat in einen "verobjektivierten" Menschen. Der Mensch existiere natürlich nicht für das Gesetz, sondern das Gesetz für den Menschen: er ist "menschliches Dasein", während er für andere eine "gesetzliches Dasein" darstellt. Hierin besteht auch die "Grunddifferenz der Demokratie", in der das "formelle Prinzip" sich gleichzeitig als "materielles Prinzip" erweist (das "formelle Prinzip" sich gleichzeitig als "materielles Prinzip" erweist (März-August 1843: 231).

Bemerkenswert sind die Anmerkung von Marx in seiner zweiteiligen Rezension mit dem Titel *Zur Judenfrage*. In seiner Analyse der *Proklamationen* von 1791 und 1793 behandelt er ausführlich die Unterscheidung "Menschenrechte" (*droits de l'homme*) - "Staatsbürgerrechte" (*Droits du citoyen*).



Auf diese Weise setzt er sich mit den Grundbegriffen einer aktuellen Dichotomie auseinander. Einerseits bildet sich in der politischen Sphäre ein "himmlisches" Leben heraus, in dem der Bürger als seinen Mitbürgern gleichberechtigt, als Souverän, als "allegorische" und "moralische Person", kurz als "wahrer Mensch" erscheint. Andererseits ist in der sozialen Sphäre ein "weltliches" Leben festzustellen, in dem sich der "unpolitische" Privatmann als Vertreter und Diener "egoistischer" Interessen bewegt, nämlich als "profanes Wesen", das eine "unwahre Erscheinung" darstellt. Durch die französische Revolution eroberte sich die bürgerliche Klasse die politische Macht: sie befreite den Staat und bot dem Individuum als Bürger einerseits ein "himmlisches" Leben, da sie das Politische zum Allgemeinen erhöhte und das Soziale zu etwas Speziellen oder Privaten hersetzte, doch andererseits nicht dazu voranschritt, die Grundlagen des "weltlichen" Lebens durch Zerschlagung der gesellschaftlichen Institutionen der "wirklichen" Person umzustürzen. So wurde der Mensch nicht von der Religion befreit, sondern erwarb nur die religiöse Freiheit; er wurde nicht vom Eigentum befreit, sondern erwarb lediglich die Freiheit des Eigentums; er wurde nicht von dem Egoismus des Berufes befreit, sondern erhielt lediglich die Freiheit des Berufes. Keines der "Menschenrechte" transzendiert die Jurisdiktion des "egoistischen" Menschen als eines Individuums, das in sich, in seine privaten Interessen eingeschlossen ist und die Gesellschaft meidet. Die "politische Emanzipation" bedeutete letztlich die Aufspaltung in ein egoistisches, unabhängiges Individuum und eine moralische Person des Bürgers. Die "menschliche Emanzipation" ist jedoch erst dann vollendet, wenn der Mensch "seine 'forces propres'" als gesellschaftliche Kräfte erkennt und organisiert und somit der Sonderung seiner selbst von der sozialen Kraft als politischer Macht ein Ende setzt (August-Dezember 1843: 361-370).

In der Einleitung zur *Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie* wird die Problematik der Revolution genauer dargestellt. Nach Marx fasst die Revolution jenes "Moment" zusammen, in dem das Individuum sich erneut zurückgewinnt und aufhört, nur der politischen Ebene, im Rahmen des politischen Staates, Mensch zu sein. Folglich ist die Revolution als die einzigartige historische Praxis aufzufassen, in der das Politische seine Herrschaft als "politischer Verstand" über das Soziale beendet und sich mit diesem versöhnt, da sie auf die Abschüttelung der bestehenden Machtverhältnisse gerichtet ist. Die politische Revolution hat einen "Teil" - Charakter, da sie




nicht an die “Pfeiler” des Hauses rührt. Nur ein Teil der “bürgerlichen Gesellschaft” wird befreit und erobert sich die “allgemeine” Herrschaft; er übernimmt sogar nach dem Maßstab der Partikularität einer bestimmten Klasse die allgemeine Emanzipation der Gesellschaft (1843/1844: 390, 388).

In *Kritische Randglossen zu dem Artikel “Der König von Preußen und die Sozialreform”* wird die französische Revolution schließlich als “klassische Periode des politischen Verstandes” bezeichnet, in der das verkehrte menschliche Bewußtsein von der “Allmacht des Willens” geleitet wird. Die Menschen werden von dem “politischen Unsinn” beherrscht, der Staat bilde die bürgerliche Gesellschaft und nicht umgekehrt. Sie werden dadurch in ihrem Denken und Handeln auf den engen Raum des politischen Lebens und die Formen der staatlichen Macht beschränkt. Der politische Verstand wird umso mehr geschärft, je weniger er die Quellen der “sozialen Gebrechen” erkennen kann. Die politische Revolution wälzt die politischen Verhältnisse um und verwandelt die Gestalt des Staates, ohne jedoch mit ihrem “kleinlichen Geist” an die Grundlagen der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft zu rühren (31-7-1844: 402, 409).

Diese Problematik der politischen Revolution verband sich für Marx, wobei er die französische Revolution nicht immer ausdrücklich erwähnt, mit einem umfangreichen Bündel von Faktoren, deren wichtigste sind:

1. Im Gesamtwerk sind zahlreiche Versuche nachweisbar, an dem Phänomen Politik Kritik zu üben.
2. Diese Versuche halten die Verschiebungen des marxistischen Denkens zusammen.
3. Von Interesse ist der Vorgang der Befreiung aus “dem Käfig der Hegel’schen Anshauungsweise” der Dinge (Engels-Marx 1845:97).
4. Die gleiche Bedeutung hat der ausdrückliche oder latente Vorgang der Loslösung von dem Theorem der “Entfremdung”, die analytische Auffassung der “Gesamtheit” der sozialen Beziehungen und der damit zusammenhängenden Klassengegensätze, die Vertiefung des Gedankens der “Individualität” und die Ausweitung der konkreten Begriffe des Widerspruchs von Kapital und Arbeit (Noutsos 1989:21-29).
5. Das Beharren auf der Konstruktion des Gegenstandes der politischen Ökonomie, um nachzuweisen, dass die Ideale von Freiheit und Gleichheit das Bestehen der Ausbeutung verschleiern (1867:189/19)0.



6. Die Kritik an den Formen der Ideologie, die zwar Bestandteile des "falschen Bewusstseins", aber die formal notwendigen Begriffe zur Reproduktion der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft sind.

7. Die soziale Revolution als langwieriger und mühseliger Umsturzprozess.

8. Die miteinander verwandten Erfahrungen der Arbeiterbewegung und von Marx selbst, wobei 1848 und 1871 die wichtigsten Stadien sind.

Eine zureichende Auseinandersetzung mit diesen Fugen im Denken von Marx setzt eine genaue Kenntnis seines Werkes und seiner Zeit voraus. Es muss natürlich berücksichtigt werden, dass sein Mitarbeiter und Mit-Theoretiker Engels, der sich die Kritik von Babeuf ebenfalls schon früh zu eigen gemacht hatte, innerhalb des Marxismus die Unterbewertung der formalen Rechte des Bürgers im Namen des zu erwartenden Kommunismus begründete. Die Demokratie, die sich aus der französischen Revolution ergab, war "ein Widerspruch in sich", "unwahr" (wie die deutsche "Theologie"), da die Ideale von Freiheit und Gleichheit nur eine neue Form der Knechtschaft bezeichnen. Die "echte Freiheit" und die "echte Gleichheit", welche die Bewegung von Babeuf vorhergesehen hatte, wird mit dem Kommunismus gleichgesetzt (1843: 481/482). Die Gewissheit über das Heraufkommen der neuen Gesellschaft ergab sich auch für Engels aufgrund der gemeinsamen historischen und theoretischen Erfahrung, die er gemacht hatte, aus der Entwicklung der Produktivkräfte. Die Einführung der sozialistischen Arbeitsteilung würde ausreichen, um das "Reich der Freiheit" zu begründen, welches das "idealisierte" (und niemals verwirklichte) "Reich der Bourgeoisie" verdrängt (1878: 17). Diese Vorstellungen sind im *Anti-Dühring* enthalten, dem vielgelesenen Handbuch, das die Führungskräfte der 2. Internationale nährte, wie Kautsky und auch sein in diesem Punkt unscheinbarer Nachfolger Lenin bekannten. Wohl als einzige stellte Rosa Luxemburg erneut die Frage nach den "formalen" und "wesentlichen" Elementen der Demokratie, da sie in der französischen Revolution ein Beispiel für das Verständnis des Phänomens Revolution sah. Sie war an der tiefreichenden Verbindung von "politischen" und "sozialen Verstand" interessiert, da sie durch eine Tradition des "politischen Verstandes" geprägt war, die Lenin unter neuen Bedingungen weiterführte.

Die eine Seite des luxemburgischen Denkens besteht aus der Verarbeitung eines ökonomischen Determinismus, der den unvermeid-



lichen Zusammenbruch des Kapitalismus für sicher hält. Diese Sicherheit wird im Optimismus wahrgenommen, den die theoretischen Führer der SPD und besonders Kautsky für die “historische Rolle” des Proletariats entwickelten. Luxemburg jedoch, ziemlich früh und mit bestimmten Kursänderungen, unternahm die sorgfältige Festlegung des Kerns der “geschichtlichen Notwendigkeit” und die Sammlung ihrer politischen Folgerungen. Der alternative Ausgang der Krise, die auch nach ihrer Meinung die europäische kapitalistische Gesellschaft charakterisierte, und die sich nicht auf die Ökonomie beschränkte, sowie auch das Aufzeigen des “subjektiven Faktors der sozialistischen Umwälzung” (1899: 401) begründete eine unterschiedliche Auffassung des historischen Geschehens. Das heisst setzte die Trennung von Natur und Gesellschaft voraus, die Ablösung der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung vom darwinistischen Evolutio- nismus und die Berufung auf den Urkommunismus und die kommunistische Gesellschaft der Zukunft als Masstab für die Beurteilung der Gegebenheiten, in denen sich der “Untergang” der gegenwärtigen Gesellschaftsformation ausdrückt. Der Träger der gesellschaftlichen Veränderungen sind die “Massen”, die ihren revolutionären “Instinkt” selbständig mobilisieren, die Parteien, die danach streben, sie bei der Verwirklichung ihrer Strategie zu repräsentieren, anstossen, und von ihnen fordern, demokratisch zu funktionieren, indem sie das Prinzip sichern, dass “Freiheit immer die Freiheit der Andersdenkenden” ist (1918: 359). Das wäre das wirksame Gegenmittel gegen den zunehmenden “Blanquismus”, den der Bolschewismus verkündete und stabilisierte, während die Herausforderung an die bürokratische Verkalkung der SPD von der Annahme des “Generalstreiks” und einer “strategischen Umwälzung” ausging. Mit diesem Gedankengut erscheint als ein Lenin des Westens und gleichzeitig als ein Kautsky des Ostens. Das heisst, sie war schlicht die rote Rosa von Zamošč, die 1919 in Berlin ermordert wurde...



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ATHANASE GOTOVOS

THE POLITICS OF DIVERSITY: UNDERSTANDING
ETHNIC AND CULTURAL IDENTITY IN A GLOBAL
CONTEXT¹

Introduction

If we look at the history of ideas in Europe in the last quarter of the past millenium, we will discover that intellectuals - but not only intellectuals - were possessed by the notion that human groups differ intrinsically². The difference refers not only and not so much to the individual characteristics, or what one may call "personality" or "personal identity"³, but to collective characteristics, to traits believed to be shared by larger collectivities. There were times when terms like "nation", "folk" and "race" meant one and the same thing, that is, a relatively homogenous group of humans having common basic traits; or a collective character, lately known as "national" or "racial" character, or - after the horrors of national socialism and the consequent stigmatization of its fully institutionalized⁴, so-called scientific, racist theories - just "mentality". At other times, nations ("ethni") or peoples were considered to be just two aspects of the same entity, *nation* or *ethnos* being the diachronic and *folk* its synchronic dimension, the same as with any existing language.

1. The following article is an elaborated version of a paper presented at the international conference of the International Association for Counselling in Thessaloniki, 4-7 May 2000.

2. See Pat Shipman, *The Evolution of Racism (in Greek)*. Athens, Nea Synhora-Livanis, 1998.

3. For a discussion of the concept of "personal identity" as opposed to "social identity" see Erving Goffman, *Stigma. Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*. Penguin Books 1976, p. 68 ff.

4. See Ingo von Münch (Hrsg.), *Gesetze des NS-Staates*. Paderbon, Schöningh 1994.



The belief in intrinsic human difference in Europe is older than Enlightenment, but it was during this time when it was systematically expressed and supported. No other than Kant wrote about the "various human races", whereas Marx and Engels believed in a strange distinction among peoples, depending on their contribution to the implementation of the world revolution project - an early scenario for communist globalization which went astray - when they wrote about "historyless peoples" (*geschichtlose Völker*), as opposed to the peoples with history¹. They even connected it with the prospects of some people building a state, or *nation* as it is conceived after the French revolution and the building of modern national states.

It is rather strange that this enduring dogma of collective human difference has not been a topic of systematic study and analysis in social sciences until recently. On the contrary, the reaction of individuals, institutions or states towards what at certain times was - and still is - considered as *difference* has been given much more attention. Starting from texts on the two major genocides of our century - that of Jews, Gypsies² and others groups in Hitler's Germany and of the Armenians in Turkey - and on population exchanges or refugees in the first half of our century up to the contemporary texts of institutions or other organizations on human rights violations³, a vast literature has been compiled. It is true that from a political point of view, the reaction towards the (allegedly) different matters more than the ideology motivating this reaction. But ideology is there and it makes a great contribution in the building of the above mentioned reaction, therefore it is not only an academic but also a political task to try to locate it and see its constituents, both in order to better understand human action (individual or institutional) and, more im-

1. K. Marx and F. Engels used the term "historyless peoples" when they had to differentiate between nations (in the traditional, premodern sense) according to their cultural development, having in mind Balkan or Latin American nations. See also L. Marmora, *Nation und Internationalismus. Probleme und Perspektiven eines sozialistischen Nationbegriffs*, Bremen, Periferia edition CON, 1983, p. 68.

2. Jews and Gypsies have a very long and painful tradition of "being different" in Europe. See Wolfgang Wippermann: *Wie die Zigeuner. Antisemitismus und Antiziganismus im Vergleich*, Berlin, Elefanten Press, 1997; see also Jacqueline Giere (Hrsg.), *Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion des Zigeuners. Zur Genese eines Vorurteils*, Frankfurt a. M/New York, Campus Verlag, 1996. Leo Lucassen, *Zigeuner. Die Geschichte eines polizeilichen Ordnungsbegriffes in Deutschland 1700-1945*, Köln, Böhlau Verlag, 1996, and Wim Willems *In Search of the True Gypsy. From Enlightenment to Final Solution*, London, Frank Cass, 1997.

3. Such as the State Department or the Helsinki Watch Monitor, for example.




portant, develop initiatives to prevent tragedies in the future. There is a trend to be pessimistic about education's capacity to prevent institutional deviance, yet education continues to play an important role in socializing the individual as a future citizen.

If it is at least just as interesting to look at the premises of this core belief about the intrinsic difference of humans as it is to look at the individual or institutional reactions to the presumed difference, then we are invited to study this topic more closely. We are challenged to look behind this conviction both at the individual and institutional level. How do people know who differs from whom in what? Why is this "knowledge" about the other's difference at certain times socially relevant and at others not? Why are most of us ready to accept a theory about someone's difference, if we are given the information that he/she belongs to a certain social category, such as a religious, ethnic, or language group? What makes institutions, states or supra-national organizations accept theories about the other's difference and try to handle it in a specific way? What makes people claim that they are different from the rest of the population, whereas others having the same objective traits claim just the opposite? What am I supposed to do if a state or a supra-national organization classifies me into a certain category and says "*you are different from the rest of the population and you have to remain different, in order for our society not to lose its diversity, which contributes to cultural wealth*"? How am I to react to the protective school teacher, who has studied the Council of Europe's Conventions on minorities and says to his pupil who happens to come from a Greek gypsy family, "*well, for your sake, and for the survival of your culture, which is of course different from our culture, we have to preserve it at school for the benefit of the whole nation*"?

This not all-too-imaginary child is born into an interesting era, an era of the revival of the minority discourse of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century. He/she is born into an era of *selective minority protection*, where the problem for him/her is not to be excluded as a regular citizen. Before he manages to be accepted as a normal citizen, he has to learn to expect the treatment of a special citizen, of a *minority citizen*. From an exclusion based on state nationalism, we seem to move to the extreme of an exclusion based on ethnic group nationalism through identity and culture protectionism.

The notion behind anti-assimilatory ethnic nationalism that individuals are *carriers of a group culture*, easily located and disting-



ished, is haunting Europe from the late 16th century, no matter how far it is removed from reality. All the same, it forms the spirit of the new era, the era of advanced globalization and beginning revisionism, where national states receive and face a double pressure; the one coming from the global level¹ to negotiate their "power of definition" concerning economic and political reality, the other coming from the local level to negotiate what has remained as "sovereignty" or *national definitions of reality*.

It would be useful at this point to proceed with the analysis at the institutional level, including both national and supra-national, or global, institutions. If human rights do not speak themselves in order to drive our attention to them, then *who speaks* about human rights² and by *what legitimation*? Who represents humanity in a power-free and culturally neutral way, and what is his association with economic and military dominance? If Protagoras³ is right that man is the measure of all things, then we may legitimately ask *what kind of man sets the measure for humanity in our era*?

Analysis on the institutional level might be helpful in unveiling the legitimacy function of contemporary minority discourse and in locating the pragmatist philosophy behind it. Looking behind the legitimacy⁴ function is probably a rather easy task, if one considers the reluctance of global players to elaborate on the legitimations they usually construct for conducting humanistic interventions, such as the one in our neighborhood⁵ or for neglecting similar interventions in Chechnya, Turkey, Cyprus and other parts of the world where ethnic conflict is associated with ethnic cleansing. Apart from that, it is

1. Which means, from other powerful national states or their alliances and international organizations.

2. To be sure, the human rights talk is a rather old academic tradition in prerevolutionary Europe. See Bernard Willms, *Idealismus und Nation*, Paderbon, Ferdinand Schöningh, 1986, p. 31.

3. Protagoras, who lived in the 5th century b.C. (480-410), is considered to be one of the most influential pre-socratic philosophers and the father of anthropological relativism.

4. Legitimation work in an era of globalization is commensurate to legitimacy demands. A global actor may produce excellent legitimacy discourse when there is a strong pressure or criticism on the part of national or international citizenry. He may not produce such work, if there is no considerable legitimacy pressure. This is the case, after the collapse of the dualist global power system and the establishment of a global power (and, perhaps, ideology), monopoly.

5. The reference is to Kosovo and the West's decision to intervene militarily for humanitarian reasons.



useful to look at the similarities of the old discourse on *race* and *national character* and the modern discourse on cultural diversity and locate the continuity and change between the old and the new practice. A careful reader of contemporary texts on cultural diversity and ethnicity will be tempted to formulate the hypothesis that in many cases, especially in texts legitimizing ethnic or religious nationalism within an existing state¹, the structure of the discourse has been the same, whereas the change refers to the labels: we do not talk today about "race", because it is not politically correct, but we talk about *ethnicity* or *culture*, constructing almost the same reality the concept "race" has referred to in the past. We do not talk about "national character", because it sounds dubious after the national-socialist horrors, but we feel at ease with the concept of "mentality", especially the mentality of a collectivity such as an ethnic group, a people or a nation. If the role of a social scientist is neither to repeat a legalistic tradition on how some decision making bodies perceive and define human diversity, mistaking political-ideological expedience for scientific knowledge, nor to align with conventional approaches to social reality, but to understand social reality for its own sake, the rebirth of the minority discourse in an era of advanced globalization is a challenging task indeed.


Education between globalization and minoritization

The institution upon which enormous pressure is exerted through the diversity discourse from the local, national and supra-national level is education. In this sense I would like to refer to an interesting paradox taking place in at least some educational systems in Europe, the greek one included.

Educational systems are through their ideological function² agents of consensus building, of partial homogenization, at least on the consciousness level. Young boys and girls have to be socialized into citizens and this has traditionally been the task of state education.

1. For an interesting discussion on ethnic nationalism in an era of globalization, especially when its development necessarily collides with long established state-nationalism, see Loring Danforth, *The Macedonian Conflict. Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995.

2. Even in an era believed by some scholars to have no room for ideologies, schools continue to transmit rules and legitimations, not only just scientific knowledge. These normative elements - for example the importance and priority of human rights - constitute the ideological function of educational organizations.




The vocabulary of the school within the context of the typical national state has been rather ethnocentric up to nationalistic. Objective traits such as descent and ancestry, language and religion but also subjective ones like consciousness and fate, have been and are still used to define national identity¹ in educational contexts. Because this discourse by definition excluded groups of citizens who did (or were believed to) not fulfill the objective criteria, it was bound to create problems from the point of view of the national state. At times, especially in periods of political repression, the practice of the state was not to modernize the discourse, but deny the reality, in suppressing either objective traits such as language use, or the expression of subjective beliefs about difference. In trying to build national identity by symbolic force, it actually created new division lines, it awakened ethnic identities, that is, it produced more diversity in society. Through such practices the national state constructed what liberals perceive now as groups needing protection, or minorities, and what conservatives see as alienated, not necessarily loyal, citizens.

One typical reaction of national educational systems towards diversity, especially towards defiant and self-assertive diversity, was to segregate the educational environment of the minority from that of the majority². The segregationist model was - and in some cases still is - favored by the minority (or its leadership) itself, mainly for ideological reasons, since it is believed that this solution is a safeguard against the danger of assimilation. This reasoning, though, ignores that contemporary educational systems are not just ideological apparatuses. Their main function is to select and differentiate the population through differentiating educational entitlements³. Minority education in the sense of a bulwark against assimilation is bound to provide the minority individual with less valuable educational capital than the one the pupil would get, if he/she followed the inte-

1. For a criticism of the notion of objectivity in defining ethnic difference (and ethnic boundaries) see Fredrik Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, Boston, Little Brown, 1969.

2. For an interesting discussion of segregationist policies in Europe before the second world war, see J.J. Tomiak et al. (ed.), *Schooling, Educational Policy and Ethnic Identity*, Vol. I. New York, New York University Press, Dartmouth, 1991.

3. Although the selective or distributional role of the school has been changed under the new market conditions, school titles continue to be important assets for the individual's negotiation power for a role in the economy and status systems. Apart from other forms of capital, educational capital is still considered to be a social value.




grationist model. In this sense, the emphasis on diversity and on identity maintenance necessarily creates problematic results on the market and social fronts, as long as the educational capital gained within the segregationist model is at odds with the politically dominant cultural code.

The diversity discourse: some conceptual problems

Contemporary discourse on cultural and ethnic diversity can not be simply considered as a reflection of what happens in society. As any discourse, this too is not a picture of social reality, it rather constructs it at the same time. The discourse on diversity gives existing diversity meaning and shape. Not only does it present diversity in a highly selective way, leaving out interesting types of difference such as economic, political or technological ones, but it also uses problematic concepts in the presentation. More important, it functions in a very similar way to the old xenophobic and ethnocentric discourse legitimizing segregation. Then you may have segregation through exclusion of a group from the rest of the society, negating the citizenship of its members, or you may have another type of segregation by fostering an institutionally based special treatment of certain groups believed to be different from the dominant group and therefore claiming their relative autonomy in cultural and educational issues.

The concept of *culture* is generally used in a rather unsatisfactory way, sometimes referring only to some forms of symbolic capital of a collectivity (dance, music, life styles, religious rituals etc.) and sometimes to the totality of symbolic and material capital (the dominant culture, for example). Either with the dominant or the minority culture, a false impression of something closed, compact and homogenous is generated, whereas the reality is usually different. The most problematic thing about the concept of culture, as it is used both in legal texts and in everyday discourse, is the assumed one-to-one correspondence between ethnicity (ethnic group) and culture, as if the label a group uses to name itself automatically generates a distinct culture. The objectivist fallacy is another problem associated with the concept of *culture* in the minority discourse: not only laymen but also experts preparing decisions in national or supra-natio-




nal bodies¹ talk about culture (usually in combination with a possessive pronoun) as if it were objectively located, compared to *the* culture of dominant group (if there is such a thing) and found to be different.

In the diversity discourse the concept of *assimilation*² functions like a scapegoat: assimilation is genuinely bad, states should refrain from advancing it, individuals must take care not to assimilate. But where is the homogenous dominant national culture into which a minority individual runs the danger to assimilate? On the other hand what is the problem with the "assimilated" Paul Tsongas, Michael Dukakis, George Stefanopoulos or Teli Savalas, just to name some of last century's Greek immigrants in the United States? Should they have asked for recognition of a special category, the "grecophone Americans", in order to have their culture survive? In the name of what should an individual perceive a prospective identity shift as something morally bad? What kind of liberalism is it, when ideological fortifications are built around an identity, in order for it to stay sta-

1. One may consider two examples of such texts coming from the Council of Europe: (a) "Convention-cadre pour la protection des minorites national" (1992), and (b) "Charte europeenne des langues regionales ou minoritaires" (1995).


2. Societies built on hierachical principles, especially capitalist societies which favour economic differentiation by definition, can not be culturally homogenous. The existence on the level of individual consciousness of an impression of homogeneity does not of course wipe out systematic economic, social and cultural variation. In this sense, assimilation and social hierarehy are too difficult to reconcile. A «leisure class" (Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, The Viking Press, 1931) is not conceivable in a society characterized by full assimilation. A social class, as any social system (see Niklas Luhmann, *Soziologische Aufklärung*. Band I, Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1984, p. 116) is built on a stabilization of difference between inside and outside, that is, a rejection of assimilation. On the other hand Bourdieu made clear how cultural distinction may be instrumentalized and play a considerable role (as a form of capital) within social status systems (for an extensive discussion see Ingo Mörth, Gerhard Fröhlieg (Hrg.), *Das symbolische Kapital der Lebensstile. Zur Kulturosoziologie der Moderne nach Pierre Bourdieu*, Frankfurt / New York, Campus, 1994). Whether one sees education as an organization converting cultural difference into social inequality (see Heinz Sünker, Dieter Timmermann, Fritz-Ulich Kolbe, (Hrsg.), *Bildung, Gesellschaft, soziale Ungleichheit*, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1994) or as a device for promoting social mobility (see Turner, R. H., *Modes of Social Ascent through Education. Sponsored and Contest Mobility*, In: R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset (eds), *Class, Status and Power*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974, pp. 449-458), in either case assimilation can not be the ultimate goal from society's point of view. See also Uwe Schimank, *Theorien gesellschaftlicher Differenzierung*, Opladen, Leske und Budrich, 1996.



ble, as in the old good times of the multi-ethnic empires, were a marriage between a Greek and a Turk would be enough to send both of them literally and metaphorically to hell? Last but not least: if assimilation is so bad indeed, then those who define it as such have an obligation to define the condition of assimilation: where does integration stop and where does assimilation begin? Why is the choice of a car type or a hotel type not an assimilationist gesture whereas the choice of a regular, instead of minority school is an assimilationist treason? It is exactly this unexpected protection from assimilation that authorizes the member of the dominant group to impute a different identity to the individual, if information¹ about the individual is in the air which relates him/her to a certain language, origin, religion, etc. Then the individual is automatically a specimen of the minority he "belongs" to. As a living example of diversity, he receives special treatment on the part of the diversity activist². The vocabulary of segregation is validated once again, even if this validation differs from the traditionally aggressive one: the talk about *your* culture, *your* ethnicity, *your* bad experience with racists from the dominant group, *your* resistance against assimilation promoted by the bad state, the other's solidarity, the other's interest to know you as a specimen of another culture - all this is just segregation through recognition. But what about the individual who would approach the minority activist differently, saying that his ethnicity and culture are his own business, that what counts is the other's attitude towards a common life, the sharing of common ideas promoting basic needs of all individuals involved in the society, that the issue is not how to organize public life along several particularities, but how to create consensus on matters having an impact on all citizens, independently of their origin, religion or any other particular social identity?

1. The shift in the ethnocentric individual's behaviour when information about the others's collective identity flowing over can be considered as one of the mechanisms of ethnic (religious, etc.) boundary maintenance, independently of the social value of the reaction (cf. Gotovos, A., «*Ausländer bleibt Ausländer. Zum Verhältnis von ausländerfreundlichen Positionen und anhaltender Staatsdiskriminierung von Immigranten*». In: H. Barkowski, G.H. Hoff (Hrsg.), *Berlin Interkulturell*, Berlin, Colloquium Verlag, 1991, pp. 75-106).

2. By *special treatment* we do not have to imagine something genuinely bad for the recipient. As Erving Goffman suggested with the stigmatized person who might get aggressive when an unknown individual tries to help, without having been invited to do so, it might be a quite benevolent action through which someone sends the message that the other belongs to a different kind of people. This special treatment is both protective and defining.




The concept of *minority* itself is a highly problematic concept. The main reason for this is that the concept was coined for quite different times. It is a heritage of the multi-ethnic empires and of 19th century nationalism. It is associated with more or less closed, geographically identifiable cultural systems based on some notion of ancestry (or ethnicity) with or without a religious or language dimension. It is not by chance that the Council of Europe¹ trying to construct binding rules for the treatment of national minorities on the part of national states, does not feel obliged to define what a national minority is. Though it proclaims that

“The protection of national minorities and of the rights and freedoms of persons belonging to those minorities form an integral part of the international protection of human rights, and as such falls within the scope of international co-operation”

it does not give information as to when a state faces a situation where the rules for the protection of minorities apply. It is also not by chance that dialect speaking nationals of a state are not considered speakers of a regional or a minority language and their dialect is not considered to be worthy of survival. As a result, it does not belong to the protected regional or minority languages. Moreover, according to the same body, (Council of Europe) migrant communities are not considered as national minorities and the survival of their culture can not be protected by the convention. These examples mark the gap between the new spirit of anti-assimilationism within supra-national decision making bodies on the one hand, and the reluctance of the participating states to officially add more diversity to the traditionally recognized one. It is not just scientific or sociological principles deciding when a group of people living in a state constitutes a minority, but mainly political ones. Minority definition is a highly selective process and the question of who decides what type of diversity exists in a certain state, and whether this diversity is enough to characterize a group as an ethnic, national² or cultural minority remains

1. Council of Europe: *Convention-cadre pour la protection des minorités nationales*, 1992.

2. The words “ethnic” and “national” have been used in most texts interchangeably. Even in those where a distinction is tried, no clarity has been obtained until now. From a linguistic point of view, both terms refer to the same entity, one being of greek (“ethnic”, from “ethnos”= nation) and the other of latin (“national”, from “natio”= nation) origin. There is only one clear difference



unosolved.

The concept of "survivance"¹, or the value of maintenance² and continuity of cultural forms, creates considerable difficulties, too. Firstly, it surrogates the idea that cultural forms survive independently of the economic and technological framework within which they are placed³. Secondly, it makes survival (or cultural reproduction) dependent on the behavior (legislation) of the national state, ignoring the unavoidable impact globalization has on the prospect of cultural continuity. Thirdly, when it is used as an ideology (e.g. protection of tradition) it tends to be ethnocentric to nationalistic, romantic towards the (constructed) past⁴ and negative towards innovation and adaptation to the new situation created by a combination of national, international and global forces. It represents a form of cultural romanticism negating the fact of change⁵.

which might distinguish between "ethnic" and "national", namely, whether the group referred to can be associated with an existing nation-state (e.g. Greeks in South Albania) or not (Kurds in Turkey or Germany). Even in such a case, where it seems reasonable to name the first case a "national minority" and the second an "ethnic minority", the labels might say absolutely nothing concerning the (minority) individual's self-definitions or loyalties.

1. For an elaboration of the concepts of "survivance" and "recognition" see Charles Taylor, *Multi-culturalism and the 'Politics of Recognition'*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992.

2. There is some "cultural essentialism" behind the ideologies of maintenance, at least in the first stage of their development. As Kloss suggested, defending language maintenance in the beginning of the 20th century in Europe was legitimized through the intrinsic value ("Selbstwert") of language; see Heinz Kloss, «Unorthodoxe Betrachtungen über Volksgruppen und Volksgruppensprachen in Europa». In P. Sture Ureland, *Kulturelle und Sprachliche Minderheiten in Europa*, Tübingen, Max Niemayer Verlag: 1981, S. 1-16.

3. This objection gains in importance, when economic and social change is rapid, as in cases of historical shifts. The collapse of the bipolar global power system, for example, constitutes such a discontinuity.

4. Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm, among others, have pointed to the process of ideological construction of the (modern) nation-state by manipulating tradition; see Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1983, *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge, At the University Press, 1983, Eric Hobsbawm, Terence Ranger (eds), Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London, Verso, 1983. For an extensive discussion on this issue see Pantelis Lekas, *The Nationalist Ideology. Five Work Hypotheses in Historical Sociology* (in Greek), Athens, Katarti, 1996.

5. In some cases educational arrangements based on maintenance ideologies create paradoxical situations for the children. So it is possible that a group of




The concept of *recognition*¹ has often been used in the diversity discourse; in the sense of officially acknowledging the existence of the “other” in the form of an ethnic, religious or linguistic minority. The argument goes that recognition is the first and most important step towards cultural autonomy and cultural authenticity. In recognizing the “other” as different, you stop measuring his action by your culturally biased standards, in other words, recognition goes together with the relativity of cultures as systems of creating meaning and regulating the actions of humans. If culture is conceived as a set of rituals, this procedural liberalism could work. But if culture entails also political culture, economic, technological and legal systems, one can not have several of these systems simultaneously functioning for different segments of the population in one and the same state during the same period of time. Society’s complexity would probably exceed the boundary of minimal social order, or else this peaceful coexistence would stop where inter-group interaction starts, interaction meaning the public negotiation of common ends and means. Societies armed only with a procedural consensus on the “meta-rules” and leaving open all possibilities concerning contents, are difficult to imagine as real entities. In this sense the concept of *cultural relativism*, the adoption of which would lead to a *peaceful coexistence* of alternative sets of values and orientations within a national state, is not as liberal in practice as it sounds in theory². Cultures are not only traditions and lore, language, art and rituals. They include all the material and symbolic products of humans, from moral codes to atomic weapons. Even at the time we are reading here we all know that the globe stays under the potential threat of weapons of mass destruction. We all know that not all cultures on the globe contributed equally to their production, and although ideologically diverse states managed to obtain them, they still do not constitute a cultural universal. One can

children are educationally separated from the rest of the child population in order to be taught in a language which used to be the living language of their ethnic group in the past, although this language is not any longer their instrument of communication in everyday life outside school - not even at school during informal interaction; see Bent Sondergaard, «The Fight for Survival. Danish as a Living Minority Language South of the German Border», In Heintz Kloss, op. cit., pp. 297-306.

1. Taylor, op. cit.

2. In fact it is a rather neo-liberal notion, in the sense that freedom in the circulation of all possible cultural forms within a given community will sooner or later result to the survival of the economically powerful ones.




talk about the peaceful coexistence of Buddhist and military culture in the United States, but reality can not obey both principles simultaneously. In the beginning of this presentation I referred to two major genocides of the 20th century and this is enough to show the boundaries of multicultural optimism: a state is not a scientific but rather a practical endeavor, and in this sense it can not give shelter to alternative conflicting cultures on the premise that there is no objective way to decide which of them has priority over the other. The model of a quasi peaceful¹ coexistence of cultures which characterized empires like the Hellenistic, the Roman, the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian presupposes more or less fixed social positions, low social differentiation, limited social mobility for more or less geographically fixed populations. There is no public sphere, no market in today's sense, no general education, and of course no citizenship. Could we turn the watch of history back to those good old times through a compartmentalization of cultures in order to fight the ghost of assimilation? Although one should be careful of underestimating the power of romanticist ideology in an era of nascent revisionism and its resulting ethnic nationalism, such a regression is for practical, historical reasons not possible.

Concluding remarks: regression to "Volkserziehung" or enhancement of citizenship education?

Even an unskilled observer of the local, european and global minority or diversity discourse will notice its Leitmotiv: bad national states repressing good minorities, the last seeking help from good supra-national or global protectors. The last big war in Europe showed that minorities sometimes seek help from the false party, that is, the future loser². The recent conflict in Kosovo shows that it is not very

1. A close look at historical reality only shows that what we - driven by present expediencies - might perceive as peaceful co-existence of different cultures within bigger empires, had too much conflict to be called "peaceful" in a literal way and that tolerance, if it existed, was instrumental; see Andreas Kazamias, «The Education of the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1923: A Case Study of "Controlled Toleration"», In: J. J. Tomiak et al. (ed.), *Schooling, Educational Policy and Ethnic Identity*. Vol. I. New York, New York University Press, Dartmouth, 1991, pp. 343-367.


2. See Wolfgang Mitter, «German Schools in Czechoslovakia, 1919 - 1938», In: J. Tomiak, op. cit., pp. 211-233, and Janusz Tomiak, «Education of the Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups in the Polish Republic 1918-1939», in: J. Tomiak, op. cit., pp. 185-209.



easy to use the principle of minority protection in order to change the political map of a non-friendly state, especially if the ones supported and protected, as bad boys sometimes do, turn out to be masters of ethnic cleansing, that is, of the same evil that protection was given for. Reality is much more complex than the stereotypic description of bad states and good minorities tends to present it. Therefore, it is not unwise to be careful and less enthusiastic about the all-too-humanistic version of the diversity protection discourse.

There are good reasons to be rather pessimistic about the long term consequences of the new dualism this discourse is trying to impose: the dualism of *special citizen* and *regular citizen*. Independently of the motives of such a dualism, it tends to enhance the existing old-fashioned division lines between social groups and create new ones for the sake of cultural pluralism in an era of globalization. Nationalists and ultra-conservatives may feel happy with this development, since they always supported "ethnic" and "cultural" order: everyone to his group, so that the good group - the dominant one - is not "molested". The irony is that it is sometimes the multiculturalists from the Left, with their cultural romanticism, who validate the conservative demand for no-mingling.

Contemporary diversity discourse is an attempt to legitimize a new type of "cultural order" in which not only the private but also the public sphere ceases to be an interaction between regular citizens and becomes an interaction between special and regular citizens. It does not favor mixing or common standards and values, because this may facilitate assimilation, or the adoption of the basic code of the dominant culture. No matter what the motives of the contemporary supporters of cultural segregation, the dynamics of the ghetto are well known. Groups and individuals socialized and trained in cultural islands in order to prevent assimilation, will be the losers of the future in a world of hard competition. Cultural survivance alone can not help them handle the complexity of the modern world. Cultural relativism can not prevent the pragmatic dominance of the culture of technology and information, because real life is different from academic discourse on cultural equivalence. Though one may agree with the slogan "ethnic is beautiful", favoring ethnic nationalism as a reaction to state ethnocentrism is the wrong answer to the problem of managing human difference. Fostering the process of ethnogenesis (nation-building) through a discourse which legitimates dissociation from political consensus on the national level-in G. Mead's terms, de-



stroying the "generalized other"¹ - is bound to generate more problems than it is going to solve. Instead of talking about the institutional fortification of difference so that it can survive, it would be more interesting to talk about the social construction of difference: about our assumption that human collectivities are intrinsically different. This discussion could show how close to each other notions like "natura populorum" of Bezold, "l' esprit general" of Montesquieu, "commune natura delle nationi" of Giambattista Vico, "Nationalgeist" of Moser and Bülow, "Seele des Volkes" of Herder, "Volkseigentümlichkeit" of Karl von Savigny, "Volksgeist" of Hegel or Lazarus and Steinthal² and ethnocentric versions of the contemporary terms "ethnic" or "cultural identity" are. Maybe one of the serious problems in managing cultural difference - real or imaginary - is the *heritage of labeling* coming from Enlightenment and modernity which shapes our perception and interpretation of social difference. And a practical notice concerning institutional management of diversity: the belief that political bodies can contribute to the solution of such problems only by the use of legal experts, political philosophers and minority activists, is a fallacy. There must be a contribution of social science too, before institutional decisions about diversity and its management are made. Disciplines such as psychology, sociology, anthropology and education are in a better position to depict diversity in society than old-fashioned legalistic perceptual schemes of the 19th century. Research findings must flow to decision making bodies, if we wish to obtain something better than one-dimensional, heavily ideologically-loaded and therefore conflict-generating arrangements and regulations.

1. George Herbert Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962.

2. See Georg Eckardt (Hrsg.), *Völkerpsychologie. Versuch einer Neuentdeckung*, Weinheim, Beltz, Psychologie Verlags Union: 1997.

