

One Strike... and You're Out!

The Survival of Political Leaders in the Aftermath of Terrorism

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of Economics

University of Ioannina

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Science in Economic Analysis

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January, 2019

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Acknowledgments

I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Adam Antonis, whose methodological knowledge, theoretical insight and thorough commenting have been of great importance to complete this thesis. I do appreciate that he was always there to steer me in the right direction whenever I needed it.

I would also like to thank Antoniou Fabio for his valuable advice and motivation.

I do owe a thanks to my fellow students. I am very grateful for all the feedback, encouragement, discussions and laughs we had.

Finally, I must express my very profound gratitude to my family, by brothers, my partner and my friends for providing me with unfailing support and continuous encouragement.

Any mistakes within this text are fully my own.

Abstract Does terrorism impact the survival of political leaders? Using a multinational dataset on terrorist episodes and leadership survival from 1970 through 2015 and selection-corrected survival models we provide evidence that autocrats who experience higher instances of terrorism face an increased hazard of exit power. For democrats, however, the effect of terrorism fails to achieve a customary level of statistical significance, yet an apparent trend is provided, implying that terrorism may benefit incumbents. Penetrating autocracies in the aftermath of terrorism, our results suggest that authoritarian incumbents in personalized non-military and in personalized military regimes will experience prolonged tenures compared to their authoritarian counterparts. Our results hold for international, domestic and unknown terrorist incidents, while are robust across various specifications.

Keywords Political Survival · Terrorism · Effective Leader · Autocracies · Democracies

1. Introduction

“History is made by people. From wars to elections to political protests, the world revolves around the way the people decide to behave” (Horowitz et al., 2015, p. xi).

With this quote Horowitz et al. (2015) start their book, implying the influential nature of political actors. As they state, individual leaders do matter as they are not simply interchangeable or continuously overwhelmed by exogenous factors.

No one can deny that political leaders have the ability to change the course of history in powerful ways, overcoming regime type constraints, bureaucratic obstacles and the will of the individuals who select them in office. But what could put a curb on the powerful role that they maintain? What happens when an external security threat, and more specifically a terrorist incident, comes to the front?

Following Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) the electorate holds the government accountable for the provision of public goods, while Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), underline the significance of national and domestic security as a public good. Incumbent governments face a trade-off between rent extraction and public goods provision, in democratic regimes. Similarly, in autocracies we may have a trade-off between rent extraction and private goods provision for some elite members (Barro, 1973 and Ferejohn, 1986). Thus, an incumbent, either in a democratic or an authoritarian regime, needs to provide a minimal amount of public goods or/and private goods, in this case national and domestic security and counterterrorism policies, or else the elected leader will be punished for inadequate handling on the provision of public and/or private goods, by her/his deposition from political power (De Mesquita et al., 2005). Note that regarding terrorism, the electorate does actually observe the number of terrorist incidents rather than counterterrorism activities of the government, in other words, the amount of terrorism provides a signal about the competence of the incumbent (Gassebner et al., 2008).

In recent years, terrorism peaked in 2014 at nearly 17.000 attacks and more than 45.000 total deaths, while according to the latest report by Start (2018) there were 10.900 terrorist attacks around the world, which killed more than 26.400 people, including 8.075 perpetrators and 18.488 victims. Such trends imply that terrorist attacks affect public's welfare substantially and as a consequence political leader's welfare and the "very essence of the office-holding homo politicus", signaling incumbents' competence in various aspects.

In this thesis, we examine whether and how an external security threat, in particular international and domestic terrorism, as well as terrorist incidents where incentives or perpetrators remain unidentified, affect incumbents of targeted states politically, in democracies and autocracies, between them, as well as among authoritarian regimes.

Using a multinational dataset on terrorist episodes and leadership survival from 1970 through 2015 and selection-corrected survival models, we infer that terrorism does affect political survival of incumbents. In fact, we provide robust evidence that autocrats who experience higher instances of terrorist attacks face an increased hazard of exit power. For democrats, however, the effect of terrorism fails to achieve a customary level of statistical significance, yet an apparent trend is provided, implying that terrorism may benefit incumbents by allowing them to rally people around the flag. Looking further, it is seems that one-dimensional measures of autocracy mask the variation among different types of autocratic regimes. What we find is that there are some types of dictatorships, where in case of a terrorist incident, their leaders will experience prolonged tenures, relative to others.

The next section briefly examines the theoretical background context. The following section presents a review on political survival and the various factors that affect incumbents' tenure in political power, as well as case studies referring to the effect of terrorist attacks on incumbent governments' survival. Hereupon, the channels through which terrorism may affect incumbent leaders' political survival, either increasing the hazard of losing political office or decreasing it, are explicitly elaborated. The

subsequent section presents our data and the empirical methodology employed. Last but not least, we report our results, while offering some potential implications and concluding remarks.

2. Theoretical Background Context

Broadly, in democracies people can express their preferences without fear or punishment and they can “penalize” political leaders who break their promises, contrary to authoritarian regimes where people are often too afraid to say what they actually believe. It is widely believed that there is no easy way to punish a dictator who violates his pledges (Wintrobe, 1998). Yet, there exist more features that may differentiate one regime from another and play a crucial role on whether a security threat destabilizes political leaders.

2.1. The Selectorate Theory

De Mesquita et al. (2005) in *The Logic of Political Survival LPS*, or as their students refer to *LPS* as *The Theory of Everything* (De Mesquita & Smith, 2011), argue that it is not the type of regime in itself that affects leaders’ survivability, but the regime type is a result of how broad support the leader needs to obtain in order to preserve his/her position.

The Selectorate theory focuses on the size ratio between electors and the subset of these that is sufficient for the political leader to gain office, as the most important aspect of political survival. To be more specific, the Selectorate Theory categorizes citizens in polities according to their importance for the political survival of a leader. The residents R are the total amount of inhabitants in a polity. Nested within the residents, there is the Selectorate S , which De Mesquita et al. (2005) defines as the set of people whose endowments include the qualities of characteristics institutionally required to choose the government’s leadership and necessary for gaining access to private benefits doled out by

the government's leadership. For example, The North Korean dictatorship has sorted people into its selectorate on the grounds of special personal origin and proficiency, and wealth as a privileged benefit has been given to the members of the selectorate and the winning coalition (Lee, 2014). Additionally, the winning coalition W , is defined as the subset of the selectorate of sufficient size such that the subset's support endows the leadership with political power over the remainder of the selectorate as well as over the disenfranchised members of the society. Those residents that are not included in the selectorate consist the disenfranchised entities. For example, in the Soviet Union, the nominal selectorate was all adult citizens whose decision was chosen by the communist party, the real selectorate were all voting members of the party, and the winning coalition consisted of a small group of people inside the party who substantially chose the candidates and controlled policy (Lee, 2014).

Every polity has one or more central individuals with the authority to raise taxes and allocate government funds to pursue chosen policies, including private uses of the monies as well as uses aimed at the general welfare. These are criteria that define what we mean when we refer to a country's political leadership or *leader L*. Yet, every leader is facing one or more potential *challenger C*, i.e., an individual or would-be leadership group attempting to depose the incumbent leader within the "rules" or norms of transition in the existing system, so that the challenger can gain control over policy choices regarding taxing and spending. As De Mesquita et al. (2005) note, challengers differ from incumbents primarily in terms of the information available to them. Authors define the term *affinity A* to explain the informational advantages that incumbents have relative to challengers.

While autocracies in general have small winning coalitions W , the ratio of W/S varies across authoritarian regimes because the size of the selectorate S varies. In particular, De Mesquita et al. (2005) contend that among authoritarian regimes, the size of S is smallest under military juntas and monarchies. Indeed, the selectorate under military juntas consists only of some high- and middle-ranking military officials, whereas under monarchies, "only a very small number of people have a routine prospect of becoming members of the winning coalition". De Mesquita et al. (2005) recalls

The Holy Roman emperor, for instance, who was chosen by a majority vote among seven electors, a very tiny group indeed (Eulau, 1941). Single-party dictatorships have larger selectorates than military juntas and monarchies. De Mesquita et al. (2005) suggest that the size of selectorate may be as much as 10 percent of the total adult population in single-party authoritarian states. Even in communist states, where party membership is restricted to a privileged few, the size of the selectorate is nevertheless appreciable, and certainly much larger than under military juntas and monarchies. For instance, De Mesquita et al. (2005) document that party membership in Vietnam is roughly 3 percent of the total population. Finally, while De Mesquita et al. (2005) do not explicitly discuss the size of the selectorate under personalistic regimes, their work implies that S is largest under personalistic regimes because of the existence of the leader's large clientele that is characteristic of such settings (Chang and Golden, 2010). In highly competitive personalistic regimes, the size of the selectorate theoretically may approach even 50 percent.

The selectorate theory utilizes the size difference between the selectorate and the winning coalition as the main explanation for why some leaders have a greater degree of perseverance, especially through policy-crisis, since different combinations of sizes of W and S give the leader different sets of appropriate policies. The loyalty norm, i.e. the ratio W/S , that shapes political survival and hence the actions a leader must take if she/he wants to remain in power, has a high theoretically explanatory power for leaders' degree of accountability, playing a central role in understanding leadership incentives and the behavior of different sectors of a polity.

Increasing the selectorate in a system with a small winning coalition strengthens the loyalty norm, thus leaders answering to a small winning coalition can more readily compensate for policy failure by providing private benefits to their few key backers and are more likely to survive in office in the face of failed national policies than are leaders answering to a large winning coalition. Yet, leaders who answer to a large winning coalition experience relatively short tenures in office, even though they tend to produce successful public policies, since they cannot easily compensate for policy failure by doling

out private goods and need to succeed in foreign and domestic policy. As per Selectorate theory, democratic politics in the selectorate theory is a competition in competence to produce public goods, while autocratic politics centers on the purchase of the loyalty of key supporters. Of course, the patterns that are described are not absolutes; they are central tendencies (De Mesquita et al., 2005).

2.2. Weeks Theory

Going one step further, it is reasonable to think that one-dimensional measures of democracy and autocracy mask the variation between democracies and different types of autocratic regimes. Weeks (2014) with her book “Dictators at War and Peace”, theorizes that different types of autocratic regimes will have divergent incentives for defensive or offensive handling when solving international affairs. This is apparent even though these regimes could have the same loyalty norm, i.e. W/S ratio. Thus, according to Weeks, it is the variation among authoritarian regime types that is the key element we should focus on. Weeks (2014) explains that although authoritarian leaders are not directly accountable to the public like democratically elected leaders, they nonetheless rely on the support of important domestic audiences.

Audience costs, or else the domestic punishment that leaders would incur for backing down from public threats (Fearon, 1994), are highly variable across authoritarian regimes, consisting an important factor that affects the political survival of an incumbent. In particular, scholars typically argue that democracies are systematically superior to non-democracies in generating audience costs, however, Weeks (2008) straightforwardly points the underestimation of the vulnerability of leaders in non-democratic regimes. As Weeks explains: *The stereotypical autocrat in the international relations literature resembles Saddam Hussein or Kim Jong II crushing domestic rivals and co-opting political institutions. But such despots are a minority among nondemocratic leaders.* Dictators also have to be concerned with the potential audience costs in the event of terrorist attacks. Autocratic leaders face

accountability threats not from the public, but rather from the domestic regime elites on whom they rely for support. These elites can act like voting publics, having incentives to punish leaders who back down (Weeks 2008). For example, Aksoy et al., (2015) find strong evidence that increasing political violence is associated with a higher risk of a reshuffling coup, where an autocratic leader is replaced, but not the entire regime (Aksoy et al., 2015).

The intensity and source of this “accountability” vary across autocracies and affect leaders’ costs of using force. Following this, Weeks (2014) distinguishes regimes along two core dimensions (1) whether the leader faces a powerful domestic audience, and (2) whether the leader or audience stems from the civilian or military ranks. These two dimensions produce four kinds of regimes: non-personalist civilian regimes *Machines*, where leaders have a civilian background and a high degree of accountability to strong domestic civil elites; non-personalist military regimes *Juntas*, where leaders have military background and a high degree of accountability to strong domestic military elites; personalized non-military regime *Bosses*, where leaders have a civilian background and a low degree of accountability to a weak domestic civil elites; and a personalized military regime *Strongmen*, where leaders have military background and a low degree of accountability to weak domestic military elites.

Weeks (2014) Regime Typology	Civilian Audience or Leader	Military Audience or Leader
Non-Personalist (elite constrained leader)	Machine	Junta
Personalist (unconstrained leader)	Boss	Strongman

Since a security threat encounters, the Selectorate Theory assumes that political leaders with a small winning coalition and a large selectorate will endure, because of the *W/S* loyalty norm. In Weeks' (2014) regimes, *Bosses* and *Strongmen* due to their reduced level of accountability, will also endure. Both theories, the Selectorate (Buono de Mesquita et. al. 2005) and Weeks' (2014) offer vital insights concerning leaders' political survival in office after engaged in a terrorist attack.

3. Political Survival

3.1. The Survival of Political Leaders in a Generalized Context

It is a high priority for political leaders to keep their office. Since Downs (1957), scholars in both International Relations and Comparative Politics have emphasized that all political leaders, regardless of their institutional setting have a common utility function that emphasizes first holding onto or gaining office, and second maximizing their personal income while in office (De Mesquita et al., 2005). As De Mesquita et al., (1995) note; "political survival is the very essence of the office-holding homo politicus-the retention of political power". Besides, for some political leaders losing political power might entail further punishment than just being replaced. In many authoritarian systems defeated incumbents are lucky if they can retreat into exile since sometimes their loss of office is accompanied by the loss of their life (Goemans (2000), De Mesquita et al. (2005)).

In general, there exist numerous factors that may have an effect on leaders' political survival. Incumbents' face risk of removal, primarily from threats internal to the ruling coalition, external to the ruling coalition and foreign governments (Svolik and Akcinarogly, 2006).

Bienen and Van de Walle (1989) interestingly demonstrate that the best predictor of whether a leader will lose power in any given period is the length of rule up to that point. Authors, having noticed both rapid leadership turnover and remarkably durable leaders in African systems of personal rule, employ

life table analysis and hazard models, explaining that the priority of the accumulated tenure as a predictor emerges from the fact that this may capture independently measured variables, such as skills, or leaders' ability to build political networks and to acquire and use information. Additionally, a couple years later, the same, Bienen and Van de Walle (1992), find evidence that the risk or hazard of losing power decreases throughout leaders' tenure. Actually, even after a number of leader and country characteristics are taken into account, the underlying risk of losing power is significantly lower in the second decade of rule than in the first decade.

As a leader accumulates years in tenure, not only fortifies her/his confidence (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003), but she/he grows older, thus die of natural causes, as well. No one can deny that age plays a crucial role for leaders' maintaining office. Leaders grow stale or are perhaps no longer able to process information as they age, while age on entry implies a negative effect on a leader's political tenure (Bienen and Van de Walle, 1992). Nevertheless, the specification consists a more complicated matter. One might think a priori that leaders of advanced age would have higher risks than leaders who are less aged, simply because they lose physical strength or may grow senile, a pattern held for Bourguiba in Tunisia and Haile Selassie in Ethiopia at advanced ages. On the other hand, younger leaders may not have acquired the skills of manipulation and knowledge of their political systems that older leaders have, as Bienen and Van de Walle (1992) explain. For example, old leaders seem to do well in China (Bienen and Van de Walle, 1992).

Work by Bienen and Van de Walle (1992) might imply that one should investigate age effect deeply, taking into account political institutions along with the age effect. In this concept, Marshall and Jagers (2002), provide evidence that the degree of democracy, measured with the Polity-IV-index, and age of entry actually affects a leader's tenure. To be more specific, younger leaders have the longest duration in those regimes with the most lack of democratic institutions. On the other hand, elderly leaders, display a reduced mean duration in office, a fact that seems reasonable due to the fact that their total potential duration is reduced because of their high age.

Besides age, chronic illness interacts with political institutions, as well as with survival in political office. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2018) using a new dataset on leader health, tried to shape the probability and timing of regular and irregular leader depositions. Their analysis indicates that in small coalition, i.e. autocratic political systems, the expectation that an incumbent will die soon, and so not be able to deliver future private rewards to her/his coalition of supporters, significantly increases the likelihood that the leader will be overthrown.

On another aspect, Barro (1973) underlined the significance of economic outcomes on leaders' political tenure. In their seminal paper, Londregan and Poole (1990), constructing a parametric model of the coup process, state that the probability that an authoritarian government is overthrown by a coup d'état is substantially influenced by the rate of economic growth. For example, Saxonberg (2013) predicted that once Kim Jong-il stepped down and if the economy under the new leader continued to perform poorly, a revolutionary situation or regime collapse could emerge. Note that according to Lewis-Beck, and Stegmaier (2000), the electorate, i.e. voters and/or the political elites, will punish or reward their leaders, for negative or positive results respectively, weighting indeed economic issues more heavily than others. On another study, Burke (2012), using commodity prices, export partner incomes, precipitation, and temperature to instrument for a country's growth rate, provides evidence that GDP empowers the likelihood of a lengthen tenure for a political leader, an effect that appears to be generally similar across both democracies and autocracies.

As far as institutions are concerned, examining data on legislatures and parties in all dictatorships since 1950, Boix and Svolik (2013) find empirical support that dictators with legislatures or parties stay in office longer and are less likely to lose office violently, controlling for a wide set of other factors, indicating that dictatorships benefit from having political institutions-a benefit that depends on the permissive balance of power within ruling coalition.

In recent literature, a growing body of studies analyzes the association between natural resource wealth and political survival. Wright et al. (2015) document that oil wealth positively affects the likelihood that autocratic leaders remain in power. Further, Ross (2008) analyzes the relationship between oil and leadership durations in a broader group of countries to find that across different income and regional categories, leaders in oil-producing countries last longer, while separating the effects of oil rents on duration between authoritarian states and democratic states, indicates that while oil revenues reduce the likelihood that an autocratic leader will depart office, oil wealth has no effect on the longevity of democratic leaders. Similarly, Cuaresma et al. (2011) note that high oil endowments significantly increase the duration for the most terrifying dictators.

While popularity functions stress the influence of the economy, the institutional nature of the American presidency prompts the hypothesis that foreign policy has a more compelling hold on presidential approval (Nickelsburg and Northpoth, 2000). Characteristically, Nickelsburg and Norpoth (2000) note that in order to maintain public support the chief executive must be “commander-in-chief” and “chief economist” in nearly equal measure. In other words, a president's overall job approval depends just as much on his handling of foreign policy as it does on his handling of the economy. However, an increase in leaders’ popularity that emerges from foreign crisis cannot repair the damage caused by the economy that is faltering at a highly unusual rate (Tir and Singh, 2013). In a related case study provided by Lee (2014), author refers to the case of North Korea that in 2016 was severely affected by one of the heaviest floods, with tens of thousands of buildings destroyed and people left suffering great hardship. Kim Jong-un’s regime has made an open and public call for assistance rather than using its own resources for the rescue, off course international society has responded (Lee, 2018), despite the fact that this event came a few days after the fifth nuclear missile test. Additionally, critical issues such as chronic economic hardship, frequent purging and defections of North Korean elites and international sanctions continue to occur. Lee (2014) state that this event is a clear example of Kim Jong-un’s strategy for political survival in times of economic hardship, in other words, given the chronic shortage

of resources, dictator Kim Jong-un is able to extract more relief assistance by letting people die and exploiting the goodwill of the international community, which enhances his political survival according to the Selectorate theory (De Mesquita and Smith, 2011).

It seems reasonable that foreign pressure, in any form, may affect incumbents' tenure in office. Actually, Marinov (2005), puts a straightforward question, examining a form of foreign pressure; economic sanctions; "Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?" Marinov (2005), supports that foreign pressure destabilizes, since sanctions may be substantially effective at altering policies. Later, Escribà-Folch and Wright (2010), using data on sanction episodes on authoritarian regimes from 1960 to 1997, find that personalist dictators who rely upon foreign aid and trade taxes to maintain power are more susceptible to economic sanctions than other types of autocracy. In contrast, when dominant single-party and military regimes are subject to sanctions, they increase their tax revenues and reallocate their expenditures to increase their levels of cooptation and repression, thus sanctions have little effect on leadership stability. In a related case study, Hayes and Cavazos (2015) concluded that even if Kim Jong-un consolidates his immediate powers, the sustainability of his tenure is questionable given the stresses induced by his domestic rule and the external pressure of sanctions.

It is worthy to note that a wide field of literature on political survival, with Bruce Bueno De Mesquita to be the bellwether, focuses on armed conflict outcomes and its interaction with regime type (e.g. De Mesquita and Siverson (1995), De Mesquita et al. (2005), Chiozza and Goemans (2004), Colaresi (2004), Debs and Goemans (2010)). Prominent work by De Mesquita and Siverson (1995) is the first study that approaches political survival through an armed conflict with a multinational dataset, providing evidence that when initiating in an armed conflict, non-democratic political leaders have longer duration in office than leaders who govern democratic states, since non-democrats do have great flexibility as a result of their reduced accountability to the public. These findings gave support to the Selectorate theory (De Mesquita et al., 2005) and Weeks' theory (2014). In a related study, Debs and Goemans (2010) provide evidence that war outcomes affect leader tenure but more intensely in

autocracies than democracies, while Croco (2011) finds evidence that democratic leaders, as a whole, are more sensitive to war outcomes than non-democratic leaders.

3.2. The Survival of Incumbent Governments in the Aftermath of Terrorism

Literature on leaders' political survival covers a wide variety of topics. Yet, we may observe a gap in the literature concerning political survival of incumbents impacted a terrorist attack. However, there exist case studies referring to the effect of terrorist attacks on the incumbent governments.

No one can deny the fact that in democratic regimes terrorism finds resonance with candidates, journalists and voters alike, being the main topic in a political agenda (Oates et al., 2010) (e.g. USA 2004) or even could override electoral outcomes (Michavila, 2005). For a government a terrorist attack is a security failure in the prevention against external threats and even more in instances of repeated attacks (Hoffman, 2006). Repeated terrorist attacks lead governments to engage in more extrajudicial killings and disappearances, but have no discernable influence on government use of torture and of political imprisonment or on empowerment rights such as freedom of speech, assembly, and religion, as Piazza and Walsh (2009) note. Following this, Gassebner et al. (2008) point that terrorist attacks along with its provision by the media affect not only policies but also electoral outcomes.

Thoroughly, Berrebi and Klor (2006) model the interaction between Palestinian militant groups and the Israeli political system, showing that the occurrence of a terror incident in a given locality within three months of the elections causes an increase on that locality's support for the right bloc of political parties, out of the two blocs vote. This effect is of a significant political magnitude because of the high level of terrorism in Israel and the fact that its electorate is 0 between the right and left blocs. Another related work comes later, by Getmansky and Zeitzoff (2014), concerning localities in Israel that have been exposed to rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip since 2001, an exposure that is regarded merely as a threat, since such attacks cause relatively few casualties but provoke widespread fear. Authors

relying on voting from 2003 to 2009 demonstrate that entering the rocket's range substantially affects voting and increases support from the rightwing bloc, especially for the nationalistic parties, a finding that is attributed to the common accepted advantage that right wing parties in Israel have with respect to security threats. Further, in the case of Spain, Bali (2007) and Montalvo (2011), examining Madrid bombing attack in 2004, show that terrorist attack mobilized citizens who are traditionally less likely to participate in politics, as well as center and leftist voters, and encouraged some of these voters to switch to the opposition.

Despite the aforementioned studies that provide evidence that terrorism affects targeted governments in meaningful ways (Pape 2003), and even though terrorism specialists and political scientists have recognized that groups use terrorism to achieve policy objectives (Crenshaw (1981), McCormick (2003)), or that terrorism may be used as a foreign policy tool (Bird et al., 2008), Abrahms in his 2006 and 2012 work straightforward states that "terrorism does not work". As per Abrahms (2006), terrorist groups are unable to coerce governments when they primarily attack civilian targets, since terrorism miscommunicates groups' objectives because of its extremely high correspondence. Using representative examples, such as the responses of Russia to the September 1999 apartment bombings, the United States to the attacks of September 11 and Israel to Palestinian terrorism in the first intifada, Abrahms (2006) explains that target countries deduce the objectives of terrorist groups from the short-term consequences of terrorist acts, not from their stated goals. Target countries view the deaths of their citizens and the resulting disturbance as proof that the perpetrators want to destroy their societies, their publics, or both. Thus, countries are unwilling to make concessions when their civilians are targeted irrespective of the perpetrators' policy demands. In a following research, Abrahms (2012) provides evidence that terrorist campaigns against civilian targets are significantly less effective than guerrilla campaigns against military targets at inducing government concessions, in other words terrorism is a suboptimal instrument of coercion that may consist an effective tactic for achieving process goals, but not outcome goals.

3.3. The Survival of Political Leaders in the Aftermath of Terrorism: Interaction Channels

From incumbent's perspective, in case of an external threat such as a terrorist attack, incumbents want to maintain their office and use appropriate policy in a way that enhances or at least does not hurt their political survival (De Mesquita et al. 2005), ousting terrorists, an action that may not only maintain but prolong their political tenure. On the other hand, concerning terrorists' perspective, removal of incumbents may constitute a great achievement, since political leaders and their foreign policies may not favor terrorists' purposes. So, there is a kind of conflict between terrorists and political leaders. Despite this "ongoing conflict" between terrorists and political leaders, some states seem tolerate the activities of terrorist organizations in their territory in exchange for no direct harm and at the expense of other nations, a fact that consists a dominant strategy and underlies the desirability of multilateral coordination and institutions (Lee, 1988).

Unlike other conflicts covered by the vast literature on political survival (e.g. armed conflict), this kind of conflict appears to have some discernable features. To be more specific, a chief part of the horror in terror attacks is the lack of meaning, the lack of reason, since attacks mostly come without a trace of warning (The New York Times, 2001). Besides, while some emphasize on elements of fear infliction (e.g. Hoffman, 1998), or the use of means that fall outside the routine forms of political struggle (e.g. Tilly, 2004), others believe that the central feature of terrorism is that it is directed towards civilians or noncombatants (e.g. Black, 2004).

Notably, terrorism is an event externally imposed, following a strategic logic and is specifically designed (Pape, 2003), while political leaders cannot be selective about, like in armed conflicts were leaders may strategically opt on whether to initiate or draw, allowing a more discernable assessment of its impacts on their leader tenure (Park and Bali, 2017).

Besides, terrorist attacks lead governments to engage in more extrajudicial killings and disappearances, but have no discernable influence on physical integrity rights, such as government use of torture and

of political imprisonment or on empowerment rights such as freedom of speech, assembly, and religion (Piazza and Walsh, 2009).

Undeniably, there exist some factors through which terrorist incidents may harm incumbent leaders' survival in political office.

3.3.1. Individuals' Effects

Apparently, as the nature of terrorism implies, terrorism is intended to instill fear and distress in target societies (Hoffman, 2006). One may consider that terrorism entails what we call "non-rational" evaluation of risk on the part of individuals. Sunstein (2003) demonstrates that individuals focus on the "badness" of the result rather than on the probability of occurrence. This so-called "probability neglect" results in fear that greatly exceeds the discounted harm. As Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) note, terror endangers life such that the value of the future relative to the present is reduced. Thus, such costs may be quite substantial, as suggested by Frey et al. (2004), who using the life satisfaction approach, in which individual utility is approximated by self-reported subjective well-being, suggest that people's utility losses may far exceed the purely economic consequences.

Fear and distress in targeted societies lead to an eternal relation; fear and distress lead to overreactions and in turn overreactions tend to exacerbate fear and distress (Hoffman, 2006). All this downturn and uncertainty sentiment makes public and elites as well, to be reluctant to incumbents' adequacy and even to blame political leaders for the sweeping distress in the society.

3.3.2. Counterterrorism Effects

Government policies and counter measures have also been shown to affect terrorist activity, sometimes reducing it through deterrence or target hardening, but at other times increasing it through backlash effects (Lum et al., 2006). Counterterrorist legislation is one of the main ways in which countries, particularly democracies, respond to terror attacks (Dyzenhaus et al. (2005), Shor (2011)). The establishment of counterterrorist laws, induces political advantages, mainly in terms of domestic and

international legitimacy, as Shor (2011) demonstrates. However, governmental and societal overreactions steaming out from counterterrorism measures may pose a threat for incumbents' political survival.

Actually, despite democratic constraints further make it hard for democracies to employ coercion and violence against terrorists, authoritarian regimes are prepared to tolerate higher civilian costs (Pokalova, 2013). As the recent events in Syria show, authoritarian regimes do not shy away from escalating violence targeted at their own citizens, since such commitment to brutality may help authoritarian regimes stamp out the terrorist threat (Martinez, 2008). Yet, as Mueller (2006) emphasizes, "the costs of terrorism commonly come much more from hasty, ill-considered, and overwrought reactions, or overreactions to it, than from anything the terrorists have done."

The loss of human rights produced by an anti-terrorist policy (Foot, 2007) would certainly qualify as one such overreaction. Goderis and Versteeg (2013) find that as a reaction to terrorist threats after the September 11 2001, human rights violations by US allies have increased systematically. After the September 11 attacks, for example, the U.S. government interrogated tens of thousands of young men from predominately Muslim or Arab countries. Over the next few months, it increased the scope of its extraordinary rendition program, tortured suspected terrorists, and established secret prisons overseas. French officials in Algeria would often respond to terrorist attacks with savage reprisals on civilians. British and Spanish security agencies violated human rights after the outbreak of terrorist violence in Northern Ireland and the Basque region (Piazza and Walsh, 2009).

While some institutional constraints may reduce such negative effects, the findings imply that in times of crisis a trade-off between security and liberty exists, where the magnitude of such a trade-off depends on the institutional setting of affected countries.

Recently, Blankenship (2018) demonstrated that among these overreactions, incumbents may con onto falling in the provocation "trap" of using repression as a means of counterterror, that in turn,

encourages dissidents to use more terrorism. Note that as Rosendorff and Sandler (2004) suggest, one country's proactive counterterrorism may impose negative externalities on other countries by diverting attacks toward foreign targets.

Apart from the impacts of security measures on citizens' rights in terror target countries, the impacts of aggressive counter-terrorism measures in terror host countries have been found to terrorize innocent citizens (Kivimäki, 2003). Thus, in some circumstances proactive measures may be oversupplied from the global perspective. In a related research, Siqueira and Sandler (2007) argue that voters will demand that politicians under-invest in proactive counterterrorism for two reasons. In order to free ride on other countries' counterterrorism investments and in order to avoid reprisal attacks from terrorists.

Thus, the argument that electorate tends to blame political leaders who use offensive counterterrorism polices seems reasonable. Besides, there exist instances when civilians might be willing to pare the slightest of their liberties to counter terrorism, but nobody wants to sacrifice her/his liberties further, especially in authoritarian regimes where oppression already exists.

3.3.3. Economic and Economic Policy Effects

Although it has been argued that terrorism should not have a large effect on economic activity, because terrorist attacks destroy only a small fraction of the stock of capital of a country (Becker and Murphy, 2001), no one can deny that terrorist acts have an adverse impact on individual utility and on the economy as a whole, factors that actually may destabilize an incumbent.

Empirical evidence confirms that terrorism has a large significant negative impact on economic activity. Choudhry (2003) points that the tragic events of 11 September 2001 in the USA along with the loss of life and destruction of property, disrupted general activity, i.e. the global economy and the financial markets, in the short-term, while following, Araz-Takay et al., (2009), the impact of terrorism on the aggregate economy is more severe during expansionary periods, while the impact of economic activity on terrorism is significant only in recessionary periods.

There are noticeable decreases in consumption after terror attacks (Eckstein and Tsiddon, 2004) and decreases in investment (Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004), Blomberg, et al. (2004)), as a consequence of a crowding-out effect in response to increases in public spending (Llussá and Tavares, 2007). Llussá and Tavares (2011) find that the impact of terror indicators varies widely. Private consumption and investment are significantly affected by terror attacks, while output and public consumption are mostly not affected. For instance, while the cost of Israeli is estimated at 4% of GDP, the Palestinian territories suffered a 50% decline in income per capita between 1994 and 2002 (Eckstein and Tsiddon, 2004).

Note that terrorism is linked with a wide variety of impacts on specific sectors of economic activity. For example, Drakos and Kutan (2003) provide evidence that terrorism reduces tourist arrivals, reducing market shares of targeted countries, while the same Drakos (2004) and Ito and Lee (2005) point the reduction of airline demand in the aftermath of terror attacks. What is more, the insurance industry is likely to be affected by terrorist attacks (Lenain et al. (2002), Woo (2002)) while, the stock of insurance companies does react to increased terrorist risk (Cummins, et al. 2003). Additionally, international capital (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008) and trade flows (Nitsch and Schumacher, 2004) are also likely to decrease. Besides, terrorism can affect fiscal and monetary policy in the same way as any other unexpected shock would, or as policymaking responds endogenously to terrorist events (Llussá and Tavares, 2007), The increased security need increases public spending, but mildly (Gupta et al., 2004), while, the impact on budget deficits also exist in a low degree (Eichenbaum and Fisher, 2004).

On another point of view, as per Harrigan and Martin (2002), the concentration of economic and governmental activities and the large population density of urban areas suggests a greater vulnerability to terrorism. Thus terrorism, even the mere threat of a terrorist attack, can be viewed as a tax on cities, which reflects the costs of fear, higher insurance premiums and increased security spending.

As we mentioned earlier, a strand of literature points the significance of economic growth for an incumbent's prolonged tenure. We observe even abominable dictators to have long-lasting tenures prioritizing the implementation of growth-friendly policies (De Luca et al., 2015). Econometric estimates provide support for the hypothesis that terrorism have a significant negative impact on economic growth through changes in the composition of government spending (Hobijn and Sager, 2002). For instance, in their study Gupta et al. (2004) explain that terrorism is associated with lower growth and higher inflation, and has adverse effects on tax revenues and investment, leading to higher government spending on defense, while this tends to be at the expense of macroeconomic stability.

As per safety spending, Drakos and Konstantinou (2013) studying the dynamic relationship between the levels of terrorism in a country, along with the level of its public order and safety spending, show that a shock in terrorism significantly increases the subsequent direction of public order and safety spending, while as a by-product, public spending is ineffective in reducing observed terrorism, since the electorate generally does not observe how much of the public good is provided, i.e. the public spending for counter terrorism activities, but just the number of terrorist attacks that occur (Barro, 1973).

Reasonably, even the best economic policies will not work in a country with extravagant terrorism and political instability (Mehmood and Mehmood, 2016). There exist cases where despite the implementation of an "anti-popular" economic program, leaders are far more acceptable politically. In voting behavior literature, the Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori during the implementation of his "fujishock" program is presented as an example of popularly supported neo-liberal economic reforms, despite the subsequent economic austerity and increasing social inequalities. (Holmes and Piñeres, 2002). Holmes and Piñeres (2002) explain that if Fujimori had not controlled terrorism, he would not be able to implement his stabilization programs and maintain popular support. Peruvians themselves viewed terrorism as a greater problem than the economic crisis. Not only the poor, but also the rest country was affected by the violence and the side effects of terrorism. Thus, as authors show, the

Peruvian's support of Fujimori's success in narrowing down terrorism was reflected in his high approval ratings. What is more, authors point out the significance of the gains in the economic situation that could be traced to improvements in security, since the political and social risks inherent in terrorism significantly curtail domestic and foreign investment.

3.3.4. Foreign Policy Effects

Reasonable, for an incumbent state's exposure on external threats, and specifically on terrorist attacks, is a security failure, even more in instances of repeated attacks (Hoffman (2006), Chowanietz (2011)). Meanwhile, as Svolik (2009) notes, repeated terror attacks are among the foreign policy failures that scholars argue facilitate the coordination efforts to punish incompetent leaders in autocracies (Debs and Goemans, 2010), given the fact that according to Nickelsburg and Northpoth (2000) foreign policy has a compelling hold on presidential approval.

Based on the common sense, for a political leader, trials and tribulations on foreign policy's handling, embarrass her/him, in front of not only the public in democracies, but also in front of elites in authoritarian regimes. Elite preferences over foreign policy may vary systematically across non-democracies, influencing when domestic groups will be motivated to hold leaders accountable. In other words, if dictators are unable to respond to the challenge of terrorist actions, regime elites may hold the leader accountable and leaders will be punished for their failures by being physically removed from office by a coup (Weeks (2008), Chiozza and Goemans (2011), Kihl and Kim (2014)). In addition, leaders concerned about terrorism are more likely to adopt a hawkish foreign policy, a fact that in turn may escalate transnational terrorism, complicating incumbents' survival further, as they have to face not only threats internal and external to the ruling coalition but also by foreign governments whose foreign policies interact.

All the above, immediate and intermediate effects of terrorism elicit even more distortions in every aspect of life, militating among others audience costs, i.e. the domestic punishment that leaders would

incur for backing down from public threats (Fearon, 1994). In addition to the aforementioned, Aksoy et al. (2015) in a recent study concerning the authoritarian field of research, note that domestic and international political dissent and violence, like terrorism, are among the important yet understudied political events that often trigger coups, and nearly three-quarters of dictators lose power as a result of a coup (Svolik, 2009). In particular, under those dismal circumstances we may see not only the public but also elites to be skeptical and reluctant concerning incumbent's adequacy to hold political office, while they pose strong incentives to punish them, by physically removing political leaders from office. On the other side of the coin, terrorist attacks may prolong a leader's tenure in political office. To be more specific, in the aftermath of a terrorist incident, despite the destabilizing effects on leaders' political survival, we may observe a reversal of the expectation that terrorism does hurt leaders' survival in political arena.

3.3.5. Rally' Round the Flag Effect

A number of studies have analyzed the relationship between international conflict and leadership support. Brody and Page (1975), Mueller (1973), Strobel (1997), Edwards and Swenson (1997) and more academics have found evidence in the United States for what has been termed as "rally effects". Under the "rally effect" scenario, citizens and political elites increase their support for a leader in times of international crisis. Specifically, terrorism may benefit incumbents by allowing them to rally people around the flag (Chenoweth, 2010). Actually, citizens seek strong and charismatic leaders, as foreign threats can make natural charisma something malleable rather than a natural trait (Merolla and Zechmeister, 2009). Davis (2007) argue that in the wake of disastrous terrorist events citizens trust more their government actions and are willing to sacrifice their civil liberties for the shake of national security.

A characteristic example comes from the September 11, 2001 attacks, a series of four coordinated terrorist attacks by the Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda against the United States. The attacks killed

2,996 people, injured over 6,000 others, and caused at least \$10 billion in infrastructure and property damage (Moghadam, 2008). Additionally, people died of 9/11-related cancer and respiratory diseases in the months and years following the attacks (Morgan (2009), Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (2014)). In the midst of the worst terrorist crisis in United States history, dozens of members of the US Congress from both the Republican and Democratic parties stood side-by-side on the steps of the Capitol pledging their support for George W. Bush in a rare display of unity (The New York Times, 12 September 2001). In the days that followed the tragic events of 9/11, Bush's public approval ratings rose from 51 percent to an unprecedented 86 percent (Gallup Polls, 7–10 September and 14–15 September 2001). With a large support both in Congress and across the nation, the rally around the flag was complete and unprecedented in the United States. As Chowanietz (2011) describes, there ensued a period of several weeks during which the mainstream political elite in Washington acquiesced to almost every decision taken by the Republican Administration. To all intents and purposes, partisan politics in Congress ceased for a time, while the United States government was able to launch a major military operation abroad and severely restrict the rights of its citizens at home, all in the name of the “war on terror” and all with minimal interference by the Senate and the House of Representatives.

A similar finding is reported by Norpoth (1987) in the British context and by Pickering and Kisangani (2003) for a wide range of nation states. Yet, it is also true that these same studies find the rally effect to be short lived and contingent on many other factors, including whether the rally is framed as offensive or defensive (Brody (1991), Levy (1989)). Chowanietz (2011), through a statistical analysis conducted on 181 terrorist events in five countries, France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States, over the period 1990 to 2006, analyses the reaction of mainstream elites acts of terror and investigates whether opposition parties will rally around the flag, like during military or diplomatic crises. His analyses indicates that rallying around the flag following terrorist acts is frequent among the political elites of the countries covered by this study, though more so in some (Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States) than in others (France and Spain), pointing that the repetition of acts

of terror is a strong factor affecting political parties' responses to terrorist acts, due to the fact that repeated attacks are more likely to prompt criticism. Besides, as Berinsky (2009) explains, public opinion on foreign threats are highly elite-driven, as elites decide where and how to stand on security issues. Additionally, the magnitude of the act is also associated with a rallying effect, as larger attacks are more likely to result in a unified front across parties, while other variables such as the identity of the perpetrators and the existence of a formal anti-terrorist pact are significant for the likelihood of rally.

Of course terror acts may intend to go beyond the immediate targets themselves (Hoffman, 2006). Yet, we should not neglect the fact that the removal of a political leader might be an unintended, random and be owed to other reasons than an international or a domestic terrorist incident. Additionally, the destabilization of the incumbent may be an unwanted outcome of a terror attack (Park and Bali, 2017). As we have mentioned, terrorist events (Berrebi and Klor, 2005) and even the mere threat of an attack (Getmansky and Zeitzoff, 2014) may create an impetus to remove left-wing incumbents and put rightwing parties in power (Williams et al., 2013). Those right-leaning governments are more likely to favor more hawkish policy against offenders, tending to restrict political freedoms when in power (Danzell (2011), contrary to leftwing governments (Koch and Cranmer, 2007) who are expected to be compromised. Such hawkish policies by right-leaning incumbents does not seem meet terrorists' needs.

The matter is that intended or not terrorism's aims go beyond the immediate targets themselves, affecting the politics of targeted society, and specifically affecting political leaders' survival in office, either destabilizing or stabilizing incumbents, in the aftermath of terror incidents.

3.3.6. Regime Type Effects

Terrorism's distinctive features—the strategic use of violence as a political message, civilian targeting, clandestine perpetrators, the inability to control territory and asymmetrical threats—make it

particularly sensitive to regime type. Differences at the presence and strength of institutions serve as indicators of the range of state capacity for dealing with terrorists. The diversity of regimes, which signals different co-optive and coercive options, explains differences in the incidence of terrorism across regimes, as Wilson and Piazza (2013) argue.

One might think that there is a selection bias effect in incumbents' removal that has to do with the specific regime of the state that the leader governs. In other words, political leaders in democratic states might experience increased hazard of losing office due to the fact that democracies may inherently experience more terrorism than non-democratic regimes. Of course that effect might occur for authoritarian regimes, as well, in other words, dictators may have not a prolonged tenure due to the fact that autocracies inherently face increased number of terrorist incidents.

Actually, most empirical studies published in the past 15 years find that democratic regimes are more likely to contain terrorist movements and experience terrorist attacks. There are five primary groups of explanations for this phenomenon, including the openness of democratic systems, organizational pressures resulting from democratic competition, the problem of underreporting in authoritarian regimes, gridlock resulting from multiparty institutions, and the coercive effectiveness of terrorism against democracies (Chenoweth, 2012).

The evidence concerning which regimes are more likely to be targeted by terrorism is mixed; On the one hand, there are those who state that democracies are likelier targets, like Eubank and Weinberg (1994), Pape (2003), Blomberg et al. (2004), Li and Schaub (2004), Piazza (2007, 2008), Wade and Reiter (2007), Chenoweth (2010), San-Akca (2014), while on the other hand there are those who provide evidence for a negative relationship between democracy and terrorism, like Hamilton and Hamilton (1983), Ross (1993) and Eyerman (1998), Piazza and Walsh (2010), Savun and Tirone (2017).

Meanwhile, in Abadie's (2006) research political freedom is shown to explain terrorism, but it does so in a non-monotonic way, i.e., countries in some intermediate range of political freedom are shown to be more prone to terrorism than countries with high levels of political freedom or countries with highly authoritarian regimes. Abadie's results suggest that transitions from an authoritarian regime to a democracy may be accompanied by temporary increases in terrorism, a result that is consistent with the observed increase in terrorism for countries in transition from authoritarian regimes to democracies (e.g. Iraq, Spain, Russia and Peru) (Bourque and Warren, 1989).

Yet, in a recent research Kingma, et al., (2015) identify a motivating key trend: 2009 appears to have been a watershed year, where terrorist attacks began to occur more often in failed states and countries under military occupation than in democratic ones. Chenoweth (2012) trying to explore whether terrorism has continued to occur more in democratic countries through 2010, demonstrates that terrorism is still prevalent in democracies, while she notes that terrorism has increased in "anocracies," countries that policymakers would often describe as "weak" or "failed" states, attributing this increase to the American-led occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. Most strikingly, later, Kingma et al., (2015) find that autocratic regimes have experienced a modest increase in terrorist attacks, whereas democracies have experienced a generalized decrease. Actually, even though democracies are thought to be the most likely targets of terrorism, many dictatorships are targets of a substantial number of terrorist attacks (Aksoy et al. (2015), Wilson and Piazza (2013)).

Further, extending audience costs logic to explain internal violence Conrad et al. (2014) argue that knowledge of audience costs affects not only leader behavior, but also the behavior of non-state actors like potential terrorists, changing their behavior. This explains why dictatorships generating higher audience costs (military dictatorships, single-party dictatorships, and dynastic monarchies) experience as much terrorism as democracies, while autocracies generating lower audience costs (personalist dictatorships and non-dynastic monarchies) face fewer attacks than their democratic counterparts.

As suggested by Savun and Phillips (2009), states that are actively involved in international politics are likely to create antipathy abroad and as a result consist more likely targets of transnational terrorism than states that follow an isolationist foreign policy. Foreign policy in democracies differ from autocracies, since democratic leaders experience different career incentives that drive them to promote foreign policies that benefit their country as a whole, at least in the short-term, while producing significant interaction effects in international politics, as captured by De Mesquita et al. (2005). Thus, democratic states consist more likely transnational terrorism targets not because of their regime type but instead, due to the type of foreign policy they tend to follow. In this context, Savun and Phillips (2009) interestingly point that regime type is no longer a determinant of transnational terrorism when foreign policy variables are included.

The above-mentioned evidence in the literature is mixed implying that there is no reliable inference to deduce, on which regime type experience more terrorist attacks. Thus, regime type seem not to have a priori effect on survival in political arena in the aftermath of a terrorist attack.

4. Theoretical Predictions

Following a wide field of academic studies where the impact of terrorism on politics has been the focal point (for example Pape (2003), McCormick (2003), Michavila (2005), Berrebi and Klor (2006), Piazza and Walsh (2009), Oates et al. (2010), Hoffman (2006), Bali (2007), Montalvo (2011), Getmansky and Zeitoff (2014), Park and Bali (2017)), existing literature on political survival (for example Svolik and Akcinarogly (2006), Bienen and Van de Walle (1989, 1992), Chiozza and Goemans (2003), Marshall and Jagers (2002), De Mesquita and Smith (2018), Barro (1973), Burke (2012), Boix and Svolik (2013), Wright et al. (2015), Lee (2014), Nikckelsburg and Northpoth (2000), Marinov (2005), De Mesquita and Siverson (1995)), as well as the aforementioned interaction channels

between them, while taking note on theoretical background context (De Mesquita et al. (2005), Weeks (2014)), we may express our testable hypothesis as follows.

Hypothesis 1 Terrorism does have an effect on the survival of political leaders.

Hypothesis 2 Authoritarian political leaders face an increased hazard of exit power in the aftermath of terrorism, compared to their democratic counterparts.

Hypothesis 3 Among authoritarian political leaders, *Bosses* and *Strongman* will endure comparatively to *Machines* and *Juntas* in the aftermath of terrorism.

Thoroughly, contradicting the stereotypical autocrat profile (Wintrobe (1998), Croco (2011)) in international relations in the aftermath of a security threat, as well as the Selectorate Theory (De Mesquita et al, 2005), we are expecting autocracies to generate higher audience costs compared to democracies (Weeks (2008), Aksoy et al. (2015)). Since interaction channels that impact incumbents' political survival in case of a terrorist incident negatively (for example see: Choudhry (2003), Drakos (2004) Frey et al. (2004), Lum et al. (2005), Hoffman (2006), Foot (2007), Araz-Takay et al. (2009), Svulik (2009), Debs and Goemans (2010), Goderis and Versteeg (2013), Aksoy et al., (2015)) seem to outweigh those that impact positively (for example see: Holmes and Piñeres (2002) Dyzenhaus et al. (2005), Shor (2011)), contrary to "rallies" that seem to predominate in democracies (for example Norpoth (1987), Kisangani (2003), Strobel (1997), Davis (2007), Chenoweth (2010), Chowanietz (2011)), we are expecting terrorist attacks to affect authoritarian incumbents' tenure negatively. However, audience costs are highly variable across authoritarian regimes (Weeks, 2008), thus, following Weeks (2014) we are anticipating that *Bosses* and *Strongmen* due to their reduced level of accountability will prevail in the aftermath of terrorism, relative to the other authoritarian regime categories (i.e. *Machines*, *Juntas*). So, what we are left to consider is the empirical validity of our hypotheses.

5. Empirical Analysis

5.1. Data

In order to examine incumbents' survival in political arena, it is vital to use a data base of political leaders. For the purposes of this thesis we employ *Archigos* that introduced by Goemans et al. (2009). *Archigos* identifies the effective leaders (effective leader: the person who de facto exercises power in a country (Goemans et al., 2009)) of each independent state in the Gleditsch and Ward (1999) compilation of independent states. The data identify the manner by which rulers enter and leave political power, the post-tenure fate of the ruler, as well as other personal characteristics. Goemans et al. (2009) make clear the utility of *Archigos* by demonstrating how leader attributes predict other features of interest in International Relations and Comparative Politics.

Actually, we use the latest version of *Archigos*, focusing on the timespan 1970 through 2015. Following COW's (The Correlates of War project) country coding, we use data on countries and the effective leaders of each independent state, including leaders' personal characteristics, as well as how and when leaders entered and left political power, their previous time in office and their post-tenure fate. We create the key indicator variable *out*, demonstrating when the effective leader losses office, as well as the variable *tenure* that gives us the total number of years that the ruler stays in power, both using entry and exit dates by "Archigos" dataset. Note that, in instances when multiple leadership changes occurred in a state in a given year, following Park and Bali (2017), we only consider the first leadership change.

Another point to note is that some political systems have legal restrictions on the consecutive terms the leader could hold office, in other words for some leaders we have to take into consideration Term Limitation. Leaders whose duration ended as a result of term limitations are censored, since their exit from power occurred due to regulations on their jurisdictions (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003). We take into account for term limits using the indicator variable *Term Limitation* (Jordan, 2016)

Continuing, in order to gather data concerning our key independent variable, terrorism, we refer to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). GTD, currently the most comprehensive unclassified database on terrorist attacks in the world, is an open-source database including information on terrorist events around the world, which is made available via online interface by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). The GTD defines a terrorist attack as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation. (GTD, 2018).

In order to consider an incident for inclusion in the GTD, all three of the following attributes must be present: The incident must be intentional – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator, the incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence -including property violence, as well as violence against people and the perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors (GTD codebook, 2018). In addition, following GTD codebook (2018) at least two of the following three criteria must be present for an incident to be included in the GTD, i.e. The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal, either there must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims or the action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.

The Global Terrorism Database includes systematic data on domestic as well as transnational and international terrorist incidents, while for each incident information is available on the date and location of the incident, the weapons used and nature of the target, the number of casualties, and-when identifiable-the group or individual responsible.

Using the categorical variable *INT_ANY* by the GTD, we had to create variables depicting the total number of terror attacks, including international, domestic and unknown terror attacks, as well as the total number of attacks for every category separately, excluding year 1993, since those incidents are not present in the GTD because they were lost. Specifically, following the GTD codebook (2018),

concerning the categorical variable *INT_ANY*, we characterize an attack as *international*, if the attack is international on any of the logistically, ideologically and miscellaneous dimensions. On the other hand, an attack is *domestic*, if it was domestic on all of the logistically, ideologically and miscellaneous dimensions. Yet, if the value for one or more dimensions is unknown, the attack is characterized similarly as *unknown*. Additionally, we created the dummy variable *ATTACK*, indicating whether in a given year a state experienced a terror attack, either international, domestic or unknown, or not.

Following, we gathered data for more independent variables, so as to control for a wide set of other factors that have high theoretical explanatory power, consistent with the existing literature.

Economic variables consist a category of variables that literature dictates us in order to examine leaders' political survival. The World Bank Dataset has been utilized to collect those data on economic variables, *GDP per capita (constant 2010 US\$)* and *GDP growth (annual %)*. Additionally, in order to control for another significant economic variable in the related literature, *economic sanctions* that have been imposed to given states, we use data on economic sanctions by Park and Bali's (2017) replication dataset. In this replication dataset, *Sanction* is a dummy variable coded as 1 if a country was targeted by economic sanctions in a given year and 0 otherwise. The information on sanctions in the aforementioned replication material is from Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) data set (Morgan et al., 2013).

To continue, we make use of *CINC* (Composite Indicator of National Capability) a statistical measure of national power, which is included in the National Material Capabilities data set (Singer et al., 1993), and is based on the following annual values for total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure of all state members in order to control for the national capability of a given state.

What is more, we control for variables that depict government's respect for human rights, in a given state. The CIRI Human Rights Dataset (Cingranelli et al., 2014) contains standards-based quantitative

information on government respect for 15 internationally recognized human. Specifically, we apply the *Empowerment Rights Index* and the *Physical Integrity Rights Index*.

Empowerment Rights Index is an additive index constructed from the foreign movement, domestic movement, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association, workers' rights, electoral self-determination, and freedom of religion indicators. *Empowerment Rights Index* ranges from 0 (no government respect for these seven rights) to 14 (full government respect for these seven rights).

Physical Integrity Rights Index is an additive index, as well, constructed from the torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance indicators. *Physical Integrity Rights Index* ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government respect for these four rights).

A crucial issue in this analysis, is to control for regime type. We utilize the Authoritarian Regimes Dataset (ARD) (Hadenius, Teorell and Wahman, 2013). Using ARD, at first we created dummy variables to distinguish *democracies* from *non-democracies*, while continuing, we created dummy variables in order to classify *non-democratic* regimes among *monarchy*, *military*, *multiparty*, *one-party*, *no-party* or *other type* of autocracy.

Yet, Bueno de Mesquita et al., (2005) have argued that it is not the type of regime itself that affects leaders' survival, but we should focus on the ratio between electors and the subset of these that is sufficient for the ruler to gain office. Data on Winning Coalition W and Selectorate S are provided by Bueno de Mesquita et al., (2005). We apply the Winning Coalition and Selectorate variables, while we also obtain the ratio of W/S , i.e. the *Loyalty norm*.

Additionally, giving a try to find evidence that one –dimensional measures of autocracy mask the variation between different types of autocratic regimes, we refer to Weeks (2014) prominent work, “Dictators at war and peace”. Using those data we classify non-democratic regimes, a process that yields *Machine*, *Junta*, *Boss* and *Strongman* indicator variables. Using those indicator variables, we

created the categorical variable *Authoritarian_Regimes_Weeks* in order to examine and compare effects of terrorism on political survival among Weeks' authoritarian regime categories.

Another strand on literature points the significance of war outcomes in a leader's ability to hold office, as we have mentioned. Data on armed conflict is collected from The Correlates of War (COW) Project (Sarkees et al., 2010).

Intra-State Wars (wars that predominantly take place within the recognized territory of a state) and *Inter-State Wars* (wars that take place between or among the recognized states) datasets have been utilized, while through those data sets we have created indicator variables concerning *interstate* and *intrastate* war involvement, as well as *War Outcomes*, i.e. *win*, *defeat* or *draw*, based on the events of the COW Project depicts.

Last, we have also utilized six composite indicators of broad dimensions of governance (i.e. the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised); *Voice and Accountability*, *Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism*, *Government Effectiveness*, *Regulatory Quality*, *Rule of Law*, and *Control of Corruption*, by the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project (Kaufmann et al., 2011). For the purposes of this analysis the aggregate WGI measures in the standard normal units of the governance indicator, ranging from around -2.5 to 2.5, have been reported.

Specifically, *Voice and Accountability* captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. *Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism* captures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. Moreover, *Government Effectiveness* captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. *Regulatory*

Quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. *Rule of Law* captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Last, *Control of Corruption* captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.

Our final dataset includes 7.498 observations, where a wide set of variables are included, as summary statistic tables in the appendix illustrate (see Appendix; Summary Statistics). In fact, we have data on 163 countries all over the world from 1970 through 2015. In total, 1.115 different political leaders are presented in this analysis, while Castro in Cuba has the longest tenure in our analysis, for half a century until his retirement in 2008. Note that we have excluded instances where incumbents' exit from power occurred due to regulations on their jurisdictions, using data on Term limitation, as well as cases where we had not complete information on a leader's tenure. As per terrorist attacks, we have information on 154.456 incidents in these 45 years. Iraq in 2014 stands out, having 3.933 terrorist incidents, from which the 1.118 were international, the 35 were domestic and the rest 2.780 have been classified as unknown terrorist incidents.

Some useful descriptive statistics, graphs as well as life tables are presented in the appendix for the better understanding of our data and the generic framework under which our analysis is conducted (see Appendix).

5.2. Survival Analysis

In order to examine how the occurrence of terrorist attacks affects effective leaders' survival in political arena, Survival Analysis offers useful insights, analyzing the time to the occurrence of an

event (Cleves et al., 2008). Survival models have a time-to-event approach, where time in this case is the time-differential between entering and losing office for the effective political leader, in other words the variable *tenure*, and the event is *exit* from office, a fact that occurs since the indicator variable *out* takes value equal to the unit.

The point of survival analysis is to follow subjects over time and observe at which point in time they experience the event of interest (Cleves et al., 2008). It often happens that the study does not span enough time in order to observe the event for all the subjects in the study (Cleves et al., 2008), for example we have many leaders in our dataset that are still in office after 2015. What is more, perhaps subjects drop out of the study, prior the event. This could be due to a number of reasons unrelated to the study, for example due to ill, retire, or term limitation etc.

There are certain aspects of survival analysis data, such as censoring and non-normality that generate difficulty in applying statistical models such as multiple linear regression (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1999). As Cleves et al. (2008), explain, the problem with using OLS to analyze survival data lies with the assumed distribution of the residuals. Concerning censoring, a censored observation is defined as an observation with incomplete information (Hosmer et al., 2011). Note that censoring is an important issue in survival analysis, representing a particular type of missing data. In survival analysis, there are four different types of censoring possible: right truncation, left truncation, right censoring and left censoring, yet for the purposes of this thesis we have to focus on right censoring. When an observation is right censored it means that the information is incomplete because the subject did not have an event during the time that the subject was part of the study. Remarkably, censoring is random and non-informative and is usually required in order to avoid bias in a survival analysis (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1999). Unlike ordinary regression models, survival methods correctly incorporate information from both censored and uncensored observations in estimating important model parameters (Hosmer et al., 2011).

The dependent variable in survival analysis is composed of two parts: one is the time to event and the other is the event status, which records if the event of interest occurred or not. One can then estimate two functions that are dependent on time, the survival and hazard functions. The survival and hazard functions are key concepts in survival analysis for describing the distribution of event times (Cleves et al., 2008).

The survival function gives, for every time, the probability of surviving (holding political office) up to that time (Cleves et al., 2008). The hazard function $h(t)$ -also known as the conditional failure rate, is the (limiting) probability that the failure event occurs in a given interval, conditional upon the subject having survived to the beginning of that interval, divide by the width of the interval (Cleves et al., 2008).

$$h(t) = \lim_{\Delta t \rightarrow 0} \frac{P(t \leq T < t + \Delta t / T \geq t)}{\Delta t}$$

Or else, $h(t) = f(t) / S(t)$

The hazard rate (or function) can vary from zero, i.e. no risk at all, to infinity, meaning the certainty of failure at that instant. Over time, the hazard rate can increase, decrease, remain constant, or even take on more serpentine shapes, as Cleves et al. (2008) explain. There is a one-to-one relationship between the probability of survival past a certain time and the amount of risk that has been accumulated up to that time, and the hazard rate measures the rate at which the risk is accumulated.

There exist various models to analyze the relationship of a set of predictor variables with the survival time, including parametric (e.g. Weibull), nonparametric (e.g. Kaplan Meier) and semiparametric (e.g. Cox) approaches.

Here we use a popular regression model for the analysis of survival data, the Cox proportional hazards regression model. The Cox model (Cox, 1972), which assumes that the covariates multiplicatively shift the baseline hazard function is by far the most popular of choices, due in part to its elegance and computational feasibility, as Cleves et al. (2008) argue. The Cox regression model is a semiparametric model, making fewer assumptions than typical parametric methods but more assumptions than nonparametric methods, while it makes no assumptions about the shape of the so-called baseline hazard function. It allows testing for differences in survival times of two or more groups of interest, for example for differences in survival times of two political leaders between democracies and autocracies, or among different types of authoritarian regimes, while allowing to adjust for covariates of interest.

The Cox model is expressed by the hazard function denoted by $h(t)$ and it can be estimated as follow:

$$h(t) = h_0(t) * \exp(b_1x_1+b_2x_2+\dots+b_px_p) \text{ where,}$$

- t represents the survival time
- $h(t)$ is the hazard function determined by a set of p covariates (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_p)
- The coefficients (b_1, b_2, \dots, b_p) measure the impact (i.e., the effect size) of covariates.
- The term h_0 is called the baseline hazard. It corresponds to the value of the hazard if all the x_i are equal to zero (the quantity $\exp(0)$ equals 1). Note that the “ t ” in $h(t)$ reminds us that the hazard may vary over time.

The Cox model can be written as a multiple linear regression of the logarithm of the hazard on the variables x_i , with the baseline hazard being an “intercept” term that varies with time.

The quantities $\exp(b_i)$ are called hazard ratios (HR). A value of b_i greater than zero, or equivalently a hazard ratio greater than one, indicates that as the value of the i_{th} covariate increases, the event hazard increases and thus the length of tenure decreases, while the reverse state for a value of b_i less than zero. A hazard ratio equal to one, implies that there is no effect on the length of survival.

While a nonlinear relationship between the hazard function and the predictors is assumed, the hazard ratio comparing any two observations is in fact constant over time in the setting where the predictor variables do not vary over time (Cleves et al., 2008), this is what we call proportional hazards assumption.

5.3. Results

Following, we are going to examine the empirical validity of our theoretical predictions, as expressed in Hypotheses 1 through 3.

As we may see in the model *Any Type of Attack, Plain* in column 1 of Table 1 where we examine the effect of terrorist incidents on incumbent leaders' political survival, as we go from no terrorist incident ($\ln 0+1$) to one ($\ln 1+1$) controlling for *age, previous time in office, growth, economic sanctions, material capabilities*, as well as *physical integrity* and *empowerment rights*, yields a hazard ratio equal to 1.09. In other words, in line with Hypothesis 1,

Table 1: *The effect of Terrorist Incidents on leaders' political survival, including international, domestic and unknown attacks*

	(1) Any Type of Attack Plain	(2) Any Type of Attack Main	(3) Any Type of Attack Democracies	(4) Any Type of Attack Autocracies	(5) Any Type of Attack Weeks
lnTerrorism	0.0864* (2.57)	-0.0248 (-0.54)	-0.0407 (-0.79)	0.213** (2.58)	0.315* (2.26)
age	-0.0384 (-1.08)	-0.0419 (-0.91)	-0.0511 (-0.82)	-0.0954 (-1.36)	-0.0282 (-0.51)
age²	0.000360 (1.23)	0.000369 (0.95)	0.000373 (0.72)	0.000863 (1.55)	0.000383 (0.86)
previous time in off	0.343*** (3.50)	0.240 (1.84)	0.205 (1.38)	0.530* (2.20)	0.516*** (3.37)
GDP growth pc	-0.0203* (-2.49)	-0.0278** (-2.68)	-0.0132 (-0.89)	-0.0286* (-2.00)	-0.0246* (-2.44)
economic sanctions	0.481*** (4.42)	0.368** (2.69)	0.390* (2.43)	0.484 (1.82)	0.463* (2.42)
material capabil	3.422 (1.10)	2.454 (0.68)	10.84* (2.43)	0.925 (0.14)	3.402 (0.66)
physical integr r	-0.0617* (-2.33)	-0.130*** (-3.60)	-0.0934 (-1.93)	-0.0417 (-0.62)	-0.0344 (-0.70)
empowerment r	0.164*** (10.01)	0.0199 (0.70)	-0.126*** (-3.37)	0.126*** (3.31)	0.123*** (4.43)
AutocraciesXlnTerr		0.247*** (3.40)			
autocraciesXage		-0.0680*** (-4.45)			
autocraciesXage²		0.000589** (2.91)			
inter-state wars		-1.549* (-2.16)	-46.28 (.)	-0.301 (-0.41)	-0.0726 (-0.14)
intra-state wars		0.0914 (0.45)	0.00595 (0.02)	0.156 (0.53)	0.455* (2.04)
loyalty norm		1.420** (3.08)	0.412 (0.54)	2.014** (3.27)	
MachineXlnTerr					-0.551 (-1.90)
BossXlnTerr					-0.823** (-2.64)
StrongmanXlnTerr					-0.490* (-2.02)
OtherAuthXlnTerr					-0.0769 (-0.58)
N	2712	1839	773	1066	1646

t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, PH-Test

the hazard of losing office for the effective political leader increases by 9.02% with a unit increase in terrorist incidents -including international, domestic and unknown terrorist attacks-while all other variables are held constant.

Controlling for regime type and loyalty norm as well as adding armed conflict variables in the model *Any Type of Attack, Main*, in column 2 of Table 1, we examine the comparative effect of total terrorist incidents between an incumbent that governs a democratic and another that governs an authoritarian state. In the model *Any Type of Attack, Main* the term *autocracies X lnTerrorism* illustrates the interaction between authoritarian regimes and terrorist attacks while the term *lnTerrorism* depicts the effect of terrorism in Democratic regimes. Add that we include *age, previous time in office, growth, economic sanctions, material capabilities, physical integrity and empowerment rights, intrastate and interstate* armed conflict involvement, as well as the ratio of winning coalition to selectorate, or else *loyalty norm*, as control variables. Explicitly, comparing two effective political leaders, a democrat versus a non-democrat, in the model *Any Type of Attack, Main*, as we go from no incident ($\ln 0+1$) to one ($\ln 1+1$), while all control variables are held constant, being an incumbent in an authoritarian state, increases the hazard of exit power to 24.88% of the hazard faced when a political leader governs a democratic state, a statistically significant effect in the 99.9% confidence interval, that validates Hypothesis 2.

It would be also beneficial to observe the effect of the control-variables that we have utilized in this analysis, so as to examine their impact on incumbents' political survival and the degree that those outcomes validate the existing literature on the political survival.

To begin, as we may see in the model *Any Type of Attack, Main* in column 2 of Table 1, in a one year increase in *age* that the leader entered in office, while all other variables are held constant, being a political leader in an authoritarian state reduces the hazard of losing office to 16.16% of the hazard faced when a political governs a democratic state.

In the same model, *previous time in office* has no explanatory power, yet the coefficient implies a tendency towards an increased hazard of losing office. The same states for *material capabilities*, as measured by the composite index of national capabilities (*cinc*), which hardly affect a leader's tenure since capability is insignificant. However, it is implied by the coefficient that a percentage increase in this index increases the hazard of losing office for the effective political leader.

As far as economic variables are concerned, we observe in the model *Any Type of Attack, Main* that *GDP per capita growth (annual%)* has a statistically significant effect. Actually, a one percentage increase in *GDP per capita growth (annual%)*, while all other variables are held constant, yields a hazard ratio equal to 0.97, implying the hazard of losing office for the effective leader decreases by 2.74% with a percentage increase in *GDP per capita growth (annual%)*, while all other variables are held constant. Concerning another statistically significant economic effect on leaders' political tenure, we may observe validating existing literature that in states where *economic sanctions* have been imposed, while all control variables are held constant, political leaders face a hazard of losing office 44.48% greater than states where *economic sanctions* are absent.

The respect for physical integrity rights is significant, as well. Actually, in the model *Any Type of Attack, Main*, a unit increase in *physical integrity rights index*, while all other variables are held constant, yields a hazard ratio equal to 0.87. Thus, the hazard of losing office for the effective leader decreases by 12.19%, as the government increases respect against torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance. On the other hand, *empowerment rights index* does not seem to have explanatory power under the model *Any Type of Attack, Main*.


What is more, *loyalty norm*, appears to be statistically significant in the model *Any Type of Attack, Main*. Specifically, a 0.25 unit increase in *loyalty norm*, while all other variables are held constant, yields a hazard ratio equal to 1.42. Thus, the hazard of losing office increases by 42.61% for the effective political leader, with a 0.25-unit increase in loyalty norm. This result is consistent with Bueno

De Mesquita et al. (2005) who imply that since *loyalty norm* increases, political leaders are less likely to survive in office, validating the Selectorate Theory.

As per armed conflict indicators, *interstate wars* appear to have explanatory power, while *intrastate wars* do not matter for a leader's tenure in political office, in the model *Any Type of Attack, Main*. In fact, concerning states that have been involved in *interstate* armed conflict, while all other variables are held constant, political leaders face a hazard of losing office 78.75% lower than leaders in states that have not been involved in *interstate* armed conflict, while all other factors are held constant.

Particularly, in Cox models, specification tests often go under the name *tests of the proportional hazards assumption* (Cleves et. al., 2008). As Box-Steffensmeier et al. (2004) note; *whether the proportional hazard assumption holds is arguably the primary concern when fitting a Cox model*. Denotative, we test the proportionality assumption by using the Schoenfeld and scaled Schoenfeld residuals in the model *Any Type of Attack, Main*.

A graph of the scaled Schoenfeld assumption for total terrorist incidents is provided, for the model *Any Type of Attack, Main* in the graph *Test PH assumption-Any Type of Attack, Main*.



The horizontal line provided in the graph indicates that there is no violation of the proportionality assumption. Note that performing a test of the proportional hazards assumption for the model *Any Type of Attack, Main* the global test for proportional hazard rate are statistically significant, yet the variables

are mainly non-significant on the proportional hazard assumption (see Appendix). To put it briefly, our model by and large do not violate the assumption of proportional hazard rates, except for some variables (e.g. *intrastate war*). In any case, we follow the existing literature trying to include as many as possible variables that prior research suggest us, or else variables that and may have explanatory efficacy for the purposes of our analysis.

Letting aside for a while our control variables, and returning again to our key independent variable, terrorist attacks, focusing merely on democracies, in column 3 of Table 1, in the model *Any Type of Attack, Democracies* the effect of terrorism on incumbents' tenure fails to achieve a customary level of statistical significance, yet an apparent trend is provided. Specifically, a unit increase in terrorist incidents, while we control for the same variables, yields a hazard ratio equal to 0.96, while the hazard of losing office for the effective democrat political leader decreases by 3.98% with a unit increase in terrorist incidents, while all other variables are held constant.

On the other hand, focusing on authoritarian regimes, in the model *Any Type of Attack, Autocracies* we may observe in column 4 of Table 1 that a unit increase in terrorist incidents, while we control for the same variables, yields a hazard ratio equal to 1.23, implying that the hazard of losing office for the effective authoritarian political leader increases by 23.73% with a unit increase in terrorist incidents, while all other variables are held constant, an effect with highly explanatory power, in the 99% confidence interval.

What we infer from the above models is that the effect of terrorism on leaders' political survival indeed exists, while this effect seems to emanate from authoritarian regimes.

Going one step further in our analysis, it would be motivating to look into authoritarian regimes, so as to examine the effect of terrorism on incumbents' survival in political arena, among authoritarian regimes. To do so, in the column 5 of Table 1, we apply Weeks (2014) authoritarian regime classification. In the model *Any Type of Attack, Weeks* one may discern our key independent variables

for this model, the interaction terms between the categorical variable *Authoritarian Regimes Weeks*, which indicates the type of a given authoritarian regime in Weeks' (2014) typology (*Machines*==1, *Juntas*==2, *Bosses*==3 and *Strongmen*==4) and *lnTerrorism*, the number of total terrorist incidents in logarithmic form ($\ln(\text{incident}+1)$). Explicitly, we use the interaction terms *Machine X lnTerrorism*, *Boss X lnTerrorism*, *Strongman X lnTerrorism*. Note that in model *Any Type of Attack, Weeks* we do not discern the interaction term that corresponds to *Juntas* (*Junta X lnTerrorism*). This is owed to the fact that we have utilized *Juntas* as the base regime category in this model. Besides, we use *age*, *previous time in office*, *growth*, *economic sanctions*, *material capabilities*, *physical integrity* and *empowerment rights*, as well as *intrastate* and *interstate* armed conflict involvement as control variables. As we may notice in column 5 of Table 1, the hazard of losing office for the effective authoritarian incumbent that governs a *Junta* increases by 37.02% with a unit increase in total terrorist incidents, while all control variables are held constant, a highly statistical significant effect.

Regarding the rest types of authoritarian regimes, comparing two dictators, an effective political leader that governs an authoritarian regime classified by Weeks (2014) as *Junta*, and another that governs an authoritarian regime classified by Weeks (2014) as *Boss*, as we go from no incident ($\ln 0+1$) to one ($\ln 1+1$), while our control variables are held constant, a dictator who governs a *Boss*, faces 60.16% of the hazard that a dictator who governs a *Junta* faces, an effect that is statistically significance in the 99% interval confidence. In the same manner, an incumbent dictator in *Strongmen*, faces 83.94% of the hazard that a dictator who governs a *Junta* faces, an effect that is statistically significant in the 95% confidence interval, while in the same concept, a dictator who governs a *Machine*, faces 78.97% of the hazard that a dictator who governs a *Junta* faces, yet this effect is on the threshold of statistically significance. To put it briefly, authoritarian incumbents in personalized non-military regimes, i.e. *Bosses*, and authoritarian incumbents in personalized military regimes, i.e. *Strongmen*, will experience prolonged tenures in case of a terrorist incident, relatively to political leaders in other authoritarian regimes, validating Hypothesis 3.

In the model *Any Type of Attack, Weeks* where we apply Weeks (2014) authoritarian regime classification it would be also worthwhile to look at the effect of the control-variables that we have utilized.


Regarding other control variables, in the model *Any Type of Attack, Weeks* in column 5 of Table 1 where in fact we have excluded democratic regimes, we may obtain results equivalent to the model *Any Type of Attack, Main* in column 2 of the same Table, yet, some differences exist.

In particular, in the model *Any Type of Attack, Weeks*, as *previous time in office* for an effective political leader increases by one term, while all other variables are held constant, yields a hazard ratio equal to 1.6, while the hazard of losing office increases by 67.53% with an additional political term that a leader had taken on, a statistically significant effect in 99.9% confidence interval as related literature indicates as well, contradicting the corresponding finding in the model *Any Type of Attack, Main* where *previous time in office* lacks statistically significance.

Additionally, in the model *Any Type of Attack, Weeks*, a unit increase in *empowerment rights index*, while all control variables are held constant, yields a hazard ratio equal to 1.13. Thus, the hazard of losing office increases by 13.08%, as the government increases respect for foreign movement, domestic movement, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association, workers' rights, electoral self- determination, and freedom of religion rights, controlling for all other factors, yielding a statistically significant result in the 99.9% confidence interval, while now *physical integrity rights index* loses its explanatory power, contrarily to the model *Any Type of Attack, Main*.

Last it is worthy to note that under the model *Any Type of Attack, Weeks*, where we include only authoritarian regimes *interstate* armed conflict involvement loses its explanatory power, while *intrastate war* do matter for leaders' political survival, as in states that have been involved in *intrastate* armed conflict, while all other variables are held constant, political leaders face a hazard of losing office 57.61% greater than leaders in states that have not been involved in *intrastate* armed conflict.

Testing proportionality assumption for the model *Any Type of Attack, Weeks* through the Schoenfeld and scaled Schoenfeld residuals, the horizontal line in the graph *Test PH assumption-Any Type of Attack, Weeks* of the scaled Schoenfeld assumption for total terrorist incidents indicates that there is no violation of the proportionality assumption.



Performing a *test of the proportional hazards assumption* for the model *Any Type of Attack, Weeks* we may observe that our model by and large do not violate the assumption of proportional hazard rates, except for some variables (see Appendix), similar to the model *Any Type of Attack, Main*.

Following, in Table 2 and Table 3 we examine the effect of international and domestic terrorism respectively, on leaders' political survival.

In column 2 of Table 2 using the model *International Attack, Main* and in column 2 of Table 3 using the model *Domestic Attack, Main* we receive parallel statistical significant effects to model *Any Type of Attack, Main* in column 2 of Table 1. In fact, as we go from no incident ($\ln 0+1$) to one ($\ln 1+1$), while all control variables that we have mentioned above are held constant, being an incumbent in an authoritarian state, increases the hazard of exit power to 29.82% and 22.36% -for international and

Table 2: The effect of International Terrorist Incidents on leaders' political survival

	(1) International Attack Plain	(2) International Attack Main	(3) International Attack Democracies	(4) International Attack Autocracies	(5) International Attack Weeks
lnInternationalTerr	0.00697 (0.15)	-0.127* (-2.08)	-0.124 (-1.84)	0.223 (1.73)	0.453 (1.90)
age	-0.0442 (-1.22)	-0.0551 (-1.16)	-0.0778 (-1.22)	-0.0846 (-1.14)	-0.0124 (-0.21)
age²	0.000399 (1.34)	0.000457 (1.16)	0.000565 (1.08)	0.000771 (1.29)	0.000249 (0.53)
previous time in off	0.338*** (3.32)	0.222 (1.62)	0.236 (1.59)	0.338 (1.10)	0.484** (2.79)
GDP growth pc	-0.0214* (-2.55)	-0.0267* (-2.48)	-0.00857 (-0.56)	-0.0301* (-2.00)	-0.0254* (-2.44)
economic sanctions	0.530*** (4.77)	0.495*** (3.46)	0.507** (3.02)	0.555* (2.00)	0.516** (2.67)
material capabilities	5.101 (1.67)	2.532 (0.69)	10.15* (2.24)	2.338 (0.36)	5.869 (1.19)
physical integrity r	-0.0919*** (-3.66)	-0.155*** (-4.37)	-0.0991* (-2.02)	-0.0993 (-1.53)	-0.0866 (-1.80)
empowerment r	0.180*** (10.89)	0.0303 (1.02)	-0.129*** (-3.33)	0.148*** (3.73)	0.137*** (4.97)
autocraciesXlnIntTerr		0.388** (3.23)			
autocraciesXage		-0.0658*** (-4.32)			
autocraciesXage²		0.000565** (2.76)			
inter-state wars		-2.190* (-2.17)	-33.19 (-0.00)	-1.049 (-1.02)	-0.345 (-0.58)
intra-state wars		0.0347 (0.16)	-0.0618 (-0.20)	0.0650 (0.21)	0.409 (1.77)
loyalty norm		1.437** (3.01)	0.520 (0.63)	1.878** (2.96)	
MachineXlnIntTerr					-1.139 (-1.77)
BossXlnIntTerr					-1.418* (-2.48)
StrongmanXlnIntTerr					-0.827 (-1.82)
OtherAuthXlnIntTerr					-0.238 (-1.00)
<i>N</i>	2594	1733	725	1008	1578

t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, PH-Test

Table 3: The effect of Domestic Terrorist Incidents on leaders' political survival

	(1) Domestic Attack Plain	(2) Domestic Attack Main	(3) Domestic Attack Democracies	(4) Domestic Attack Autocracies	(5) Domestic Attack Weeks
lnDomesticTerr	0.0736 (1.77)	-0.0262 (-0.46)	-0.0292 (-0.45)	0.135 (1.42)	0.359 (1.72)
age	-0.0452 (-1.25)	-0.0540 (-1.13)	-0.0701 (-1.09)	-0.0958 (-1.30)	-0.0303 (-0.53)
age²	0.000404 (1.35)	0.000452 (1.13)	0.000502 (0.95)	0.000869 (1.47)	0.000392 (0.86)
previous time in off	0.343*** (3.38)	0.220 (1.60)	0.230 (1.54)	0.326 (1.05)	0.476** (2.76)
GDP growth pc	-0.0211* (-2.49)	-0.0281* (-2.53)	-0.00913 (-0.60)	-0.0319* (-2.07)	-0.0273** (-2.63)
economic sanctions	0.539*** (4.87)	0.405** (2.87)	0.422* (2.56)	0.511 (1.83)	0.487* (2.50)
material capabilities	4.256 (1.39)	2.656 (0.71)	9.413* (2.03)	3.038 (0.47)	4.168 (0.85)
physical integrity r	-0.0681* (-2.45)	-0.138*** (-3.71)	-0.0748 (-1.45)	-0.102 (-1.52)	-0.0859 (-1.78)
empowerment r	0.171*** (10.30)	0.0300 (1.03)	-0.122** (-3.18)	0.146*** (3.72)	0.142*** (5.05)
autocraciesXlnDomTerr		0.228** (2.64)			
autocraciesXage		-0.0650*** (-4.19)			
autocraciesXage2		0.000577** (2.77)			
inter-state wars		-2.161* (-2.15)	-46.32 (.)	-0.978 (-0.95)	-0.460 (-0.76)
intra-state wars		0.0139 (0.06)	-0.0281 (-0.09)	0.0771 (0.24)	0.449* (1.98)
loyalty norm		1.193* (2.53)	0.00706 (0.01)	1.860** (2.92)	
MachineXlnDomTerr					-0.794 (-1.67)
BossXlnDomTerr					-0.863* (-2.25)
StrongmanXlnDoTerr					-0.455 (-1.44)
OtherAuthXlnDoTerr					-0.209 (-1.01)
N	2594	1733	725	1008	1578

t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05,
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, PH-Test

domestic terrorist incidents respectively- of the hazard faced when a political leader governs a democratic state.

As far as the effect of international and domestic attacks on leaders' survival in political office among authoritarian regimes is concerned, similar to the model *Any Type of Attack, Weeks*, column 2 of Table 2 and column 2 of Table 3 present us that in models *International Attack, Weeks* and *Domestic Attack, Weeks* respectively, only dictatorships classified by Weeks as *Bosses* yield results with explanatory power.

To be more specific, focusing merely on international terrorist incidents, in column 5 of Table 2, comparing two dictators, one that governs a *Junta*, and another that governs a *Boss*, in a unit increase in international terrorist incidents, holding all the aforementioned variables constant, the incumbent dictator who governs a *Boss*, faces 38.10% of the hazard of losing office that a dictator who governs a *Junta* faces. Similarly, in a unit increase in domestic terrorist incidents, in column 5 of Table 3, holding all the aforementioned variables constant, the incumbent dictator who governs a *Boss* faces 60.42% of the hazard of losing office that a dictator who governs a *Junta* faces.

Remarkably, in the model, *Unknown Attack, Main*, in column 2 of Table 4, where we examine the effect of unknown terrorist incidents on incumbent leaders' political survival, in a unit increase in unknown terrorist incidents, holding all control variables constant, being an incumbent in an authoritarian state increases the hazard of losing office to 48.88% of the hazard faced when a political leader governs a democratic state, an effect that is statistically significant, like the abovementioned, yet starkly intense, about 1.9 times more intense compared to other types of terrorist attacks.

Table 4: *The effect of Unknown Terrorist Incidents on leaders' political survival*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Unknown Attack Plain	Unknown Attack Main	Unknown Attack Democracies	Unknown Attack Autocracies	Unknown Attack Weeks
lnUnknownTerr	0.196*** (4.56)	0.0980 (1.58)	0.0588 (0.84)	0.338*** (3.48)	0.357* (2.24)
age	-0.0496 (-1.36)	-0.0509 (-1.07)	-0.0690 (-1.07)	-0.0923 (-1.26)	-0.0233 (-0.40)
age²	0.000429 (1.43)	0.000413 (1.03)	0.000488 (0.91)	0.000847 (1.44)	0.000340 (0.73)
previous time in off	0.340*** (3.36)	0.218 (1.61)	0.226 (1.52)	0.364 (1.20)	0.463** (2.74)
GDP growth pc	-0.0199* (-2.33)	-0.0265* (-2.40)	-0.00998 (-0.66)	-0.0294 (-1.87)	-0.0254* (-2.38)
economic sanctions	0.481*** (4.32)	0.366* (2.57)	0.413* (2.51)	0.434 (1.53)	0.382 (1.93)
material capabilities	1.406 (0.43)	-0.254 (-0.07)	8.143 (1.73)	-0.327 (-0.05)	2.730 (0.51)
physical integrity r	-0.0301 (-1.09)	-0.0809* (-2.11)	-0.0426 (-0.83)	-0.0323 (-0.47)	-0.0402 (-0.81)
empowerment r	0.155*** (9.28)	0.0172 (0.59)	-0.122** (-3.21)	0.133*** (3.35)	0.121*** (4.30)
autocraciesXlnUnTerr		0.300*** (3.39)			
autocraciesXage		-0.0721*** (-4.56)			
autocraciesXage²		0.000647** (3.10)			
inter-state wars		-2.137* (-2.12)	-36.35 (-0.00)	-0.890 (-0.87)	-0.382 (-0.64)
intra-state wars		-0.0205 (-0.10)	-0.114 (-0.37)	0.0456 (0.15)	0.319 (1.42)
loyalty norm		0.979* (2.08)	-0.0596 (-0.08)	1.562* (2.46)	
MachineXlnUnTerr					-0.471 (-1.31)
BossXlnUnTerr					-0.967* (-2.07)
StrongmanXlnUnTerr					-0.625 (-1.85)
Other AuthXlnUnTerr					-0.0208 (-0.13)
N	2595	1734	725	1009	1579

t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, PH-Test

Regarding the effect of unknown terrorist attacks on leaders' political survival among authoritarian regimes, using models *Unknown Attack, Weeks* in column 5 of Table 4, we may observe that the effect is similar to the corresponding models for international and domestic terrorist incidents, where only dictatorships classified by Weeks as *Bosses* yield results with explanatory power. In fact, in a unit increase in unknown terrorist incidents, holding all the aforementioned variables constant, the incumbent dictator who governs a *Boss*, faces 54.34% of the hazard of losing office that a dictator who governs a *Junta* faces. These effects appear to be statistically significant in the 95% confidence interval.

Summing up, the above results in Tables 1 through 4 seem to validate empirically Hypotheses 1 through 3.

5.4. Sensitivity Analysis

It would be worthwhile to examine certain “core” regression coefficient estimates behave when the regression specification is modified in some way (Lu and White, 2014). “Fragility” of regression coefficient estimates is indicative of a specification error and sensitivity analysis should be routinely conducted to help diagnose misspecification (Leamer, 1983). Survival analysis enables us to apply robustness checks using various alternatives of our models, by either adding/removing coefficients or excluding subsets of our sample, or even separating our sample in different time periods etc. In our analysis, we apply denotative robustness checks for models *Any Type of Attack, Main* and *Any Type of Attack, Weeks* excluding instances where outliers that infer selection bias in our estimations might lurking.

Table 5: Robustness Checks for Armed Conflict variables

	(1) NO WAR Any Type of Attack Main	(2) NO WAR Any Type of Attack Weeks	(3) NO CIVIL WAR Any Type of Attack Main	(4) NO CIVIL WAR Any Type of Attack Weeks	(5) NO WAR LOSS Any Type of Attack Main	(6) NO WAR LOSS Any Type of Attack Weeks
InTerrorAttacks	0.00526 (0.10)	0.413 (1.83)	0.00526 (0.10)	0.510* (2.53)	-0.0253 (-0.55)	0.270 (1.81)
autocraciesXlnTerrAtt	0.313*** (3.38)		0.313*** (3.38)		0.247*** (3.40)	
age	-0.0927 (-1.90)	-0.107 (-1.83)	-0.0927 (-1.90)	-0.0985 (-1.69)	-0.0414 (-0.89)	-0.0347 (-0.62)
autocraciesXage	-0.0806*** (-4.71)		-0.0806*** (-4.71)		-0.0681*** (-4.46)	
autocraciesXage²	0.000705** (3.11)		0.000705** (3.11)		0.000589** (2.92)	
age²	0.000777 (1.92)	0.00106* (2.24)	0.000777 (1.92)	0.000978* (2.08)	0.000364 (0.94)	0.000442 (0.99)
previous time in office	0.135 (0.90)	0.0774 (0.31)	0.135 (0.90)	0.181 (0.80)	0.241 (1.85)	0.482** (3.02)
GDP growth pc	-0.0191 (-1.43)	0.00458 (0.29)	-0.0191 (-1.43)	0.00360 (0.23)	-0.0289** (-2.73)	-0.0258* (-2.50)
economic sanctions	0.335* (2.19)	0.532* (2.23)	0.335* (2.19)	0.572* (2.45)	0.371** (2.70)	0.449* (2.31)
material capabilities	-1.777 (-0.39)	2.766 (0.49)	-1.777 (-0.39)	3.011 (0.54)	2.471 (0.68)	3.141 (0.61)
inter-state wars	0 (.)	0 (.)	-39.29 (-0.00)	-0.0690 (-0.10)	-1.456* (-2.04)	-0.633 (-0.88)
intra-state wars	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0.0915 (0.45)	0.481* (2.15)
physical integrity r rights	-0.0952* (-2.29)	0.0152 (0.26)	-0.0952* (-2.29)	0.0298 (0.51)	-0.130*** (-3.61)	-0.0414 (-0.83)
empowerment rights	-0.00312 (-0.10)	0.126*** (3.86)	-0.00312 (-0.10)	0.126*** (3.88)	0.0196 (0.69)	0.119*** (4.28)
loyalty norm	1.201* (2.33)		1.201* (2.33)		1.419** (3.08)	
MachineXlnTerrAtt		-0.611 (-1.67)		-0.679 (-1.94)		-0.513 (-1.74)
BossXlnTerrAtt		-0.792 (-1.41)		-0.885 (-1.60)		-0.764* (-2.45)
StrongmanXlnTerrAtt		-0.556 (-1.76)		-0.641* (-2.14)		-0.452 (-1.81)
OtherAuthXlnTerrAtt		-0.105 (-0.48)		-0.189 (-0.97)		-0.0398 (-0.28)
N	1574	1357	1607	1385	1837	1642

t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, PH-Test

Table 6: Robustness Checks for country, year and GDP groups

	(1) No Latin America	(2) No Latin America	(3) No Arab World	(4) No Arab World	(5) GDP over Mean GDP	(6) 1970-1993 Any type Main
	Any Type of Attack Main	Any Type of Attack Weeks	Any Type of Attack Main	Any type Weeks	Any Type of Attack Main	
InTerrorAttacks	-0.0114 (-0.22)	0.303* (2.01)	-0.0205 (-0.44)	0.302* (2.12)	-0.0921 (-1.64)	0.0457 (0.69)
autocraciesXlnTerrAtt	0.245** (3.10)		0.224** (3.03)		0.456** (3.25)	0.305** (2.94)
age	-0.0470 (-0.97)	-0.0310 (-0.54)	-0.0256 (-0.55)	-0.00196 (-0.03)	-0.134 (-1.88)	0.0390 (0.50)
autocraciesXage	-0.0693*** (-4.32)		-0.0643*** (-4.19)		-0.116*** (-3.76)	-0.0651** (-2.66)
autocraciesXage²	0.000615** (2.92)		0.000536** (2.61)		0.00106* (2.50)	0.000519 (1.58)
age²	0.000401 (1.00)	0.000411 (0.90)	0.000230 (0.59)	0.000151 (0.32)	0.00109 (1.86)	-0.000260 (-0.39)
previous time in office	0.253 (1.89)	0.522*** (3.37)	0.249 (1.92)	0.471** (2.99)	0.480** (3.28)	0.245 (1.28)
GDP growth pc	-0.0267* (-2.46)	-0.0237* (-2.30)	-0.0273* (-2.55)	-0.0229* (-2.11)	-0.0434* (-2.13)	-0.0528*** (-3.70)
economic sanctions	0.334* (2.25)	0.387 (1.92)	0.389** (2.80)	0.413* (2.06)	0.372* (2.22)	0.410* (2.04)
material capabilities	1.816 (0.48)	3.792 (0.74)	2.403 (0.66)	2.360 (0.46)	12.62** (2.74)	6.761 (1.37)
inter-state wars	-1.527* (-2.13)	-0.327 (-0.55)	-1.347 (-1.89)	0.142 (0.27)	-2.016* (-1.96)	-37.19 (-0.00)
intra-state wars	0.179 (0.85)	0.452 (1.95)	0.0442 (0.21)	0.313 (1.34)	-0.130 (-0.40)	-0.352 (-1.17)
physical integrity r	-0.128*** (-3.30)	-0.0401 (-0.78)	-0.125*** (-3.40)	-0.0194 (-0.36)	-0.0782 (-1.45)	-0.129* (-2.44)
empowerment rights	0.0203 (0.68)	0.117*** (4.01)	0.00247 (0.09)	0.0923** (3.05)	-0.0357 (-0.81)	0.0558 (1.38)
loyalty norm	1.455** (2.99)		1.270** (2.78)		0.139 (0.18)	1.068 (1.63)
MachineXlnTerrAtt		-0.590 (-1.82)		-0.577 (-1.95)		
BossXlnTerrAtt		-0.776* (-2.49)		-0.862* (-2.43)		
StrongmanXlnTerrAtt		-0.378 (-1.48)		-0.429 (-1.66)		
OtherAuthXlnTerrAtt		-0.0469 (-0.32)		-0.0676 (-0.50)		
N	1704	1584	1652	1295	860	1069

tstatistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, PH-Test

In Table 5 we perform sensitivity analysis regarding armed conflict variables. Specifically, in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 we exclude countries that have been engaged either in *inter* or *intra* state war, for both models *Any Type of Attack, Main* and *Any Type of Attack, Weeks*, while similarly, in columns 3 and 4 we exclude countries that have been involved in *intra-state* armed conflict. Additionally, in the same table, in columns 5 and 6, we exclude countries that have experienced any *war loss* for models *Any Type of Attack, Main* and *Any Type of Attack, Weeks*, respectively.

In another aspect, in Table 6, in columns 1 and 2, we exclude *Latin American countries* for models *Any Type of Attack, Main* and *Any Type of Attack, Weeks*, respectively, while in the same concept, in columns 3 and 4 we exclude *Arab World countries*.

In column 5 we examine leaders' political survival including only those countries that their *GDP per capita* (constant 2010 \$) exceeds the mean *GDP per capita* (constant 2010 \$) for model *Any Type of Attack, Main*, while for the same model, we provide robust checks, excluding the time span 1994 through 2015.

What is more, the six composite indicators of broad dimensions of governance provided by the WGI project have also been utilized to make robustness checks for both models *Any Type of Attack, Main* in Table 7 and *Any Type of Attack, Weeks*, in Table 8.

In fact, in columns 1 to 6, for both Tables 7 and 8, we exclude cases where each of following indexes; *Voice and Accountability*, *Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism*, *Government Effectiveness*, *Regulatory Quality*, *Rule of Law*, and *Control of Corruption*, do not surpass the mean value. For example, the composite index *Control of Corruption* captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as we have mention (see the section referring to Data). Excluding values that do not surpass

Table 7: Robustness Checks for WGI on the model Any Type of Attack, Main

	(1) Corruption Main	(2) Pol Stab Main	(3) Gov Eff Main	(4) Rule Law Main	(5) Voice&Acc Main	(6) Reg Qual Main
lnTerrorAttacks	-0.0291 (-0.61)	-0.0278 (-0.59)	-0.0302 (-0.64)	-0.0397 (-0.84)	-0.0268 (-0.58)	-0.0289 (-0.62)
AutocraciesXlnTerrAtt	0.289*** (3.78)	0.267*** (3.50)	0.276*** (3.59)	0.274*** (3.61)	0.271*** (3.55)	0.258*** (3.48)
age	0.00110 (0.02)	-0.0107 (-0.22)	-0.00536 (-0.10)	-0.00970 (-0.19)	-0.00344 (-0.07)	-0.0170 (-0.35)
autocraciesXage	-0.0689*** (-4.17)	-0.0741*** (-4.58)	-0.0694*** (-4.20)	-0.0710*** (-4.36)	-0.0745*** (-4.61)	-0.0697*** (-4.42)
autocraciesXage²	0.000605** (2.77)	0.000669** (3.13)	0.000599** (2.74)	0.000619** (2.88)	0.000677** (3.19)	0.000611** (2.93)
age²	0.0000281 (0.06)	0.000123 (0.30)	0.0000895 (0.21)	0.000119 (0.28)	0.0000616 (0.15)	0.000164 (0.41)
previous time in office	0.331* (2.55)	0.259 (1.94)	0.295* (2.25)	0.281* (2.14)	0.270* (2.05)	0.270* (2.08)
GDP growth pc	-0.0299** (-2.76)	-0.0295** (-2.76)	-0.0283** (-2.60)	-0.0286** (-2.68)	-0.0300** (-2.82)	-0.0281** (-2.64)
economic sanctions	0.378** (2.63)	0.365* (2.56)	0.386** (2.70)	0.374** (2.64)	0.371** (2.65)	0.373** (2.69)
material capabilities	3.982 (1.07)	2.351 (0.62)	4.168 (1.15)	3.991 (1.10)	3.834 (1.06)	3.058 (0.84)
inter-state wars	-1.509* (-2.11)	-1.496* (-2.09)	-1.509* (-2.10)	-1.531* (-2.14)	-1.525* (-2.13)	-1.512* (-2.11)
intra-state wars	0.0139 (0.06)	0.0410 (0.19)	0.0871 (0.41)	0.0824 (0.39)	0.0540 (0.26)	0.0425 (0.21)
physical integrity r	-0.131*** (-3.39)	-0.120** (-3.14)	-0.133*** (-3.48)	-0.135*** (-3.58)	-0.130*** (-3.50)	-0.139*** (-3.78)
empowerment rights	0.0226 (0.76)	0.0219 (0.74)	0.0239 (0.80)	0.0217 (0.74)	0.0260 (0.89)	0.0204 (0.70)
loyalty norm	1.520** (3.12)	1.260** (2.62)	1.446** (2.96)	1.380** (2.87)	1.360** (2.82)	1.522** (3.21)
N	1713	1746	1719	1726	1733	1791

t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, PH-Test

Table 8: Robustness Checks for WGI on the model Any Type of Attack, Weeks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Reg Qual Weeks	RuleofLaw Weeks	Voice&Acc Weeks	Corruption Weeks	Polit Stab Weeks	Gover Eff Weeks
lnTerrorAttacks	0.310* (2.15)	0.312* (2.15)	0.335* (2.31)	0.350* (2.43)	0.356* (2.48)	0.324* (2.24)
MachineXlnTerrAtt	-0.512 (-1.75)	-0.441 (-1.57)	-0.444 (-1.57)	-0.454 (-1.62)	-0.475 (-1.70)	-0.481 (-1.68)
BossXlnTerrAtt	-0.756* (-2.45)	-0.750* (-2.43)	-0.763* (-2.49)	-0.740* (-2.42)	-0.765* (-2.49)	-0.760* (-2.46)
StrongmanXlnTerrAtt	-0.482* (-1.99)	-0.514* (-1.98)	-0.461 (-1.91)	-0.513* (-2.00)	-0.539* (-2.08)	-0.508 (-1.96)
OtherAuthXlnTerrAtt	-0.0615 (-0.45)	-0.0651 (-0.47)	-0.0758 (-0.55)	-0.0654 (-0.48)	-0.0861 (-0.63)	-0.0678 (-0.49)
age	0.00352 (0.06)	0.0153 (0.24)	0.0428 (0.62)	0.0192 (0.29)	-0.000290 (-0.00)	0.0191 (0.29)
age²	0.000145 (0.29)	0.0000225 (0.04)	-0.000167 (-0.30)	-0.00000810 (-0.02)	0.000158 (0.31)	-0.00000323 (-0.01)
Previous time in office	0.501** (3.11)	0.591*** (3.56)	0.584** (3.25)	0.627*** (3.65)	0.596*** (3.38)	0.574*** (3.31)
GDP growth pc	-0.0217* (-2.01)	-0.0220* (-2.00)	-0.0224* (-2.01)	-0.0208 (-1.85)	-0.0215 (-1.93)	-0.0205 (-1.82)
economic sanctions	0.459* (2.19)	0.531* (2.44)	0.518* (2.30)	0.536* (2.44)	0.446* (2.00)	0.550* (2.46)
material capabilities	2.538 (0.48)	1.241 (0.19)	1.427 (0.23)	1.796 (0.29)	0.640 (0.10)	4.517 (0.87)
physical integrity r	-0.0527 (-1.00)	-0.0323 (-0.58)	-0.0270 (-0.48)	-0.00628 (-0.11)	-0.00530 (-0.10)	-0.0176 (-0.31)
empowerment r	0.117*** (3.97)	0.116*** (3.80)	0.126*** (4.02)	0.106*** (3.46)	0.104*** (3.42)	0.112*** (3.61)
inter-state wars	0.0200 (0.04)	0.0726 (0.14)	0.108 (0.20)	0.0148 (0.03)	0.0767 (0.15)	0.0543 (0.10)
intra-state wars	0.377 (1.58)	0.438 (1.75)	0.412 (1.61)	0.422 (1.67)	0.457 (1.78)	0.502* (1.99)
N	1462	1350	1292	1343	1411	1331

t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, PH-Test

the mean value of *Control of Corruption*, is an implicit way to exclude skeptical perceptions that may bias our results, implying that the deposition of dictators in the aftermath of a terrorist attack is owed to skeptical perceptions and a particular distrust sentiment in various aspects of governance. The equivalent logic is followed for the rest WGI.

As we may see in Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8, to all appearances, the effect is similar in the subsets and full models, implying that the coefficients are plausible and robust, a fact that is interpreted as evidence of structural validity.

Last but not of less importance, in Tables 9 and 10 we provide sensitivity analysis for the models *Any Type of Attack, Main* and *Any Type of Attack, Weeks* respectively, to examine the validity of our analysis in various models except for the semiparametric Cox model, including parametric and multilevel parametric model approaches and more specifically, Weibull, Gompertz, Loglogistic, Exponential, Gamma and Lognormal approaches. Regardless of the model approach that we have applied, certain “core” regression coefficient estimates behave in the same way like when we use the semiparametric Cox model approach.

Table 9: Robustness Checks for Parametric Model Approaches on the model Any Type of Attack, Main

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Any Type of Attack Main Cox Semi Parametric	Any Type of Attack Main Weibull Parametric	Any Type of Attack Main Gompertz Parametric	Any Type of Attack Main Loglogistic Multilevel Parametric	Any Type of Attack Main Exponential Multilevel Parametric	Any Type of Attack Main Gamma Parametric	Any Type of Attack Main Lognormal Parametric
main							
lnTerrorAttacks	-0.0248 (-0.54)	-0.0247 (-0.54)	-0.0251 (-0.55)	0.0117 (0.22)	-0.0254 (-0.56)	0.0264 (0.56)	0.00249 (0.04)
autocraciesXlnTerrAtt	0.247*** (3.40)	0.260*** (3.60)	0.242*** (3.35)	-0.254** (-3.18)	0.266*** (3.70)	-0.275*** (-3.62)	-0.217* (-2.57)
age	-0.0419 (-0.91)	-0.0263 (-0.57)	-0.0257 (-0.55)	0.0444 (0.87)	-0.0245 (-0.53)	0.0261 (0.54)	0.0641 (1.22)
autocraciesXage	-0.0680*** (-4.45)	-0.0762*** (-4.95)	-0.0729*** (-4.76)	0.0752*** (4.56)	-0.0779*** (-5.08)	0.0806*** (4.94)	0.0630*** (3.84)
autocraciesXage2	0.000589** (2.91)	0.000666** (3.27)	0.000637** (3.14)	-0.000665** (-3.01)	0.000682*** (3.35)	-0.000705** (-3.29)	-0.000548* (-2.42)
age2	0.000369 (0.95)	0.000206 (0.53)	0.000211 (0.54)	-0.000342 (-0.79)	0.000185 (0.48)	-0.000204 (-0.50)	-0.000513 (-1.15)
previous time in off	0.240 (1.84)	0.341** (2.63)	0.311* (2.39)	-0.359* (-2.51)	0.363** (2.84)	-0.361** (-2.70)	-0.331* (-2.16)
GDP growth pc	-0.0278** (-2.68)	-0.0295** (-2.85)	-0.0290** (-2.82)	0.0301** (2.63)	-0.0298** (-2.89)	0.0311** (2.85)	0.0186 (1.81)
economic sanct	0.368** (2.69)	0.410** (2.97)	0.398** (2.89)	-0.477** (-3.08)	0.416** (3.02)	-0.429** (-2.96)	-0.490** (-2.95)
material capabilities	2.454 (0.68)	3.658 (1.00)	3.054 (0.84)	-2.994 (-0.75)	3.984 (1.09)	-3.930 (-1.03)	-0.786 (-0.18)
inter-state wars	-1.549* (-2.16)	-1.609* (-2.24)	-1.627* (-2.27)	1.646* (2.27)	-1.612* (-2.25)	1.696* (2.22)	1.324* (2.19)
intra-state wars	0.0914 (0.45)	0.0981 (0.49)	0.120 (0.59)	-0.107 (-0.48)	0.0934 (0.46)	-0.102 (-0.48)	-0.207 (-0.88)
physical integrity r	-0.130*** (-3.60)	-0.150*** (-4.17)	-0.144*** (-3.99)	0.155*** (3.85)	-0.155*** (-4.31)	0.159*** (4.20)	0.162*** (3.75)
empowerment rights	0.0199 (0.70)	0.0227 (0.79)	0.0171 (0.60)	-0.0349 (-1.16)	0.0237 (0.83)	-0.0231 (-0.77)	-0.0572 (-1.91)
loyalty norm	1.420**	1.503**	1.420**	-1.680***	1.532***	-1.576**	-1.817***

	(3.08)	(3.28)	(3.11)	(-3.47)	(3.34)	(-3.26)	(-3.94)
_cons	-3.186*	-3.107*	2.829	-3.350*	3.389*	2.912	
	(-2.27)	(-2.22)	(1.86)	(-2.40)	(2.32)	(1.89)	
ln_p _cons	-0.0550						
	(-1.06)						
gamma _cons		-0.0267*					
		(-2.48)					
logs _cons			-0.0330		0.0294		
			(-0.64)		(0.96)		
ln_sig _cons							0.644***
							(13.50)
N	1839	1839	1839	1839	1839	1839	1839

t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001/, PH-Test

Table 10: Robustness Checks for Parametric Model Approaches on the model Any Type of Attack, Weeks

	(1) Any Type of Attack Weeks Cox Semi Parametric	(2) Any Type of Attack Weeks Weibull Multilevel Parametric	(3) Any Type of Attack Weeks Gompertz Parametric	(4) Any Type of Attack Weeks Loglogistic Parametric	(5) Any Type of Attack Weeks Exponential Parametric	(6) Any Type of Attack Weeks Gamma Multilevel Parametric	(7) Any Type of Attack Weeks Lognormal Weeks Multilevel Parametric
main							
lnTerrorAttacks	0.315*	0.359*	0.356*	-0.467*	0.426**	-0.475**	-0.482*
	(2.26)	(2.57)	(2.54)	(-2.38)	(3.06)	(-2.68)	(-2.05)
MachineXlnTerrAtt	-0.551	-0.602*	-0.613*	0.820*	-0.650*	0.781*	0.935*
	(-1.90)	(-2.06)	(-2.10)	(2.09)	(-2.22)	(2.03)	(2.19)
BossXlnTerrAtt	-0.823**	-0.883**	-0.863**	1.165**	-0.994**	1.165**	1.257**
	(-2.64)	(-2.84)	(-2.80)	(2.88)	(-3.15)	(2.81)	(3.09)
StrongmanXlnTerrAtt	-0.490*	-0.544*	-0.547*	0.737*	-0.604*	0.707*	0.802*
	(-2.02)	(-2.23)	(-2.25)	(2.26)	(-2.47)	(2.22)	(2.30)
OtherAuthXlnTerrAtt	-0.0769	-0.0920	-0.0939	0.0996	-0.118	0.129	0.103
	(-0.58)	(-0.69)	(-0.71)	(0.53)	(-0.89)	(0.77)	(0.45)
age	-0.0282	-0.0210	-0.0158	0.0611	-0.0196	0.0166	0.0799
	(-0.51)	(-0.37)	(-0.28)	(0.81)	(-0.34)	(0.22)	(1.03)
age2	0.000383	0.000323	0.000281	-0.000723	0.000302	-0.000328	-0.000857
	(0.86)	(0.71)	(0.62)	(-1.17)	(0.66)	(-0.55)	(-1.33)
previous time in off	0.516***	0.572***	0.577***	-0.776***	0.656***	-0.751***	-0.743**

	(3.37)	(3.69)	(3.69)	(-3.51)	(4.23)	(-3.78)	(-2.83)
GDP growth pc	-0.0246*	-0.0259**	-0.0260**	0.0320*	-0.0269**	0.0343**	0.0160
	(-2.44)	(-2.62)	(-2.65)	(2.20)	(-2.75)	(2.73)	(1.15)
economic sanctions	0.463*	0.547**	0.560**	-0.752**	0.607**	-0.715**	-0.709*
	(2.42)	(2.85)	(2.91)	(-2.83)	(3.17)	(-2.86)	(-2.44)
material capabilities	3.402	4.212	3.636	-4.066	5.779	-6.059	-2.481
	(0.66)	(0.82)	(0.71)	(-0.58)	(1.13)	(-0.92)	(-0.32)
physical integrity r	-0.0344	-0.0313	-0.0291	0.0425	-0.0315	0.0408	0.0328
	(-0.70)	(-0.63)	(-0.59)	(0.64)	(-0.64)	(0.63)	(0.46)
empowerment rights	0.123***	0.132***	0.128***	-0.186***	0.146***	-0.171***	-0.194***
	(4.43)	(4.76)	(4.58)	(-4.83)	(5.23)	(-4.65)	(-4.83)
inter-state wars	-0.0726	-0.0693	-0.100	0.147	0.00576	0.0641	0.130
	(-0.14)	(-0.13)	(-0.19)	(0.21)	(0.01)	(0.09)	(0.17)
intra-state wars	0.455*	0.480*	0.493*	-0.699*	0.479*	-0.609*	-0.800*
	(2.04)	(2.15)	(2.20)	(-2.24)	(2.15)	(-2.08)	(-2.29)
main							
_cons		-5.569**	-5.986***	6.313**	-6.462***	7.588**	6.324**
		(-3.13)	(-3.37)	(2.72)	(-3.59)	(3.21)	(2.68)
ln_p							
_cons		-0.283***					
		(-3.91)					
gamma							
_cons			-0.0433***				
			(-3.82)				
ln_gam							
_cons				0.224**			
				(3.13)			
logs							
_cons						0.151***	0.965***
						(3.85)	(14.54)
N	1646	1646	1646	1646	1646	1646	1646

t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, PH-Test

6. Concluding Remarks and Implications

There exist various factors that may impact the survival of political leaders. Using a multinational dataset on terrorist episodes and leadership survival from 1970 through 2015 and selection-corrected survival models including a wide set of control variables we demonstrate that terrorism does have political impact in target societies, through several channels, such as impacts emerging by counterterrorism policies, economic or foreign policy effects, as well as effects emerging by individuals.

Separating the effects of terrorist attacks on political survival between authoritarian and democratic states, using Hadenius et al. (2013) regime data, indicates that while terrorism increases the hazard that an autocratic leader will depart office, terrorist incidents have no statistically significant effect on the longevity of democratic leaders. In fact, in a unit increase in terrorist incidents, including international, domestic and unknown attacks, we find robust evidence that being an incumbent in an authoritarian state increases the hazard of exit power to about 25% of the hazard faced by a leader in a democratic state, controlling for a wide set of variables. We may witness similar effects for international or domestic terrorist incidents, while referring to unknown type of terrorist attacks, the same effect is about to be duplicated. Nevertheless, one-dimensional measures of autocracy mask the variation among different types of autocratic regimes, implying that incumbents of different types of autocratic regimes, will be differently affected in the aftermath of terrorism. In fact, applying Weeks (2014) authoritarian regime categorization, we find robust evidence that authoritarian incumbents in personalized non-military regimes, i.e. Bosses, and authoritarian incumbents in personalized military regimes, i.e. Strongmen, will experience prolonged tenures in case of a terrorist incident, relatively to political leaders in other authoritarian regimes.

Our findings validate Weeks' (2014) theory in that since a security threat encounters, among authoritarian regimes, Bosses and Strongman due to their reduced level of accountability will endure.

Nevertheless, our results contradict the Selectorate Theory, where De Mesquita et al. (2005) state that since a security threat encounters, political leaders with a small winning coalition and a large selectorate, i.e. non-democracies, will endure because of the loyalty norm. In this case, it is provided a tendency that terrorism may not destabilize democratic incumbents as a result of citizens rallying round their elected leaders in threatening times, while public as well as elites in authoritarian regimes evidently pose strong incentives to punish their elected leaders who experience higher instances of terrorist attacks.

From rational authoritarian incumbents' perspective, our results might sign that they are able to experience a prolong tenure keeping terrorism truncated, either carrying out less provocative foreign policies or posing efficient counterterrorism measures. Still, leaders should not fall in the "provocation trap". If leaders reveal their insecurity in front of terrorists by repressing society through offensive counterterrorism, then, not only public are prone to react violently increasing domestic terrorism further a fact that leads to an eternal relation, but also elites will have strong incentives to trigger a reshuffling coup, deposing the leader on the top while letting the regime intact, not to mention that terrorists will probably response with reprisal attacks.

From rational terrorists' perspective, terrorism does work, but only in autocracies. Our results imply that terrorism targeted at authoritarian states consists a rational powerful mean of coercion that may be a quite effective tactic for achieving not only process, but also outcome goals, contradicting partially Abrahms' (2006, 2012) studies.

In the conflict between terrorist actors and authoritarian political leaders, incumbents have no option rather than avoiding offensive counter-policies, while terrorists being aware of the fact that terrorism works in autocracies may carry out repeated attacks so as to achieve their stated goals, making authoritarian regimes more likely targets of terrorism, contradicting a vast literature concerning the

vulnerability of democracies to terrorist attacks. In turn, in autocracies increased terrorist incidents may mobilize citizens who are traditionally less likely to participate in politics (Montalvo, 2011).

In this context, autocracies may consist more efficient counter-terrorists compared to their democratic counterparts, since authoritarian leaders not only do face stronger incentives to “fight for survival” against terrorists, but also know how to stand in front of this security threat looking deeper than just into the shortcomings of an attack (e.g. that terrorists intent to disrupt their societies’ prosperity) and perceiving that there exist profounder aims that terrorists seek to attain.

It is vital for scholars to examine the ways in which agents, terrorists and political leaders, interpret events rather than simply react to them, since incentives for both sides in this conflict might be rather profound.

Terrorism is much more than an expression of rage, and intends much more than to instill fear and distress. In autocracies, terrorism is a political weapon in terrorists’ hands that does work. Yet, there are those domestic regime elites on whom leaders rely for support who will pull the trigger and shoot at the survival of political leaders.

Appendix

Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
year	6,188	1.992.931	1.330.064	1970	2015
COW code	6,188	484.557	232.173	2	950
leader id	6,188	5.398.712	3.167.789	1	1115
tenure	6,188	1.407.886	1.147.316	0	49
age	6,187	5.778.988	1.156.443	18	93
Gender	6,188	.0332902	.1794079	0	1
out	6,188	.1611183	.3676697	0	1
entry	6,188	.2525856	.4657683	0	2
exit	6,188	1.536.284	3.377.058	-888	4
posttenure fate	6,188	2.683.867	3.969.633	-999	3
previous time in office	6,188	.135585	.4380563	0	4
year born	6,187	1.935.138	1.644.844	1886	1996
year entry	6,188	1.984.771	1.584.351	1932	2015
year exit	6,188	1.998.851	1.303.262	1970	2015
Terror Attacks	6,042	2.388.034	126.026	0	3933
ln Terror Attacks	6,182	1.076.443	1.564.051	0	8.277.412
ln International Terror Attacks	6,008	.5771641	1.043.774	0	7.020.191
ln Domestic Terror Attacks	6,008	.4890359	1.159.718	0	7.052.721
ln Unknown Terror Attacks	6,009	.7236568	1.265.613	0	7.930.566
International Terror Attacks	6,008	4.710.386	2.820.876	0	1118
Domestic Terror Attacks	6,008	7.807.923	4.387.703	0	1155
Unknown Terror Attacks	6,009	1.143.052	8.267.521	0	2780
ATTACK	6,042	.4867594	.499866	0	1
INTERNATIONAL ATTACK	6,008	.3413782	.4742115	0	1
DOMESTIC ATTACK	6,008	.2180426	.4129509	0	1
UNKNOWN ATTACK	6,009	.3649526	.4814569	0	1
cname	6,188	81.931	4.697.426	1	163
material capabilities	5,679	.0060938	.0183105	.0000131	.1809692
physical integrity rights	3,92	4.654.847	2.301.802	0	9
empowerment rights	3,937	7.691.897	4.223.473	0	14
total population	5,678	34059.33	117817.8	135	1302810
urban population	3,958	345.285	2.502.207	-4.92	15.75
monarchy	5,731	.0790438	.2698306	0	1
military	5,731	.1615774	.3680948	0	1


multiparty	5,731	.2688885	.4434205	0	1
one party	5,731	.1720468	.377454	0	1
no party	5,731	.0390857	.1938157	0	1
Regime Democracy	5,732	.3637474	.4811191	0	1
regime type	6,187	6.929.691	4.542.048	1	20
economic sanctions	4,649	.2202624	.4144681	0	1
inter-state war	5,039	.0303632	.1716015	0	1
war win	5,039	.0059536	.0769369	0	1
war loss	5,039	.0047628	.0688557	0	1
war draw	5,039	.0067474	.0818729	0	1
intra-state war	4,66	.1090129	.3116888	0	1
Selectorate	3,897	.831922	.3610634	0	1
Winning Coalition	3,986	.5333041	.3139446	0	1
lag Winning Coalition	4,115	.5317132	.3133655	0	1
loyalty norm	3,3	.6227273	.2748256	0	1
Machine	4,072	.0923379	.2895379	0	1
Junta	4,072	.0473969	.2125123	0	1
Boss	4,072	.1031434	.3041835	0	1
Strongman	4,072	.1132122	.3168909	0	1
GDP growth pc	5,422	1.932.624	694.852	6.499.631	1.405.011
GDP pc (ct \$2010)	5,382	9.904.158	15139.98	1.157.941	113682
lnGDP pc (ct \$2010)	5,382	8.081.052	1.567.362	4.751.814	1.164.116
Term Limits	6,142	.0953012	.2936522	0	1
Voice & Accountability	2,338	-.2205404	.9776656	2.313.395	1.800.992
Political Stability	2,338	-.2156312	.9252004	3.180.798	1.760.102
Government Effectiveness	2,338	-.1297264	.9476375	2.445.876	2.436.975
Regulatory Quality	2,338	-.1156529	.9577129	2.529.559	2.260.543
Rule of Law	2,338	-.1857678	.9522259	2.404.246	2.100.273
Control of Corruption	2,338	-.1680329	.9605112	1.772.761	2.469.991
age ²	6,187	3.473.385	1.343.643	324	8649




Life Table




Interval		Beg. Total	Deaths	Lost	Survival	Std. Error	[95% Conf. Int.]	
RegimeDemo=		0						
1	2	3645	128	0	0.9649	0.0030	0.9584	0.9704
2	3	3517	39	41	0.9541	0.0035	0.9468	0.9604
3	4	3437	36	86	0.9440	0.0038	0.9360	0.9510
4	5	3315	23	105	0.9373	0.0040	0.9289	0.9448
5	6	3187	26	104	0.9296	0.0043	0.9207	0.9375
6	7	3057	26	158	0.9215	0.0045	0.9121	0.9299
7	8	2873	11	85	0.9179	0.0046	0.9083	0.9265
8	9	2777	10	83	0.9145	0.0047	0.9047	0.9233
9	10	2684	7	85	0.9121	0.0048	0.9022	0.9211
10	11	2592	13	135	0.9074	0.0050	0.8972	0.9167
11	12	2444	11	139	0.9032	0.0051	0.8927	0.9127
12	13	2294	8	66	0.9000	0.0052	0.8893	0.9097
13	14	2220	7	82	0.8971	0.0053	0.8862	0.9070
14	15	2131	8	87	0.8937	0.0054	0.8825	0.9038
15	16	2036	5	79	0.8914	0.0055	0.8801	0.9017
16	17	1952	2	89	0.8905	0.0055	0.8791	0.9009
17	18	1861	7	90	0.8871	0.0057	0.8754	0.8977
18	19	1764	5	108	0.8845	0.0058	0.8726	0.8953
19	20	1651	4	122	0.8822	0.0059	0.8702	0.8932
20	21	1525	3	41	0.8805	0.0059	0.8683	0.8916
21	22	1481	5	151	0.8774	0.0061	0.8649	0.8887
22	23	1325	4	92	0.8746	0.0062	0.8619	0.8862
23	24	1229	2	63	0.8732	0.0063	0.8603	0.8849
24	25	1164	6	122	0.8684	0.0065	0.8550	0.8807
25	26	1036	1	75	0.8675	0.0066	0.8540	0.8799
26	27	960	4	81	0.8638	0.0068	0.8498	0.8765
27	28	875	2	51	0.8617	0.0070	0.8474	0.8748
28	29	822	1	27	0.8607	0.0070	0.8462	0.8738
29	30	794	2	84	0.8584	0.0072	0.8436	0.8718
30	31	708	2	66	0.8558	0.0074	0.8406	0.8697
31	32	640	1	18	0.8545	0.0075	0.8391	0.8685
32	33	621	4	78	0.8486	0.0080	0.8321	0.8636
33	34	539	4	104	0.8416	0.0087	0.8238	0.8578
34	35	431	0	11	0.8416	0.0087	0.8238	0.8578
35	36	420	2	59	0.8373	0.0091	0.8185	0.8544
36	37	359	1	73	0.8347	0.0095	0.8152	0.8524
38	39	285	2	60	0.8282	0.0105	0.8065	0.8476
41	42	223	1	13	0.8243	0.0111	0.8014	0.8449
42	43	209	2	76	0.8147	0.0129	0.7879	0.8385
45	46	131	0	43	0.8147	0.0129	0.7879	0.8385
46	47	88	1	22	0.8041	0.0165	0.7694	0.8342
47	48	65	1	27	0.7885	0.0224	0.7406	0.8286
49	50	37	1	36	0.7470	0.0456	0.6442	0.8241




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1	2	2071	113	3	0.9454	0.0050	0.9347	0.9544
2	3	1955	73	84	0.9093	0.0063	0.8960	0.9210
3	4	1798	57	130	0.8794	0.0073	0.8644	0.8929
4	5	1611	63	198	0.8428	0.0083	0.8257	0.8583
5	6	1350	63	263	0.7992	0.0095	0.7798	0.8171
6	7	1024	16	88	0.7861	0.0099	0.7660	0.8048
7	8	920	17	104	0.7708	0.0104	0.7496	0.7904
8	9	799	20	159	0.7493	0.0112	0.7267	0.7704
9	10	620	12	117	0.7333	0.0118	0.7093	0.7557
10	11	491	8	90	0.7202	0.0125	0.6948	0.7438
11	12	393	13	93	0.6931	0.0141	0.6646	0.7198
12	13	287	6	64	0.6768	0.0153	0.6459	0.7057
13	14	217	3	23	0.6670	0.0161	0.6344	0.6973
14	15	191	7	69	0.6371	0.0189	0.5988	0.6728
15	16	115	1	14	0.6312	0.0196	0.5914	0.6683
16	17	100	1	15	0.6244	0.0206	0.5827	0.6632
17	18	84	1	16	0.6162	0.0219	0.5718	0.6574
18	19	67	2	18	0.5949	0.0258	0.5425	0.6434
19	20	47	3	9	0.5529	0.0335	0.4849	0.6157
20	21	35	1	0	0.5371	0.0360	0.4640	0.6047
25	26	34	1	9	0.5189	0.0392	0.4396	0.5924
27	28	24	1	0	0.4973	0.0431	0.4104	0.5782
29	30	23	0	22	0.4973	0.0431	0.4104	0.5782
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









Winning Coalition




De Mesquita et al., (2005)

Selectorate




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

Loyalty Norm









De Mesquita et al., (2005)

Authoritarian Regime Typology Weeks 2014







Test of proportional hazards assumption - Any Type of Attack, Main

Time: Time

	rho	chi2	df	Prob>chi2
lnTerrorAttacks	0.11565	1.38	1	0.2397
age	-0.07628	0.63	1	0.4257
age2	0.11666	1.47	1	0.2259
previous time in office	-0.05894	0.48	1	0.4871
GDP growth pc	-0.09851	2.73	1	0.0982
economic sanctions	-0.09577	0.84	1	0.3598
material capabilities	0.05281	0.20	1	0.6552
inter-state wars	-0.06777	0.40	1	0.5265
intra-state wars	-0.24018	4.89	1	0.0269
Physical integr rights	0.04557	0.15	1	0.7006
empowerment rights	0.07845	0.50	1	0.4817
Loyalty Norm	-0.11340	1.62	1	0.2036
global test	23.20		12	0.0261

Test of proportional hazards assumption - Any Type of Attack, Weeks

Time: Time

	rho	chi2	df	Prob>chi2
lnTerrorAttacks	0.06372	0.65	1	0.4185
Machine X Terrorism	0.04129	0.21	1	0.6484
Boss X Terrorism	0.09266	2.17	1	0.1403
Strongman X Terrorism	0.08543	1.22	1	0.2692
OtherAuth X Terrorism	-0.04276	0.28	1	0.5987
age	-0.10755	1.93	1	0.1646
age2	0.14759	3.59	1	0.0580
previous time in office	-0.02910	0.14	1	0.7036
GDP growth pc	-0.08494	2.28	1	0.1308
economic sanctions	-0.11033	1.97	1	0.1607
material capabilities	0.06012	0.57	1	0.4498
physical integrity rights	-0.06093	0.51	1	0.4752
empowerment rights	0.03658	0.21	1	0.6433
inter-state war	-0.10159	1.75	1	0.1854
intra-state wars	-0.16579	3.95	1	0.0469
global test	37.19		15	0.0012

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