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COMMENTS ON KANTIAN PROBLEMATIC ON METAPHYSICS
AND THE HEIDEGGERIAN INTERPRETATION OF IT

Saying that the epistemological gains of both Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic of the Kantian *Critique of the Pure Reason* have thoroughly determined the modern Theory of Knowledge is but a common place.

Things seem to go differently as far as Transcendental Dialectic of the CPR is concerned. The insights of this latter seem not to have been fully understood by contemporary both positivistic epistemologies and hermeneutical philosophies. This was partly due to a distortedly one-sided confrontation of the Kantian problematic on Metaphysics and its further development through the post-kantian idealism leading to Marx. The renovation of the ontological contemplation on the basis of a regression to preconceptual forms of thinking may be considered as a reaction to the reductionnism -either naturalistic or historicist- which had prevailed not only in the frame of Positivism but also in the frame of Marxism, during the first decades of the century. The increasing dogmatism of this latter, by that time, prevented, for a long period, a clear recognition of those of its own theoretical points on the ground of which a History of Being would be possibly conceived of, not in pre- but in meta-scientific terms.

In the limits of this article, we shall focus on the B edition of the CPR and show how its second division leads to the Hegelian comprehensive attempt to illuminate man and his existence as historical and to the Marxian attempt to found History as a science. Given that Being as actualitas is in itself historical, as Heidegger defines it¹, we can possibly assume that modern Ontology as History of Being had to be instaured on the ground of such a science with the main task

1. M. Heidegger, *Metaphysics as a History of Being*, in the *End of Philosophy*, 1973, p. 13.

to overcome the narrowness of its explanatory scope. In our discussion of the Heideggerian interpretation of the CPR, we will argue that Heidegger's view that nihilism is rooted in the metaphysical essence of the Western civilization is due to a partly positivistic and partly mystifying approach of Kant's problematic on *Metaphysics*.

Kant made novel gains in the domain of *Metaphysics*, by showing its own limits and demanding to renovate its scope. In order to achieve that, Kant analysed the status of sciences existing in his time, as well as the status of *Metaphysics* practiced in his time.

On the basis of subtle observation of the available scientific data of mathematics and physics, he attempted, through hypotheses which he formulated on the ground of this quasi-empirical observation to explain how the scientific knowledge is produced. So far, he works in the frame of what he entitled *Metaphysical Deduction*. Then, he examined its validity and legitimacy, in the frame of what he entitled *Transcendental Deduction*.

Based on his theory of knowledge, constructed in the area of metaphysical deduction, Kant relates the validity and legitimacy of the scientific knowledge to its primordial possibility. Science is valid and legitimate, in other words, *de jure* possible, so far as it has been proved to be *de facto* possible.

Following the same process, in the *Transcendental Dialectic*, Kant showed that *Metaphysics* is arbitrary and illegitimate, in other words, *de jure* impossible as a science as long as the knowledge already produced in its domain, does not conform to the standards determining the status of the scientific cognition. However, if metaphysical knowledge as science had not been possible so far, the remaining question was whether it could be possible, in the future. According, to Kant, all rational knowledge is either material -and in this case, it is itself divided into two parts, i. e. physics which studies the laws of nature and ethics which studies the laws of freedom- or formal, and in this case, it is occupied merely with the forms of understanding and reason as well as with the universal rules of thinking without regard to distinction between objects.

If we take seriously Kant's claim that apart from the formal logic, there is a transcendental one, underlying the rational knowledge, we can easily realise that the question «how metaphysics could gain its scientific status» constitutes a coherent part of the whole epistemological treatment of knowledge carried out in the CPR. And it is quite clear that in this text, Kant defined the conditions of possibility

and validity of rational knowledge by explaining the coordinate functioning of sensitivity, understanding and reason.

Under these terms, we can say that the Kantian distinction of the rational material knowledge into a possible and valid one and a non valid so far but possibly valid, in the future, is the epistemological outcome of the CPR. However, in case we divide this theoretical text into two autonomously founded parts, we risk to overlook the way Kant related Metaphysics to science; the ontological limits he imposes to the former are directly connected to the gnoseological limits which he has imposed to the latter. In a reverse sense, the methodological restrictions imposed to the scientific procedures are also connected to the regulative principles of pure reasoning.

In our point of view, the distinction of the CPR into two autonomous parts must be considered as one of the main sources of misunderstanding the Kantian approach of the question of Metaphysics. As an example, we can mention Dryer's *Kant's Solution for Verification in Metaphysics*.

By focusing on the Transcendental Analytic, Dryer claims that in Kantian terms, Metaphysics as a science is possible only as long as it remains rational and material knowledge concerning the laws of nature or, else, the laws of cosmological freedom.

Under these terms, the laws of human freedom are excluded from the scope of science and so ethics is limited in the realm of a practical but not cognoscible experience. As the author says: «Metaphysics is able to obtain knowledge a priori of what exists in nature only by recourse to conditions of empirical knowledge of nature. Metaphysics is possible as a science only on the base of the principles of empirical knowledge of nature»¹.

The aspects concerning the Kantian insights of Metaphysics are of various types. Not only Dryer, Strawson or Martin, but also Fisher, much earlier or even Heidegger, later on, have confronted the CPR as a Theory of Experience, following Cohen's presentation, and later on, Cassirer's evaluation of the text. Of course, as we said, the interpretations of the above interpreters are of various types.

According to Martin, for example, in his *Kant's Metaphysics and the Theory of Science*, it is not necessary to wait for the section of the Critique of Practical Reason on the postulates for the ontology to begin. For, as he claims, Kant provides to the problem of the do-

1. D. P. Dryer, *Kant's Solution for Verification in Metaphysics*, 1966 p. 485.

uble existence of man as a sensible and as an intelligible being only an aporetic solution. As he says: «the aporetic solution, which draws on all essential historical problems, is inescapable as far as it is rooted in the problem itself. Because, the only point at which we can go beyond the region of appearances is the self-consciousness of freedom and of the 'I think'; but also in this point, according to Martin, «we neither can nor have any real knowledge»¹.

In claiming that, Martin's argument is that «we can be certain of the objective reality of freedom in self-consciousness, yet we cannot know how freedom is possible». And he explains: «Here we come up against the boundary of knowledge. If all knowledge is tied to the spatial and temporal conditions, then, of course, it is evident that the objective reality of freedom and of intelligible existence, both of which are not tied to space and time, cannot be understood in the spatio-temporal sense. The results of the Transcendental Analytic could thus stand; we know that freedom is possible but we do not know how it is possible»².

Therefore, according to Martin, Transcendental Analytic represents the final stage of development of critical theory, whereas the Transcendental Dialectic represents only an important one which could not be following the Transcendental Analytic.

However, if the intelligible existence of the subject, not being tied to space and time, cannot be known, in opposition to its phenomenal appearance, we can ask nevertheless, how can we separate the phenomenal from the intelligible existence of the subject, if the knowing procedure of synthesis, where knowledge is the outcome of an action?

Martin himself poses the same question in kantian terms: «How if the acting subject is not an appearance, can Kant predicate existence and actuality of it, when the Transcendental Analytic has shown that these predicates only have meaning for appearances»³.

For Martin, who takes the Transcendental Analytic as the final development of critical thought, the above question cannot be answered. We shall make an attempt to answer this question in critical-historical terms.

For Kant, the subject is appearance, a sensible being, as far as it is subjected to the causal sequence of events. In other words, as

1. G. Martin, *Kant's Metaphysics and the Theory of Science*. 1961.

2. G. Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

3. G. Martin, *op. cit.* p. 172.

far as it is seen as a part of nature. This explains also Dryer's view that Metaphysics as a science is possible as long as it is Metaphysics of nature. But this view is one-sided.

In the CPR, the knowing subject is not only a merely appearance, being a part of nature; it is also an acting subject in the process of synthesis, by the way it functions in it in order to obtain knowledge.

If the knowing subject is active in his producing the knowledge of the object of mathematics and physics, then we can claim that it turns to be itself the object of Metaphysics radically transformed after Kant's criticizing its dogmatism. It is indeed well known that Kant was the first to show us that the knowing subject, represented in the idea of soul, was one of the three main topics of dogmatic speculation. However, the aim of this latter was not to produce the knowledge of the knowing subject, but to prove its immortality. Kant, leaving behind this type of speculation of the soul, will pose in his *Logic* (1800) the question in totally different terms, by claiming that Man in order to know what he is, should have known how does he know.

Following the above type of problematic, we can pose the following question: can we have a real knowledge of the knowing subject i.e. man, acting in his knowing and knowing in his acting, not only in the realm of cognition, but also in the realm of will? In other words, can we have a real knowledge of human being?

According to Martin's formulation of the answer to the above question, «we can be certain of the objective reality of freedom in self-consciousness, but we cannot know how freedom is possible in a real sense»¹.

But the question answered here above is not the question which Kant ever asked in the CPR. Or, if Kant asked such a question, he would have not written his *Critique of the Pure Reason*. After having criticised the dogmatic Metaphysics, in the second division of this text, what Kant would have asked is the following question: «How science of the knowing (acting) subject is possible?» And he should have answered the above question, only if there were already existing science of the knowing (acting) subject, developed in parallel to the Newtonian science. Such a science, which would be called science of man or science of History, did not exist in Kant's time.

1. G. Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

What really existed was either a rational psychology or a practical and social thought affected by the mechanistic approach of nature. Hobbes or William Petty and others in the 17th century, Diderot, Condorcet or the french materialists in the 18th century should be considered as instances of this latter. We can find the echo of such mechanistic anthropological views in the thesis or in the antithesis of the cosmological antinomies, which, in their turn, reflect the philosophical foundation of these views.

In these broad terms, we could say that at the late 18th century, one could know whether a metaphysical doctrine concerning the soul and its immortality were valid or not, but one could not equally know the conditions under which a science of acting subjects would be possible.

The Transcendental Dialectic of the CPR echoes this state of the anthropological problem, whereas the Transcendental Doctrine of Method, in the same text, might be considered as the outcome of the systematic but not fulfilled effort to be given its solution.

In the point of fact, Kant tried to prove the arbitrary character of the idea of soul as substantiality by showing that the syllogisms concluding this latter, were paralogisms due to the transcendental faculty of reason. By making the word «absolute» of all its ontologic content deriving from the transcendental faculty of reason, Kant confines its meaning as the completely inconditionned, i. e. as the absolute whole of appearances¹.

In this sense, if the CPR must be considered as a systematic attempt to found a theoretical platform for the refutation of ontology in its traditional form, it must be considered as a primordial and incomplete one. As such, it has been gradually developed through its-Fichtean, Hegelian and Marxian criticisms and their contribution to the formation of a social science named History. Because, as it should be assumed, the refutation of the dogmatic ontology could not be the outcome of an isolated reasoning against its possibility, but rather the result of a long chain of gnoseological and epistemological efforts to construct a rigorous anthropological field. If we neglect the historical conditioning of the tradition of truth about beings, which is called Metaphysics, we risk once again to distort the essence of Being and cover it up, instead of revealing it in terms of a meta-scientific approach of it. By all means, as far as the development of

1. Im. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, (transl. by N. Kemp Smith) 1965, p. 318.

a non dogmatic ontological thought is concerned, the CPR has to be treated as the starting point and also as the most decisive one.

In the following lines we shall develop briefly the specific points which give support to our point of view. In this effort, the main focuses will be given to the question of time and the concept of reciprocity implied in the category of community.

A. W. Collins' *Ambiguities in Kant's Treatment of Space* provides us with a well grounded basis for supporting our point of view. Through a systematic analysis, Collins throws light on the obscure relation of temporal spatial objects of outer sense.

As the author notices, Kant reworks the distinction between primary and secondary qualities which is now replaced by the distinction between formal and material ingredients of empirical intuition. By this new distinction, Kantian thought grows out of the traditional claim that primary qualities are attributes of mind-independent reality; claim which absolutizes the rigor of science only by its reduction to Metaphysics. In Kant's account, temporal mind-dependent objects as well as spatial non temporal ones both have formal and material ingredients. Their formal ingredients constitute our necessary link to them. In order to get knowledge of the things of our empirical intuition, we project them into the space, assuming their materiality. Thus, in the realm of cognition, it is impossible to separate the formal from the material ingredients of the objects of the outer sense which turn to be the objects of our inner sense. In these terms, as far as the reality of ideas or the ideality of empirical objects is concerned, the old distinction between primary and secondary qualities loses its determining power. Taken in its reality per se, the object of outer sense is now located somewhere and from where it is located, it affects us. In this sense, space underlying the permanence behind the perishness of the appearances, becomes the determining factor which conditions our cognitive access to them¹.

Throughout Collins' analysis, we become aware of the reason why the demand for something not subjected to the ravages of time and therefore non mental is the point of Kant's central argument concerning apperception and personal identity. We shall focus to the latter.

As Collins says «Kant insists on a substantial foundation for the unity of the subject of experience outside the various experience of

1. A. Collins, *Ambiguities in Kant's Treatment of Space*, The St. John's Review, Winter / Spring 1883, pp. 25-26 and 29.

that subject. The great Kantian contribution here is the recognition that the subject could not possibly be given in experience...We have to look outside the realm of conscious contents to find a foundation for the unity of consciousness¹.

As Collins points out, this realm is the realm of reality which constitutes a whole of relatively stable material objects and which we represent as a spatio-temporal system. It is in this realm that the single subject bases its own abiding self or else, it is in this same realm that the single consciousness finds its unity².

Under these terms, reality seem to be the secular deposit of transcendentalism which endows the temporal mind-dependent objects of inner sense with their permanence. With the same permanence, reality endows the single consciousness in its cognitive activity. For if the mental subject is an appearance whenever we get knowledge of it -and this is the reason why the CPR is supposed to be the temporary substitute for Metaphysics- it is also an intelligible being and thus a real one, whenever he acts as a knowing subject.

In fact, in the most important note on the refutation of idealism, Kant maintains that «the representation of 'I am' ...immediately includes in itself the existence of a subject; but it does not so include any *knowledge* of that subject, and therefore also no empirical knowledge, that is, no experience of it. For this, we require, in addition to the thought of something existing, also intuition, and in this case inner intuition, in respect of which, that is, of time, the subject must be determined. *Bur in order so to determine it, outer objects are quite indispensable*; and it therefore follows that inner experience is itself possible only mediately, and only through outer experience»³.

The above quotation helps us not to forget that the consciousness of our beings as thinking and therefore as existing subjects is tightly related to the cognitive activity.

The cognitive activity, as it has been shown in the CPR, is a combinatory activity. But this combinatory activity in the process of cognition is to be found in other processes as well. We can find the same acts of «assembling, integrating, collating, comparing, retaining, retrieving, reproducing, synthesizing»⁴ also in the so called ethical processes of making decisions, rules, institutions or other cultu-

1. A. Collins, op. cit., p. 29.

2. A. Collins, op. cit., p.

3. Im. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, op. cit., p. 246.

4. A. Collins, op. cit., p. 28.

ral patterns. By these mental acts, the active subject formalizes the material ingredients of its practical experiences.-

But the processes of making rules, institutions or cultural patterns of behavior are not carried out by a single consciousness. It is the outcome of activities carried out by the whole of changing consciousness permanently existing in space. Thus reality is not only the whole of relatively stable material objects. Being the realm where the single consciousness finds its own unity, reality is also the whole of relatively stable mental subjects which act in terms of cognition as well as in terms of will. It is this whole of consciousnesses which will be called community (*gemeine der Iche*) by Fichte and which will be represented as a system of concrete social relations, later on, by Marx.

Of course, we could not find the notion of community of consciousnesses or of active subject interrelated in the frame of a system of social relations, in the CPR. It is not wrong to say that what Kant was not able to do in this text -that is to find the answer to the question of Metaphysics as science- seems to have been answered in the Critique of Practical Reason, i. e. in the field of a moral theory. In this field, according to Kant, we know a priori the possibility of freedom as the condition of the moral law, but we do not understand it. In other words, we cannot have the knowledge of the realization of its possibility.

Viewing the same question, throughout the History of social science (supposedly written by a historian who would have a serious philosophical training so that he could not miss the point concerning the German Idealism from Kant to Marx via Fichte and Hegel) we should say that human freedom was knowable, but not yet known in Kant's time. However, the presuppositions of its theoretical access to it are to be found in the CPR.

K. Fisher' Commentary for Kant's Critique, although it belongs to the neo-kantian tradition of Kant's interpretations which neglect or underestimate the importance of the Transcendental Dialectic, still helps us in supporting our point of view.

According to Fisher, the Kantian doctrine of space and time is the foundation of idealism in its strictest sense¹. When Kant, in the B edition, claims that beyond our faculty of representation, there is also something as an unknown X, he makes only a concession to his readers in order to render his teaching popular².

1. K. Fisher, *Commentary on Kant's Critick of the Pure Reason*, 1866, p. 172.

2. K. Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

We can easily overcome this argument which is historically weak and philosophically incomprehensible and say that in the realm of knowledge the only access we have to reality is through representation so that as far as we know reality, we know phenomena; while real objects which constitute reality, remain unknown per se. However, we have to notice, here, that real objects, which constitute reality, are not all given per se, since we do not only know reality, we are also involved in it by creating or changing it. Needless to say that our scope, here, is not the theory of knowledge constructed on the basis of how we get knowledge of appearances in their phenomenality, but of how we get knowledge of objects which represent the effects of the human action. We assume the reality of these effects, behind their phenomenality, whenever we think of them as products of the action of knowing and willing agents.

As far as the question of the agents is concerned, Fisher remarks that if every effect presupposes temporarily the efficient cause, and this latter, being the effect of another preceding cause; there must be, then, at the basis of all effects, a cause which is not the effect of another, i. e. not produced in time, but which forms the permanent substratum of all changes. This permanent existence is substance¹.

For Fisher, the agent of knowledge or of will cannot be a permanent existence, because the ego behind it, least of all can it be the permanent ego of an intuition, because were it all so, the thinking being must be intuited not in time, but in space².

Collins, in his essay, discusses this specific question, and from the first lines of this discussion, he remarks: «The nontemporal spatial object of outer sense offers a foundation for permanence because it is an essentially perishing object. Of course, the spatial object is not the sought-for subject of experience. But the nontemporal outer object provides the minimal conceptual framework for the idea of the endurance of the subject. Enduring things in space introduce the «determinate time» within which the endurance of the subject can be thought»³.

The problem still remaining concerns the substantial character of the permanent existence of the agent. In his commentary of Paralogisms, Fisher underlines the Kantian critique according to which

1. K. Fisher, op. cit., p. 119.

2. K. Fisher, op. cit., p. 178.

3. A. Collins, op. cit., pp. 29-31.

Rational Psychology translates the 'I think' in a thinking being from which it obtains a thinking substance. In these terms, the ego is hypostatized as if it were an independent existing thing per se. In this case, the subject becomes predicate and the whole syllogism becomes a parallogism¹.

The impossibility of making out of the 'I think' a cognoscible substance has been noticed by Kant. In the Transcendental both Aesthetic and Analytic, Kant does not get the knowledge of the 'I think' in the field of Mathematics and Physics, by analysing the ego of the mathematician or of the physical scientist, but the knowledge of their cognitive activities producing Mathematics and Physics as sciences.

In this point, we have to make clear that our main concern, here, is not to save dogmatic Metaphysics in its being out of the reach of science. On the contrary, our concern is to show how Kant's criticism of it gave rise to its transformation into a non dogmatic Metaphysics, the scientific status of which could be easily recognised. Within its scope, Kant's refutation of Rational Psychology remains valid even in nowadays, given that modern Psychology, behaviourist or structural still infers the egos from their deeds or from their relations to one another approached in a diachronical or a synchronical process of analysis. The knowledge produced by this type of approach concerns mechanisms, processes or effects of action.

Action being the attribute of the unknown substance which is the ego, in the frame of the speculative philosophy, does not take its place, here. In other words, it is not hypostatized in an independently existing thing per se. It is well known that by transforming the attribute of an unknown subject into another subject, we do not get the knowledge of it. The transformation of the attribute into subject, through an arbitrary reversal, has been practiced, not only once, in speculative philosophy. Hegel, for exemple, in his Philosophy of Right, reverses the idea of State, which is the attribute in judgments concerning family and civil society, and makes a subject out of it, defined in an a prioric, generic and mystifying way, severely criticized by Marx. Metaphysical reflexion on human world, freedom and necessity turns to be scientific in its foundation only as far as it elaborates a spatio-temporal system representing reality, in the limits of which, the subjects of causality are cognised by the effects of

1. K. Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

their action. In this case, action is not the cause; it is the relation of the knowing and willing subjects to one another. Under these terms, action does not take the place of the substance, being a reflective (and not an empirical, as Mahaffy noticed in his translation of Fisher's commentary) criterion of it.

In the spatio-temporal system which represents reality, we realize that the subjects coexisting in its frame, presuppose one another mutually in time. Neither of them can be preceding or following. Their action is reciprocal and they cannot be isolated by empty space. By their connection in space and time is formed a whole, of which they are the parts. This whole, consisting of coexistent, real, acting subjects, is a *compositum reale*.

Neither the CPR nor Kant's writing on History gives us the knowledge of such a *compositum reale*. In his proof of the third Analogy, Kant, explaining why the perceptions, following one another reciprocally, refer to things which coexist objectively, he says that this is because there is a pure concept of reciprocal sequence, i. e. the category of community which permits us to represent their coexistence as objective¹. In the B edition of the CPR, Kant added a paragraph saying that all substances, so far as they coexist, stand in thorough-going community². Nevertheless, when he comes to confront coexistence of substances in space, he claims that it is not knowable save on the assumption of their reciprocal interaction. This is a difficulty caused by the fact that the synthesis of imagination in apprehension does not reveal that the objects are coexistent. Substances can be empirically represented as coexisting only by their position in time by which they constitute a whole³.

Community, here, means reciprocal influence, but it is not found on apperceptions. Given that without it, the reciprocal relation of coexistence could not be met with, in experience, we can say that the category of community in the CPH renders possible the conception of a *compositum reale* as a whole of substances, but it did not render possible the knowledge of it, too. In the CPR, the synthesis of imagination remains the most fundamental and, finally, unique source of knowledge and this is the reason why Hegel, by characterising the CPR as formalistic idealism, still integrates it within Empiricism. In his own Logic, the category of reciprocity, deduced by

1. *The Logic of Hegel*, transl. by W. Wallace, 2d ed. 1931, p. 279.

2. Im. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, op. cit., p. 233.

3. Im. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, op. cit., pp. 234-235.

the categories of actuality and causality, is supposed to make possible the analysis of a whole of existing and related to one another things which are not only perceived but are real too. It is well known to the reader of the Hegelian Logic that «the progress ad infinitum of causes and effects is, as progress, really and truly suspended»¹ thanks to the category of reciprocity elaborated by Hegel.

Heidegger, who is the reader not only of the CPR but also of the Hegelian Logic, does not take it into account, either in his critique of the CPR or in his *Metaphysics as History of Being*; in this latter, he identifies actualitas to causalitas, and by excluding reciprocity, he manages to reduce actuality (reality) to existentia². As Heidegger says «existentia is actualitas in the sense of the *res extra causas et nihilum sistentia*, a production which transposes something into the realm outside of causality»³.

In his work *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, Heidegger already claimed that the CPR is the instauration of the Fundamental Ontology, i. e. of an Analytic of the finite essence of the Human Dasein⁴. He also claimed that this instauration is identical to a restoration of traditional Metaphysics resulting from Kant's dialogue to Aristotle and Plato⁵.

In claiming the above points, Heidegger pretends to ignore all further development of the Kantian category of community, through post-kantian idealism leading to Marx. However, even though he pretends to ignore it, he seriously takes it into account. We could even say that his main effort is to reintegrate all this further development in a philosophical past which would save philosophy from a future seemingly promising philosophy's death. In this effort, the category of community and its further transformation into the category of reciprocity is strategically abolished, and with it, is abolished any possible tie of philosophical thought to sciences. Let us see how.

Heidegger refuses to see the CPR as a Theory of Experience⁶ as far as this latter is considered to be a Theory of ontic knowledge. However, by saying that Nature's essential truth is not ontic but on-

1. *The Logic of Hegel*, op. cit., p. 277, § 154.

2. M. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 15.

3. M. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 17.

4. M. Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, Bonn 1929, pp. I-118, where are exposed the 5 atages of the instauration.

5. M. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 11.

6. M. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 16.

tological, Heidegger is not seriously opposed to modern empiricism; he rather intervenes to repulse its growing antihumanism. In order to do that, in the limits of *Fundamental Ontology*, he relates *Metaphysica specialis* to *Metaphysica generalis* so that the justification of the latter is presupposed for the instauration of the former¹.

By such an interpretation, it is made clear to the empiricist that Nature, which is the deposit of objects of scientific approach, becomes also the field where we can have a thorough comprehension of the knowing subject's transcendental, by exploring its primordial foundation. Under these terms, *Fundamental Ontology* cannot be either scientific or non scientific; it is only authentic, and thus valid in its authenticity. However, if *Fundamental Ontology*, in its authenticity, has gained the validity it had not before, as Kant already pointed out in the *Transcendental Dialectic* of the CPR, this is effected thanks to its possibility to formulate a priori synthetic judgments producing ontological knowledge. The object of such a knowledge is not the phenomena approached by science, but the being of Nature's phenomenality. In this case, we have not to determine the being of phenomenality, since it does not contain anything to determine; what we have to do is to understand it in its existence as nothingness.

If Heidegger takes the risk to treat the CPR so violently and reverse its negativity to a positive speculation of Being in its existence or non-existence, he does so, on the basis of an unconfessed dialogue with post-kantian philosophers like Fichte and Hegel as well as on the basis of all further theoretical work done up to his days, in the field of the dialectical thought. The points of this unconfessed dialogue are numerous. In the limits of our paper, attention will be paid to those concerning the foundation of transcendental.

According to Heidegger, transcendental is founded in transcendental imagination. Transcendental imagination functions as pure synthesis and it forms the essential unity of pure intuition and of pure understanding². Intuition as well as understanding have both their source in transcendental imagination. According to Heidegger, it is this latter that renders possible the transcendence as the essence of finite ipseity³.

By this interpretation, Heidegger makes an attempt to neutralise the Fichtean contribution to the matter. If the source of transcen-

1. M. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 15; see also pp. 118, 211, 209-221.

2. M. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 119-138.

3. M. Heidegger, op. cit., see the end of paragraph 29.

dentality is not Ego but only its transcendental imagination, it is not necessary or meaningful to see cosmos (Being in the broadest sense of the term) as an *allgemeine der Iche*. On the contrary, it is necessary and sufficient too, to consider Cosmos primarily as the broadest possible system of reference of the human subjectivity in its creative reflexion.

Fichte was deeply concerned about what happened in his own time where «life acquired a historical and symbolical character, but it very rarely achieved to be real»¹. It is this quasi-abstarct frame where «life becomes a strange story and where it is hard to know where to search for people and how to reach them»² that he pursuits to elucidate its reality, by exploring the unknowable, according to Kant, root unifying the sensible and suprasensible worlds³.

Ego which is the unknowable root unifying these two worlds, gains its epistemological identity as principle, only because it is to be discovered in our internal selves and in what we do and live⁴. As a principle of organic unity, Ego is purely and simply the Reason. As such, Reason is therefore genetic, i.e. free and active in its own-objectification. In other words, Reason is absolute as far as Ego is absolute, given that we cannot, as Fichte maintains, to conceive of absoluteness unless we live and create it⁵.

It has been apparently clear so far that Fichte's Theory of Science has been the decisive turning-point preparing the Hegelian Logic. Heidegger is well aware of it. Let us see why.

According to Hegel, the aim of Logic is to study the forms of thought not only in their essential nature, which was already done by Kant, but also in their complete development⁶. In this point, Hegel mentions Fichte's contribution concerning the deduction of categories, exhibited in their necessity⁷. As Hegel remarks, categories are not mere properties of thought, as Kant confined them; they are also conditioned by their material given to them through their action⁸. This action, which will be specially considered by Hegel under

1. J. G. Fichte, Werke, Kant IV, *Die Wissenschaftslehre*, 1804, p. 167.

2. J. G. Fichte, op. cit., pp. 167-168.

3. J. G. Fichte, op. cit., pp. 181-182.

4. J. G. Fichte, op. cit., p. 211i

5. J. G. Fichte, op. cit., p. 383.

6. *The Logic of Hegel*, op. cit., p. 84.

7. Op. cit., p. 87.

8. Op. cit., p. 90.

the name of Dialectic, instead of being brought to bear upon the categories from without, it is immanent in them¹. The contradiction essentially and inevitably introduced into the world of Reason by the categories of ununderstanding as Kant signalled, obtains, in Hegelian Logic, an objective character; its seat is not the Reason but the world conditioned by Reason's action².

The three instances of the Hegelian Logic, i.e. the doctrine of being the doctrine of essence and the doctrine of notion, constitute a further development of the Kantian Transcendental Dialectic, where the critical functioning of this latter turns to be heuristic and constructive too, by forming a new instrument of approach which reveals not only the true source but also the fate of contradiction. The contradiction is immanent neither in the world per se nor in the Reason in itself, but in their reciprocal action leading to unity.

The Hegelian categories, deduced from one another and exhibited in their necessity, are schemata which correspond to Reason's approach to the thing per se and to the inevitable gnoseological but also praxeological alteration of this latter.

Being constitutes the starting point of this deduction. As such, it has not been discovered by the Hegelian Logic. It is already there in the Transcendental Logic. Hegel's decisive intervention consists in revealing the indeterminatedness of Being in its immediacy, and thus its identity as nothingness.

However, for Heidegger, the starting point of the Hegelian Logic is also its end. Putting in parenthesis the work done by Hegel in the field of Logic, he makes an attempt to open up a domain of speculation parallel to that opened up by Hegel and hopefully eliminating it.

Hegel, in his remark that being in its indeterminatedness, is identical to nothing, was pointing out the limits of the mechanistic approach of *Verstand* in its total neglecting the genetic and dynamic aspects of being. More than a century later, Heidegger respects the limits of the mechanistic approach of *Verstand* (furtherly consecrated by positivism) and builds up his *Fundamental Ontology* on nothingness. Hence, the categories of the Hegelian Logic revealing step by step the reality of being in its constant implication with Reason, are rejected. Being, taken here in an exclusively ontological aspect, has to be neither genetic nor dynamic; its auto-alteration is

1. op. cit., p. 85.

2. op. cit., p. 98.

a mere effect of our approach elucidating its double character: as phenomenon so far as it constitutes the object of a finite, i.e. scientific knowledge (Gegenstand) and as thing per se so far as it is the created result of an infinite approach; which is but the Heideggerian approach revealing being in its internal essence (Ent-stand)¹.

Within this scope, the seat of categories, which would render possible the Heideggerian ontological approach, cannot be either in the Hegelian Logic nor in Transcendental Logic; because, the former does not conform to the positivist criteria of scientific legitimacy or validity and the latter refers exclusively to pure ontik knowledge. Thus, the new field elaborated by Heidegger to offer ground to the categories of pure ontological knowledge is Heidegger's Existential Analytic.

This latter takes the place of Transcendental Analytic, but in both of these analytical frames, which are complementary to one another, the pure synthesis, producing knowledge of both ontic and ontological beings in their finitude, is founded on the transcendental imagination and its temporality. Under these terms, the transcendental imagination becomes the common source not only of intuition and understanding, but also of theoretical Reason, the intellectual dimension of which is underestimated and finally left apart. Thus, the preconceptual comprehension of human Dasein becomes not merely admissible or permissible but also obligatory, if we are to apprehend, under the abstract form of being, its obscure nature. Tracing the way back from its abstractedness to its original obscurity, Heidegger finds out that the absence is the radical property of Being. By this regression, one realises that being-there is the other face of being-in-nowhere, so that when we talk, think or write about being, we talk or think of an absence or we even create it, in our effort to put something in the place of nothing. Because, nothingness, even though it has been negated in our thinking or writing, is still there as the reason of our task to understand its inner and primordial essence.

Cl. Piché, in his article *Le schematisme de la raison pure, Contribution au dossier Heidegger-Kant*², discusses at length all possible objections against the Heideggerian interpretation of the transcendental Schematism of Pure Reason. There is one more point connected with the Kantian category of community, transformed into

1. M. Heidegger, op. cit. p. 28.

2. Les Etudes Philosophiques, P.u.f., Janvier-Mars 1986, pp. 79-99.

the Hegelian category of reciprocity, that we have to discuss, here, before closing this paper.

Heidegger, having reduced the Theoretical Reason to a pure sensible Reason and by sharing Kant's criticism of the idea of god as a result of the dialectical illusion of it, concludes the ex nihilo creation of the world of being-in-the-world; so that the only legitimate question about being-in-the-world has not to do with the genetic or dynamic aspect of its formation, but with the meaning or truth of its existence. And we have to remind that the search of meaning or truth of existence is the crucial point not only in Heidegger's *Fundamental Ontology*, but also in his problematic on the objectivity of the thing, developed later on, in the years of 30's.

But what if, for a moment, we leave apart the interrogation concerning the meaning of human Dasein and ask what is the ground not of our approach of existence, but of existence itself? The question, which is to be answered in ontological terms, remains unanswered in Heidegger's ontology and makes us to turn from it straight back to Hegelian Logic.

In point of fact, in his effort to understand the abstract identity of being, in its existence, Heidegger neglects its concrete or true identity; he also neglects the Hegelian remark that the main thing is not to confuse these two (abstract and true) identities¹. For Heidegger, the abstract identity of being is the existent reflected into-self, the ground of which is suspended; following Hegel, in this point, he might even claim that existence is but the result of this negation². But as existence reflected into-self, the abstract identity of being is the Kantian thing per se, and thus, as Hegel showed an empty substratum for the predicates of relation³. For existence, in its true identity, is not merely reflection into-self -if it were so, it would be abstractedly conceived- but also reflection into-another. Heidegger seems to ignore that part of the Hegelian doctrine of essence, where Hegel, in his effort to conceive of the concrete identity of being, takes into account not only the principle of identity, but also the principle of difference and concludes that existence is the indefinite multitude of existents which are co-relative and form a world of reciprocal dependence⁴, so that «everything that exists stands in

1. *The Logic of Hegel*, op. cit., p. 215.

2. op. cit., p. 231.

3. op. cit. p. 231.

4. op. cit., p. 230.

relation and this is the veritable nature of every existence»¹. He seems also to ignore the logical consequence of this conclusion, that is the deduction of actualitas, causalitas and reciprocity from one another, by which, Hegel saves causality from dogmatism. Causality has not to be rejected as giving rise to dogmatic Metaphysics, since by its integration into the relation of reciprocity, the progress ad infinitum of causes and effects is suspended. Heidegger, in order to confine his search on Being's nothingness, follows the opposite direction and regresses, as we said, from causality to actuality. By doing that, he remains in the sphere of traditional Metaphysics, even though his approach is not conditioned by the dogmatic rationalism of this latter. This is so because in Heidegger's task, the abstract identity of Being which echoes the Kantian thing per se, consists the ultimate and non transcendable limit posed by Kant in his CPR and respected thereafter, by Positivism².

Under these terms, Heidegger's attempt to abandon scientific approach and philosophical interrogations arisen in it and conceive of the essence of Being in preconceptual terms, is rather an heroic exodus from the History of modern rationalism comparable to those of epic poetry than a contribution to its further development. In its ekstasis, the Kantian quest for scientific Metaphysics to be fulfilled in future is not overcome but overthrown.

1. op. cit., p. 245.

2. op. c. p. 279.