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CURRENTS OF PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT IN THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES A. D.¹

The philosophy of the first two centuries A. D. is a neglected subject. On the surface, nothing of great interest was happening. There were no great individuals like Plato or Aristotle, or even Zeno or Epicurus, writing works destined to inspire generations of readers. The Hellenistic systems, Stoicism and Epicureanism, had reached the end of their development; while they continued to hold a dominant position during the greater part of this period, their adherents produced no fresh ideas and were mainly preoccupied with applying their tenets to the needs and problems of everyday life. The great system of Neoplatonism, which was to hold the stage during the last three centuries of the Roman Empire, had not yet arisen. Older historians of philosophy, e.g. Zeller or Überweg, when trying to find a single term to sum up the intellectual character of our period, fixed on the word 'Eclecticism', and it is true that some of the writers whose work has survived combine elements originating in different schools in their work. But this tendency is neither consistent nor universal, and other philosophers fought hard, in their polemics and their positive teaching, to maintain the purity of whatever doctrine they preferred. Again, it might appear that the philosophers of our period were concerned with ethics to the exclusion of other areas of

1. This is a slightly revised version of a lecture delivered at Ioannina University in September, 1986. I have added references to the most important ancient authorities; for fuller information, including references to modern scholarly literature, I have sometimes referred to the footnotes of an article entitled «Aristotelian philosophy in the Roman world, from the time of Cicero to the end of the second century AD» (abbreviated AROW), to be published in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* II 36 pt. 1. The most recent general book on the philosophy of this period, which only reached me after the draft of AROW had been completed, is P. Donini's *Le scuole, l'anima, l'impero: la filosofia antica da Antioco a Plotino* (Torino 1982).

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philosophy, and certainly most of them would have agreed that philosophy is not merely an objective study of the world and human life, but commits its adherents to a certain way of living. But although this aspect predominates in our sources, there is sufficient evidence to show that other areas, logic, cosmology and particularly the relationship of the physical world to God, were studied attentively, and many of the ideas which appear fully developed in Neoplatonism can be traced back to this period. If we want to characterise the age, we must take a broader view and consider what went before and what came after; and then we can see that it was really an age of transition. On the surface, the old ethical truths continued to be preached and the old moral problems to be debated, but underneath new forces were at work, reshaping men's vision of the world. Not all of these impulses originated from philosophical thinking; one of the most important is the religious fervour which sets off the Imperial age from the Hellenistic. In the present lecture I cannot, of course, give a comprehensive survey of everything that was going on. What I want to do is first to describe some general features of the philosophy of the period, and then to say something about the contribution of one school about which we hear even less than the others, that of Aristotle.

To begin then with some of the features common to all the philosophies of the period (except of course the Sceptic).

1) They were systematic: it was believed that any philosophy worthy of the name must provide a comprehensive account of the world and of man's place within it, of human behaviour, and of human knowledge. As an ideal, this notion can be traced back to the classical period of Greek philosophy; Plato, you remember, quotes Hippocrates as holding that it is impossible to have any real knowledge of the human body without a knowledge of the soul, or of the human soul without a knowledge of the nature of the universe¹. But Plato did not construct such a comprehensive system himself, and Aristotle at least did not live to complete one. This was left to the Hellenistic schools, and their systems were successful enough to eclipse the older schools for nearly three centuries. When Aristotelianism and dogmatic Platonism were revived (about the middle of the first century B.C.), their adherents presented them as systems like the Stoic one, embracing all

1. Pl. *Phaidros* 270c. The reference is disputed; according to Galen (XV 12 Kühn), Plato was thinking of the *Περὶ Φύσεως ἀνθρώπου*, but many modern historians have denied this and made various alternative suggestions. Cf. A. Diès, *Autour de Platon* (Paris 1927) I 30ff and M. Pohlenz, *Hippokrates* (Berlin 1938) 76ff.

areas of philosophy and articulated them into three main parts, λογική, φυσική and ἠθική, which were in turn subdivided. This raised problems concerning the relationship of the part of philosophy and the order in which they should be studied; in the Hellenistic era, these had troubled nobody except the Stoics, but now they began to be debated by Aristotelians and Platonists as well.

2) They were book-centred. Their systems were incorporated in the writings of their founders and to a lesser extent those of their immediate followers. The work of their schools was to expound the writings and to propagate the teaching they contained. Much of it consisted of straight exegesis, but inevitably there would be problems which the founders three or more centuries previously, had not considered or to which they had attached less importance than their later adherents: the question of fate, providence and freewill is a case in point (I shall say something more about this later). When this happened, and new ideas had to be introduced or old ones modified, there was a strong tendency to present them as an interpretation or development of the traditional doctrine. Philosophical debate could take the form of an argument over the meaning or authenticity of a text.

This had some consequences for the literary form of philosophical writing. Apart from popular lectures, known by such terms as σχολαί or διατριβαί, mostly on ethical or religious matters, and elementary handbooks, the characteristic form of our period is the ὑπόμνημα, a portmanteau term which embraced everything from a line-by-line commentary to a paraphrase with occasional notes. Such ὑπομνήματα could be written by students for their personal use—Galen wrote many in his youth, and the work entitled «Aristotle's *Topics*» listed in the Lamprias-catalogue of Plutarch's writings may have been a ὑπόμνημα of this kind; they could be passed on to friends, as many of Galen's were, and those produced by professional teachers would no doubt circulate among their pupils. This way of doing philosophy seems to have originated in the Aristotelian school but soon spread to the others; Seneca finds it necessary to point out that philosophy is not primarily a matter of reading other people's books, and his complaint is echoed by Epictetus and others¹.

3) Great importance seems to have been attached to membership of a school. In a way, this is only a consequence of what I have said about the systematic and book-centred nature of philosophy at the time, but in another way it is surprising. Our period is often supposed

1. Seneca *Epist. Mor.* 33.7ff, 108.23; Epictetus 4.4.

to be the age of eclecticism, and several recent scholars have claimed that the old philosophical schools ceased to exist as institutions after the Roman sack of Athens in 86 B. C. They have succeeded in demonstrating that we know virtually nothing about the existence or structure of the 'schools' in the imperial period, and that the tables of 'Successions of Scholarachs' found in some older histories are almost pure invention, but there can be no doubt that, in an ideological sense at least, 'schools' were important¹. When Strabo or Galen mention a philosopher, they almost always say what school he belonged to, and when publicly funded chairs of philosophy were instituted, each school was given an equal number. Adherence to a school appears to have been considered an essential part of being a philosopher, although we do not know what tests, if any, were employed to demonstrate that such adherence was genuine. Some differences of doctrine within schools were tolerated, but these would have to be presented as different interpretations of the founder's words, not as outright disagreement.

Relations between the schools were complex. Each school was eager to maintain its identity and the integrity of its teaching, and this led to polemics which could be acrimonious. But there was also some borrowing; in particular, the Platonists took many ideas from the Aristotelians and both Platonists and Aristotelians were open to Stoic influences to some extent, as in their teaching about 'parts' of philosophy which we have touched on already. But this interaction was subject to severe limitations. No school allowed its central doctrines to be jeopardised. The Stoics paraded the rigour of their moral teaching and their belief in an ineluctable but providential power ruling over the natural world and human affairs; the Epicureans maintained their atomism and their peculiar brand of hedonism. Neither of these schools was prepared to modify its teaching to meet the new demands of the imperial age. There was more interchange between Platonists and Aristotelians; the Platonists in particular were ready to learn from other schools, especially in logic, but to some extent in other fields as well. But their doctrines of transcendent forms and the immortality of the human soul set their philosophy off from all the others, and on these points there was no compromise. And the Aristotelians? For the moment, all I want to say is that they occupied the middle ground, and this was enough, in the period under consideration, to gain them a steady following among men

1. See AROW n. 5-6 and 74.

of affairs as well as those who wanted to devote their lives to philosophy.

One last point is worth making in this connection. When discussing the views of rival schools, the writers of our period rarely mention their contemporaries but refer instead to the founders, Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Chrysippus or Epicurus, or occasionally to their immediate followers, like Theophrastus. Even when they refer to later members of the school, these belong to the Hellenistic age. Thus Philo of Alexandria, when reporting a controversy about the eternity of the world, names Aristotle, Theophrastus and Critolaus on the Peripatetic side and Chrysippus, Boethus of Sidon and Panaitios on the Stoic; Plutarch, in his essay on Moral Virtue, uses Peripatetic material taken from a nearly contemporaneous source to refute the Stoics, but only names Zeno, Chrysippus and others belonging to the Hellenistic age. When Alexander of Aphrodisias makes a distinction between 'earlier' and 'more recent' Stoics, the latter expression refers to Sosigenes, who was active in the second half of the second century B.C.¹ One might suppose that the apparent unwillingness to criticise contemporaries or near contemporaries was due to professional courtesy, but the same writers show no such inhibitions on other occasions. Alexander was prepared to criticise members of his own school, including his teachers Herminus and Aristotle of Mytilene, by name, and quite severe on Galen²; Galen himself was always ready with insults for those who disagreed with him. So we must look for a different explanation of this phenomenon. It looks as if each school treated the teaching of the others as closed systems authoritatively expounded in the writings of their founders. This was a natural consequence of the attitudes to philosophy I have mentioned already, but meant that philosophical debate tended to degenerate into polemics using traditional arguments against traditional targets. It does not seem to have occurred to anyone that philosophies can change and develop over time, and that their own period could make a genuinely new contribution to the old systems. This gives a curiously impersonal feel to many of the controversies of the period, and limited the possibility of fruitful interaction.

1. Philo *Περὶ ἀφθαρσίας κόσμου* c.11ff. 16ff; Plutarch *Περὶ ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς* 440 E ff; Alex. Aphr. *Περὶ κράσεως* p. 216.13. Bruns (Alexander and the other ancient commentators on Aristotle are quoted by page and line of the edition in the series «Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca», published by the Prussian Academy, Berlin 1883-1909).

2. Alex. Aphr. *In Anal. Pri.* 74.6 Wallies (Herminus), *De anima* II p. 113. 12ff. Bruns (Aristotle of Mytilene). For Galen, see AROW n. 413 and 419.

The most important philosophical development during our period was the emergence of a systematic form of Platonism in which the fundamental doctrines of the Platonic dialogues, especially the late dialogues including the *Timaeus* and *Parmenides*, were supplemented by Aristotelian and, to a lesser extent, Stoic ideas. A good deal of work has been done about this in recent years, but it is too big a subject for a single lecture; I shall concentrate on a different topic, the revival and development of Aristotelianism which paralleled and influenced that of Platonism, until the two philosophies merged in the third century A. D.

It is well known that Aristotle's school, the Peripatos, lost its intellectual vitality about fifty years after Aristotle's death. The reasons are obscure and probably complex, but in the middle of the first century Andronicus of Rhodes, probably the tenth scholarch after Aristotle himself, set out to revive the fortunes of his school by making Aristotle's most important philosophical writings available in a form that the people of his generation would find attractive and useful. These were not literary works prepared for publication, but notes connected with Aristotle's lectures, and were apparently left in considerable disorder when Aristotle died. After his death they passed to Theophrastus, but although they seem to have continued serve as the basis for much of the school's teaching under both Theophrastus and Eudemus, little attempt was made to arrange them in any systematic way, and after Theophrastus' death, as the direction of the school's teaching changed they appear to have fallen into disuse and neglect. Andronicus' task of editing these was complex; not only had he to provide readable texts, but to bring the books dealing with the same subject-matter together to form comprehensive treatises and then to arrange the treatises themselves in an intelligible order. The result of this efforts was to create what is in most respects the Corpus Aristotelicum we still have today, apart from a few minor additions (*Metaph.* $\bar{\alpha}$ and of course some of the spurious works), and some changes of order. In addition, Andronicus wrote an elaborate treatise, which included a detailed catalogue of Aristotle's writings, justifying his work, and a commentary or paraphrase on the *Categories*, which he placed at the head of his edition.

Andronicus presented Aristotle's philosophy as a system divided into three parts, λογική, φυσική and πρακτική, and his arrangement was meant to reflect this and encourage readers to approach the parts in

the right order. What this order should be was disputed at first. Andronicus believed that students should begin with logic, because a knowledge of the laws of thought was essential for understanding any philosophical argument, while his pupil Boethus wanted them to start with natural philosophy, because this is closest to ordinary experience¹. This argument only lasted one generation, and after that Andronicus' view was generally accepted.

The tripartite division of philosophy is clearly derived from that of the Stoic although its origin is older—it is mentioned once in the *Topics* (105b 19ff), one of Aristotle's earliest works, which still reflects the logical teaching of Plato's Academy. In his mature works, Aristotle uses a division of sciences into theoretical, practical and poetic, but this covers a somewhat wider field than the division of philosophy used by the Stoics and Andronicus. However, there are some points of contact between the two systems; both distinguish a class of 'Practical' sciences or philosophy, i.e. Ethics and 'Politics', while the Stoic *Physike* covers the most philosophically important of Aristotle's 'Theoretical' sciences (it would have included the subject-matter, of Aristotle's 'Theology' or 'First Philosophy'). Where the two diverge is in their treatment of logic. Aristotle did not assign it a place in his scheme—it is not included in his list of theoretical sciences, and it is difficult to see where else it could have been fitted in—and this could have been regarded as sufficient reason for putting it into a separate class, as the Stoics had done. But there was still a discrepancy, which was overcome by saying that logic was not a 'part' of philosophy co-ordinate with the others, but a tool necessary for understanding both theoretical and practical philosophy. This view is found in all the Greek commentators from Alexander onwards, and Andronicus' argument in favour of beginning the study of philosophy with logic suggests that he may have originated it².

This rather involved story illustrates the way in which Aristotle's philosophy was presented in a modernised form, and the kind of problem to which this gave rise. Other problems arose from the attempt to read Aristotle's works as part of a comprehensive system. It has been argued that this involved a distortion of Aristotle's thought, but for reasons I have briefly stated at the beginning of this lecture, I believe that this is mistaken³. A systematic tendency was implicit in Aristotle's

1. Philoponos *In Categoriais* 5.16ff.

2. See AROW n. 99-101.

3. Cf. AROW n. 97.

tle's philosophy from the start; it is revealed by the elaborate crossreferences found in all his works (I do not believe that they can be dismissed as the work of later editors), his elaborate classifications of sciences and their interrelation, and in his attempt to apply a limited number of explanatory principles to all subjects of scientific investigation. But he did not live to complete such a system, and the writings he left behind were composed at different periods of his life for different audiences; some were written to explore problems rather than record firm conclusions. Modern interpreters try to take account of such features and to understand each work as a separate entity with its own unity and philosophical and literary character. The ancients tended to subordinate the individual work to what they thought was Aristotle's system and to smooth over real or apparent discrepancies by means of verbal interpretation or even textual changes¹. In this way their systematic tendency, although not false to the spirit of Aristotle's philosophy as a whole, could lead to a distorted view of individual works.

With Andronicus began the tradition of exegesis which lasted to the end of antiquity. Its thrust was, as we have seen, different from that of modern commentaries: there were no genetic explanations and little attempt to understand the context in which any work was produced, and the character of Aristotle's arguments received less attention than a modern reader would give it; all the emphasis was on the elucidation of Aristotle's doctrines within the system of his philosophy. Within those limits, Aristotelian exegesis attained a high level of competence. The best of the commentators knew his writings thoroughly and used them intelligently to explain Aristotle's meaning, and many of their comments are still useful or at least interesting to-day.

Andronicus' work was continued and in a sense completed by his pupil Boethus of Sidon, a friend and possibly teacher of the geographer Strabo (this gives us some indication of his date). He was the author of an immense commentary on the *Categories* in which all the problems raised by that work were fully discussed and many of the arguments and explanations found in later commentaries were anticipated. He had read extensively in the Aristotelian corpus and the works of Aristotle's immediate successors, Theophrastus and Strato. As a philosopher, he seems to have ranged more widely than Andronicus, and he was particularly interested in questions of natural philosophy (*φυσική*). But while he probably wrote a number of monographs on such topics, it is characteristic that some of his most interesting suggestions ca-

1. Cf. AROW n. 98.

me in his commentary on the *Categories*; e.g. his very subtle discussion of time, which seems to have been influenced by Strato as well as Aristotle, was occasioned by a remark in the *Categories* (15b 1) which seemed to require elucidation¹.

Once established, this tradition continued unbroken until it culminated in the work of Alexander of Aphrodisias at the beginning of the third century A. D. Throughout this period, the chief philosophical work of the Peripatetic school was to expound Aristotle's writings. The form of the commentaries varied; some were mainly paraphrases with fairly elementary explanations of Aristotle's meaning, others tried to discuss the philosophical issues in greater depth; no doubt this depended to some extent on the audience at which they were aimed. As I have said already, much of this work was excellently done and determined the way in which Aristotle was understood for many centuries. But the concentration on his text made it difficult to deal with new problems or absorb new ideas, and led to a rigidity which ultimately proved fatal.

The activity of commentators is not a good subject for a general lecture, and so I shall now turn to a different one: the interaction between Aristotelianism and the other schools. When Andronicus published his edition, he seems to have produced something of a sensation, and for a few years Platonists and Stoics, as well as Aristotelians, joined in the discussion of Aristotle's philosophy. Simplicius names five 'early commentators' in the *Categories*, who belonged to the same generation as Andronicus or the one which followed immediately: three of these were Peripatetics, Andronicus himself, Boethus and Ariston of Alexandria; the others were a Platonist, Eudorus, and a Stoic, Athenodorus². No doubt their comments were largely hostile, but the important thing is that they joined in the debate at all. At the same time Areius Didymus, another Stoic and, like Athenodorus, a teacher of Octavian (the future emperor Augustus), wrote a great handbook containing summaries of the teaching of the Academy, Peripatos and Stoa. Much of his material is Hellenistic, but he must have known at least some of Aristotle's school-treatises and presumably wrote after the publication of Andronicus' edition. Since he was a Stoic and writing a general book covering different schools of philosophy he naturally tended to formulate Peripatetic doctrine in a Hellenistic and Stoic way; e.g. he describes sensation and intellect as the 'criteria', respectively, of sen-

1. Cf. AROW n. 147-8.

2. Simplicius *In Cat.* 159.32.

sible and intelligible objects, and he tries to assimilate Aristotle's Unmoved Mover to the Stoic supreme deity by calling him 'A rational and blessed being, sustaining the heavenly bodies and exercising providence on their behalf'¹. Some of these formulations are also found in later writers, for non-specialists continued to derive most of their knowledge of Aristotelianism from handbooks of the same kind, long after they should have been superseded by the genuine school-treatises which Andronicus had made available. But for our present purpose, what matters is that, when Andronicus, Areius and the others I have mentioned were writing, a genuine interchange between the schools was still possible. A couple of generations later this was no longer so. In the middle of the first century the Stoic Cornutus wrote about Aristotle's *Categories*, but he was following in the footsteps of Athenodorus and is the last member of his school known to have shown any interest in Aristotle's school-treatises. Most of Seneca's knowledge of Aristotle and his philosophy seems to come from handbooks. Epictetus mentions the Peripatetics once as falling short of Stoic standards of moral rigour, in language which hardly differs from that used by Cicero in similar circumstances; Andronicus might never have been born for all the effect his work appears to have had in him. One reason for this may have been the tendency of Stoic thinkers to concentrate on practical ethics, but I doubt if this is the whole explanation. There was a parallel development on the Aristotelian side. It is possible quite often to see traces of Stoic influence in the work of Andronicus and Boethus; not only in their presentation of Aristotle's philosophy as a system, but in some details as well. This was not due to any desire to compromise or mediate between the two philosophies, but happened simply because Stoicism was the dominant philosophy when they wrote and provided the schemata in which it seemed most natural to think. But later Peripatetics tried to eliminate such influences and to return to a purer form of Aristotelianism. One example must suffice. Aspasius, a peripatetic of the second century A. D. who wrote a commentary on the *EN* of which some parts are still extant, tells us that the early Peripatetics (by which he apparently means those of the Hellenistic period, including Aristotle and Theophrastus) did not give a definition of *πάθος*, but that both Andronicus and Boethus did; he then quotes their definitions, which only differ in one detail but which clearly owe their form and much of their content to the Stoics: it is an irrational movement of the soul owing to a perception (*δρόληψις*) of good or bad.

1. Areios Didymos fr. 9 (Diels, *Doxographi Graeci* p. 450.15).

(Interestingly, Areius Didymus attributes a very similar definition to Aristotle himself)¹. Aspasius then proceeds to criticise it on the ground that the use of the word ὑπόληψις implies a process of reflection of some kind before a πάθος can arise; in other words, it seemed to him to be too close to the Stoic intellectualist view. Aspasius does not mention the Stoics by name in this context, but instinctively he has rejected an element in his predecessor's account which came dangerously close to their position. In logic, each school stubbornly maintained its own system and terminology, based respectively on the Aristotelian categorical syllogism and the hypothetical or propositional syllogism, and neither seems to have thought much about the relationship between them, except for quarreling about which type of syllogism was prior to the other. Modern logicians have pointed out that the two systems are complementary and should have been combined, but this was not done in antiquity (Galen came close to doing it, but remained half-hearted), although Boethus, in admitting the priority of the hypothetical syllogism made a concession which should have made it possible².

The only school to make creative use of Aristotle's ideas were the Platonists. In itself, this is not surprising. Plato's dialogues deal with particular philosophical problems and while his insights were capable of wider application, those who wanted to use them as the basis for constructing a system found many gaps which had to be filled with material from other sources. There was also a genuine historical link between Aristotle and Platonism to which Antiochus of Ascalum, one of the authors of the revival of dogmatic Platonism, attached great importance. Even so some Platonists expressed strong reservations about borrowing from Aristotle: in the second century Calvenus Taurus and Atticus, and Plotinus in the third³. In spite of this, the temptation was too great, and with Porphyrius, a pupil of Plotinus and his literary executor, the 'syncretist' tendency, if we may call it that, won the upper hand. However, certain limits were rigorously observed. Nothing was admitted which might threaten their fundamental doctrines, and Porphyry himself wrote a long book about the soul in which he severely criticised Aristotle's view that it is the ἐντελέχεια of the body, as well as a more «naturalistic» version of it best known to us from Alexander of Aphrodisias, but which in essentials seems to go back to Andronicus and Boethus; it may be significant that Porphyry's book had the

1. Aspasius *In EN* 44.24ff, cf. Areios ap. Stob. *Ecl.* II p. 38. 18ff Wachsmuth.

2. Galen, *Εἰσαγωγή διαλεκτικῆ* 7.2.

3. Cf. AROW n. 305 and Donini (cited in n.1 above) p. 113 ff.

title «Against Boethus on the soul»¹. Even Aristotle's doctrine of the «Fifth Substance» was attacked by at least some Platonists. What they accepted was the whole of Aristotle's logic, including the doctrine of *Categories*, and most of them adopted three Peripatetic ethical tenets: that virtue is a mean, that virtue is not sufficient for happiness without some measure of bodily and «external» goods and that passions should be moderated rather than eradicated, as the Stoics prescribed. These moral attitudes were traditional in the Academy - it is said that *Metriopatheia* originated with Crantor, although it came to be associated with the Peripatetics-and necessitated no change of attitude, and the Platonists claimed to find much of Aristotle's logic, including his *Categories* and syllogistic, prefigured in the *Timaeus* and other late dialogues of Plato². There was less scope for borrowing in cosmology and metaphysics, but when such borrowing did take place, it is all the more interesting. Two instances may be mentioned. From the early first century A. D., it seems, Platonists distinguished two kinds of Form, the transcendent «eternal pattern of material objects» and a Form immanent in particulars. The first is clearly Platonic, and was designated by the purely Platonic term ἰδέα; the second, which clearly owes a lot to Aristotle, was denoted by εἶδος, a term used by both philosophers. This distinction is mentioned by Seneca and stated as part of the system by Albinus in the second century A. D.³ Even more interesting is Albinus' description of the supreme Deity: he is an eternally active mind and arouses the activity of the «Mind of the Universe» (i. e. the Platonic world-soul), acting on it without being moved, as the sun acts to arouse vision or like an object of desire; his thinking must have the noblest of all objects and this can only be himself; therefore «he must always think himself and the content of his own thinking, and this activity of his is an Idea»⁴. At first sight, this is a strange farrago, combining aspects of Plato's Demiurge and World-soul and Aristotle's Unmoved Mover, with the notion that the Platonic Forms are thoughts in the mind of God which seems to go back to the beginnings of Middle Platonism. But Albinus is wrestling with a real problem, which troubled both Platonists and Aristotelians: how to reconcile the concept of God as a transcendent mind with the creative and providential a-

1. See my article «Boethus' psychology and the Neoplatonists», *Phronesis* 31. 1986. 243-57.

2. See AROW n. 311-2.

3. See AROW n. 314.

4. Albinos *Διδασκαλικός* c. 10.2-3; cf. AROW n. 329.

ctivity usually associated with God. Aristotle had rather ignored the latter aspect, and his followers could do little about it; we have already seen that Areius Didymus described Aristotle's supreme deity as «sustaining and exercising providence on behalf of» the heavens, but we are not told how this is done and when the author of the pseudo-Aristotelian *De Mundo* (c.6) claims that God is transcendent but his power permeates and sustains the universe, he is using rhetoric rather than philosophical argument. Albinus is trying to use Aristotelian concepts to bridge the gap. The detailed demiurgic function is given to an immanent 'Mind of the Universe', but it has to be roused to its proper activity by a fully actual mind which 'thinks itself' like Aristotle's Unmoved Mover and also 'makes all things' (by thinking the totality of Platonic Forms) like Aristotle's 'Active Reason' (*De An.* 430a12). Unfortunately, by admitting that the Supreme Deity thinks other objects besides itself, Albinus has sacrificed the consistency of Aristotle's approach while leaving the relationship between the Forms and the supreme mind unclear. The solution he offered does not quite add up, or at least it would need more underpinning than Albinus gives it. But it is a creditable effort, and reveals something of the creative possibilities of a combination of Platonic and Aristotelian ideas.

Π Ε Ρ Ι Λ Η Ψ Η

Εισαγωγή: δυσκολία προσδιορισμού του φιλοσοφικού χαρακτήρα της εποχής αυτής. Χαρακτηρισμοί όπως «έκλεκτικισμός» έχουν περιορισμένη σημασία. Στην πραγματικότητα είναι μια μεταβατική εποχή, από την Ελληνιστική στη Νεοπλατωνική κοσμοθεωρία.

Α: Γενικά χαρακτηριστικά. 1. Η φιλοσοφία είναι συστηματική: κάθε σχολή υποστηρίζει ότι δίνει μια συνολική διδασκαλία για όλες τις πτυχές της πραγματικότητας. Αυτό είναι κληροδότημα της Ελληνιστικής περιόδου, ιδιαίτερα της στωικής, και δημιουργήσε προβλήματα για τα «μέρη» της φιλοσοφίας και των μεταξύ τους σχέσεων.

2. Η φιλοσοφία είναι βιβλιο-κεντρική: κάθε σύστημα ενσωματώνεται στα γραπτά του ιδρυτή του, και το έργο των οπαδών του ήταν να επεκτείνουν και να τις διαδόσουν. Νέες εξελίξεις έπρεπε να παρουσιαστούν ως επανερμηνείες του έργου του ιδρυτή. Αυτό οδήγησε στην ανάπτυξη του υπομνήματος σε όλες του τις μορφές ως σημαντικού μέσου φιλοσοφικής συζήτησης.

3. Μεγάλη σημασία δινόταν στο να είναι κανείς μέλος της σχολής: κάθε «πραγματικός» φιλόσοφος έπρεπε να ανήκει σε μια από τις αναγνωρισμένες σχολές. Μερικές διαφορές απόψεων γίνονταν ανεκτές μέσα στη σχολή: έπρεπε όμως να παρουσιαστούν σαν διαφορετικές ερμηνείες του δόγματος της σχολής. Οι σχέσεις μεταξύ των σχολών ήσαν συνήθως πολεμικές, με περιορισμένα δάνεια σε μερικές περιοχές. Ενδιαφέρον είναι ότι οι φιλόσοφοι της εποχής αυτής σπάνια αναφέροντα! ονομαστικά σε σύγχρονους τους άλλων σχολών.

Β: Εξέλιξη της Αριστοτελικής σχολής: Μετά από μια περίοδο παρακμής την ελληνιστική περίοδο, ο Ανδρόνικος ο Ρόδιος θέλησε να αναβιώσει την τύχη της Αριστοτελικής σχολής με τη δημοσίευση μιας περίτεχνης έκδοσης των *πραγματειών* πιθανόν γύρω στα μέσα του 1ου αι. π.Χ. Παρουσιάστηκαν σέ ένα συστηματικό corpus που διαιρείτο σε λογική, φυσική και πρακτική φιλοσοφία, ακολουθώντας το στωικό πρότυπο, με τη διαφορά ότι η λογική δεν θεωρείτο ως ισοβάθμια με τα άλλα «μέρη», αλλά ως ένα μέσο αναγκαίο για τη μελέτη της.