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AMERICAN STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN TURKEY AND GREECE.  
THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF TURKEY TO AMERICAN  
OVERALL POLICY OBJECTIVES AND TURKEY'S DEFINITION,  
IN THIS FRAMEWORK, OF HER MISSION AS THE DOMINANT  
POWER IN THE AREA

In the early 1950's the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their position paper JCS 2009/6 promulgated the principles to be listed, to be the primary goals of Washington's foreign policy in the area of Eastern Mediterranean<sup>1</sup>, Greece and Turkey included:

The U.S. military objectives in this area are the development of sufficient military power in SELECT NATIONS<sup>2</sup> to prevent capitulation to Communism; to retain control of certain base areas; to delay materially any USSR advance...<sup>3</sup>.

In this context, therefore, the preordained «contribution» of Greece within the aforementioned projection of American military planning was of course, properly speaking, an insignificant one, in as far as the military potentialities were involved. Greece, was not included in the SELECT NATIONS whose military forces would be boosted and an offensive capability created with American financing, advice, and hardware.

On the contrary, the Greek military establishment was to be limi-

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1. The paper specified that the area of Eastern Mediterranean included Greece and Turkey. A point omitted from the main text of this paper is that the United States in accordance with same paper wanted to «ensure control of the Eastern Mediterranean» with allied support, i.e. the use of bases in those countries. National Archives of the United States, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, Entry 97, Army - Operations, Folder: G-3 092 Top Secret, p. 62.

2. This doctrine of «select nations» could not but bring to mind old discarded theories of «chosen» nations destined to assume a leading role and shape history accordingly.

3. National Archives of the United States, RS 319, Records of the Army Staff, Entry 97, Army - Operations, Folder: G-3 092 Top Secret, p. 62.

ted. Its primary function was to serve as an enlarged security force, denying the nonconservative political forces ascension to power, such an eventuality judged to be tantamount to a breach in the intricate network of American strategic interests in the area. For if, in accordance with this train of thought «communist» or «nationalist» forces were to challenge the *status quo*, they were bound, at best to question the state of dependency, that legacy of the American conducted civil war.

At worst, any indigenous political movement coming out of this inevitable collision with the American upheld conservative establishment in Greece, could not but put in jeopardy the American military presence in Greece, abolishing such tangible symbols of dependency like the military installations. And in not a so improbable case could seek out allignment with forces in the immediate area, flourishing because of their clash with American vested interests.

Therefore, American policy in Greece was formulated with these considerations in mind and, of course, within the context of the overall strategy of confrontation with the USSR. The Joint Chiefs of Staff then not surprisingly had assigned the following role Greece:

It is in the security interests of the United States that Greece should not fall under Communist domination. The United States should, by appropriate political, military and economic aid continue to assist Greece in its efforts to oppose Communist pressure and aggression.. It is, therefore, important that a Greek military establishment be supported which is capable of maintaining internal security, preventing Communist domination...<sup>1</sup>.

It was precisely this philosophy permeating American military planners when deciding on the role, size, and political and the ideological indoctrination of the cadres of the Greek army. In a top secret report by the United States European Command on the Greek Army issued on June 30, 1953<sup>2</sup>, the following were observed on the capabilities and actual potential of the Greek armed forces:

1. *Ibid.*

2. *Ibid*, RG 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defence, Assistant Sec. of Defence (International Security Affairs) USEU COM Effectiveness Report 1953-54, Greece. In this rather lengthy study, 62 pages, on the Greek armed forces some comments on the internal developments in Greece are worth noticing: «There is little likelihood that the Greek people will swing over to Communistic faith, because of the belief that Communist domination would mean the dismemberment of

The Greek Army would not be capable of maintaining forces during sustained modern warfare against a determined enemy because of the inadequate logistical and combat support base.

The Gendarmerie in conjunction with the Greek National Army is sufficient to assure internal security of the country<sup>1</sup>.

This was to be the extent of the Greek army's capabilities as sanctioned by the United States. However, the doctrine of SELECT NATIONS, those to be reinforced to develop to the utmost their military capabilities, BEYOND AND ABOVE THEIR DEFENSIVE NEEDS, was applied with full vigor in the case of Turkey. In the same position paper of the JCS great hopes were placed in the development of Angora's military power:

It is in the security interests of the United States that Turkey should not fall under Communist domination. The United States should continue to support and strengthen Turkish efforts to resist Communist pressures with a view toward possible utilization of base areas in Turkey by the United States for strategic purposes in the event of war with the USSR.

The United States should assist TURKEY IN DEVELOPING SUFFICIENT MILITARY STRENGTH TO DETER OUTSIDE AGRESSION AND TO ENABLE TURKEY TO PROTECT ITS SOVEREIGN INTERESTS<sup>2</sup>.

This was a corollary to the previous thesis of the JCS of 1948 which had defined as follows the United States long-range strategic interests in the development of an overexpanded Turkish armed forces:

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Greece and also because the passion aroused by the struggle against the guerrillas has not yet subsided. In view of these, there is little change that the Communist party will be made legal. The Communists, since their defeat, in addition to suffering the loss of assistance from armed guerrillas within the country, have had their underground organization disrupted. Further, the defection and ideological deviation among the rank and file of the Communists are plaguing the leadership. These factors all tend to reduce the possibility of successful subversive operations».

1. *Ibid*, p. 1.

2. *Ibid*, Records of the Army Staff, Entry 97, Army-Operations, Folder: G-3 092 Top Secret, p. 64.

A Turkish military establishment of sufficient size and effectiveness to insure Turkey's continued resistance to Soviet pressure; the development of combat effectiveness to the extent that any overt Soviet aggression can be delayed...<sup>1</sup>

According to the thinking of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as it was enunciated by general Omar Bradley and was adopted by the Defence Department, and in fact became the official policy of Washington, Turkey was vital for the defence planning of the Mediterranean area<sup>2</sup>. Indeed, the United States over-all strategic concept which provided for a global war between the United States and the USSR provided «for the conduct of a strategic offensive in Europe and a strategic defensive in the Middle East»<sup>3</sup>. In the light of the above the over-all United States objectives for the Mediterranean area «to be secured prior to any outbreak of any hostilities should include:»<sup>4</sup>

The establishment of defences which will secure...Crete and Cyprus;

Insuring that the Mediterranean nations remain oriented to the West and that, with assistance as necessary...they develop sufficient military strength for the maintenance of internal security;<sup>5</sup>

Breaking it down to specific countries this doctrine provided the following specific objectives should be sought in connection with that military «contributions» of Turkey:

a. The development of sufficient military power to constitute a deterrent to military aggression by the USSR, and, in the event of war, to pose serious opposition to Soviet or satellite attack on Turkey across the Straits and a threat to the flank of any Soviet advance to the south through Iran;

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1. *Ibid.* Top Secret Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defence, RG 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defence CD 5-1-13, p. 2.

2. Memorandum by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff general Omar Bradley on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defence of October 19, 1950, p. 1.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

5. *Ibid.*

- b. The provision of such allied air, naval, and army bases as may be required in Turkey;
- e. The preparation and test of plans for the withdrawal of Turkish armed forces from Turkey in Europe and the establishment of an initial defence line along the Turkish Straits and the northern mountainous areas of Asiatic Turkey. Such plans should be predicated upon the intent to hold this general line firmly as long as such action is consistent with the capability of withdrawing the bulk of these Turkish forces to the South and southeastward. The purpose of this withdrawal would be the establishment of a strong defensive position contributing to the over-all allied defence of the Middle East;
- f. Denial to the USSR of an exit from the Black Sea via the Bosphorous and the Dardenelles;
- e. Extensive employment of guerrillas and observation posts in areas overrun by the USSR armed forces;<sup>1</sup>

The mission of the Greek armed forces, in addition to policing the state to preclude political developments leading to «communist» administrations, was a rear-guard action. In the American planning, the Greek armed forces was an expendable quantity indeed:

- 6. Likewise in consonance with the foregoing over-all United States objectives for the Mediterranean area, the following specific objectives should be sought in connection with the military effort of Greece:
  - a. The development of sufficient military power to maintain the will and determination of the Greek people to resist communism during the ideological conflict and, in the event of war, despite the likelihood of attack by vastly superior forces, to delay to the maximum extent possible the advance of the Soviet and/or Satellite forces;
  - b. Provision of such allied naval and air facilities as may be required;
  - c. The effecting of maximum delay, utilizing demolitions and obstacles, consistent with the capability of effecting withdrawal of the Greek navy and air force, with possible some army units, to Crete, Cyprus, or other areas in the Middle East for subsequent operations;

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1. *Ibid*, p. 3.

- d. Extensive employment of guerrillas and observation posts in those areas of Greece overrun by the enemy, and on the islands of the Aegean to assist in maintaining surveillance over any USSR naval forces operating or attempting to debouch from the Dardanelles;<sup>1</sup>

Turkey's grandeur and superior military position *vis a vis* the other states in the region was methodically and with an exceptional enthusiasm conceived and carried out by Washington since 1947. In 1951 the State Department despatched a mission to the political leadership to Ankara to assure them of the American plans for Turkey. The special emissary, George McGhee Assistant Secretary of State, in a series of conferences with Adnan Menderes, prime minister, and Celal Bayar, president of the republic, first and foremost emphasized the significance that Turkey had for the security of the United States:

Responding to the Prime Minister's request Mr. McGhee said that he had closely followed the question since the inception of the program of aid to Turkey in 1947. THE UNITED STATES HAS CONSISTENTLY ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO AND RELIANCE UPON TURKEY'S POSITION OF STRENGTH IN THIS VITAL PART OF THE WORLD»<sup>2</sup>.

In the conference which followed with Celal Bayar, McGhee was more precise and left no doubts about the extent of the importance attached to Turkey:

The United States, Mr. McGhee said, considers Turkey's security to be of very great importance to our own security; the importance which we attach to Turkey's independence has been demonstrated by our policies and programs during the course of the past several years.

The building of Turkey's armed forces was the key of the American policies and in the that there was not to be any vassilation:

Turkey was the first foreign country to which the United States extended military assistance on any scale in the post war period, to build its own defensive capabilities. Our military aid program in this country

1. *Ibid*, pp 3-4.

2. *Ibid*, RG 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defence, CD 092, Turkey 1951. Memorandum of conversation with the prime minister of Turkey, Top Secret, p. 1.

was a forerunner to military assistance to Western Europe and to other areas of the free world.

*Turkey has to date received more such aid than any other country, and, proportionately, our greatest effort continues to be made here. Our Turkish military aid program has continually increased in size and scope and we expect it to increase further in the future<sup>1</sup>.*

The beefing up of the Turkish armed forces, as a matter of fact the building up from the beginning of Turkey's military potentialities, was not simply to enable that country to meet possible security threats by the Soviet Union. What the State Department was laboring in to develop and the Turkish leadership was eagerly and persistently advocating and considered as a *sine qua non* of her relations of «cooperation» with the United States was the building of a powerful military establishment far beyond the «defensive» needs of Turkey. What the Americans were striving at and the Turks methodically and unequivocally pursuing was the creation of a powerful military machine to be the center of American power in the area in one hand and the instrument of Turkish expansionism and imperialism in the other.

Mr. McGhee was candid about it and certainly could not but have pleased his Turkish listeners:

The importance of a strong Turkey has been highlighted by the revelation of the comparative weakness of the Middle East as a whole... and it might therefore be more appropriate at the proper time to consider another arrangement such as an Eastern Mediterranean grouping centered around Turkey as a strong point in the area<sup>2</sup>.

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1. *Ibid*, RG 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defence, CD 92.3 (NA-TO Gen.) 1951. Memorandum of conversation with the president of the Turkish Republic with Mr. McGhee, Top Secret, p. 1. Mr. McGhee was a bit apologetic of not coming up to the expectations of the Turkish leadership for a more rapid increase in the building-up of the Turkish forces: «The only present limiting factor in our helping Turkey build up the defensive capabilities that Turkey feels it needs is our ability, in light of our own requirements and our commitments elsewhere, to deliver the necessary military supplies and equipment».

2. The «contributions» of the Turkish armies to the Korea affair seemed to have impressed the American leadership more than anything else about the potentialities of Turkey: «Mr. McGhee said that the importance of Turkey to the defence of the free

However, as it has been already mentioned elsewhere here, the Turks were not to be placated to be the advance security post of Washington planners. Both Menderes and Bayar were pressing for the creation of a military power in Turkey capable to advance Turkish national interests of neo imperialist nature not witnessed by Turkey since the fall of the empire:

The Prime Minister said that Turkey is most appreciative of these United States ... Turkey, however, is not only prepared to defend itself against aggression, but is prepared to support the common cause of the free world.

The Prime Minister repeated that Turkey is able to contribute more to the common cause, and referred to his previous talks with Ambassador Wedsworth concerning the possibilities of substantially enlarged Turkish army...the more Turkey strengthens itself the more it can help other countries, AND TURKEY IS ANXIOUS TO LOOK BEYOND PURE SELF-DEFENCE<sup>1</sup>.

The Turkish armed forces came to be the focal point of Menderes' arguments:

The Prime Ministers said that the President intended to speak with Mr. McGhee on this subject (army), and therefore indicated some reluctance to go into detail. He said, however, that for the Turkish military capabilities to be increased in order to render possible for the country to do more for the common cause, military aid on a much larger scale would be needed.

Turkey is spiritually and morally prepared for the task. It has great manpower, most of which has received military training. The country's geographic position requires that the Army be built up on sound lines and equipped with modern weapons. Had American military aid in the past been on a larger scale, Turkey today would be very strong. The objective of that aid has been limited to the development of Turkish defensive for-

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world has, if anything, been increased as the result of Korea ... and the fighting qualities of the Turkish soldiers there have won for them the admiration of the whole world». p. 2.

1. *Ibid*, Memorandum of the conversation of McGhee with the Turkish prime minister, p. 2.



ces, but if the United States had gone further, Turkey could now contribute more for the common cause<sup>1</sup>.

The prime minister did not hesitate to state emphatically, how Turkey's political leadership envisioned the resurrection of Turkish militarism:

Turkey needs, the Prime Minister continued, from ten to twelve divisions for self-defence. Even the cold war potentialities are considerably greater than the 19 divisions now under arms. Roughly 24 to 26 divisions could be brought under arms with little delay. He said that the essential point is to increase the forces within the shortest possible time, because we are confronted with the possibility that little time remains. He would reinforce the existing organizational units and create new ones as soon as possible<sup>2</sup>.

Turkey, would be willing to permit the use of her military power outside the confines of the state, if that was to serve the «needs» of the alliance, but what essentially Turkey wanted was the building up of her forces under the pretext that an expanded military force could be employed elsewhere:

The Prime Minister expressed the view that is relatively immaterial where free forces lie, in Europe, the United States or elsewhere. Turkish troops would demore useful in Turkey than if scattered elsewhere in the world, although forces committed to the common cause would not be the private forces of Turkey but would be under a «common cause command». Turkish forces in Turkey, he pointed out, would cost considerably less than elsewhere<sup>3</sup>.

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1. *Ibid*, p. 3.

2. *Ibid*, p. 4.

3. Once again here MrGhee responded to the prime minister's requests with explanations which underlined his country's interest in the creation of a strong Turkish army: «Mr. McGhee repeated that the United States is very anxious to help Turkey build up a strong force, and that the limiting factor is the ammount of military supplies and equipment which can be furnished in light of the drain upon our resources.....» *Ibid*.

The Turkish foreign minister Fuad Koprulu, attending the same conference, used some of the folk proverbs to flatter the assistant secretary of state and indirectly underline the theme pursued by his government that the United States should build a strong Turkey:

The Foreign Minister commended that there are certain known facts which bear recognition. Russia, because of Turkey's geographical and strategic position, would be frightened if Turkish forces were substantially increased; Turkey's position is like an aircraft carrier near Russia. Turkey is on the road leading to petroleum, and Russia has insufficient oil for a long war. Finally he quoted the Turkish proverb: «The wise farmer with little seed does not plan in weak soil; he plans in his best soil»<sup>1</sup>.

The building of a powerful military machine was to be the corner stone of Turkey's relationship with the United States, as president Bayar authoritatively insisted in his talks with McGhee:

The common goal of the free world can be helped by the Turkish army, the President said.... The President said that the General Staff has discussed with the American Military Mission the question of how many divisions, both infantry and motorized should be maintained under present circumstances. The General Staff says that it could put under arms in short order twenty-five divisions. If this is done, these forces would be an important factor in the interests of the free world<sup>2</sup>.

The other point interwoven with the military build-up was the signing of a security pact with the United States, an alliance which would guarantee Turkey's aggressive behavior, while she would be transformed into a military power to be reckoned, at last in her immediate area. Ostensibly, of course, the security pact would be directed against any incursions by the Soviet Union and the State Department encouraging that thinking with statements like the following: «We have considered that a Soviet attack against Turkey would lead to a general conflict».

The Turks were realizing that such a partnership with the United States would be tantamount to a licence for an expansionist policy and

1. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

2. *Ibid.* Memorandum of conversation with the president of the Turkish republic with McGhee, p. 3.

at the same time provide a steady flow of armaments, without in the least inhibiting Turkey's sovereign rights or committing the country to a policy conflicting with her national interests:

In describing the relationship between the United States and Turkey in security matters, the President drew the analogy of a business concern in which some members make profit and some members invest capital but acquire no profit. The concern cannot succeed under these circumstances. Turkey, a part has received military and economic assistance, but to regularize the legal aspects it has tried to join the Atlantic pact and was turned down....

His country is not satisfied with its present position in the partnership with the United States, as Turkey was unwilling not to do its part. It wants to give a guarantee, and it would like to receive a guarantee<sup>1</sup>.

To impress Washington the Turkish president emphasized the subject of reciprocity, which, of course, was to be used as a shield for his country's expansionism...

Turkey is a poor country, but for six hundred years it has fought and defended itself; it made no commitments which it was unwilling to meet. The Turkish people are opposed in principle to receiving assistance without themselves returning something<sup>2</sup>.

Of course, the above arguments of the head of the Turkish state in retrospect are in contradiction with his country's record in honoring her international obligations. Notwithstanding the obvious, Mr. McGhee was quite laudatory of Turkey its past and its future contributions. Alluding to the idea of the «company» the undersecretary of State stated that as the capitalist in the company the United States was assured that Turkey was already repaying in full its obligations to his country. So much so that he wished that all countries that had received «aid» could prove to be such good investments like Turkey<sup>3</sup>. Taking all this into account the American government was assuring Turkey it would «like to assist in building up the strength of Turkish forces to any level which

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1. *Ibid.*

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

Turkey desires, and we are gratified that the Turkish Government already is considering the establishment of twenty-five divisions»<sup>1</sup>. Mr. McGhee was quite exuberant of the understanding reached so much so that to delight of the newly acquired allies he seemed to endorse all the demands made by the Turkish officials:

Mr. McGhee said the United States is proud to be a partner with Turkey in the «company» which the President had referred to, and that we view it as a partnership of equals; we do not make policy exclusively, for that must be done on a mutual basis. We would like to widen the basis of Turkish-American consultation on world issues, especially on issues in this general part of the world. He said that he was convinced, that Turkey has a very important role to play in the world, particularly in the Middle East, and the United States is anxious to help her play that part<sup>2</sup>.

The undersecretary's trip was of cardinal importance to the region. Immediately after the conference in Angora, a special meeting was conveyed at Mr. McGhee's request of all the American heads of mission in the area in Istanbul. The conclusions of that gathering of the representatives of the State Department on the spot were conveyed to Washington in a special telegram by McGhee:

...US political and military objectives in Turkey and Greece, and consequently in entire ME area, requires that US enter at earliest possible moment into reciprocal security arrangements with Turkey and Greece.

If offer not made soon, there is reason to believe that Turkey will veer toward policy of neutralism...until commitment is made there is no assurance that Turkey will declare war unless attacked;

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1. *Ibid*, p. 5.

2. *Ibid*, p. 6. At the end of the conference Mr. Bayar could not help but overstate his case, obviously for the benefit of the flegmatic Anglosaxon: «The real point, the President said, is that Turkey wants to make its share of the sacrifices and do its duty in the creation of a free and democratic world. The 'company' in which Turkey and the United States are partners is a fine concern, and the President was sure that it will pay extremely good dividends».

Commitment on part of US is required for assurance of immediate US and allied utilization of Turkish bases in event we are engaged in hostilities;

Initially at least, Turkey in entering into security arrangements with US would be committing more than the commitments which she would receive;

Conference is convinced that, if security arrangement is offered Turkey, it must at same time be offered to Greece.

*Price which US must pay for security commitment to Greece and Turkey is one we believe US can afford, namely, practicable naval and air support plus practicable resupply support. This does not (repeat not) involve commitment of ground forces<sup>1</sup>.*

On March 24, 1951, Secretary of State Dean Acheson in a memorandum to George Marshall Secretary of Defence, after elaborating on the negotiations with the Turkish officials, and submitting a memorandum on McGhee's recommendations he solicited the Defence Department's views on the subject «in view of the desirability of arriving at an early decision upon the question». The main arguments in the State Department's communication with George Marshall were not unlike those elaborated by McGhee only different in the extent of advantages to be acquired by the United States by the inclusion of Turkey in the NATO pact. Acheson was convinced that Turkey could be placated by the offering of a NATO membership and would be induced to serve US's strategic interests in the area while being impervious to the fact that the building up of a superior military force in the area could be an element of instability threatening the status quo in the region. Acheson like the rest of the American representatives dealing with subject believed that the concession of a NATO membership and the creation of a mighty military power we-

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1. *Ibid.*, Telegram by McGhee to the Secretary of State of February 22, 1951. p. 1. Of course, the underlying fear of the State Department and the administration in general was that Turkey was not all that reliable, if her demands were not to be met to the fullest: «If offer not made soon, there is reason to believe that Turkey will veer toward policy of neutralism, which always will have strong basic appeal. Until commitment is extended to Turkey, there is no assurance that Turkey will declare war unless attacked». Memorandum by the Secretary of State Dean Acheson to the Secretary of Defence George Marshall of March 24, 1951. CD 092.3 NATO (Greece), p. 4.

re more than balanced to Washington's favor by the establishment of American power in Eastern Mediterranean and the subsequent American control of what was perceived as the gates to Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean:

The present arrangement has not been satisfactory to, Turkey for a variety of reasons. On February 22, 1951 the Conference of Middle Eastern Chiefs of Mission held at Istanbul concluded that the attainment of United States politico - military objectives in Turkey and Greece, and consequently in the entire Middle Eastern area, requires that the United States enter at the earliest possible moment into reciprocal security arrangements with Turkey and Greece.

A full fledged security arrangement would insure Turkish belligerency in case of aggression which involved the United States. Further, it would be an important factor in obtaining Turkey's cooperation in security measures which might only indirectly benefit its security but which would be of considerable value to the anti-Soviet coalition as a whole<sup>1</sup>.

Therefore, the NATO pact in the words of Dean Acheson was a device advancing a U.S. anti-Soviet coalition rather than the individual security needs of the countries in the area of Eastern Mediterranean. But the inclusion of Turkey and consequently Greece into the pact would also have other concrete benefits for Washington:

A number of measures which would be of strategic importance to the United States,

1. Controlled mining of the Turkish straits, which the Department of the Navy is understood to advocate. The Turks fear that if the Straits are mined the Soviets will renew their demands for a revision of the Montreux Convention and possibly subject Turkey to other forms of pressure.
2. Agreement with the United States on the use of air and other bases which the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider essential. While these bases would undoubtedly be of great value to the United States in view of their proximity to vulnerable targets in the

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1. *Ibid*, p. 2.

USSR, such a request would be viewed by the Turks as another indication that they are being asked to contribute their strength but are not permitted the same guarantees of protection as given to Western European countries.

*Moreover, the existence of bases in Turkey developed by the United States would appear to be of limited value if we not assured of immediate Turkish participation in the event the United States becomes involved in hostilities with the Soviet Union. NEUTRALITY WOULD RENDER SUCH BASES IN TURKEY OF POTENTIAL VALUE ONLY<sup>1</sup>.*

It was then a prerequisite for the well function of the military bases to have the full confidence and cooperation of the host country by adhering to and satisfying its national interests. Furthermore, the United States wanted to use Turkish troops as proxies to fight their wars as it was demonstrated in the Korean conflict. Turkey, probably would be willing to cooperate in return as Acheson pointed for a security pact «or unless it felt that experience to be gained by military units would be of great value to the Turkish military forces».

All and all, under the more adverse of conditions the extension of a security pact to Turkey would be more advantageous to the United States than to Turkey: Initially at least, Turkey in entering into security arrangement with the United States would be committing more than the commitments which she would receive. That was the learned opinion of the State Department and the pertinent defence agencies which in the light of subsequent developments was a fallacious judgment. What in reality it was accomplishing was the creation of a military power with long term commitments to continued upgrading it irrespective of the erosion in the balance of power that it did imply in the immediate area, given the not so covert designs of Turkey to be the leading state in the area, militarily.

The Joint Secretaries of the three service Departments, Army, Navy Air Force on March 27, 1951, responded favorably to the State Department's policy on Turkey. In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defence they had this to say: «They recommend that U.S. security commitments to these countries be extended by their admission as full members in NATO. It is understood that General Eisenhower favors this approach».

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4. Again the theme of «commitment» is emphasized here: «Commitment on part of the United States is required for assurance of immediate United States and allied utilization of Turkish bases in event we are engaged in hostilities».

ch<sup>1</sup>. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also in a separate memorandum warmly advocated a timely extensio<sup>n</sup> of a security pact to Turkey.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff favor the adoption of a policy whereby the United States would propose and support early membership to Turkey and Greece in the North Ateantic Treaty Organization (NATO)... They feel, however, that such action on the part of the Unitrd States would provide favorable results both immedieately and in the long term<sup>2</sup>.

A few days later in a separete communication to the Secretary of De-fence, on April 30, 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff elaborated in a much more detailed manner on the strategic significance of Turkey to the United States:

The Turkish Straits, including the contiguous land areas, are strategic importance to both the United States and the USSR. As the gateway to and from the Black Sea, control of the Straits, in the eventuality of war, would have major military significance. In any event their control by the USSR would, in all probability, lead to the elimination of Turkey-in-Europe and might eventually force Turkey into the Soviet hegemony.

In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff attach great importance to ensuring that Turkey is on the side of the Western Powers at the outset of a general war, should such eventuate. The strategic importance of the Staits increases thus in degree as the strength and agressive intent of the USSR and its satelites increase in the Near and Middle East.

That the United States give maximum support to Turkey to insure that no part of the sovereignty of the latter is yielded to the USSR<sup>3</sup>.

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1. Top Secret Memorandum by the Secretary of the Army, Navy, Air Force to the Secretary of Defence of March 29, 1951, p. 1. *Ibid*.

2. Top Secret Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defence of April 10, 1951. «This memorandum is in responce to your memorandum, dated 27 March 1951, in which you requested the comments and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the action which the Department of Defence should take in connection with the alternative proposals raised by the Secretary of State in his letter to you dated 24 arch 1951, concerning the desirability and feasibility of the United States entering into reciprocal security arrangements with Turkey and Greece». *Ibid*.

3. *Ibid*, RS 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defence, CD 092 Tur-



In retrospect, therefore, it can be said that the avowed and unvacillating goals of the American foreign policy in the area of Eastern Mediterranean has been to secure, at what the State Department considered a reasonable cost, the cooperation of Turkey as a bastion of U.S. policy of encirclement of the Soviet Union. The concessions for Turkey's willingness to committ itself to this anti-Soviet coalition, in the words of the late distinguished Secretary of State Acheson, was her military and political support in the form of both upgrading, expanding and modernizing her armed forces and an almost unquestionable adherence to her expansionist aims in the area. Indeed, the pronouncements of the the late McGhee about Turkey being the center of power in the area and the later's endorcement of Turkey's political leadership frantic efforts to create a military establishment far above the defensive needs of Turkey versus the Soviet Union provided a licence and an endorsement to that country to pursue with American active collaboration her aggressive policies against neighboring states. The extent of the paramount significance attached to Turkey by Washington was ettested by the later's willingness to rationalize Angora's aggressiveness manifested against neighboring allied countries since 1955. A prime example of that is what was contained in the National Security paper NSC 5713/1 on Greece where among the objectives of the United States on Greece was the «lessening of Greek irredentism», that is the compromise of Greece in favor of Turkey in the Cyprus issue, and the settlement of the Cyprus dispute in such a manner as to satisfy Turkish demands<sup>1</sup>. A Greek acceptance of the Turkish claims on Cyprus was actively pursued by the United States since its aims was to satisfy Turkish expansionism, which in turn would have ment an orderly function of the alliance in that area: «Continue to exert influence on the Greek Government to reach an accord with the United King-

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key. Memorandum by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, general Bradley to the Secretary of Defence of April 30, 1951, p. 2.

1. *Ibid*, National Security Council, «U. S. Policy toward Greece» state paper NSC 5718, August 5, 1957 «Progress toward a solution (my note to Cyprus issue), acceptable to the Greek Government and the Greek Orthodox Churches of Cyprus and Greece, would facilitate *a continuation of rule by the concervative and moderate groups*. Greek frustration over Cyprus and differences between the Greek Government and the Greek Orthodox Church over the issue, might lead to a series of less stable governments still drawn primarily from concervative and moderate groups but subject to a varying degree of leftist influence». Italics mine. This then is another facet of the issue that a dissapointed Greece could by the American action adopt a «leftist» regime. A danger apparently, not all that grave if it was to be balanced with a disatisfied Turkey.

dom and Turkey for an equitable settlement of the Cyprus issue»<sup>1</sup>. In the light of all the above it was certainly the understatement of the century or the epitomy of American hypocrisy when the same paper of the National Security Council observed that even the Greek political leadership of the concervative right at times was voicing dissatisfaction with the American treatment of Greece versus Turkey: «Greek leaders continue to voice the widespread Greek feeling that the United States fails to give sufficient support and understanding to one of its most faithful allies... and a chronic Greek feeling that Turkey receives far more favorable treatment from the United States»<sup>2</sup>.

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1. *Ibid.*

2. *Ibid.*