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KANT, HEGEL AND HABERMAS ON WAR AND PEACE*

The purpose of this essay is, to explore Immanuel Kant's, Georg W.F. Hegel's, and Jürgen Habermas's positions on the issues of war-making, peace-keeping and peace-making. The intention of this text is, to show the development of the concepts of and the attitude toward war and peace from Kant through Hegel to Habermas. This study is produced in the context of the Gulf War, the conflicts in Ireland, Lebanon, Israel, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and particularly the wars in former Yugoslavia, and in other parts of Eastern Europe. It is the goal of this essay, with the help of Kant, Hegel and Habermas to deepen the theory of war in all its forms, in order to make possible a more adequate peace-keeping or - if necessary - peace-making activity in war zones, wherever they may open up around the globe: in the framework of the third new world order in this century.

I. Immanuel Kant

In his essay on the «Idea of a Universal History in Cosmopolitan Intent» of 1784, Kant discussed the problem of the establishment of a perfect civil constitution¹. According to Kant, this problem is dependent on the question concerning a legal and lawful external relationship among states, and can without an answer to the latter not be resolved. In Kant's view, it does not help very much to work

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1. I. Kant, *Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik*, Frankfurt a M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1981, I, 33-50.

at a legal and lawful constitution among individual people, i.e. on the internal order of a polity, if the external, international relations are not in a good shape: if there is antagonism and war among nations. Kant discovered, that the same unsociableness, which made it necessary for people to create a lawful civil constitution inside of their community, is also the cause for the fact, that every polity stands in its external relations, i.e. as a state in relation to other states, in unbound freedom. Consequentially, every polity must expect from the other the same evils, which once oppressed the individuals inside of each community, and forced them, to enter with each other a lawful civil condition.

Incompatibility

Thus, so Kant explained, nature uses the incompatibility of individuals and even the unsociableness of large societies and states as a means, in order to discover in the unavoidable antagonism of nations a condition of tranquillity and security. According to Kant, nature drives states - particularly through wars or through the exaggerated and never ending preparations for wars, and through the wants which every state must finally feel internally, because of such enormous armaments even in the midst of peace - into initially imperfect attempts at peace. Finally, after many devastations and upsetting events and even after a thorough internal exhaustion, nature pushes the states into that, what reason could have told them in the first place, without so many sad and tragic experiences. Nature could have told the states to move out of the condition of savages, and to enter a league of nations (*Foedus Amphictyonum*).

League of Nations

In such a league of nations, every state, even the smallest one, can expect his own security and rights. Each state can expect security and rights not from its own power, or from its own righteous judgement, but only from this great league of nations: from its united power and from its decisions according to laws of its united will. Kant knew, of course, that such an idea sounds somewhat enthusiastic, and that the Abbe of St. Pierre and Rousseau had ridiculed it. Kant thought, that these thinkers had ridiculed the idea of a league of nations, because they thought it was to be established in too short a time. However, according to Kants' rather sober analysis, the league

of nations is precisely the long-range, but nevertheless necessary consequence of the want and the need, into which nations push each other through their incompatibility, and through their wars, and through their preparation of wars. They force the states, to decide for such an association of nations, no matter if they like it or not. Also savages do not like to be forced into a civil condition, in which they must give up their brutal freedom, and to seek tranquillity and security in a lawful constitution. But they do it nevertheless. For Kant, the same is true of nation states.

New Conditions

In Kant's perspective, all wars are so many attempts - not in the intention of humans but in the design of nature - to bring about new relationships among nations, and to form new states through destruction, or at least through dismemberment. But also those new states, so Kant argued, can again not maintain themselves either in themselves or besides each other. Therefore, they must suffer new similar revolutions. This goes on until some day, be it through the best order of the civil constitution inside a nation, or be it through a common agreement - a legislation among states - a condition is established, which can -very similar to a civil community- maintain and preserve itself like a self-stabilizing and self-steering *automaton*.

Epicurean Concurrence

Kant knew of three views of history. Firstly, we can expect that an Epicurean concurrence of effective causes will bring about a situation, in which the states - like small particles of dust - try out through their approximate collision all kinds of formations, which are destroyed again through a new push, until accidentally such a form succeeds, which can steer and maintain itself. Kant considered this to be a lucky accident, which will probably never happen in history.

From Animality to Humanity

Secondly, according to Kant, we can assume, that nature pursues a regular course to lead the human species from the low stage of animality slowly to the highest level of true humanity. Nature shall lead man from animality to humanity through his own art, which is, nevertheless, forced upon him. Thus, nature develops in the apparent-

ly wild arrangement of history man's original dispositions in a completely regular way.

Nothing New Under the Sun

Thirdly, so Kant argued, we can expect that from all those historical effects and counter-effects of men's actions nothing really results in general anywhere, at least nothing prudent. Everything remains in history as it has always been: there is nothing new under the sun! Therefore, one can also not predict, if the discord and disunion, which is so natural to the human species, will at the end prepare a hell of evils in such a civilized condition, as they maybe annihilate again this cultivated condition itself, and all former progressions of culture which led to it, through a barbarous devastation. According to Kant, this is a fate, for which one can not stand under the government of blind chance. It is indeed the same as lawless freedom, if one does not underlay it secretly a guide of nature, which is connected with wisdom. These thoughts lead Kant to the question, if it could possibly be reasonable to assume expediency and suitability in the parts of the arrangement of nature, but a purposeless condition as far as its totality is concerned?

Cosmopolitan Condition of State Security

Kant knew, that while the purposeless condition of the savages held back all natural dispositions of the human species, it nevertheless forced them finally through the evils, into which it brought them, to step out of their barbarous condition and into a civil constitution, in which all the seeds of humanity can be fully developed. Kant assumed, that the barbarous freedom of the already established states produces the same effect. Through the application of all energies of the politics to the armament against each other, and through the devastations caused by war, and even more so through the necessity of the continual readiness for war, the complete development of the natural dispositions of man is certainly hindered. However, the evils which result from such condition force the human species to discover - for the as such wholesome and salutary resistance of many states existing besides each other, which originates out of their freedom - a law of equilibrium and a united force, which re-enforces it: i.e. to introduce a cosmopolitan condition of public state-security. According

to Kant, such condition of state security must not be without all danger, so that the energies of human kind do not fall asleep. But such condition must also not be without a principle of equality among the effects and counter-effects of states, so that they do not destroy each other.

Association of States

In Kant's historical-philosophical perspective, before this last stage in the history of the human species has been achieved, namely the association of states, or in the middle of its long march from animality to freedom, i.e. half way in the process of the formation of that federation of states, human nature suffers the harshest evils under the fraudulent appearance of external well-being: even a high living standard. According to Kant, Jean, J. Rousseau was not entirely wrong, when he preferred the condition of the savages, as long as one leaves out that final stage of human history, which our species has still to accomplish. Kant confessed quite proudly, that we modern human beings of today are cultivated to a high degree through art and science. We are even civilized to the point of satiety and disgust in terms of all kinds of social prettiness, good behavior, politeness, civility, decency, and propriety. But much is still missing, before we can consider ourselves to be already «moralized»: i.e. made into moral beings.

Morality and Culture

According to Kant, the idea of morality belongs to culture. However, the present-day use of this idea of morality, that is not more than the usual customs, habits, usages, manners, or morals, which at best have a certain similarity to the former, and which can be found in the love for honor and in the external decency, is just civilization. It is not yet culture in the emphatic sense. Real culture would be the full realization of the categorical imperative by individuals and nations. It is the determinate negation, i.e. secularization and formalization of the Golden Rule, which is present in the Sermon on the Mount, but which beyond that is shared by all living world religions today:

So always treat others as you would like
them to treat you.

The categorical imperative demands:

Act in such a way, that the axiom of your
actions can become the foundation of a
universal legislation.

In both, religious and philosophical ethics, the law of the universalization of particular acts, serves as the criterion for valid moral norms.

Education

As long, so Kant argued, as states use all their energies for vain and violent intentions of expansion of territory, and as long as thus they hinder incessantly the slow effort of the internal formation of the mode of thinking of their citizens, and as long as they withdraw from their citizens all support for their education, we can not expect, that the idea of morality and culture will be realized, and that people and states will be truly cultivated. This is so, because the realization of the idea of morality demands the long inner work of every state for the purpose of the education of its citizens. But in Kant's view, everything good, which is not grafted on the morally-good mind, sentiment, and conviction, is nothing else than mere appearance, and as such a gleaming and glimmering misery. Kant stated not without some resignation, that the human species will probably remain in this its miserable condition until it has worked itself out of the chaotic situation of its international relations, and has reached the stage of a global association of states, which is based on and deeply grounded in the morally-good minds, sentiments, and convictions of their citizens.

Civil Liberty

According to Kant, in contemporary bourgeois society, civil liberty can not be touched without everybody feeling the disadvantage of this in all trades, particularly in commerce, and without thereby also everybody noticing the weakening of the energy of the political state in its external relationships to other states. But this civil liberty moves slowly further. If one prevents the bourgeois from seeking his well-being in all the ways he likes best - as long as these ways can exist together with the freedom of others - then one stops the vivacity of the general business of capitalist society. Thereby, one also checks and hampers again the energies of the political whole,

the state. Therefore, the personal limitation of the bourgeois in his actions is more and more liquidated in modern times. The universal freedom of religion is granted. Thus the enlightenment originates with delusions, freaks, and whims slipping in: the dialectics of enlightenment¹.

Enlightenment

Kant considered enlightenment to be a great good². Kant himself was an enlightener and the master of German enlightenment. According to Kant, the great good of enlightenment would draw away the human species particularly from their rulers' selfish intent of national enlargement and magnification, if it could only learn to understand its own advantage. In Kant's view, with the enlightenment comes a certain love affair, which the enlightened person can not avoid to have with the good of the world, and which he comprehends completely. However, so Kant argued, such enlightenment must step by step move up to the thrones, and must influence their principles of government.

The Rulers of the World

Of course, so Kant explained, at the present time the rulers of the world have no money left for the institutions of education, and in general for anything, which might have to do with the best of the world. They do not have any money left for good things, so Kant explained, because they have already spent it all in preparation of the next war. Kant hoped, nevertheless, that the masters of the world shall find their own advantage in not preventing the certainly weak and slow efforts of their nations, when they want to educate themselves. Finally, Kant calculated, that war will slowly become a very artificial and - in its consequences for both sides of combatants - very uncertain and very costly enterprise, particularly in terms of the at his time new invention of the always growing national debt. Its payment is not to be foreseen. Thus, according to Kant,

1. M. Horkheimer, ›*Dialektik der Aufklärung*‹ und *Schriften 1940-1950*, Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Verlag, 1987, 13-14, 15, 16-24, 25-66, 67-103, 104, 143, 144, 196, 197-238.

2. Kant, *Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik I*, op. cit. 33-50, 53-61.

war becomes more and more a very doubtful, serious, delicate, and precarious undertaking.

A Body of States

Kant found indeed remarkable the influence, which every shock that one state suffers through war, has upon all other states in a world, which is interconnected through business. Thus, Kant foresaw, that these states -forced through their own danger- offer themselves - if also without lawful and legal authority, prestige and reputation - as arbitrators, and thus prepare for the distant future a large body of states, for which past history can not present any example any longer. In spite of the fact, that this body of states stands for now only in its raw design, there begins to stir, nevertheless, already a feeling of something new in all its members. Each member is interested in the preservation of the totality of that body of states. That development gave Kant the hope, that after many transforming revolutions will finally come about, what nature has for its highest intent: a universal, cosmopolitan condition as the womb, in which all original good dispositions of the human species shall be fully developed.

Monogenesis

In his essay on the «Supposed Beginning of Human History» of 1786, Kant defended the principle of *monogenesis*, which he had found in the Torah, more precisely in the first book of the *Pentateuch*, the *Genesis*, in order to have an anthropological basis for peace¹. If the philosopher does not want to revel in surmises and suppositions concerning the beginning of human history, so Kant argued, then he must start his reflections with that, which is not able of any derivation from preceding natural causes through human reason: i.e. with the existence of man. Man must appear in his developed greatness, because he must lack and dispense with any motherly help. Man must also appear in one pair, in order to propagate his species. Man must appear in one single pair in terms of *monogenesis*, so that not right away war will break out among different pairs and families as different origins of the human species: as would certainly happen in the case of *polygenesis*. It would necessarily happen, if men would

1. Ibid. 85-102.

be close to each other, but would at the same time also be foreign for each other. Furthermore, according to Kant, there must be *monogenesis*, so that nature can not be accused, that it has through the difference of the human descent missed to make the most proper arrangement for human sociability, sociality, and peace, as the highest purpose of human determination and destiny. Kant has no doubt, that the singularity of the family, from which - according to the *Genesis* myth - all humans are to descend, was the best arrangement for this purpose of sociability, sociality, solidarity, and peace. Kant's autonomous reason gives support to revelation.

Location

Following the *Genesis* myth, Kant posited the human pair into a location, which is secure against the attacks of predators, and which is by nature richly equipped with all means of nourishment. This location is some kind of a garden. It is situated under an always mild climate. What is more important, Kant considered the first human pair only after it had already made powerful progress in the skill to use its own energies. Thus, Kant did not start from the complete rawness, roughness, rudeness, and brutality of the nature of the first human pair. Kant thought, that there could be for the reader too many surmises and too few probabilities, if he would try to fill the probably very long period between the original rawness of the first human pair, and its later skillfulness. According to Kant - still following the *Genesis* myth - the first man could stand and walk, and, most importantly, he could speak. In Kant's view, the first pair was characterized by a language-mediated intersubjectivity.

Communication Drive

According to Kant, the drive to communicate must first have lead man - as long as he was still alone - to the manifestation of his existence toward other beings, particular toward those, who could make a sound, that he could imitate, and that later on could serve as a name. Kant saw a similar effect of this human communication drive still in children of today, and in thoughtless adults, who disturb through their rattling, crying, shouting, yelling, whistling, singing, and other noisy entertainment, and often also devotions of that kind, the thinking part of the community. Kant saw no other motivation for all this disturbing noise except man's original communication drive.

Speaking and Thinking

For Kant, nevertheless, the most progressed form of man's communication drive, i.e. real speaking, was nothing more or less than his expressing himself in terms of connected notions. In Kant's view, such speaking in terms of connected notions meant thinking. Those skills of speaking and thinking man had to acquire himself. If God had created these skills in man, then they would be inherited from one generation to the other through gene exchange. However, empirically that is not the case. Each generation has to learn anew to speak, and to think through cultural transmission in terms of education. However, in his surmises about the beginning of human history, Kant assumed, that the first pair had acquired already those skills of real speaking and thinking, in order to be able to merely even consider the development of the ethical and moral dimension in human communicative action. Such consideration certainly presupposed those skills of speaking and thinking. According to Kant, such speaking as thinking, and thinking as speaking, and the consequent ethical and moral dimension constituted the medium, in which war was to be overcome, and peace was to be established. This is still true today for the Kantian Karl - Otto Apel's formal linguistic pragmatic and for the Kantian Marxist Jürgen Habermas's universal linguistic pragmatic, and theory of communicative action, and discourse ethics¹.

1. K.O. Apel, *Der Denkweg von Charles S. Peirce. Eine Einführung in den Amerikanischen Pragmatismus*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1975, 116, 211, 223, 238, 251, 351, 355. - *Transformation der Philosophie. Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973, Vol. II, part II. - K. O. Apel, (ed), *Sprachpragmatik und Philosophie*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1982, chs. 1,2. - K. O. Apel, *Diskurs und Verantwortung. Das Problem des Übergangs zur Postkonventionellen Moral*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1990, chs. 1-11. - J. Habermas, *Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1984, parts I - V. - *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Vol. 2. Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1981, ch. VIII. - *Moralbewusstsein und kommunikatives Handeln*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1983, chs. 3, 4. - *Eine Art Schadensabwicklung*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1987, chs. 5-7. - *Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1991, chs. 1-6. - *Texte und Kontexte*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1991, part III. - *Die nachholende Revolution*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1990, 167-178, 179-204, 205-224. - *Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaates*, Frankfurt a.

Awakening of Human Reason

As Kant described the awakening of human reason, he spoke about the transition of man from the rawness and brutality of a mere animal creature into true humanity: from the guardianship of nature to the state of freedom¹. Kant thought, that the development of an animal, which became a man through language and reason, and which has a history, needed probably a very long time. Kant portrayed this long development with the help of a guide, which was through reason and language connected with experience: the *Torah*, the first book of the *Pentateuch*, the book of *Genesis*. According to Kant, no thinking was possible without speaking, i.e. stories. Philosophy was rooted in religious myths. However, the enlightener Kant wanted to show, what is possible in the mythical surmises about the beginning of human history, without falling into mere arbitrary interpretations and speculations. Kant criticized Herder for having fallen into such arbitrary interpretations and speculations concerning the same five chapters of the *Genesis*, that he himself was concerned with, in his book *The Oldest Document of the Human Species*.

The Long March

Influenced by Kant and Georg, W.F. Hegel, socialists from Karl Marx through Lenin to Mao tse Tung spoke about the long historical march of human kind from animality to the realm of freedom beyond the realm of necessity, the classless society, the realm of freedom and peace². Today, after the victory of nationalism over

M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1992, 9, 11, 25, 45-47, 50-51, 63, 79, 82, 91, 109, 111, 113, 118-119, 121-122, 130-132, 136, 141, 143-144, 153, 157, 164, 172, 184, 194, 202, 211, 232, 249, 282, 285, 305-306, 413, 481, 532, 541, 549-550, 561, 564, 567, 590-592, 596, 610, 617, 635, 637, 660. - H. Schnädelbach, (ed), *Rationalität. Philosophische Beiträge*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1984, chs. 1, 9. - D. Hoster, «Ein marxistischer Kant», in *Frankfurter Hefte*, 2/35, February 1980, 58-65 (FH). - «Jürgen Habermas Rechtsphilosophie», in *Die Neue Gesellschaft. Frankfurter Hefte*, 12/39, Dezember 1992, 1138-1140 (NG). - W. Barus, «Zwischen Faktizität und Geltung», in *NG*, 1/40, Januar 1993, 74-76.

1. Kant, *Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik*, op. cit. Vol. 1, 85-102.

2. G.W.F. Hegel, *Frühe Schriften*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986, 43, 102, 182, 204, 269, 289, 300, 335-337, 350, 394-395, 439, 453, 465-467, 485, 555, 570, 571-577. - R.P. Horstmann, (ed), *Seminar: Dialektik in der Philosophie Hegels*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1978, parts one to three. K. Marx,

socialism in Eastern Europe the Right - Hegelian Francis Fukuyama, former Undersecretary of Planning in the Bush Administration, thinks that this long march from animality to freedom has come to its end once for all in the American and European liberal democratic society, in spite of all its internal and external contradictions: the end of history, the last man¹. Fukuyama knows, of course, that in the past similar contradictions have driven societies beyond themselves into new and better life forms, often through the medium of wars and civil wars.

Continual War

According to Kant, as long as in human history the nomadic pastoral tribes, who alone recognized God as their Lord, swarmed around the inhabitants of the cities and around the farmers, who had a human being, an authority, as their lord and master, and as long as the former as definite enemies of all land property showed enmity to the latter and were hated again by them, there was continual war between them, or at least the unceasing danger of war². At least both nations, the nomadic pastoral tribes on one hand, and the inhabitants of cities and the farmers on the other, could enjoy inside of their communities the inestimable and invaluable good of freedom. According to Kant, this is so, because even in his own time the danger of war is still the only factor, which moderates despotism. This is so, because now great wealth is required, so that a state can be a real power in war or peace. But without freedom there is no activity and industry, which could produce wealth. In a poor nation, the place of wealth must be taken by an intense participation of the people in the self-preservation of the community. However, also

Das Kapital, Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie, Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1961, 873-874. - E. Bloch, *On Karl Marx*, New York: Herder and Herder, 1971 chs. 2, 4, 5, 9. - E. Fromm, *Marx's Concept of Man*, New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co. 1-86, 87 - 196, 217 - 219, 220 - 221, 258 - 260, 261-263. - B. Waldenfels, J.M. Broekman, und A. Pazanin, (eds), *Phänomenologie und Marxismus. Vol. I. Konzepte und Methoden*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1977, chs. 1 - 10. - *Phänomenologie und Marxismus. Vol. II. Praktische Philosophie*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1977, chs. 1 - 7.

1. F. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York: The Free Press, 1992, parts I - V.

2. Kant, *Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik*, op. cit. Vol. I, 85 - 102.

such self-preservation is not possible without the people, who participate in it, feeling that they are free.

Luxury

However, in time, so Kant - the bachelor - argued, the growing luxury of the inhabitants of the cities, particularly the art to make oneself attractive and to please, through which the «clean urban women» put into the shadow the «dirty whores of the desert», had to be a powerful bait for those herdsmen to get into contact with the former, and to let themselves be drawn into the glittering misery of the cities. Thus, through the melting together of the two otherwise hostile nations of city dwellers and farmers on one hand, and herdsmen on the other, and through the end of all danger of war, and through the end of all freedom, and through the despotism of powerful tyrants, on one hand, and through a merely initial culture, and through a soulless voluptuousness, and through the most depraved slavery, with all vices of the raw condition, on the other, the human species was irresistably deflected and diverted from the progress of the formation of its dispositions for the good, which had been predestined for it by nature. This end of freedom made unworthy to exist a humankind, that had been destined to be the master over the earth instead of being engaged in animal-like enjoyment, and in slave-like servitude.

Discontent with Providence

In Kant's historical-philosophical perspective, the thinking person feels a grief, which can even turn into the corruption of morals: the problem of theodicy¹. The thoughtless person does not know anything of such sorrow. Kant thought of the thinking person's grief of the discontent with the divine Providence, who governs the course of history in its totality. The thinking person falls into this

1. I. Kant, *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam Verlag, 1981, 3 - 13, 14 - 16; first to fourth piece.- *Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik*, op. cit. 85 - 102, 105 - 124. -W. Schmidt-Biggemann, *Theodizee und Tatsachen. Das philosophische Profil der deutschen Aufklärung*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988 part I. - C. Colpe /W. Schmidt-Biggemann (eds), *Das Böse. Eine historische Phänomenologie des Unerklärlichen*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1993, parts III, IV, V.

sorrow, when he considers and estimates the evils, which oppress the human species without hope for improvement. For Kant, it was, nevertheless, of the greatest importance, that people would be content with the divine Providence, nevertheless, in spite of the fact, that the providential God predestined human beings on this earth to such a toilsome and troublesome road. It is necessary for people to be content with Providence, so Kant argued, partially in order to remain courageous under the continual toilsomeness, and partially in order - as we push the guilt for it on fate - not to lose sight of our own guilt, which is maybe the only cause of all those evils, and to neglect the remedy against it, which might lay in self-improvement.

Armament

Kant had to admit, that the greatest evils, which are contained in the theodicy problem, and which oppress civilized nations, come to us indeed from war. But they come to us not even so much from the real war, or the one which has just happened, but rather from the never ceasing and always increased armament for future wars. All energies of the state, all fruits of its culture, which could be used for an even greater culture, are used up for armament. Thus, in many places freedom is very much diminished. The motherly providence of the political state for individual citizens is transformed into the merciless harshness of the demands, which are justified through the worry about external danger. However, so Kant asked, would this culture, this close connection of the estates of the polity for the purpose of the promotion of the well-being of the population, even that degree of freedom, which is still left over in spite of the limiting laws, still be found, if that always feared war would not force from the heads of states this respect for humanity?

Necessary Means

According to Kant, in the stage of history, in which the human species still finds itself at this time, war remains a necessary means to promote it further. Only after a complete culture - one based on the categorical imperative - has been achieved and established - and only God alone knows, when that will happen - a perpetual peace can be salutary and - through such perfect culture - alone possible. Thus, as far as this point is concerned, so Kant concluded, we ourselves are guilty for those evils, about which we so bitterly com-

plain. We do not live up to the categorical imperative. Thus, Kant considered the book *Genesis* to be completely correct, when it represents the melting together of nations into one society and their complete liberation from external danger - because their culture had just started - as a restraint and inhibition for all further culture, and an immersion into an incurable corruption and depravity.

Reason and Freedom

According to Kant, no irrational and as such unfree being can act morally. Morally good and evil actions, so Kant argued, presuppose reason and freedom. Thus, man's history of freedom begins with his fall: with evil. One most horrible example of this evil is war. Kant stood with his conception of evil in opposition not only to the bourgeois enlightenment, to which he himself belonged, but also to Rousseau, Johann, Wolfgang von Goethe, and Friedrich Schiller.

Means of Progress

In Kant's view, reason drives irresistably to the development and the progress of the human species. Kant admitted, that the development and progress of humankind can be to the disadvantage of individual human beings involved in it: historical progress has its victims. Thus, for Kant war, the «scourge of humankind», was on the cultural level of the 17th century an indispensable means of progress. But, so Kant argued, maybe war as means of progress is still necessary only, because true human culture has not yet really begun: the realization of the categorical imperative. In the war-ridden 19th century, Marx, following Kant and Hegel, thought, that the pre-history still continued, and that the truly human history had not yet begun¹. In the even more war-ridden 20th century, Max Horkheimer and Theodor, W. Adorno, and the other critical theorists still awaited the beginning of the truly human history pointing to alternative Future III - the liberated, reconciled, and as such peaceful society².

1. K. Marx und F. Engels, *Ausgewählte Schriften*, Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1953, Vol. I, 347-349; Vol. II, 13, 27, 65, 122, 123-125, 151, 152, 156, 160, 337, 363-366, 414 - 415, 437, 455, 459 - 475. - *Das Kapital*, op. cit. Vol. III, 873-874. - K. Marx, *Die Frühschriften*, Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1953, 322, 347, 353, 364-366.

2. M. Horkheimer, *Vorträge und Aufzeichnungen 1949-1973*, Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Verlag, 1985, chs. 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39,

Justification of Providence

The ideas of Kant's philosophy of history - progress of humankind, purpose of the totality of history - were well suited, to justify Providence against the everyday experiences as well as against the inexpedient and inappropriate details of history, as well as against the discontent of humans¹. According to Kant's practical theodicy, it is of the greatest importance for men, to be satisfied with Providence. In Kant's view, also wars - no matter how unsuitable, inappropriate, or inexpedient they might be for the individuals involved in them - are, nevertheless, providential as instruments of progress. A generation later, Hegel will still affirm this Kantian argument². However, during and after World War I and World War II, after Auschwitz and Dachau, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Horkheimer and the other critical theorists negated the Kantian and Hegelian position on the providential and moral character of war as mere ideology and mythology, i.e. untruth³.

Failure of the Theoretical Theodicy

Of course, Kant had no theoretical theodicy⁴. For Kant, a theoretical justification of divine Providence was as little possible as a

40. - *Zur Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft. Aus den Vorträgen und Aufzeichnungen seit Kriegsende*, Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Verlag, 1967, 335-354. - Th. W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, New York: The Seabury Press, 1973, part III. - *Ästhetische Theorie*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970, 9,12-13, 16, 24, 29, 33-35, 75-76, 103-104, 132-133, 199-200, 256-257, 286-287, 290-291, 297-298, 309-310, 315-316, 333-334, 359-360, 383-384, 386-387, 409-410, 529-530.

1. Kant, *Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik*, op. cit. Vol. 1, 85-102, 105-124. - Kant, *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, op. cit., first to fourth piece.

2. G. W. F. Hegel, *Jenaer Schriften 1801-1807*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986, 481-482. - *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986, 335, 353. - *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986, 492, 494.

3. M. Horkheimer, >Aus der Pubertät. Novellen und Tagebuchblätter< 1914-1918, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988, 19-364, 365, 375, 376-378. - *Dialektik der Aufklärung und Schriften 1940-1950*, op. cit. 45-47. - M. Horkheimer, *Sozialphilosophische Studien, Aufsätze, Reden und Vorträge 1930-1972*, Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Verlag, 1981, 13-32, 59-67, 137-144. - *Gesellschaft im Übergang. Aufsätze, Reden und Vorträge 1942 - 1970*, chs. 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13. - Th. W. Adorno, *Soziologische Schriften*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1979, Vol. I, 354-372, 373-391, 397-407, 408-433, 457-477, 578-587.

4. Kant, *Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik*, op. cit. Vol. I, 85-102, 105-124. - *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, op. cit. pieces one to four.

judgement about the existence or non-existence of God, or about the immortality of the soul, or about human freedom. Those ideas lay entirely outside the realm of possible experience, to which the knowledge of reason is limited, and were at best postulates necessary for communicative action. That precisely had been the result of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*¹. Kant reaffirmed this negative result still in his essay «On the Failure of all Philosophical Attempts concerning the Theodicy», of 1791, toward the end of his philosophical life². Kant could justify divine Providence in history, and thus the providentiality of war, only in terms of a practical postulate, not in terms of theoretical, rational insight. The providentiality of war was a matter of practical, not of pure reason.

Neither Hot nor Cold

Later, Hegel called Kant's philosophy as practical theodicy merely half a philosophy, which - being neither hot nor cold but rather lukewarm - was to be spit out of one's mouth, if it was not to lead to atheism³. Friedrich Nietzsche cancelled Kant's and Hegel's theodicies altogether, before he even started his own philosophy. The Nietzschean philosopher Vaihinger mitigated Kant's theodicy into an «as if» position: one was to live «as if» there was a Providence for the purpose of self-preservation, in spite of the fact that one knew better. The psychoanalyst of power, Alfred Adler, who followed Kant and Nietzsche and Vaihinger, weakened Kant's theodicy further by counselling, that we should hold on to the idea of Providence in the interest of mental health and survival, until it could be replaced by the further developed, and thus better equipped positive sciences.

Right of Resistance

Kant declared, that when the will of the lawmaker does not aim at the well being of his subjects, then he can also not oblige them to obey him⁴. Thus, Kant conceded in principle a right of resistance.

1. I. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Leipzig: P. Reclam jun., 1877, Zweiter Teil, Buch II, Kapitel III, Abschnitte 4-7.

2. Kant, *Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik*, op. cit. Vol. I, 105-124.

3. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, op. cit. 27-28.

4. Kant, *Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik*, op. cit. 85 - 102.

However, Kant rejected any right of revolution. But then again, Kant considered the condition of right, which has been created by a revolution, as obligatory and binding for the citizens. Kant's kind and benevolent attitude toward the great French Revolution as an event, which promoted the progress of humanity, contradicted its illegality as little, as his pacifism opposed his insight into the time-bound inevitability and unavoidability of war.

Man: Evil by Nature

Between 1792 and 1794, Kant tried to defend in his book *Religion in the Limits of Reason Alone* the traditional thesis, that man is evil by nature¹. That meant, according to Kant, that man is aware of the moral laws, but that he has, nevertheless, taken into his maxims the occasional deviation from them. In Kant's view, man has a natural inclination toward evil. Man has brought this evil inclination upon himself, and is thus responsible for it, in spite of the fact that it is at the same time radical and inborn. This Kantian paradox has its roots, of course, in the Judeo-Christian tradition: the *Genesis* Story of the Fall. For Kant, war is one of the most horrible forms, in which the evilness of human nature expresses itself.

The State of Nature

Kant knew of philosophers, who tried to prove, that man was not bad, but rather good by nature, by referring to and exploring man's natural condition: his original existence in the state of nature. However, Kant refuted those romantic philosophers' thesis, that man was good by nature - at least in the state of nature - by pointing to the unelicited cruelty in the murder scenes of Tofoa, New Zealand, and on the Navigator Islands. Kant read the reports of Captain Hearne about the never ceasing killing between the Arathapescou and Hundsribben Indians in the wide deserts of the American North West. Here, none of the combatants had any advantage from such murder scenes. There was no other intent behind the perpetual war between Arathapescou and Hundsribben Indians, except the mere killing for killing's sake. According to Kant, in the opinion of the native Americans of the North West, bravery in war was their highest virtue.

1. Kant, *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, op. cit. 20-25.

Valour

Kant knew, of course, that even in civilized conditions of man valour is often the object of great admiration, and a reason for the highest recognition and respect. Such recognition is particularly demanded by that estate in traditional and modern states, for which such respect is the only merit: the military class. Kant had to admit that this was so not without some grounding in reason. For Kant, that man can have something and make it into his purpose, e.g. his honor, and that he can esteem this something to be even higher than his own life and his self-preservation, and that he can thus give up all selfishness for this something and this purpose, does prove a certain sublimity in his disposition. However, Kant saw in the ease and comfortableness, with which the victors praised their great deeds - namely the merciless and bloody slaughter of their victims - that it was merely their superiority and the destruction which they could effect, and not any other purpose, e.g. their honor, of which they were really proud.

War Cruelties

If Kant looked at the war cruelties of uncivilized people, he found it very easy, to leave behind the hypothesis, that man was good by nature, and to turn to the hypothesis, that man was evil by nature. If, however, so Kant argued, somebody is inclined to the opinion, that the human nature can better be known in a civilized condition, in which it can develop its dispositions more adequately, then he has to listen to long melancholical litanies of accusations against humankind: about secret falseness in the even most intimate friendship, so that the moderation of trust in mutual relations even among the best friends is counted as a universal maxime of prudence in daily intercourse and association with others; about an inclination to hate particularly that person, to whom we owe most gratitude, which inclination every benefactor must take into consideration; about a hearty and cordial benevolence, which nevertheless allows for the remark, that there is something in the misfortune of our best friends, which does not completely displease us. Kant knew of many other vices, which are hidden under the appearance of virtues. Kant did not even want to speak of those vices, which make no secret of themselves, because we consider already that man to be good, who is an evil man of the general and common kind. Accord-

ing to Kant, who ever takes all that into consideration, he shall have enough of the vices of cultured and civilized nations - the most sickening vices of all - in order to prefer to turn away his eyes from the behaviour of human beings, so that he shall not fall into another vice, namely into misanthropy, and the disgust, and even hate of human beings. Particularly considering the most concrete expression of human evilness, namely war, Kant was - so to speak - ashamed of being a member of the human species, barbarous or civilized.

Combination of Barbarism and Civilization

If however, so Kant argued, a philosopher had - after seeing all the vices not only of uncivilized, but even also of halfway cultured and civilized people - still not enough reasons to accept the hypothesis, that man is evil by nature, he must only turn to the strange combination of barbarism and civilization, that can be found in the external historical conditions of nations. Here, civilized nations indeed stand to each other in the relationship of a raw and most barbarous state of nature: i.e. the state of a perpetual readiness and constitution of war. The nations have put it firmly into their heads, never to get out of this perpetual war situation. The philosopher can very easily become aware of the real principles - the principles of war - of the great societies, called states, which continually contradict their moral pretenses, and which they can never give up. Kant found these aggressive principles of states clearly revealed in their history.

The Mechanism of Nature

When Kant looked upon the history of states as the mere *phenomenon* of the - to a large extent - hidden inner tendencies and dispositions of humankind, then he observed a certain machine-like course of nature - the mechanism of nature. This mechanism of nature follows purposes, which are not the purposes of the acting nations, immediately involved in it. There is at work in the history of nations a certain cunning of nature. The mechanism of nature realizes its purposes, so to speak, behind the back of the nations. Thus, according to Kant, every state strives - as long as it has another state besides itself, which it might hope to overcome and to conquer, and through the subjugation of which it hopes to enlarge itself - finally toward an imperialistic universal monarchy. In the constitu-

tion of such universal monarchy, all freedom and with it all ontic, normative, and expressive elements of human existence, i.e. all science, virtue, and taste, is necessarily extinguished.

Universal Monarchy

However, so Kant argued, such universal monarchy, such monstrosity of a super-state, such Leviathan, in which the laws do slowly lose their legitimation and power, will - after it has swallowed up all neighbouring states - slowly dissolve itself. Then, of course, the universal monarchy, the super-state, will divide itself again through insurrection and separatism into many smaller states. These new smaller states will - instead of striving toward a union of states, a republic of freely associated nations - each for itself begin the imperialistic game all over again, in order under no circumstances to let come to an end the international war: the scourge of humanity. Kant admitted in the tradition of St. Augustine, that war is not entirely evil: it is certainly not so incurably evil as the grave of universal despotism or as an alliance of nations for the very purpose, to prevent despotism from disappearing in any state. However, Kant had no doubt concerning the old saying, that war unfortunately produces more bad people than it is able to take away.

Philosophical and Theological Chiliasm

Kant remembered from the history of philosophy, that there has been no philosopher yet, who was able to harmonize the evil war principles of states through morality. However, Kant was also reminded by the history of philosophy, that philosophers had not been able so far, to propose better principles, which could be harmonized with a good human nature. Kant considered this, to be a very bad situation. Thus, so Kant lamented, the philosophical chiliasm, that hopes for an eternal peace, which is grounded in a federation of nations as world republic, as well as the theological chiliasm, that waits for the complete moral improvement of the whole human species at the end of history, are ridiculed as pure revelling, enthusiasm, or fanaticism.

The Good and Evil Principle

According to Kant - here following the dualistic Zoroastrian tradition - as the juridical state of nature is a condition of war of ev-

everybody against everybody, thus also the ethical state of nature is a condition of the evil principle in man, unceasingly making war upon the good principle in him¹. The evil principle can be found in the one, as well as in the other. Thus, both ruin mutually their moral disposition: their good principle. Even in case of the good will of each individual, they nevertheless distance themselves from each other through the lack of a principle, which could unite them, and - as if they were tools of evil - through their discord and dissension from the common purpose of the good. Thus, the individuals bring each other into danger, to fall again into the hands of the domination of evil.

War of Everybody against Everybody

Furthermore, according to Kant, there is a condition of a lawless, external, brutal freedom and independence from compulsory laws, which is a condition of injustice and of war of everybody against everybody. In terms of Kant's theory of religion and right, man ought to move out of this condition of the war of everybody against everybody. He ought to move into a political civil condition. Kant agrees with Thomas Hobbes's sentence,

status hominum naturalis est bellum omnium
in omnes².

Kant just wanted to improve Hobbes' sentence a little bit by simply stating:

status hominum est status belli.

According to Kant, we must not right away concede, that among men, who do not stand under external and public laws, there will be dominant at any time real hostilities. However, the juridical condition among men, i.e. the relationship in and through which they are able to acquire and maintain rights, a situation arises, in which each of them wants himself to be the judge over that, what is his right, against others. At the same time, nobody has any security for his right from others, nor does anybody give security for the rights of the others. Thus, everybody has his own force, with which he maintains

1. Ibid. 20-163. - G.W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986, Vol. I, 395-405.

2. Kant, *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, op. cit. 20-50. - M. Horkheimer, *Nachgelassene Schriften 1914-1931*, Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Verlag, 1987, 103-132.

his right against the others¹. That precisely is a state of war. In this state of war, everybody must continually be armed against everybody.

Exit from the State of Nature

According to Kant, Hobbes' second sentence,
 exeundum esse ex statu naturali,
 follows logically from his first sentence,
 status hominum naturalis est bellum omnium
 in omnes.

In Kant's perspective, this is so, because the natural state of man is a continual violation of the rights of all others through the presumption of the one to be the judge of his own affairs, and to leave to the other people no security concerning their own matters, except his own arbitrariness. Thus, natural man must make all efforts, to step out of the ethical state of nature as a condition, in which one principle of virtue publicly makes war upon the other, and *vice versa*, and as a condition of internal immorality.

The Task

Kant wrote his essay «On Eternal Peace» in the year 1795². At that time, Kant had come to the end of the period, in which he had reached the highest level of his philosophical work, and had completed it. Kant had explored all, what human reason can achieve in all areas of human culture, including personal and social morality, as well as its limits. He had presented all that in his own critical philosophy: in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, his *Critique of Practical Reason*, and his *Critique of Judgement*³. It is obvious, that the development of Kant's critical philosophy in the past 25 years influenced deeply his essay «On Eternal Peace», and that the former

1. Kant, *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, op. cit. 20-45. - W. Benjamin, *Zur Kritik der Gewalt und andere Aufsätze. Mit einem Nachwort von Herbert Marcuse*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1978, chs. 4-6. - Habermas, *Die nachholende Revolution*, op. cit. 167-178, 179-204.

2. Kant, *Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik*, op. cit. Vol. I, 195-251.

3. Ibid. - Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, op. cit. parts I, II. - I. Kant, *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1982, 107-302. - *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974, 9-456, esp. 396-456.

constituted the latter's fundamental insights. In terms of those critical insights, we must state first of all, that Kant did not want in his essay to take a position in relation to the utopian goal of eternal peace, which is more or less passionately longed for by most nations. In reality, Kant was not too far away from the sober word of the Prussian General Moltke, that the eternal peace is a dream, and not even a beautiful one. Kant was also not very distant from the statement of Francois de Voltaire, that such a dream of eternal peace can exist as little among rulers and sovereigns as among elephants and rhinoceroses, or among wolves and dogs. According to Kant, the idea of eternal peace belongs like other concepts of reason - e.g. freedom, God, immortality - to the group of those notions, that transcend the realm and possibility of experience. To those ideas, no coinciding object can be given in the realm of the senses. Eternal peace belongs to those notions, in case of which reason has in mind only a systematic unity, to which it tries to approximate the possible empirical unity, without ever reaching it. Kant is not so much concerned with the goal, the eternal peace, simply because it lays in an infinite distance, and thus can never be completely reached. Kant is rather concerned with the very real task at hand, namely to find the practical way, on which the nations can at least approximate the goal of eternal peace. In Kant's view, the nations are able to work successfully at least toward the accomplishment of that task.

Moral Demands

It has become clear already from Kant's previous statements on war and peace, that he was not really engaged in philanthropy. What Kant is concerned with, however, are the moral demands concerning war and peace, which every rational being affirms, and with the right, which must finally be valid in the totality of the human species. Thus, Kant's statements about the way to eternal peace are based on his teaching on the idea of freedom, on the law of morality, and on right: shortly, the realization of the categorical imperative, and thus a genuine human culture.

The Idea of Freedom

Already 15 years before Kant wrote his essay «On Eternal Peace», he stated in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, that a state constitution of the greatest human freedom according to laws, which accom-

plish that every man's freedom can exist together with the freedom of the others, is at least a necessary idea, which one must presuppose not only in case of the first design of a constitution, but also in case of all legislation¹. For Kant, such freedom was the fundamental condition for a peaceful living together of people. Such freedom remained a firm cornerstone in the structure of Kant's critical philosophy.

Universal Will

According to Kant, as the idea of freedom so was also his teaching about the categorical imperative unshakeably built into the structure of his critical philosophy and system of reason, long before he started to apply it in his design «On Eternal Peace» to the historical process. In Kant's view, the categorical imperative, according to which for the individual the rational willing counts as moral, is valid also concerning the behaviour of nations among each other. The *a priori* given universal will, which has its seat and origin in reason, alone determines, what is right among humans in their communicative action. This thought had long been firmly grounded in Kant's theory of morality. It served also as the foundation for Kant's essay on a culture of perpetual peace based on the universal will of individuals and nations: his final thought on the most terrible problem of war.

II. Georg W. F. Hegel

From his earliest theological writings on up to his reconstruction of the ontological proof for the existence of God in the Summer and Fall Semester of 1831, and up to his cholera death in Berlin, on November 14th, 1831, Hegel considered his absolute-idealistic philosophy to be the determinate negation of Kant's relative-idealistic philosophy². Likewise, Hegel saw his own dialectical social philosophy of war and peace as the concrete nega-

1. Kant, *Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik*, op. cit. Vol. I, 195-251. - *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, op. cit. Vorwort zur zweiten Auflage; Zweiter Teil, Buch I, Abschnitte 1, 3; Buch II, Kapitel I, Kapitel II, Absätze 1, 2, 4, 6, 9/III/IV, Chapter III, Abschnitte 6,7; II. Transcendentale Lehre der Methode, Kapitel I, Abschnitt 2, Kapitel II, Abschnitt 1.

2. Hegel, *Frühe Schriften*, op. cit. 74, 188, 234, 254, 299, 301, 325-326, 359, 443. - G. W. F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag,

tion of Kant's critical philosophy of war and peace¹. Hegel did not only critically negate Kant's critical philosophy of war and peace, but he also preserved and elevated it into a qualitatively new form. Furthermore, Hegel developed his philosophy of war and peace on the basis of his very intense study of the Greek, Roman, medieval, Islamic, and modern European wars². Hegel tried to comprehend these wars by applying to them his dialectical method: determinate negation³. The combination of his vast historical knowledge and his dialectical method allowed Hegel to throw light not only on past and present wars and the consequent peace times, but also to penetrate the future, and to make suggestions, how the issue of war and peace should be dealt with in coming ages⁴. However, while

1986, Vol. I, 48-53. - *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1969, Vol. II, 421-447, 501-517, 518-528, 528-535. - *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, op. cit. 72-75. - *Jenaer Schriften 1801-1807*, op. cit. 9-10, 11, 51, 70, 80-81, 90, 103-104, 141-154, 176, 204-205, 251, 260, 269, 270, 271, 287-433. - H. Küng, *Menschwerdung Gottes. Eine Einführung in Hegels Theologisches Denken als Prolegomena zu einer künftigen Christologie*, Freiburg: Herder Verlag, 1970, 499-500.

1. Kant, *Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik*, op. cit. Vol. I, 33-50, 53-61, 85-102, 105-124, 195-251. - *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, op. cit. 41 A, 123, 124, 124 A, 39 A, 40, 41, 163. - Hegel, *Frühe Schriften*, op. cit. 198, 462, 485-491, 539-540, 545, 571, 604. - *Jenaer Schriften 1801-1807*, op. cit. 481-482. - *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, op. cit. 335-353. - *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, op. cit. 492, 493, 494, 502. - G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986, 313-315, 324-330, 369, 370. - *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986, Vol. II, 85, 133. - *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986, Vol. III, 353. - *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, op. cit. Vol. I, 216. - *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986, 483.

2. Hegel, *Frühe Schriften*, op. cit. 198, 462, 485-491, 539-540, 545, 571, 604. - *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, op. cit. 492, 494, 502. - *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, op. cit. 313-315, 324-330, 369, 370. - *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, op. cit. 216. - *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, op. cit. Vol. III, 353.

3. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, op. cit. 37, 61, 66, 68-77, 160, 161, 543. - *Wissenschaft der Logik*, op. cit. Vol. I, 48-53.

4. G.W.F. Hegel, *Nürnberger und Heidelberger Schriften 1808-1817*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986, 56, 87, 90-91, 91-96, 96-99, 99-102, 164, 209-210, 210-211, 406, 414, 415, 441, 450, 452. - *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, op. cit. 16, 38-39, 39, 78-79, 79, 80, 37, 61, 66, 137, 160, 161, 543, 585. - *Wissenschaft der Logik*, op. cit. Vol. I, 48, 50, 51, 52, 105-106, 109, 110, 111, 131, 138, 193. - *Je-*

Kant trusted that people could indeed learn from history, Hegel was much more pessimistic: experience and history had taught him, that nations and governments have never learned anything from history—particularly not how to keep peace¹. Maybe, this deficiency could be corrected through the determinate supersession of Kant's and Hegel's philosophy of war and peace into a new critical theory of subject and inter-subjectivity, society and history². Such critical theory could take into consideration the horrible experience of hundreds of wars, which have been fought since Hegel's death in 1831, particularly World War I and World War II. It could apply to them the modern dialectical method, which Kant initiated, and which Hegel developed, and which Adorno concretely superseded into his negative dialectics³. It could teach individuals and nations, how to combine Kant's subjective-idealistic conception of peace-keeping with Hegel's objective- and absolute-idealistic, and as such more realistic notion of peace-making.

Wars of Ambition

In 1795, at the age of 25, Hegel remembered in his essay on «The Positivity of the Christian Religion» in Bern, Switzerland, that the wars, which had eaten up millions of Germans in past centuries, had really been wars of political ambition, or wars of inde-

naer Schriften 1801-1807, op. cit. 512, 541. - *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, op. cit. 422, 500. - *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, op. cit. 352. - Th. W. Adorno, *Drei Studien zu Hegel*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1969, 21-22. - Horstmann, *Seminar: Dialektik in der Philosophie Hegels*, op. cit. parts one to three.

1. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, op. cit. 17. - *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, op. cit. 492, 494, 502, - *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, op. cit. Vol. III, 353.

2. M. Horkheimer, *Critical Theory*, New York: The Seabury Press, 1968, chs. 3, 5, 6, 7, 8. - *Vorträge und Aufzeichnungen 1949-1973*, op. cit. ch. 40. - J. Habermas / D. Henrich, *Zwei Reden. Aus Anlass des Hegel-Preises*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974, 25-75. - *Theory and Practice*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1974, chs. 3, 4, 5. - *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, op. cit. ch. VIII. - *Moralbewusstsein und kommunikatives Handeln*, op. cit., chs. 3, 4. - *Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik*, op. cit. / parts I-III. - *Die nachholende Revolution*, op. cit. 179-204. - *Texte und Kontexte*, op. cit. part III.

3. M. Horkheimer, *Nachgelassene Schriften 1931-1949*, Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Verlag, 1985, 483-492. - Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, op. cit. parts two and three.

pendence of the princes¹. In those wars, the German nation was merely a tool. Even if the German nation fought those wars with exasperation, rage, and fury, at the end of each war the Germans never knew to say, why they had fought this war in the first place: what had they really gained from it?

The Reformation

For the Lutheran theologian and philosopher, Hegel, who not too long ago had left the Protestant Seminary in Tübingen, Germany, the Protestant Reformation and the bloody wars to assert the right to make one, were a few occasions in German history, in which at least a part of the German nation took some interest. Thus, the interest, which the German nation took in the Reformation and the wars connected with it, did not soon evaporate again, as did, e.g., the earlier interest in the Crusades, when the imagination soon grew cold. This interest in the Reformation and its wars, so Hegel argued was particularly active in the German nation's feeling of an abiding right: the right to follow in one's religious opinions the religious conviction, which one had bravely fought for, and which one had maintained.

The Augsburg Confession

But Hegel asked quite realistically: which feast celebrates the memory of the Reformation and the wars, which made it possible and preserved it, except the yearly reading of the Augsburg Confession in some Protestant churches, which usually bores the listeners to death, and except the cold sermon, which follows it? It appeared to Hegel, as if the authorities in church and state would like to see the very memory, that the ancestors once felt this right to make a reformation, and that thousands of them really dared to give their lives for the assertion of this right, fall asleep as soon as possible in the souls of the people: the memory is not to be kept alive under any circumstances!

Absolute Freedom

In 1796, Hegel developed in Frankfurt a.M., Germany, together with his former co-seminarians and his friends, Friedrich Höl-

1. Hegel, *Frühe Schriften*, op. cit. 198, 462, 485-491.

derlin and Friedrich W. J. Schelling, «The Oldest System Program of German Idealism»¹. Here, Hegel moved from nature, which he had considered in terms of a new physics, to the work of man: society, state, and history. Here, the first idea was that of humanity. Then Hegel wanted to show, that there is no idea of the state. This is so, because the state is something mechanical. At that early time Hegel did not yet - as later on in his *Philosophy of Right* - differentiate sharply between civil society as the external, mechanical state of want and analytical understanding on one hand, and the organic, political state, on the other². Thus, Hegel could argue, that there can be as little an idea of the state as there can be an idea of a machine. Only what is an object of freedom can be called an idea. Thus, Hegel wanted to go beyond civil society as the mechanical, machine-like state, because such state must necessarily treat free people as mechanical wheelwork, in order to exist. The state should not treat people that way. But the state does so anyway. Thus, according to Hegel, here anticipating Karl Marx, civil society as mechanical state of want and analytical understanding should cease to exist. In this connection, Hegel thought that all ideas, including the Kantian idea of perpetual or eternal peace, should be subordinated to a higher idea: namely the idea of the absolute freedom of all spirits, who carry the intellectual world in themselves, and who search neither for God nor for immortality outside of themselves.

The Moral Health of the State

As early as 1800, there appears in Hegel's essay on the «First Designs for an Introduction to the German Constitution» his answer to the question, which he had posed five years earlier: Why wars?³ Hegel answered: in order to keep or restore the moral health of the nation. By now, Hegel understood the state as being differentiated from civil society: as organic state, dialectically containing in itself the family and civil society as concretely superseded subsystems⁴. Hegel - who never personally participated in the Na-

1. Ch. Jamme / H. Schneider (eds), *Mythologie der Vernunft. Hegels > ältestes Systemprogramm < des deutschen Idealismus*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1984, 11-14.

2. Ibid. - Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, op. cit. 339-397, 398-514.

3. Hegel, *Frühe Schriften*, op. cit. 462.

4. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, op. cit. part III.

poleonic or any other wars, except once being «crushed» as an «innocent flower» by the «world-historical individual», Napoleon, in Jena, Germany, in 1807, and his property being «demolished», and he being plundered by the great man's victorious army, and being driven out of town, and having escaped in the poorest condition to Bamberg, Germany - nevertheless never deviated from this answer, that war is a means to keep or restore the moral health of the organic state, up to his late philosophies of right and history, almost 20 years later¹.

War - The Father of All Things

Hegel understood himself very much as the Heraclitos of the 18th and 19th centuries². There was not one element of Heraclitos' teaching, which Hegel did not integrate into his dialectical logic: here, in Heraclitos' work, Hegel saw the first time «land» in the history of philosophy³. One of the famous sayings of Heraclitos, which Hegel included into his philosophy, was:

Polemos pater panton.

Throughout his life and philosophy, Hegel maintained, like Heraclitos, that war was indeed the father of all thing: even of the moral health of the nation state. Of course, also Kant had not been so far away from the Heraclitian position, when he understood war as an instrument of progress on man's long march toward a true humanity, which finally could live up to the categorical imperative, and thus could live in a culture of peace. Paradoxically enough, for Her-

1. Ibid. 492-493. G.W. F. Hegel, *Jenaer Kritische Schriften*, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1968, 450.-*Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, op. cit. 48-49. - H. Glockner, *Hegel, Schwierigkeiten und Voraussetzungen der Hegelschen Philosophie*, Stuttgart - Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1964, 276.

2. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, op. cit. Vol. I, 84, 185, 226.- G.W. F. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986, Vol. I, 57, 193; Vol. II, 146, 336, 522. - *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, op. cit. 499. - G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986, Vol. I, 14, 194, 215, 238, 301, 319-343, 346-347, 348, 353, 355, 356, 379, 382, 390, 406; Vol. II, 66, 153, 257, 263-264, 265, 363, 432; Vol. III 459.

3. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, op. cit. Vol. 18, 320.

acleitos, Kant, and Hegel, war was the father of ultimate peace, if indeed it could be achieved at all. The paradox is echoed in the during the 20th century often repeated Wilsonian saying of the

War, to end all wars!

The Tranquillity of Peace and the Movement of War

According to Hegel - at the age of 30 - the moral health of the state reveals itself not so much in the tranquillity of peace, but rather in the movement of war¹. The tranquillity of peace, so Hegel argued, is a condition of enjoyment and of activity in separation and isolation in the dimension of civil society. In times of peace, the government acts like a wise family father, an earthly providence, who demands merely the usual services from the governed people, e.g. taxes. In peace, the arteries of society and state threaten to harden. Everything in society and state becomes reified. That can mean moral illness, and even death. It seems that the whole philosophical development from Kant's relative idealism to Hegel's absolute idealism, and even still to Marx's historical materialism, had no other intent, than to conquer reification. However that may be, for Hegel in any case war overcomes reification: thus also moral illness and death. In the movement of war the energy of the inter-connection of all people with the totality of the political state shows itself. Now, it becomes obvious, how much the state is prepared to demand from its citizens: how much that is worth, what the citizens are willing to do for the state out of their own drives, and their own hearts. Hegel anticipated President J. F. Kennedy's and President W. Clinton's political, relative idealism:

Dont' ask, what your country can do for you,
but rather ask, what you can do for your
country!

That political application of the Golden Rule and the categorical imperative means national health and survival. To be sure, in the face of the enormous weapon technology of the 20th century, other means must be found to resolve the indeed tremendous reification of human relations in liberal democratic society, and to restore its moral health, and to guarantee its survival, instead of new devastating wars.

1. Hegel, *Frühe Schriften*, op. cit. 462, 485-491.

The Napoleonic Wars and the Following Peace

According to Hegel, in its wars with Napoleon and the French Republic Germany had finally experienced, that it was no longer a real state. Through the Napoleonic wars as well as through the peace treaty, which followed and concluded it, Germany became aware of its real political condition. The empirically very real results of the Napoleonic wars for Germany were: the loss of some of its most beautiful parts, as well as of millions of its inhabitants; and an enormous burden of war debts, which oppressed northern Germany even more than southern Germany. This debt prolonged the misery of the Napoleonic wars far into the following peace time. Besides those German states, which came under the control of the French conquerors, and under the domination of foreign laws as well as customs, habits, usages, manners and morals, there were other German states, which lost, what was their highest good: to be truly sovereign states. They lost their statehood. For Hegel, each nation had the right to statehood. A nation's inability to achieve its rightful statehood or the actual loss of its sovereignty, are its greatest misfortunes. What Hegel meant here in the Germany of the 18th and 19th centuries, the Germany of the 20th century has most painfully and tragically experienced after the end of World War II: the loss of its sovereignty. Only in recent days (9.16.1994) Germany has been able to restore its full sovereignty after the departure of the allied forces of World War II from Berlin.

Military Talent and Bravery

According to Hegel, the continuation of the German military talent itself proved, that those troops and bands of armed men still present in Germany even after the end of the Napoleonic wars and the peace treaty, were not idle at all. New German wars could easily follow, and indeed they did follow, and that more than ever before throughout the 19th century, and particularly in the 20th century. Since centuries, so Hegel remembered, no significant war took place among European nations, in which not German bravery and valour acquired, if not laurels, then, nevertheless, always honor, and in which not streams of German blood were flowing.

Defenselessness

However, so Hegel argued, in spite of the multitude of Germany's inhabitants, their military talents, the readiness of their masters and lords to shed their blood, its wealth of dead as well as living requirements and equipments of war, there was no other country, which was more defenseless, and less able to conquer, but only to defend itself. In Hegel's view, in the Germany of 1799 / 1800, not even the attempts, or the mere aspiration of defense, were significant or honorable.

Larger and Smaller Estates of the Realm

Hegel differentiated the armed forces of Germany into the military of the larger and smaller estates of the realm. As far as the smaller estates were concerned, their armies, troupes, etc. could usually not be more than mere police-or parade-soldiers. They could not be real warriors, who do not know anything higher than the glory of their large army, and their service in it. The military spirit, so Hegel argued, which elevates the heart of every soldier of a large army, when he hears the word «our army», his being proud of his status and service, the very soul of an army, can not really develop in the guard of an imperial city, or in the body guard of an Abbot. The kind of respect, which the look at the uniform of large armies awakens in the still unknown individual, who wears it, can not possibly belong to the uniform of an imperial city. According to Hegel the statement «I have been 20, 30 years in this military service», carries along in the mouth of even the best soldier of a small estate of the realm a completely different feeling and effect than in the mouth of an officer of a large army. In Hegel's view, the self-esteem of a man, and the respect of others for him, grows with the largeness of the social totality, to which he belongs. He participates in the glory, which centuries have heaped on his large estate, and on its large army. In contrast to all types of positivists since the Right-Hegelian, A. Comte, for the dialectician Hegel, quantity does indeed turn over into quality in military as well as in all other human and natural affairs¹. Thus, today an American citizen may enjoy the respect,

1. Ibid. 485-491.- Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, op. cit. Vol. I, 80, 174, 199, 209-386, 387. - *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, op. cit. Vol. I, 195, 206, 208, 209-224. - *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, op. cit. Vol. III 344-345.-Horkheimer, *Vorträge und Aufzeichnungen 1949-1973*, Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Verlag, 1985, ch. 23.

which he receives in Europe and other parts of the world for being a member of the only «super-power» left, after the desintegration of the Soviet Union, since 1989.

Military Weakness

In Hegel's view, if Germany's military weakness was neither the consequence of cowardness, nor of military unfitness and of the unfamiliarity with those skills, which in more recent times bravery needs in order to become victorious, and if the empirical contingencies give in every battle occasion for the greatest proofs of the German soldiers' courage and of their sacrificial spirit, and if those soldiers show themselves worthy of the old glory of war of the Germans and of their ancestors, then it is the arrangement of the social totality, the German nation, and the general desintegration of its state organization, which waste fruitlessly the efforts and the sacrifices of innumerable individuals and corps, and put a curse on the whole German political and military enterprise. According to Hegel, this terrible curse ruins -no matter how hard the individual soldiers may try to fight- all their effects and consequences. It makes the individual soldiers equal to a farmer, who puts seeds into the ocean, or who plows the rocks.

Autonomy and Solidarity

For Hegel, the individual is - in spite of his personal freedom - nevertheless very much preformed and predetermined by the social totality, the nation, to which he belongs: be it in his successes, or in his failures. While Hegel did indeed take into consideration and always preserved the difference between the particular and the universal, the citizen and the state, autonomy and solidarity, their balance and identity has priority for the absolute idealist¹. Hegel leaned toward the socialist reconciliation of autonomy and solidarity². For Hegel, genuine autonomy was not possible without solidarity, and *vice versa*. Socialist solidarity without autonomy is as untrue as bourgeois autonomy without solidarity. It was not an accident,

1. Hegel, *Frühe Schriften*, op. cit. 462, 485-491. - *Wissenschaft der Logik*, op. cit. Vol. II. 273-300. - *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, op. cit. Vol. III, 352.

2. Hegel, *Frühe Schriften*, op. cit. 485-491. - *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, op. cit. Vol. III, 351-352. - J. Habermas, *Autonomy and Solidarity*, Thetford, Norfolk: The Thetford Press, 1986, chs. 1-7.

that Hegel became the teacher of socialists from Karl Marx and V.I. Lenin through Georg Lukacs to Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse¹. In spite of the breakdown of Eastern European real socialism under the pressure of different nationalisms, or maybe precisely because of it, the socialist critique of bourgeois autonomy will continue until late capitalist society changes its identity in such a way, that a real balance and reconciliation between sovereignty and universal solidarity can be achieved, in the world-historical process². As Eastern European really existing socialism was threatened from its very start and finally succumbed not only to nationalisms, but also, and particularly so, to its lack of autonomy, so liberal democratic society remains threatened not only by nationalisms, but also, and particularly so, by its lack of solidarity, and its consequent inability to tame a monopoly and oligopoly capitalism, that is running wild.

Wars of Aggression and of Defense

According to Hegel's essay on «The Constitution of Germany» of 1802, the different parties of combatants can never agree, if they should call wars wars of aggression or wars of defense³. In any case, in Hegel's view, wars would be called unjust only, if the peace treaties would stipulate an unconditional, mutual peace. In Hegel's view, even if Kant's expression of an eternal peace and friendship among the nations has indeed that element of an unconditional, mutual peace, then it is, nevertheless, to be understood with the limitations, which

1. Hegel, *Frühe Schriften*, op. cit. 485-491.- Marx, *Das Kapital*, op. cit. Vol. 1, 17-18. - Horkheimer, *Vorträge und Aufzeichnungen 1949-1973*, op. cit. ch. 23. - *Nachgelassene Schriften 1914-1931*, Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Verlag, 1987, 100-118, 171-188. - *Nachgelassene Schriften 1914-1931*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1990, 11-168. - *Philosophische Frühschriften, 1922-1932*, Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Verlag, 1987, 295-311.- *Nachgelassene Schriften 1931-1949*, op. cit. 483-492. - Adorno, *Drei Studien zu Hegel*, op. cit. chs. 1-3.-H. Marcuse, *Hegel's Ontology and the Theory of Historicity*, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987, parts I, II. - *Reason and Revolution, Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1960, Parts I and II.-Habermas, *Zur Rekonstruktion des historischen Materialismus*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1976, ch. 4. - H.G.Gadamer /J. Habermas, *Das Erbe Hegels. Zwei Reden aus Anlass des Hegel-Preises*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1979, 9-32.

2. Hegel, *Frühe Schriften*, op. cit. 485-491.- Adorno, *Soziologische Schriften*, op. cit. Vol. I, 354-372, 578-587. - Habermas, *Die nachholende Revolution*, op. cit. 179-204.

3. Hegel, *Frühe Schriften*, op. cit. 539-602.

lay in the nature of things: before a nation state attacks, or acts in a hostile way. No state can agree to letting itself be treated in a hostile way, or to let itself be attacked, while it itself does not defend itself, and keeps the peace.

Types of Hostilities

In Hegel's view, the types of international hostilities have such an infinite possibility, that they can not be determined at all by human, analytical understanding. The more determinations, so Hegel argued, the partner-states set up - i.e. the more rights they posit - the easier can come about a contradiction among such particular rights. If one partner-nation pursues a particular right, which has been granted to it, to such an extent as it has been given to it, then it will necessarily violate some other right, which belongs to the other partner-state. In order to prove his point, Hegel asked his readers simply to explore the mutual manifests and official state documents, which in the case of a conflict of two states always contain the accusations of one state against the behaviour of the other power, and the justification of its own actions.

Rights

According to Hegel, every partner-nation bases its own behaviour on rights, and accuses the other partner-state of the violation of a right. The right of the one state A has been violated in one right a, which belongs to it, by the state B. However, the state B declares that it has asserted its own right b, and that this can not be seen as a violation of the right of B. The public takes sides. Every partner-state asserts, that it has the right on its own side. In Hegel's perspective, both parties are right. It is precisely the rights themselves, which have come into contradiction with each other.

Friends of Humanity

In Hegel's ironical and dialectical view, particularly the friends of humanity and the moralists, who criticize politics as an effort and as the art, merely to seek one's own advantage for the price of the right of the other party, and as a system and a work of injustice, and the impartial public, which rants about politics, i.e. a crowd without interests and without a fatherland, the ideal virtue of which

is the tranquillity of the ale-house, accuse politics of insecurity, infidelity, and of unsteadiness of law. The public is participating in, and is, therefore, distrustful of the form of right, in which the interests of its state appear. If those interests are the public's own, then it will also assert the form of right. However, so Hegel argued, those interests are the real driving force, and not the form of right. Dialectically and ironically Hegel stated, that if the friends of right and morality - who love humankind - had a real interest of their own, then they could comprehend, that the interests of nations, and, therefore, also the rights themselves, can come into collision with each other, and that it is foolish and silly, to oppose the interest of the state - or as it is expressed with a word, which is more malicious for morality - the profit of the state, to right.

Internal Wars

In Hegel's view, as far as free associations of German states against external powers were concerned, those took the place - when Germany did not mangle, lacerate, and tear itself to pieces internally, but protected itself against external enemies - of the real empire wars. What princes and estates did, was the free will of individual county-associations: as the lawful, generally obligating decision of a body of state. According to Hegel, for some time, the state of Brandenburg still appeared to be in connection with the German Empire. But this was so, not because of Brandenburg's duties toward the German Empire. Brandenburg rather acted independently. Its main purpose was the royal crown of Prussia. In Hegel's perspective, the wars of the 18th century were internal wars, i.e. civil wars: inside the German Empire. However, during the recent wars against Napoleon's France, so Hegel argued, when at a certain point in time Germany threatened to come into severe danger, there was more of a common will among German states, to participate in the defense of Germany in its totality. Almost all German states participated in the wars against the Napoleonic France. But Hegel could not identify any point in time, in which *all* German states fought together against France. During the largest part of the anti-Napoleonic wars, particularly the most powerful German states separated themselves from the German Anti-Napoleon alliance.

Change in the Nature of War

Hegel remembered, that since the German Emperor Charles V the Spanish and the Austrian monarchies were no longer united. Since 1700, both monarchies were owned by completely different families. Austria has lost large provinces. France and England elevated themselves to an equal greatness of power. Prussia and Russia constituted themselves. Since a long time, Austria is no longer the monarchy, which would have no equal in Europe. According to Hegel, since 1700 a European system of ballance of power has established itself. It is a system of ballance, with the help of which usually all powers of Europe take interest in a war, and in which every power is prevented from harvesting the fruits even of the luckiest war either alone, or also only in proportion to their fought for advantages. At the same time, the wars have changed their nature to such an extent, that the conquering of a few islands, or of a province, costs years of effort and gigantic sums of money.

No Chance

In Hegel's view, the idea of a universal monarchy has always been an empty word. The very fact, that when the plan of such a universal monarchy had been designed, it was not executed in reality, demonstrated to Hegel the impossibility of its realization, and thus the emptiness of this thought. However, so Hegel argued, in more recent times, i.e. around 1800, such a project as an universal monarchy has no chance any longer at all. Fundamentally, Hegel was as much opposed to the idea of an universal monarchy, as Kant had been.

Austria and Prussia

Around 1800, Hegel saw in Germany instead of an universal monarchy an over-powerful Austria. Austria had become more powerful than any other German state. Austria had become more powerful than many German estates together. At the same time, Prussia had elevated itself into a relationship of power almost equal to that of Austria. In Hegel's view, both, Austria and Prussia, posed an equally great danger to the other German estates. In the power of his very extensive and intensive knowledge of German and European history and of his dialectical method, Hegel was able to predict quite

correctly, that what usually had called itself «German freedom» had to be on its guard against Austria, as well as against Prussia.

The Power of War

In his «Fragments of a Constitutional Design» of 1801, Hegel criticized, that one German state leaves the attacked other estate - possibly through a neutrality treaty - to the devastating superiority of the enemy of the German Empire, and to its own weakness¹. Hegel remembered, that one German state pronounced during the Empire-war against Napoleon's France, that its associations do not allow it, to participate in the establishment of an Empire-army, and in the payment of the «Roman months» for the war. For Hegel, there was no holier obligation for any German estate than its fief-obligation toward the German Empire. The German states did not think so. Even the Empire-laws gave the estates the right, to conclude treaties with foreign powers. Therefore, every state had legally the choice between the association with the Empire on one hand, and the association with foreign powers, on the other. The German Empire refused, to give itself a constitution, through which it would be strong enough, to protect its member estates against external enemies. Thus, the state, which is in danger, is put into the condition of nature. It is legitimated and obligated, to care for itself as good as it is able to. In Hegel's view, it would be extremely unnatural to demand from any estate, to depend on an Empirical protection, which is obviously unable to protect it, and which is really rejected legally and rightfully through the very right of each particular state to conclude treaties, if necessary even with the Empire-enemy: i.e. not to grant the protective contingents. Thus, it can become necessary for the smaller and weaker estates in a certain international constellation, to put themselves under the protection of powers external to the German Empire.

Absolute Social Morality: The Necessity of War

In his essay «On the Scientific Forms of the Treatment of the Natural Law, and its Position in the Practical Philosophy and its Relationship to the Positive Legal Sciences» of 1803, the absolute idealist Hegel stated, that in the absolute social morality of the or-

1. Ibid. 603-610.

ganic state the infinity or the form of the absolute negative mastering is nothing else than the overcoming, conquering, subduing of itself being taken up into its absolute notion¹. Here, the state's negative mastering does not relate itself to singular determinations, but to its whole reality and possibility: namely to the nation's life itself. That means, that matter is equal to the infinite form. But that must happen in such a way, that the positive of the state is its absolute social morality: namely the belonging of the individual to the nation. The individual proves unambiguously his identity with the nation in the negative alone: namely, through the danger of death. Through the absolute identity of the infinite, or of the side of the relationship with the positive, the socio-moral totalities, the nation-states, form themselves. Thus, the nations constitute themselves as individuals. Hereby the individual nations put themselves up against other individual nations. This position and individuality of the nations is the side of reality. If the nations are thought of without this reality, then they are only abstract thoughts. That would be the abstraction of the essence, without the absolute form. Such essence would be unessential. This relationship of national individuality to national individuality is a double relationship. The one relationship is the positive one: the quiet, tranquil, calm, equal being besides each other of two or more nations, in peace time. The other relationship is the negative one: the exclusion of one nation from the other in war. For Hegel, both relationships are absolutely necessary. Hegel comprehended the second, negative relationship as a rational relationship: as a mastering by the nation-state, which has been taken up into its notion, or as absolutery formal virtue: bravery. According to Hegel, this second side of the relationship posits for the form and the individuality of the moral totality, the nation, the necessity of war.

The Possibilities of Annihilation and Self-preservation

According to Hegel, war contains in itself the free possibility, that not only singular determinations of a state, but their entireness and completeness, the national life itself, is annihilated. This happens for the absolute itself: i.e. for the universal national life. As Hegel had said already in his *Early Writings*, war also contains in

1. Hegel, *Jenaer Kritische Schriften*, op. cit. 449-464.

itself the free possibility, to preserve the moral health of the nations through their indifference against their particular determinations: e.g. against their habits, and their petrification, and their reification. Hegel compared war with the movement of the winds, which preserves the lakes from rottenness, into which a perpetual stillness would get them. Hegel argued against Kant, that likewise a perpetual, not to speak of an eternal peace would bring the nations into putridity and decay. That precisely was Hegel's absolute-idealist theodicy or justification of the evil of war: war is necessary for the nations moral health¹.

The Lord Death

Hegel stated in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* of 1807, that the polity organizes itself into the sub-systems of the personal independence, and of the private property, and of the rights of the person and of things². Likewise, the community differentiates the modes of work first of all in terms of singular purposes: the acquisition and enjoyment of things. It distributes the individuals into associations, and makes them as such independent. The spirit of the universal polity is the simplicity and negative being of such self-isolating sub-systems. In order to prevent these sub-systems from rooting themselves too deeply into that isolation and from getting petrified and reified in it, and in order to hinder the social totality from thus falling apart and to let its spirit dissipate, the government must shake, shock, and move through war the sub-systems of the national totality in their very interiority, from time to time. The government must violate and confuse through war the self-made order and right of the independence of those sub-systems. Also through the imposition of war, the government must make the individuals, who have immersed themselves too deeply into those particular sub-systems of the state, and who have thus torn themselves loose from the social totality of the nation, and who have thus exclusively aimed at their own unviolable being-for-themselves, their privacy, and their personal security, feel their lord, death. The spirit of the nation does ward

1. Hegel, *Jenaer Schriften 1801-1807*, op. cit. 481-482. - Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, op. cit. 28, 540. - *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, op. cit. Vol. I, 88. - *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, op. cit. Vol. II, 497; Vol. III, 248, 455.

2. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, op. cit. 334-353.

off through such liquidation of the form of the *status quo* of the state the immersion of the individuals into an alienated and reified natural existence, isolated from their moral existence in the unity and identity of the state, and thus maintains and elevates the self of its consciousness into the freedom and into its energy. The negative being of the universal, national spirit, shows itself as the real power of the polity, as the energy of its self-preservation, as its truth, and as the reinforcement of its power. Thus, the national community has the truth and the reinforcement of its power in the being of the divine law of the family and of the subterranean realm. At present (9.16. 1994), President Clinton confuses through the preparation of the invasion of Haiti the different fixed sub-systems of the American society and the individuals rooted in them, and they show their dislike of such violation of their bourgeois tranquillity through negative polls, criticisms, and protests, without really disturbing him: he knows, he is right.

Individuality as Weapon

According to Hegel, the polity can maintain itself only through the oppression of the spirit of individuality. However, because the spirit of individuality is, nevertheless, also an essential element of the national community, it likewise generates it. Nevertheless, the universal polity preserves itself through its oppressing attitude against the particular spirit of individuality as a hostile principle. However, this hostile principle of individuality would not accomplish anything by itself, because it is as being separate from the universal purpose of the national community merely evil, null, and void in itself. The principle of individuality can be effective only, if universal polity itself recognizes the energy of the individualistic youth - the manhood, which is not yet mature, and which still stands inside the singularity - as the energy of the social whole. This is so, because the community is a nation. As a nation, the polity is itself individuality. The nation is essentially for itself only in such a way, that other universal individualities, other nations, are for it: that it excludes them from itself, and that it knows itself as being independent from them. The negative side of the community, which in its own internality oppresses the singularization of the individuals, is, nevertheless, auto-active toward the outside, toward other nations. The community uses the individuality of the young individuals as weapon in its war

against other nations. For Hegel, the war is the spirit and the form in which the essential element of the socio-moral substance, the absolute freedom of the socio-moral self-being, is present before all accidental, individual existence: as reality and verification. As on one hand the war makes the particular systems of property and of personal independence, as well as also the individual personality itself, feel the power of the negative, of death, on the other hand in war this negative being elevates itself into that, what maintains the social totality of the state.

The Battlefield

According to Hegel, the brave young man, whom the young woman desires and enjoys, the repressed principle of corruption and destruction, steps into the bright daylight on the battlefield, and here he is precisely that, what has not only facticity, but also fullest validity. Now, on the battlefield, it is the natural energy of the young man, and that what appears as accidentality of luck, which decides over the existence of the socio-moral being and its spiritual necessity. Because the socio-moral being rests on the physical strength and the luck of the young soldier, it is already decided, that the latter has gone under. As in Greece the Penates went under in the spirit of the nation, so in the following Roman Empire the living spirits of the nations desintegrated into the universal polity. Its simple universality is spiritless and dead. Its vivacity is the singular individual, as individual. The socio-moral form of the Greek spirit has disappeared. The Roman life form takes its place.

Civil Society and Political State

According to Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* of 1821, we would end up with a very wrong account, if in case of war we would demand from the individual the sacrifice of his property, and his well-being, and even of his life, and if at the same time we would understand the state as civil society -as he himself had once done in his «Oldest System Program of German Idealism» 25 years earlier- and if we would take as the state's final purpose the security of the individual citizens' property, well-being, and life in the framework of civil society and family¹. Certainly, such security of the individual hour-

1. Jamme /Schneider, *Mythologie der Vernunft*, op. cit. 11-14; chs. II-IV. -Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, op. cit. 492-502.

geois is not achieved through the sacrifice of what is to be secured: namely his property, well-being, and life. To the contrary! For Hegel, in this statement lay the socio-moral moment of war, and its theodicy as ethical justification. Following St. Augustine, Hegel did not consider war to be an absolute evil, as the early Christians had done in terms of their dualistic theodicy¹. Augustine - who had been a Manichean himself for 8 years - had - outrageously enough - called the Christians of the first 400 years of Church history «Manicheans», because of their abstract negation, i.e. total condemnation of war in conformity to the Sermon on the Mount. Also, according to Hegel, war is not to be considered as a mere external accidentality, which has its accidental grounding in the mere passions and selfish interests of the powerful classes or nations, as Kant thought, or in their injustices, or, in general, in the kind of circumstances, which simply ought not to exist. In Hegel's view, what is accidental by nature encounters the accidental. Therefore, its fate is of inner necessity.

Necessity

According to Hegel, in general the dialectical notion and philosophy make disappear the perspective of the accidental, and recognize in it - as the mere appearance - its essence, the necessity: as once did the myth². All is necessary! For Hegel, it is necessary, that the finite, possession, well-being, and life, are posited as accidental - as indeed it happens most practically in war - because that is the very notion of the finite. On one hand, this necessity has the form of the force of nature: everything finite is mortal and transitory. In the socio-moral being, in the political state, this force is taken away from nature, and the necessity is elevated into the work of freedom, into something moral. Thus, that transitoriness of finite beings becomes a willed passing away, and the grounding negativity turns into the proper substantial individuality of the socio-moral being: the organic nation-state.

1. Saint Augustine, *The City of God*, New York: The Modern Library, 1950, Books I - XX.- Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, op. cit. 492-502.

2. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, op. cit. 492-502.- Horkheimer, ›*Dialektik der Aufklärung*‹ und *Schriften 1940-1950*, op. cit. 13-145.

Universal and Particular Providence

In Hegel's view, the war is the condition, in which the vanity of temporal goods and things, which particularly in churches is usually merely a nice, pious, and edifying figure of speech, is taken very seriously. Thus, as such the war is the moment, in which the negativity or ideality of the particular receives its right, and becomes reality. In war, the particular human being with all his property, well-being, and life is negated determinately: he is negated, but also preserved and elevated in the national community. For Hegel war has the higher meaning, that through it - as has been said before - the socio-ethical health of the nations is maintained in their indifference against the reification and petrification of their particular institutional determinations, as the movement of the wind saves the sea from rotteness and putridity, into which a lasting calm would take it: likewise the nations would fall into utter decay in the case of - what Kant had called - a perpetual or even an eternal peace¹. Hegel knows, of course, that this legitimation of war as means for the healing of nations, is «merely» a philosophical idea or only a justification of divine Providence, and that the real wars need still another justification: the particular national government as a - not universal - but particular providence, taking into consideration a particular state's well-being, interests, condition, circumstances, and treaty relations².

Tranquillity in the State

For Hegel, the ideality, which in war appears as situated in an accidental relationship toward the outside, i.e. other nations, and the negativity, according to which the internal state-powers are organized elements of the social totality, are the same³. According to Hegel, this identity of the two idealities appears in the empirical, historical world e.g. in the form, that victorious wars prevent inner restlessness, insurgencies, and revolutions, and that they strength-

1. Kant, *Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik*, op. cit. 195-251.- Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, op. cit. 492-493. - *Jenaer Kritische Schriften*, op. cit. 449-451.

2. Hegel, *Frühe Schriften*, op. cit. 35-36. - *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, op. cit. 491-494, 501. - *Jenaer Kritische Schriften*, op. cit. 449-451.- *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, op. cit. 25-27, 35-36.

3. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, op. cit. 491-494, 493n, 500.

en and stabilize the internal state-power: international wars prevent civil wars. Nations, which do not want to endure their inner sovereignty, or which are afraid of it, have often been subjugated by other nations. Those nations have worked for their independence with the less success and honor, the less they were able to establish internally a first institution of state-power. Those nations' freedom has died, because of their fear to die. Here belongs the phenomenon, that states, which do not have the guarantee of their independence in their own armed forces, but in other respects, e.g. against neighbours of disproportionally small states, can exist with an internal constitution, which guaranties by itself neither internal nor external tranquillity.

The Negativity in the Individuality

In Hegel's view, in peace time bourgeois life in civil society expands indefinitely. All spheres of bourgeois society immerse and get settled down in themselves. In the long run, the individual bourgeois gets bogged down in civil society, and grows dissolute. Peoples' particularities become always more reified, firmer, and finally get completely ossified. But to health, so Hegel assured us, belongs the unity of the body. When the parts of the body become hard - as e.g. in old age - death arrives soon. Hegel remembered, that Kant and the Kantians have often demanded eternal peace as an ideal, toward which humanity ought to move. Thus, according to Hegel, Kant proposed an association of princes, which ought to settle the conflicts among states¹. In Hegel's view, the Holy Alliance had the intention to be something like such an institution. However, so Hegel argued, the state is an individual. In the individuality of the state - like in the individuality of each individual person - negativity, i.e. aggression, is essentially contained. Thus, even in the case that a number of states make themselves into a family, then this association must as individuality, and out of its own intrinsic negativity, once more create for itself an opposition, and generate an enemy. Today we may think of the UN-alliance against Iraq, Somalia, Serbia, Haiti, etc.. According to Hegel, often nations come out of a war in a strengthened condition. Nations, which are unsociable and incom-

1. Kant, *Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik, und Pädagogik*, op. cit. 195-251. - Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, op. cit. 493n - 503.

patible in themselves, gain through war toward the outside, against other nations, tranquillity inside. If nations can not find an external enemy, they may introvert their negativity, their hostility, against themselves, and civil war may be a necessity.

Insecurity

Hegel never denied, that through war insecurity comes into the bourgeois life and property in the framework of liberal democratic society. But in Hegel's view, this real insecurity is nothing else than the movement, which is necessary for the moral health of the nation. Very often, Hegel, the Lutheran Christian, heard pious ministers preach from the pulpits of their bourgeois churches about the insecurity, vanity, and instability of all temporal, earthly goods. But no matter, how moved the listening believers maybe, everybody thinks, that he shall keep his life and property anyway. However, in case this insecurity appears in the empirically concrete form of hussars with bright, shining sabres, and things get really serious, then this moved, emotional edification, which predicts everything, begins to curse the conqueror. In spite of all that, so Hegel - the greatest idealist, who alone knew what idealism was, and at the same time the greatest realist - stated, wars take place, nevertheless, again and again, where this simply lies in the nature of things: i.e. in international relations and constellations. Those wars happen, no matter how many good President Carters may try their best to keep a kind of peace. After a war has come to its end, the states shoot up again. All talks about perpetual or even eternal peace grow dump and silent before the serious repetitions of world-history. We may think of the end of World War I and World War II, and the over 100 wars, which have followed the latter in spite of the presence and the peace-keeping and peace-making capacities of the UN, and later on the EC. History has obviously and unfortunately verified Hegel's philosophy of war and peace over that of Kant, which had also already not been exactly over-optimistic.

Political Bond in War

According to Hegel, by the very fact, that states recognize each other as such and in their sovereignty, remains also in war - the very condition of outlawry, bloody force, and abominable contingencies - a political bond, in which they are valid for each other in and

for themselves, in spite of the most horrible facticity surrounding them. Thus, even in war the war is determined as something which ought to pass away. Thereby, the war contains in itself the determination relating to international law, that in it the possibility of peace is to be maintained. Thus, e.g., the mutual envois are to be respected. During World War II emissaries from the combatting nations, e.g. Germany and England, met regularly in Switzerland and Portugal. Even trade continued between Germany and England in the midst of war. In general, the combatants are expected, not to make war against the internal institutions of the enemy-state, or against the peaceful life of its families, or against the private life of the individual citizens, and particularly not against the symbols of a nation's sovereignty. Thus, even Adolf Hitler, when he bombed Belgrade during World War II, did not destroy the King's palace.

Duty

Therefore, Hegel thought, that the modern wars were fought in a more humane way than the traditional wars of earlier centuries. He could, of course, not foresee the saturation bombings of open cities in World War II. Certainly, so Hegel stated, in modern wars the individual soldier in one army does no longer stand in personal hate against the soldier of the enemy-army. Maybe, so Hegel argued personal hostilities still appear among outposts. However, between armies as armies the enmity has become something indeterminate, which recedes against the duty, to defend one's own nation, which everybody respects in everybody. We may here think of the military honors with which the British airforce buried its enemy, the Red Barron von Richthofen in World War I, and of the speech with which Premier Churchill remembered and honored the death of the «desert fox», Fieldmarshall Erwin Rommel, in World War II. Of course, Hegel was aware of the possibility of regressions in history, which could make wars - particularly civil wars - again more inhuman than they had ever been. Such regression has indeed taken place in many wars in the 20th century, particularly at the occasion of the project Barbarossa in World War II, and more recently e.g. in Korea, Vietnam, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Angola, Iraq, Ex-Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Haiti, etc..

Universality of Actions

In Hegel's view, the mutual behaviour of at least the European nations in war - e.g. the taking of prisoners and what in peace one state concedes to the citizens of another in terms of rights concerning private interactions, etc.- rests mainly on the customs and morals of nations as the internal universality of actions, which maintains itself under all conditions: even under those of war. According to Hegel, at the beginning of the 19th century the European nations constituted a family according to the general principles of their legislation, customs, education, religion and morals. In terms of this commonly shared cultural background, the actions of the European nations relating to international law modify themselves even in a condition of war, in which otherwise the mutual inflicting of evils is dominant. According to Hegel, of course, the relationship of state to state is continual staggering, fluctuating, and vascillating. Also, there is no *praetor* in international relations and affairs, who can really settle conflicts. The higher judge is alone the universal spirit, who is in and for itself, the spirit of the world, the spirit of the human species, and beyond that the highest *Praetor*: God's absolute reason, providence, wisdom, spirit, love¹.

Epic Poetry of War and Peace

Hegel was very much interested in the epical poetry of nations insofar as it reflected wars among world-historical states². According to Hegel, of course not every war among nations, who have hostile feelings against each other, must already be considered worthy of being treated in epical poetry. Hegel considered a war worthy of such treatment only, if the nation, which had fought it, had a universal-historical legitimation. Only then, an epical painting of a new, higher world-historical enterprise and stage is developed before our eyes. This political undertaking can not merely appear as being subjective, or as arbitrariness of subjugation. The universal-historical enterprise must rather be absolute in itself through its being ground-

1. Hegel, *Frühe Schriften*, op. cit. 35-36. - *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* op. cit. 25-27, 35-36, 539-540. - *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, op. cit. 575-591. - *Wissenschaft der Logik*, op. cit. Vol. II, 548-573, - *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, op. cit. Vol. II, 247-248, 273-274.

2. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, op. cit. Vol. III, 352-353.

ed in a higher necessity. That must be so, in spite of the fact, that the next external occasion of the war might assume on one hand the character of a singular violation of right, or on the other hand the character of revenge and retribution. Hegel found an *analogon* of this relationship already in the Indian epical poetry of the Ramajana¹. Hegel discovered an even better *analogon* in the Greek epic poetries of the Ilias and the Odyssee². Here, the Greeks make war against the Asians. Here the Greeks carry out the first legendary battles of the gigantic opposition between East and West. The wars of this first East-West conflict constitute the world-historical turning point of Greek and European history: Europe begins to supersede Asia. In a similar way, the Cid fights against the Moors³. In the epical poetries of Tasso and Ariost, the Christians struggle against the Saracenes⁴. In the epical poetry of Luiz de Camões, the Portugeses make war against the Indians⁵. Thus, Hegel saw in all great epical poems nations, which are very different from each other in custom, habit, usage, manners, morals, religion, language, internally and externally, confronting each other in decisive, necessary, world-historically battles. Concerning all the important national epic poetries, Hegel completely acquiesced in the world-historically legitimated, i.e. rational and providential, victory of the higher political principle of freedom over the subordinated one: from the freedom of the One (despotisms) through the freedom of the Few (oligarchies) to the freedom of All (democracies). That is Hegel's theodicy in the realm of universal history⁶.

1. Ibid. - G. W. Hegel, *Berliner Schriften 1818-1831*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986, 167. - *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, op. cit. 200. - *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, op. cit. Vol. I, 434-436; Vol. III, 332, 347 -348, 350, 352-353, 358-359, 386, 396.

2. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, op. cit. Vol. III, 336, 342, 352-353, 358, 360, 376-377, 386, 405. - *Berliner Schriften 1818-1831*, op. cit. 186. - *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, op. cit. 283-285. - *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, op. cit. Vol. I, 300.

3. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik* op. cit. Vol. I, 245; Vol. II, 193; Vol. III, 342, 352-353, 358-359, 405. - *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, op. cit. 472.

4. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, op. cit. Vol. I, 354, 363; Vol. II, 217 -218, 234; Vol. III, 342, 350, 352-353, 361, 369, 370, 379, 384, 411. - *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, op. cit. 484.

5. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, op. cit. Vol. III, 350, 351-352, 412.

6. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, op. cit. 28, 540. - *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, op. cit. Vol. I, 88. - *Vorlesungen*

Epical Poems of the Future

According to Hegel, the Greek epical poems of the Ilias and the Odyssee portrayed and celebrated the triumphant victory of the Occident over the Orient: of the European measure, individual beauty, self-limiting reason over the Asiatic splendour and magnificence of a patriarchal unity, which had not yet achieved complete differentiation, or which - as abstract association - had already desintegrated¹. In Hegel's view, contrary to the Greek epical poems, those of the future might portray and celebrate the triumphant victory of a post-European, post-modern, post-bourgeois, post-capitalistic American and Slavic «diving rationality» - i.e. the reconciliation of the abstract universal and the abstract particular in the true, i.e. concrete individual - over the boring, i.e. meaningless, historical armoury of Europe: over the European, modern, bourgeois, and capitalistic imprisonment into an endless positivistic particularization and measuring, which has lost all universality, without reaching true individuality². Hegel aimed at a post-European American and Slavic reconciliation of personal autonomy and universal, i.e. anamnestic, present and proleptic solidarity. Because Europe has become an over-particularized armoury and prison without concrete universality or true individuality, so Hegel argued, and because each European nation is now most narrowly limited by the other, therefore the European nations are no longer allowed - in terms of world-historical, providential and rational necessity - to make war against each other. It took the Europeans 160 years and two most terrible world wars, in order to catch up with Hegel's dialectical insight into the incompatibility of old Europe and war-making, and to produce Maastricht: slow learners³!

über die Geschichte der Philosophie, op. cit. Vol. II, 497; Vol. III, 248, 455. - Schmidt-Biggemann, *Theodizee und Tatsachen*, op. cit. part one. - Colpe-Schmidt-Biggemann, *Das Böse*, op. cit. parts I-V.

1. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, op. cit. Vol. III, 352-353.

2. Hegel, *Frühe Schriften*, op. cit. 218. - *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, op. cit. 107-115, 413, 418, 422, 490-491, 500, 513. - *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, op. cit. Vol. III, 352-353. - *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, op. cit. Vol. III, 62. - Adorno, *Drei Studien*, op. cit. 21-22.

3. K. Busch, «Die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion in Europa,» in *Die Neue Gesellschaft, Frankfurter Hefte*, 39 / 7, (Juli 1992), 594-599 (NG). - P. Conradi, «Ach Europa,» in NG op. cit. 600-606. - Ch. Randzio-Plath, «Deutschland-Frankreich und Europa nach Maastricht,» in NG, op. cit. 607-611. - E. Hobsbaum, «Nationalismus und Ethizität,» in NG, op. cit. 612-618. - «Gespräch mit An-

The American and the Slavic World

In Hegel's view, if the contemporary Europeans want to find future epical poems of war and peace beyond Europe, then they had to search for them in the American and Slavic World¹. Thus, Walt Whitman saw in Hegel the outstanding philosopher, of whom the great American nation was very much in need. However, the future epical poem, which - as Hegel envisioned - would celebrate the victorious concrete supersession of Asian abstract universalism and European abstract particularism in terms of a true American and Slavic reconciliation of universal solidarity and personal autonomy, has not yet been written, even 162 years after his death. Neither Kant's cosmopolitan culture of peace, based on the categorical imperative, nor Hegel's peaceful American and Slavic World, characterized by the ballance of personal sovereignty and universal solidarity, has happend yet in world-history: neither in the East, nor in the West². Both thinkers of war and peace are still the future, and they will remain that, as long as humankind has not yet progressed further on its long march from animality toward freedom than it has up to now. However, as long as history still continues - and it has not yet stopped in spite of the Right-Hegelian and student of Allan Bloom, Francis Fukuyama's book *The End of History and the Last Man* - there is hope, and as long as there is hope, there is still history. Even a desperate hope has the power to create, what it hopes for: man on his own - man with the upright carriage - autonomous man in universal, i.e. anamnestic, present, and anticipatory solidarity³.

tonin Leihm. Lettre Internationale - ein Europäisches Projekt», in *NG*, op. cit. 619-630. - H. Rosenstrauch, «Ein Schalk in Europas Nacken - Zehn Thesen zur Kultur-Politik,» in *NG*, op. cit. 631-632. - H. P. Riese, «Europa ist ein politischer Begriff,» in *NG*, 38 / 11, (November 1991), 965.

1. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, op. cit. Vol. II, 272-296. - *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, op. cit. 114. - *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, op. cit. Vol. III, 352-353.

2. Kant, *Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik*, op. cit. Vol. I, 11-30, 33-61, 65-82, 85-102, 105-124, 195-251. - Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, op. cit. 19-33. - *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, op. cit. Vol. III, 352-353. - W. Benjamin, *Illuminationen*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1977, chs. 10, 11. - *Zur Kritik der Gewalt und andere Aufsätze. Mit einem Nachwort von Herbert Marcuse*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1978, chs. 4-6. - Habermas, *Autonomy and Solidarity*, op. cit. chs. 1-7. - *Die nachholende Revolution*, op. cit., 179-204.

3. E. Bloch, *A Philosophy of the Future*, New York: Herder and Herder, 1970, chs. 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15. - *Man On His Own. Essays in the Philosophy*

The Hitler Government

Often after lectures in Europe, I have been asked the interesting, speculative question, if the Hitler Government would have started World War II, in case it had been familiar with Georg W. F. Hegel's dialectical philosophy, particularly with his philosophy of law and history, and with his aesthetics, or in case it had taken it seriously? It seems, that the Mussolini Government was more familiar with Hegel than the Hitler Government. Benito Mussolini's teacher, Vilfredo Pareto, was a Hegelian on the Right. Also Mussolini's idea of an estate-state have had some connections with Hegel's philosophy of right. But it seems, that also Adolf Hitler had some, at least indirect knowledge of Hegel's philosophy of right. There were Hegelian undertones, when Hitler differentiated between nation, civil society, and political state. It is true, that Hitler was an enemy of dialectics, but only in its materialistic, Marxist form. Certainly Hitler's court-jurist and court-political theologian, Carl Schmitt, was deeply rooted in Hegel's philosophy of law. But whatever the familiarity of the Hitler Government with Hegel's dialectical philosophy was, we can say with great certainty, that if it had taken seriously, what the great philosopher had to say about war and peace, it would not have started World War II, and the lives of 50 million people would have been saved.

The European Union, and the American and Slavic Worlds

There are several reasons, why in Hegelian perspective World War II, and even already World War I, were anachronisms. A century before Adolf Hitler came into power, Georg W.F. Hegel had warned the Europeans, not to make wars any longer against each other. The reason for Hegel's warning was his insight, that the European Civilization was coming to its end. Hegel could describe the Euro-

of Religion, New York: Herder and Herder, 1970, 7-18, 19-30; chs. I-VIII. - *On Karl Marx*, New York: Herder and Herder, 1971, chs. V, VIII, IX. - Benjamin, *Illuminationen*, op. cit. chs. 10, 11. - Habermas, *Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus*, op. cit. ch. 4. - *Kommunikatives Handeln*, op. cit. ch. VIII. - *Moralbewusstsein und kommunikatives Handeln*, op. cit. chs. 3, 4. - *Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik*, op. cit. chs. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6. - *Die nachholende Revolution*, op. cit. 179-204. - *Texte und Kontexte*, op. cit. chs. 1, 5, 6, 7. - A. Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987, Parts One to Three. - F. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York: The Free Press, 1992, parts I-V.

pean Civilization only, because it had long overstepped its climax: the owl of Minerva could fly only, because dusk had set in already for the old European life form. For Hegel, at the horizon of world-history appeared a new American and Slavic world. Therefore, it was too late too to build a German, or for that matter any other European Empire, through new wars. According to Hegel, every nation could be at the front of the world-historical process only once. Then it was destroyed, or it had to move into a niche of world-history, and from there to give support to the new front-runners. The Germans had had their first empire, which lasted a 1000 years and then was finally buried by Napoleon Buonaparte, whom in 1807 Hegel saw riding on his horse as world-historical individual through Jena. In Hegelian terms, it was too late even already for Otto von Bismark's second German Empire, which nevertheless was created by the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. But it was as small-German solution - without Austria - not much of an empire after all. In Hegelian perspective, Hitler's attempt to establish a third German Empire lasting another 1000 years through World War II, was even more irrational, than the foundation of the second one. By Hegelian standards, Hitler's declaration of war against the Slavic and the American World, could only mean his own disaster, and a further progress of these worlds to the front of history. So it happened! It would certainly have been better for everybody, for the Germans, for the Europeans, for the Americans, for the Slavs, even for himself, if Hitler, when he planned the project Barbarossa, had not followed his own book *My Struggle*, but rather Hegel's philosophy of right, history, and art. When in 1945 the American and Slavic armies met in central Germany, some Germans remembered, what their greatest philosopher had taught about the end of the European Civilization, and about the beginning of a new American and Slavic World in the University of Berlin, over a century earlier. When in recent years, the European nations gave up some of their sovereignty and formed the European Community and the European Union, they finally obeyed Hegel's warning, but not without having slaughtered each other senselessly in two world wars: slow learners! Now, the Yugoslav catastrophe shows, that the Europeans -NATO- can not even make wars any longer, even if they would like to, or consider it to be necessary. At the same time, the United Nations behave in Ex-Yugoslavia precisely as Hegel thought such international peace - organizations would behave:

on the basis of their own inner negativity they put one nation outside themselves, and make it the enemy, and gang up on it - in the present case the Serbs. Maybe Slavic wars have to be left to the Slavs! Of course, Hegel would not have excluded the possibility of new American and Slavic wars. But maybe that is the point, where today we should determinately negate Hegel's philosophy into a new critical theory of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, right, civil society, democratic, constitutional state, and history, which can imagine the further formation of new American and Slavic societies, characterized by the reconciliation of personal autonomy and universal solidarity, without bloody wars, and for the good of all nations.

III. Jürgen Habermas

At present, the German scholar Jürgen Habermas, who grew up during World War II, and who then became committed to the Kantian and Hegelian tradition, is deeply concerned - if not always and directly with the issue of war and peace - then nevertheless at least with a new formal and universal pragmatic, with a theory of communicative action, with a discourse ethics as responsibility ethics, with a theory about the transition from a conventional to a post-conventional morality, with a discourse theory of right and of the democratic constitutional state, with a theory about the relationship of facticity and the unconditional validity claims of truth, justice, and honesty, and with a theory of modernity, which all alone and together are certainly most relevant for the further development of that theme, initiated by Kant and Hegel¹. Kant's and He-

1. K. O. Apel, *Der Denkweg von Charles S. Peirce. Eine Einführung in den amerikanischen Pragmatismus*, op. cit. Parts One and Two. - *Transformation der Philosophie. Band 1. Sprachanalytik, Semiotik, Hermeneutik*, op. cit. parts I and II. - *Transformation der Philosophie. Band 2. Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft*, op. cit. parts I, II. - *Diskurs und Verantwortung. Das Problem des Übergangs zur postkonventionellen Moral*, op. cit. chs. 1-11, esp. ch. 11.-J. Habermas, *Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1984, chs. 1-11. *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Band 1. Handlungsrationalität und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung*, op. cit. chs. I-IV. - *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Band 2. Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft*, op. cit. chs. V-VIII. - *Moralbewusstsein und kommunikatives Handeln*, op. cit. chs. 1-4.- *Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik*, op. cit. chs. 1-6. - *Die neue Unübersichtlichkeit*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp

gel's ideas on war and peace can be concretely superseded, i.e. not only critically negated, but also preserved, elevated, and fulfilled in those new theories, and they can furthermore through them even practically applied to the world-historical situation, which has resulted from the catching-up revolutions in Eastern Europe, since 1985¹.

World-Citizen-Status

According to Habermas's universal pragmatic, theory of communicative action, discourse ethics, discourse theory of right and of the democratic, constitutional state - inspired by Kant and Hegel as well as by K.O. Apel and other contemporary thinkers in Germany and America - only a democratic citizenship, which does not close itself up particularistically, can prepare the way for a world-citizen-status and a corresponding universal peace². Already today such world-citizen-status takes form in global, political communications about war and peace. For Habermas, the Vietnam war, the recent transformations in East and Central Europe, the Iraq War, as well as the wars in the former Yugoslavia and other Eastern European countries are the first world-political events in the strict sense of the word. These world-historical events - e.g. the fall of the Berlin Wall, or the bombardment of Baghdad and Basra, or the attack on Dubrovnik and Sarajevo - have been made present through electronic mass media at the same time to a world-wide public³. In

Verlag, 1985 chs. 1-6. - *Eine Art Schadensabwicklung*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1987 chs. 1-7. - *Texte und Kontexte*, op. cit. parts I-V. - *Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaates*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1992, 9-14; chs. I-IX; 541-660.

1. D. Howard, «Die Revolution von 1989 aus heutiger Perspektive», in *NG* 41 / 1, (Januar 1994), 56-64.

2. Habermas, *Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaates*, op. cit. 659-660.

3. K. Hartung, «Die neue Teilung Berlins», in *NG* 38 / 3, (März 1991), 229-235. - R. Mohr, «Der Golfkrieg und das Fernsehen», in *NG*, op. cit., 198 - 202. - A. Taheri, «Heiliger Krieg - gerechter Krieg?» in *NG*, op. cit. 197. - M. Rabie, «Die Golfkrise - Entstehung, Gefahren und Chancen,» in *NG*, 37 / 12, (Dezember 1990), 1081-1087. - B. Tibi, «Europäische Moderne und islamischer Fundamentalismus», in *NG*, 38 / 12, (Dezember 1991), 1073-1077. - A. Taheri, «Flucht nach dem Golfkrieg,» in *NG*, 38 / 5, (Mai 1991), 416-417. - H. Brücker, «J. Habermas und die Ost-Europäischen Umbrüche», in *NG*, 38/2, (February 1991), 168-172. - Z. Djindjic, «Jugoslaviens - ein unerwünschter Staat», in *NG* 38/9, (September 1991), 775-778. - D. Melcic, «Die Hoffnungsblüten der Belgrader Demo-

view of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, first Kant, and a generation later also Hegel, referred to the reactions of a participating public¹. Kant and Hegel have identified the phenomenon of a world-wide public, which only today is in the process, to become a political reality in the form of a cosmopolitan communication-connection. In the context of such world-wide coherence, on September 19, 1994 the USA and over 20 other nations made a non-violent invasion into Haiti under the eyes of the massmedia from all around the globe, in order to bring back the duely elected, and after seven months ousted President Jean, Bertrand Aristide - a Roman

kratiebewegung sind schnell verwelkt,» in *NG*, 38/5, (Mai 1991), 397-400.-I. Ivanij, «Religionskrieg oder Völkermord?» in *NG* 40 / 8, (August 1993), 710-717. - M. Dobos, «The War in Bosnia. Rape: War Crime against Women and a Nation», in *Peace & Democracy News*, Vol. VII, No. 1, Summer 1993, 16-19 (PDN).- Th. Harrison, «No to Intervention», in *PDN* op. cit. 19-21. - D. Wilsnack, «Non-violent Strategies in the Balkan War», in *PDN*, op. cit. 21-23. - L. Jones «The Peacemovement's Moral Failure in Bosnia», in *PDN*, op. cit. 23-32.- M.A. Hewitt, «Neither Bread Nor Roses: Women, War & Intervention in the Balkans», in *The Ecumenist. A Journal For Promoting Christian Unity*,» Vol. 1, No.4/May-June, 1994, 57-60 (E). - A. Borden and Z. Pajic, «A Vision for Peace in the Balkans», in *Balkan War Report, Bulletin of the Institute for War & Peace Reporting*, April /May 1993, Number 19, 1, 21 (*BWR*).-V. Surroi, «The Key to Kosova: Enabling Constructive Negotians», in *BWR*, op. cit. 3-4. - S. Maliqui, «Ex-Yugoslavia. A Battleground for Slav Nationalism», in *BWR*, op. cit. 5-6.- S. Popovic, «Serbia. A Pattern of Domination», in *BWR*, op. cit. 6-7. - H. Poulton, «Risking a Third Balkan War», in *BWR*, op. cit. 11. - A. Borde, «The Bosnians: A War on Identity», in *BWR*, op. cit. 2-8. - I. Williams, «United Nations. Will Bosnia Break the UN,» in *BWR*, op. cit. 28. - K. Mehmeti, «Mazedonia. Albanien across der Border: Waiting for Felon Milosevic to come home», in *BWR*, op. cit. 10.-A. Finkielkraut, «Wer will denn schon Kroate sein?» in *NG*, 40 / 12, (Dezember 1993), 1114-1123. - P. Glotz, «Der Kroate als Kunstprodukt. Antwort auf Alain Finkielkraut,» in *NG*, 41 / 1, (Januar 1994), 69 - 70.- R. Münz, «Jugoslavien - ein Nekrolog,» in *NG* 41 / 5, (Mai 1994), 406-411. - I. Ivanji, «Die Nächte der Ultimaten», in *NG*, op. cit. 412-417. - S. Goldstein, «Demokratische Diktatur in Kroatien», in *NG*, op. cit. 418-423.- N. Zakosek, «Die Chancen einer nicht nicht-nationalistischen Politik,» in *NG*, op. cit. 429-436. - Z. Vukovic, «Alija Izetbegovic - ein Gefangener seiner Mission,» in *NG*, 424-428. - T. Fichter, «Bosnien, Krieg ohne Ende?» in *NG*, op. cit. 437 -439. - L. Unterseher, «Eine Militär Intervention und ihre Folgen,» in *NG*, 440-444. - S. Tönnies, «Diesmal werd ich nicht mit ihnen zieh'n...», in *NG*, op. cit. 445-448.

1. Kant, *Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik I*, op. cit. 195-251.- Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, op. cit. 391-393, 482-490, 491-497, 497-503, 507-509. - Habermas, *Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaates*, op. cit. 659-660.

Catholic priest, liberation theologian, socialist, and fighter for the rights of the poor classes in the poorest country of the Western hemisphere - and to remove General Raoul Cedras - graduate of the military School of the Americas, the «school of the assassins», nationalist, fascist, until recently employee of the CIA, and protector of the rights of the rich businessmen at home and from abroad - and his Junta, and to establish democracy¹. This invasion into Haiti is to warn all anti-democratic forces in every nation around the globe that the liberal democratic society has been victorious over fascism and patriarchal and bureaucratic communism, and that -not history- but the time of nationalist or socialist dictatorships, and of their wars and civil wars, has definitely and definitively come to an end.

Protest Movements

According to the Kantian and Left-Hegelian Habermas, even the liberal democratic societies of the West must take into account world-wide protest movements at least in so far as they possess a certain amount of quite effective communicative power: e.g. the peace movements². The obsolescence of what Kant and Hegel called the condition of nature among warlike nations, which have lost already their sovereignty, has at least already begun. The concrete cosmopolitan condition is at least no mere phantom any longer, which it certainly still was in Kant's and Hegel's time³. Habermas must, of course, admit, that we are still far away from the full realization of such a world-citizenship condition, which could effectively guarantee universal peace. For Habermas, a peaceful state-citizenship and

1. «Clinton scheduled a televised address on U.S. policy toward Haiti», in *The Wallstreet Journal*, Vol. XXV, No. 234, Wednesday, September 14, 1994, A 1. - «Republicans have stiffened...» *The Wallstreet Journal*, op. cit. A 1-2. - J.H. Birnbaum and J. Harwood, «Clinton sets Haiti T V. Talk Tomorrow; Invasion Idea has only faint support,» *The Wallstreet Journal*, op. cit., A 24.

2. Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Band 2. Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft*, op. cit. ch. VIII. - *Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaates*, op. cit. 660.

3. Kant, *Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik*, 1, op. cit. 11-30, 33-50, 127-172, 195-251.-Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, op. cit. 338-339, 339-360, 382-393, 490-503, 503-509, 511-512. - Habermas, *Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaates*, op. cit. 560.

a likewise peaceful cosmopolitan citizenship constitute a *continuum*, which at present is at least visible already in its outlines.

The Future Arena

According to Habermas's universal pragmatic, theory of communicative action and ethics, and discourse theory of right and democratic constitutional state, the challenges of the 21st century shall demand answers from Western liberal democratic societies in terms of their type - e.g. war and peace - and their size, which can hardly be found and implemented without an interest-generalizing radical-democratic formation of opinion and will¹. In this future arena also the humanistic-democratic, socialist Left can find its place and its political tasks². It can constitute the ferment for political

1. O. K. Flechtheim, «Die Herausforderung der Zukunft und die Futurologie», in *NG*, 32/2, (Februar 1985), 152-160. - J. Habermas, «Nachholende Revolution und Linker Revisionsbedarf. Was heisst Sozialismus heute?» in Habermas, *Die nachholende Revolution*, op. cit. 179-203, esp. 203-204.

2. P. Bender, «Gorbatschows neue Politik», in *NG*, 32/8, (August 1985), 726-727. - A. Gortz, «Eine Neudefinition des Sozialismus», in *NG*, 37/6, (Juni 1990), 519-524. - «Gespräch mit Bruno Kreisky: der Europäische Kapitalismus ist besser als sein Ruf», in *NG*, op. cit. 524-527. - J. Strasser, «Sozialismus 2000, oder: Die Kunst des Möglichen», in *NG*, op. cit. 528-535. - R. Altmann, «Die Tugenden Hoffnung und Solidarität bleiben», in *NG*, op. cit. 536-540. - H. Brücker/Th. Kreuder, «Die neo-sozialistische Linke», in *NG*, op. cit. 550-554. - M. Rocard, «Sozialistisches Handeln heute», in *NG*, Sonderheft 2: Der Sozialismus der Zukunft, 38/1991, 5-9. - C. Martelli, «Sozialismus-Freiheit-Demokratie», in *NG*, op. cit. 10-16. - R. Miluiband, «Was kommt nach den kommunistischen Regimen», in *NG*, op. cit. 17-24. - I. T. Frolov, «Der Sozialismus der Zukunft: Perestrojka und Humanismus», in *NG*, op. cit. 25-27. - P. Vranicki, «Selbstverwaltung als permanente Revolution», in *NG*, op. cit. 85-92. - E. Eppler, «Zusammenwachsen Europas und die weltweite Gemeinschaft», *NG*, op. cit. 93-96. - J. Pelikan, «Die Veränderungen im Osten Europas und der Sozialismus», in *NG*, op. cit. 97-102. - J. Elleinstein, «Der Marxismus stirbt, der Marxismus ist tot, es lebe der Sozialismus», in *NG*, op. cit. 103-107. - W. Korpi, «Strategien reformistischer sozialistischer Parteien in einem gemischtwirtschaftlichen System: Das schwedische Modell», in *NG*, op. cit. 108-117. - G. Erb, «Abschied von Walter Dirks», in *NG*, 38/7, Juli 1991, 581. - S. Tönnies, «Das Recht und die Linke», in *NG*, op. cit. 636-643. - E. Weingartner, «Glasnost and Perestrojka: An Ecumenical View», in *The Ecumenist*, Vol. 29, No. 1/Winter, 1991, 1-4. - A. Abascal-Jaen, «The World Consultation. Socialism: A Viable Project or an Illusion?» in *COELI. Centre Oecumenique de Liaisons Internationales*, Quarterly - Autumn 1993, 2-15. - B. Wielenga, «Reorienting our Hopes?» op. cit. 16-24. - F. Betto, «Socialist Alternative in Latin America and in the Caribbean», in *COELI. Centre Oecumenique*

communicative action and public discourse - e.g. about problems of war and peace inside and outside of nations- which can save from drying out the institutional framework of the democratic, constitutional state. Thus in Habermas's opinion, the humanist-democratic socialist Left has particularly after 1989 - the breakdown of the patriarchal and bureaucratic socialism in Eastern Europe - really no reason for an emotional or intellectual depression. Certainly, some intellectuals in Eastern Europe shall have to adjust to a situation, in which the West-European Left has found itself at least since the end of World War II: namely to have to translate the socialist ideas into the radical reformist self-critique of an advanced capitalist society. This society has unfolded its strong and its weak points in the forms of a mass-democracy, a constitutional state, and a welfare-state-class-compromise, which have contributed to peace-keeping and peace-making inside and outside of nations in recent decades, at least to some extent. In Habermas's perspective, after the bankruptcy of the state socialisms of Eastern Europe, such radical democratic self-critique of advanced capitalist society is the only «eye of the needle», through which all thinking, speaking, and acting must go in the future. Also nothing else can secure peace inside and outside modern countries than such radical-democratic critique and reforms.

Hope for Enlightenment and Emancipation

According to Habermas - here concretely superseding in his universal pragmatic, theory of communicative action, discourse ethics and discourse theory of right and the constitutional state Kant and Hegel - such radical humanistic - democratic socialism shall disappear only with the object of its critique¹. That may happen some day in the future, when the criticized liberal democratic society has changed its identity to such an extent, that it can perceive in their relevance and take seriously also all those things, the value of which can not be expressed in price tags: not only the unconditional validity claims of truth, justice, and honesty, but also national and international peace. The hope for the enlightenment of the people as

de Liaisons Internationales, Quarterly, Nr. 69, Spring 1994, 27-30. - Habermas, «Nachholende Revolution und linker Revisionsbedarf. Was heisst Sozialismus heute?», op. cit. 179-204.

1. Habermas, «Nachholende Revolution und linker Revisionsbedarf. Was heisst Sozialismus heute?», op. cit. 202-203.

Kant and Hegel perceived of it - that they are liberated from their fears and being made into masters of their fate - and for their emancipation from their being guilty of their own minority and their own degrading and humiliating life circumstances, has not lost its power with the collapse of the really existing socialism¹. But according to Habermas's correct insight, since World War II this hope has been purified through the fallibilistic consciousness and the historical experience, that already much would be accomplished, if a ballance of the endurable could be maintained for the less favoured nations on this earth: and if most of all such equilibrium of the tolerable could be established for the war-ravaged countries.

1. Kant, *Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik I*, op. cit. 53-61.- Ch. Jamme und H. Schneider (eds), *Mythologie der Vernunft. Hegels »ältestes Systemprogramm« des deutschen Idealismus*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1984, 11-14; Parts I-IV. - G.W.F. Hegel, *Frühe Schriften*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986, 24-33.- *Jenaer Schriften 1801-1807*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986, 183, 292, 294. - *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986, 327, 362, 398-431, 496. - Habermas, «Nachholende Revolution und linker Revisionsbedarf. Was heisst Sozialismus heute?» op. cit. 179-203.

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Ο KANT, Ο HEGEL ΚΑΙ Ο HABERMAS ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΕΙΡΗΝΗΣ

(Π ε ρ ί λ η ψ η)

Θα ήθελα να σας προσκαλέσω σε έναν πρακτικό διεξοδικό λόγο, ο οποίος έχει ως στόχο τη διερεύνηση των απόψεων του Kant, του Hegel και του Habermas περί πολέμου και ειρήνης, και για την ακρίβεια περί διεξαγωγής πολέμου, περί διαφυλάξεως της ειρήνης και περί επιτεύξεως της ειρήνης. Θεωρώ τον διεξοδικό λόγο μας ως ανάμνηση του πόνου των ανθρώπων που υποφέρουν από τον πόλεμο, και μάλιστα ως ανάμνηση που είναι προσανατολισμένη στο μέλλον και έχει ως πρακτικό στόχο τον περιορισμό αυτού του πόνου και των αιτιών του. Μπορούμε να θεωρήσουμε τον Kant ως τον πατέρα της ιδέας της διαφυλάξεως της ειρήνης, όπως αυτή προωθείται σήμερα από τα Ηνωμένα Έθνη. Μπορούμε να θεωρήσουμε τον Hegel ως τον πατέρα της ιδέας της επιτεύξεως της ειρήνης. Και μπορούμε να θεωρήσουμε τον κεντιανό Habermas ως ένα φιλόσοφο που προτείνει τη διαφύλαξη της ειρήνης διά του διεθνούς πρακτικού διεξοδικού λόγου. Το θέμα μας έχει ιδιαιτερότητα, διότι οι ζώνες του πολέμου είναι πολλές και δεν βρίσκονται μακριά από μας. Συνεπώς ο πρακτικός διεξοδικός λόγος μας μπορεί να συμβάλει ώστε να εμβαθύνουμε στο θέμα του πολέμου με τη βοήθεια των τριών φιλοσόφων και να σκεφθούμε για τις πρακτικές διαφυλάξεως και επιτεύξεως της ειρήνης εντός του πλαισίου της τρίτης, νέας παγκόσμιας τάξης πραγμάτων του αιώνα μας.

Στο δοκίμιο *Ιδέα για μια παγκόσμια ιστορία με κοσμοπολιτική προοπτική* (1784) ο Kant εξετάζει το ζήτημα της θεσπίσεως μιας τέλει πολιτείας και υπογραμμίζει ότι η λύση εξαρτάται από την απάντηση στο ερώτημα για τις νόμιμες και ένομες εξωτερικές σχέσεις μεταξύ των εθνών-κρατών. Ο Kant ανακάλυψε ότι η ίδια αντικοινωνικότητα, η οποία οδηγεί τα άτομα να δημιουργήσουν ένομη πολιτεία, είναι η αιτία για το ότι κάθε πολιτεία, ως προς τις εξωτερικές σχέσεις της - δηλαδή ως κράτος σε σχέση προς άλλα κράτη - βρίσκεται σε αχαλίνωτη ελευθερία. Συνεπώς, κάθε πολιτεία πρέπει να αναμένει από την άλλη τα ίδια δεινά, τα οποία καταπίεζαν αρχικώς τα άτομα εντός της κάθε κοινότητας και τα εξανάγκασαν να εισέλθουν από κοινού στην κατάσταση της ένομης πολιτικής οργάνωσης. Σύμφωνα με τον Kant, η φύση - άλλοτε δια των πολέ-

μων, άλλοτε δικ της συνεχούς προπαρκασκευής προς πόλεμον, άλλοτε δικ των ζωωτερικών αναγκών που προκύπτουν από την άμυνα- οδηγεί σε προσπάθειες για την ειρήνη, οι οποίες βεβιαώς είναι αρχικώς ατελείς. Τελικώς η φύση ύστερα από τις εξαντλητικές συγκρούσεις ωθεί τα κράτη στην κατάσταση, στην οποία θα μπορούσαν να είχαν οδηγηθεί ενωρίτερα, αν είχαν υπακούσει στις επιταγές του λόγου, δηλαδή σε μια ομοσπονδία των εθνών, σε μια «ομοσπονδία αμφικτυόνων». Μόνον αυτή η ομοσπονδία μπορεί να οδηγήσει στη δικαρή ή αιώνια ειρήνη ύστερα από μακρά εξέλιξη ειρηνευτικών διαδικασιών.

Δεκαπέντε χρόνια πριν από το δοκίμιο *Περί της αιώνιας ειρήνης* ο Kant είχε υπογραμμίσει στην *Κριτική του καθαρού λόγου* ότι ένα σύστημα της μέγιστης ανθρώπινης ελευθερίας σύμφωνα με νόμους, το οποίο δισφιλίζει τη συνύπαρξη της ελευθερίας του ενός με την ελευθερία του άλλου, αποτελεί μια τουλάχιστον αναγκαία ιδέα, η οποία πρέπει να γίνει δεκτή όχι μόνον στην περίπτωση ενός πρώτου σχεδιάσματος του συντάγματος αλλά επίσης και στην περίπτωση όλων των εθνικών και διεθνών σχέσεων. Σύμφωνα με τον Kant αυτή η ελευθερία είναι ο θεμελιώδης όρος για την ειρηνική συμβίωση των ατόμων και των εθνών. Ακριβώς αυτή η ελευθερία αποτελεί το σταθερό θεμέλιο στη δομή της κριτικής φιλοσοφίας του δικαίου και της ιστορίας του Kant και αναφέρεται τόσο στα ατομικά έθνη-κράτη όσο και στις διεθνείς σχέσεις. Εκτός από την ιδέα της ελευθερίας και η κατηγορητική προσταγή είναι ενταγμένη στο κανονικό σύστημα του λόγου πολύ πρωτότερα από την εφαρμογή της στο δοκίμιο *Περί της αιώνιας ειρήνης*. Πάντως η τελική γνώμη του Kant για το φρικτό πρόβλημα του πολέμου είναι ότι χωρίς την κατηγορητική προσταγή δεν υπάρχει πολιτισμός εντός ή μεταξύ των εθνών-κρατών και χωρίς πολιτισμό υπάρχει μόνον βαρβαρότητα, δηλαδή υπάρχει μόνον πόλεμος, ανεξαρτήτως του αν ο πόλεμος επικινείται από τους εθνικιστές.

Ο Hegel σε όλα του τα συγγράμματα θεωρούσε την απόλυτη ιδεαλιστική φιλοσοφία του ως την προσδιορισμένη άρνηση της σχετικής ιδεαλιστικής φιλοσοφίας του Kant. Ο Hegel δεν κινήθηκε την κριτική φιλοσοφία του Kant περί πολέμου και ειρήνης απλώς με κριτικό τρόπο, αλλά τη διατήρησε και την ανύψωσε σε ποιοτικώς νέα μορφή. Επίσης ο Hegel ανέπτυξε τη δική του φιλοσοφία περί πολέμου και ειρήνης αξιοποιώντας τις ιστορικές γνώσεις του και την άμεση εμπειρία του για τους πολέμους. Ο ίδιος προσπάθησε να κατανοήσει τους πολέμους χρησιμοποιώντας τη διλεκτική μέθοδο, την προσδιορισμένη άρνηση, όπως την είχε επεξεργαστεί στη φαινομενολογία και στη λογική. Ο συνδυασμός των ιστορικών γνώσεων και της διλεκτικής μεθόδου επέτρεψε στον Hegel όχι μόνον να ρίξει νέο φως στους πολέμους του παρελθόντος και του παρόντος

καθώς και στις εποχές της ειρήνης μετά από αυτούς, αλλά και να δικτυώσει προτάσεις για το μέλλον. Ωστόσο, ενώ ο Kant πίστευε ότι οι άνθρωποι μπορούν πράγματι να μάθουν από την ιστορία, ο Hegel ήταν πολύ απαισιόδοξος, διότι η πείρα και η ιστορία τον είχαν διδάξει ότι τα έθνη και οι κυβερνήσεις ποτέ δεν έμαθαν κάτι από την ιστορία - κυρίως δεν έμαθαν πως να διαφυλάσσουν την ειρήνη. Γι' αυτό ο Hegel συνηγορούσε περισσότερο υπέρ της επιτεύξεως της ειρήνης παρά υπέρ της διαφυλάξεως της ειρήνης. Και εδώ τίθεται το σημερινό ερώτημα: Η σκληρή ιστορική πραγματικότητα θα αναγκάσει τα Ηνωμένα Έθνη να μετακινήθούν από τον Kant στον Hegel;

Κατά τη γνώμη του Hegel, αν οι Ευρωπαίοι επιθυμούν να ανεύρουν τα μελλοντικά επικά ποιήματα του πολέμου και της ειρήνης πέραν της Ευρώπης, τότε έπρεπε να τα αναζητήσουν στον αμερικανικό και στον σλαβικό κόσμο. Για τους Ευρωπαίους ήταν πολύ αργά για να διεξγάγουν πολέμους. Έτσι ο Walt Whitman είδε στον Hegel τον εξέχοντα φιλόσοφο, τον οποίο χρειάζεται το αμερικανικό έθνος. Ωστόσο το μελλοντικό επικό ποίημα του πολέμου και της ειρήνης, το οποίο - όπως οραματίστηκε ο Hegel - θα πανηγύριζε τη νικηφόρα συγκεκριμένη υπέρβαση του ασιχτικού αφηρημένου καθολισμού και της ευρωπαϊκής επίσης αφηρημένης μερικότητας υπό τους όρους της αληθινής αμερικανικής και σλαβικής συμφιλίωσης της καθολικής αλληλεγγύης και της προσωπικής αυτονομίας, δεν έχει ακόμη γραφεί, αν και έχουν περάσει 164 χρόνια μετά τον θάνατό του. Ούτε ο κοσμοπολιτικός πολιτισμός της ειρήνης, ο οποίος θα στηριζόταν στην κατηγορική προσταγή, όπως τον οραματίστηκε ο Kant, ούτε ο ειρηνικός αμερικανικός και σλαβικός κόσμος, ο οποίος θα χαρακτηριζόταν από την εξισορρόπηση της προσωπικής κυριαρχίας και της καθολικής αλληλεγγύης, όπως τον οραματιζόταν ο Hegel, έγιναν ακόμη πραγματικότητα στην παγκόσμια ιστορία, ούτε στη Δύση ούτε στην Ανατολή. Και οι δυο στοχαστές του πολέμου και της ειρήνης εξοκλοουθούν να αποτελούν και θα παραμείνουν το μέλλον της ιστορίας, εφόσον το ανθρώπινο γένος δεν θα έχει προχωρήσει περισσότερο από ό,τι έως σήμερα στον μακρύ δρόμο που οδηγεί από την ζώωδη κατάσταση στην ελευθερία. Εφόσον όμως η ιστορία συνεχίζεται ακόμη - και δεν έχει ακόμη σταματήσει παρά τα όσα ισχυρίζεται ο δεξιός εγελικός Francis Fukuyama στο βιβλίο του *Το τέλος της ιστορίας και ο τελευταίος άνθρωπος* - υπάρχει ακόμη ελπίδα, και εφόσον υπάρχει ελπίδα, υπάρχει και ιστορία. Ακόμη και η απελπισμένη ελπίδα έχει τη δύναμη να δημιουργήσει ό,τι ελπίζει: Τον άνθρωπο με τις δυνατότητές του - τον άνθρωπο στην όρθια στάση - τον αυτόνομο άνθρωπο με την καθολική, δηλαδή αναμνηστική, παρούσα και προκαταληπτική αλληλεγγύη - τον ειρηνικό άνθρωπο.

Σήμερα ο γερμανός διανοούμενος Jürgen Habermas, ο οποίος μεγάλωσε κατά τη διάρκεια του δευτέρου παγκοσμίου πολέμου και κτόπιν αποδέχθηκε τις δεσμεύσεις της καντιανής και της εγγελιανής παράδοσης της κοινωνικής φιλοσοφίας, ασχολείται πολύ - αν όχι ευθέως με το θέμα του πολέμου και της ειρήνης - πάντως με τη νέα τυπική και καθολική πραγματολογία, με τη θεωρία της επικοινωνιακής ενέργειας, με τη θεωρία του διεξοδικού λόγου ως λόγου περί δικαίου και περί δημοκρατικού συνταγματικού κράτους και με τη θεωρία της νεωτερικότητας, δηλαδή με θέματα που είναι πολύ σημαντικά για την περαιτέρω ανάπτυξη των ζητημάτων του πολέμου και της ειρήνης, τα οποία είχαν θέσει ο Kant και ο Hegel. Οι ιδέες αυτών των δύο φιλοσόφων μπορούν να αρθούν και να αποκτήσουν νέα μορφή στις νέες θεωρίες και να εφαρμοσθούν στην παγκόσμια ιστορική κατάσταση, η οποία έχει προκύψει από τις επαναστάσεις της ανατολικής Ευρώπης από το 1985 και ύστερα.

Ίσως στον διεξοδικό λόγο μας μπορούμε να προσπαθήσουμε να παραμερίσουμε το μειονέκτημα για το οποίο μίλησε ο Hegel, ότι δηλαδή οι άνθρωποι δεν μαθαίνουν από την ιστορία πώς να διαφυλάσσουν ή να επιτυγχάνουν την ειρήνη. Ίσως μπορούμε να το επιτύχουμε με την προσδιορισμένη υπέρβαση της φιλοσοφίας του Kant και του Hegel περί πολέμου και ειρήνης και με τη δικτύπωση μιας νέας κριτικής θεωρίας του υποκειμένου και της διυποκειμενικότητας, της κοινωνίας, του κράτους και της ιστορίας, δηλαδή μιας θεωρίας με πρακτική προοπτική, όπως την ανέπτυξαν κριτικοί φιλόσοφοι από τον Horkheimer και τον Adorno έως τον Habermas. Ίσως μια τέτοια κριτική θεωρία μπορεί να λάβει υπόψη τη φρικτή εμπειρία εκατοντάδων πολέμων, οι οποίοι έχουν διεξαχθεί αφότου πέθανε ο Hegel, συμπεριλαμβανομένου και του πρώτου και του δευτέρου παγκοσμίου πολέμου. Ίσως στον πρακτικό διεξοδικό λόγο μπορούμε να εφαρμόσουμε σε αυτή τη φρικτή εμπειρία των πολέμων τη νεωτερική διαλεκτική μέθοδο, την οποία εισήγαγε ο Kant και ανέπτυξε ο Hegel, και την οποία υπερέβη ο Adorno με συγκεκριμένο τρόπο στην αρνητική διαλεκτική του μη ταυτού, του ετέρου. Μια τέτοια διαλεκτική μπορεί να διδάξει τα άτομα και τα έθνη πως να συνδυάζουν τη σχετική ιδεαλιστική αντίληψη του Kant περί διαφυλάξεως της ειρήνης με την απόλυτη ιδεαλιστική και - παραδόξως - πιο ρεαλιστική αντίληψη του Hegel περί επιτεύξεως της ειρήνης προς την κατεύθυνση του εναλλακτικού «Μέλλοντος III» - δηλαδή της κοινωνίας της ειρήνης - που ευρίσκεται πέραν του «Μέλλοντος I» (της κοινωνίας της ολικής διοικητικής διαχείρισης) και πέραν κάθε μορφής του «Μέλλοντος II» (της στρατοκρατικής κοινωνίας που εμ-

πλέκεται συνεχώς σε συμβατικούς και εμφυλίου πολέμους ή ακόμη και σε πυρηνικούς πολέμους και / ή σε τοπική ή πλανητική καταστροφή του περιβάλλοντος).

(Μετάφραση: Γεωργία 'Αποστολοπούλου)