

## HEIDEGGER ON THE «ENIGMA» OF MOVEMENT

Till some time ago, the only elements which helped us trace the concept of movement - but also those of motion, movedness, motility (*Bewegtheit*), being - moved (*Bewegtsein*) - in Heidegger were those present in *Being and Time* as well as in the writings and lecture courses of the same period, such as the course on *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. We had no hints about movement viewed as motility, movedness or as simple motion in the context of his hermeneutics of facticity. Macquarrie and Robinson translate *Bewegung* as movement as well as motion and *Bewegtheit* as movement. In Joan Stambaugh's recently published translation of *Being and Time*<sup>1</sup>, we are given the same translation of *Bewegung* as movement and motion, whereas *Bewegtheit* is rendered by movement. Consequently, both translators are unanimous on the double meaning of *Bewegung*, which sometimes refers to motion with regard to space, as spatial change that is as locomotion, and sometimes to movement in the existential sense of the term, that is, Dasein's *Bewegtheit*<sup>2</sup>. Even if we consider the common definition of movement, its multiple senses are still apparent. Movement is the act, the process, or the result of moving. Consequently, we

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1. *Being and Time. A Translation of «Sein und Zeit»* (New York Albany: SUNY Press, 1999).

2. In the English translation of the course on the *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle. Initiation into Phenomenological Research*, Richard Rojcewicz translates *Bewegtheit* as movedness and *Bewegung* as movement (Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001), p. 158. John van Buren, on the other hand, translates *Bewegtheit* as movement and *Bewegung* as motion (*Ontology. The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 135-136.



can speak of a more “kinetic” sense of *Bewegung*, as the process of moving, or of a more static one, as the result of a movement<sup>3</sup>.

(I)

Let us give two examples of the use of those terms in *Being and Time*. First, with regard to *Bewegtheit*. Whereas the question of movement is already present in the first division of the work, where it is about Dasein’s thrownness into the world<sup>4</sup>, it is in the second division that the question of *Bewegtheit* in opposition to the motion of something “present-at-hand” is raised:

“The constitutional totality of care has the possible ground of its unity in temporality. The ontological clarification of the “connectedness of life”, that is, of the specific way of stretching along, movement, and persistence of Dasein, must accordingly be approached in the horizon of the temporal constitution of this being. The movement of existence (*Bewegtheit der Existenz*) is not the motion of something objectively present (*Bewegung eines Vorhandenen*). It is determined from the stretching along of Da-sein”<sup>5</sup>.

The movement of the “stretching itself along” of the Dasein is the way in which Dasein’s historicity is to be understood, that is, in a totally different manner from space attributed to physical motion: it is what lies between life and death<sup>6</sup>. Let us now make two assumptions

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3. *Einführung in die Phänomenologische Forschung*, GA 17 (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994), p. 285-287. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the recently published summer semester 1924 course on the *Fundamental Concepts of Aristotle’s Philosophy*. The issue here is not to define movement but to render visible the moving character of being (*das Seiende als bewegtes in seinem Dasein sichtbar zu machen*) (*Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, GA 18, Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002, p. 293, author’s emphasis).

4. Take for example the moving aspect of «fallenness» (*Verfall*), which was earlier on designated as «ruinancy» (*Ruinanz*).

5. *Being and Time*, transl. Maquarrie, p. 344; cf. *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1966), p. 375. Cf. John D. Caputo, «Retrieval and the Circular Being of Dasein: Hermeneutics in *Being and Time*», *Radical Hermeneutics. Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987) p. 60-82.

6. Cf. M. Heinz, *Zeitlichkeit und Temporalität im Frühwerk Martin Heideggers* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1982) p. 149-163.



with regard to it. First, the explanation of this particular way, which identifies itself to the very constitution of the "Da", presupposes a level of comprehension prior to existential analytics. If the "connectedness of life" is a term borrowed from Dilthey, Jaspers, and undoubtedly, a certain "phenomenological" Aristotle are also in perspective here. Second, concerning movement and time in Aristotle: It is in one of the final sections of *Being and Time* that Heidegger treats the Aristotelian conception of time. While referring to the well-known interpretation of time in book Δ of the *Physics*, as the movement which we encounter within the horizon of the earlier and later (ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως), Heidegger poses that time is what is counted, showing itself in following, making present, and counting the moving in such a way that making present (*Gegenwärtigen*) temporalizes itself in ecstatic unity while retaining and awaiting horizontally open according to the earlier and later<sup>7</sup>. An obvious question to ask concerns Aristotle's forclusion into measurable time. If we judge from Heidegger's early courses (1918-1925), the question of Dasein's "motility" is also to be considered with regard to Aristotle's phenomenological anthropology. Of course, in this context, time in its existential dimension is not yet the issue. But what if the interference of the questioning on time and temporality is nothing but the temporalizing of Heidegger's early "kinetics of life"?<sup>8</sup> We will try then to highlight some of those critical issues, by going from *Being and Time* back to the early Freiburg and Marburg courses.

Let us start by pointing out some more nuances of *Bewegtheit*, before going back to factual movement. *Bewegtheit* is more likely to be translated as motility and it is in that sense that we are going to make use of it with regard to the question of factual life (*faktisches Leben*). It is possible that with the shift from the factual to the existential lexikon, this translation is no more valid. We could then turn to *Bewegung* by referring to its double meaning as motion and movement, and translate *Bewegtheit* as movement. Does the 1922 intro-

7. *Being and Time*, p. 386; cf. *Sein und Zeit*, p. 421. This thesis will be further developed in the course on the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Cf. E. Martineau: «Conception vulgaire et conception aristotélicienne du temps. Note sur les *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* de Heidegger (§ 19)», *Archives de Philosophie*, 43 (1980).

8. The theme of life is present in Heidegger as early as 1919: «Comments on Karl Jaspers's *Psychology of Worldviews*», in: *Pathmarks* (ed. by W. McNeill, Cambridge Mass.: Cambridge University Press: 1998), p. 30-33.



duction to a projected book on Aristotle - the notorious *Natorpbericht* actually treat the historical movement of factual life? Is Heidegger's investigation of temporality contemporary to his inquiry into the essence of movement as such? In other words, does the temporal interpretation of Dasein have, as its starting point the ontological interpretation of the "kinetic" nature of life itself<sup>9</sup>? Our treatment of those questions will be soon clarified, as we are finally in possession of the work which gave a definitive form to this questioning, at the same time paving the way towards existential analytics, the 1924 lecture course on *The Fundamental Concepts of Aristotle's Philosophy*<sup>10</sup>. Even if there are other themes that have also to be considered in order to get the full picture of Heidegger's existential project, it is plausible to argue that the origins of this questioning are to be traced back to his courses on facticity since 1919.

But why choose the term motility? What do we mean by motile? Motility in biology means that which moves or is capable of moving spontaneously. My claim is that the aforementioned rough definition of movement with regard to capacity, as well as to spontaneity as movement which stems from itself, that is, autoreferentiality, are some of the most basic aspects that Heidegger indicates as far as life is concerned<sup>11</sup>. Hans Jonas renders this explicit in his account of animal life: "Three characteristics distinguish animal from plant life: motility, perception, emotion"<sup>12</sup>.

In order to grasp the meaning of the spontaneous nature of life's movement, we should put in perspective another term, that is, event or occurrence (*Geschehen*). Life is eventful; it has the character

9. In numerous papers, Thomas Sheehan has argued that, when Heidegger speaks of the meaning of Being, he simply names the analogical unity of the intelligible structure of entities with the «kinetic» structure of man. Cf. «On Movement and the Destruction of Ontology», *The Monist*, 64 (1981), p. 535-536.

10. The analysis of movement is said here to be nothing more than the revealing of Being as making-present: «Analyse der Bewegung selbst nichts anderes als die Entdeckung des Seins als Gegenwärtigsein» (GA 18, op. cit., p. 395).

11. In the summer semester 1924 lecture course, Heidegger interprets the definition of movement as «έντελέχεια τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος» in the third book of the *Physics*. He insists on the fact that δύναμις is a positive determination of beings (ibid, p. 288).

12. «To move and to feel: On the Animal Soul» in: *The Phenomenon of Life. Toward a Philosophical Biology* (New York: A Delta Book, 1966), p.99.



of an event, an occurrence, what Aristotle calls *τύχη*. While treating the *Physics* in his 1922 report to Paul Natorp, Heidegger brings forth the distinction between *τύχην* and *αὐτόματον*:

“In the second book of the *Physics*, the *ἀρχή* - problematic is approached from another visual direction. It is asked which possibilities of theoretical being-interrogated (*αἴτιον*-why) are motivated within the content of the *φύσει ὄντα* and of their basic categorial structure... But at the same time the books is of decisive importance with respect to the problem of facticity as such. It is shown how Aristotle ontologically explicates the “historical” movement of factual life (the movement of that “which daily happens, and can happen to someone”), and how he does so under the titles of *τύχην, αὐτόματον*”<sup>13</sup>.

It is precisely this eventful character that lies at the very root of life's “motility”. In the second division of *Being and Time*, Heidegger talks about the “movement of the occurrence» within the context of his analysis of «world-history” (*Welt-Geschichte*). In general terms, historicity seems to be the frame within which the question of movement or motility is raised. Our investigation of the courses and writings prior to *Being and Time* are going to illuminate the reasons for this inner connection. Heidegger's suggestions on the matter are discreet. For him, what “occurs” with tools and works as such has its own character of motion, and this character has been completely obscure up to now. The movement of occurrence (*Bewegtheit des Geschehens*), in which “something happens to be”, cannot be grasped at all in terms of motion as change of location. He goes on admitting that we should necessarily go beyond the limits of our theme, if we were to pursue the problem of the ontological structure of world-historical occurrence: we cannot do this because the intention of the exposition is to lead us to the ontological enigma of the movement of occurrence (*ontologische Rätsel der Bewegtheit des Geschehens*) in general<sup>14</sup>. So in a certain sense the purpose of the development on historicity would also be to clarify the question of movement. But this project has been left unfinished in *Being and Time*. We also have to bring to attention

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13. *Man and World*, op. cit., p. 390. Also on the question of the *ἀρχαί*: GA 18, p. 284.

14. *Being and Time*, p. 355.



a difference in the translation of the German *Geschehen*. Stambaugh translates it as "occurrence", whereas Macquarrie and Robinson as 'historizing', "the movement of historizing in general". Stambaugh is nevertheless closer to the German. In this context, *Bewegung* is translated as motion and *Bewegtheit* as movement<sup>15</sup>. The reason for rejecting this translation is its terminological affinity with the act of mobilizing, that is, the active character of movement caused by an agent, thus eradicating the spontaneous self-referential nature of life. The specific character of motility is due to the fact that it shows movement as the existential possibility of being moved.

As we have seen, Heidegger relates the question of Dasein's movement (*Bewegtheit*) to the questioning on historicity determined by the stretching-along between death and the "connectedness of life". It is in this very context that Heidegger arrives at a puzzling yet critical, remark that goes beyond existential analytics at the very moment of its formulation:

"...The obscurities are all the more difficult to dispel when the possible dimensions of appropriate questioning are not disentangled and when everything is haunted by the *enigma of being* (*Rätsel des Seins*) and, as has now become clear, of *movement* (*Bewegung*). Nevertheless, we may venture a project of the ontological genesis of historiography as a science in terms of the historicity of Dasein. It should serve as a preparation for the clarification of the task of a historical deconstructing of the history of philosophy to be carried out in what follows"<sup>16</sup>.

The interest of this passage lies in its most unique identification of the question of Being with that of movement. But this is not all. Heidegger doesn't simply raise the question of the meaning of Being but that of an enigma, the "enigma of Being", which is said to be equivalent to that of movement. We have already here a first acceptance

15. In the French translation of the 1922 report to Natorp, Jean-Francois Courtine translates *Bewegtheit* as *mobilité* (*Interprétations Phénoménologiques d'Aristote. Tableau de la situation*, Mauzevin: T.E.R., 1992). This goes also for Michel Haar's account of the hermeneutics of facticity: «Le moment (*καίρως*), l'instant (*Augenblick*) et le temps-du-monde (*Weltzeit*) [1920-1927]» in: *Heidegger 1919-1930. De l'herméneutique de la facticité à l'ontologie du Dasein* (Paris: Vrin, 1996).

16. B.T., p. 358; SZ, p. 392 (author's emphasis).



of the so-to-speak failure of *Being and Time* and the announcement of what would be the overturning of its questioning. This becomes clear immediately after, when Heidegger introduces - through the "enigma" of Being, but also, that of movement - his future task of the historical destructuring of the history of philosophy. The ontological "enigma of movement" is in fact closely related to the historical "destructuring" (*Destruktion*) announced but not completed in *Being and Time*. In fact, it lies at its very roots. It is hard not to see in this development the echo of the 1922 report. In the 1921/22 course on *Phenomenological Interpretations to Aristotle*, Heidegger already speaks of the *Lebenszusammenhang* in which the University has to be transformed, revived, concluding that factual life is historical in itself, so that the question of tradition brings us back to that of historicity intrinsic in life itself. Facticity, the relationship of objective historical knowledge to its ontological background, the historical dimension of tradition, briefly, all the questions that are found later in *Being and Time* are already here. In the 1922 *Introduction*, the question of *kinesis* comes forth, giving an ontological weight to these investigations. Philosophy, in the manner of its asking questions and finding answers, also stands within the movement of facticity, since philosophy is simply the explicit interpretation of factual life. The phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity sees itself as called upon to loosen up the handed-down and dominating interpretedness in its hidden motives and pushes forward by way of a dismantling return [*im abbauenden Rückgang*] towards the primordial sources of explication<sup>17</sup>.

Consequently, in 1922, philosophy in its force of "dismantling return" belongs to the movement of factual life. What is puzzling about it is that, what the project had announced in 1922/23, that is, the clarification of the historical movement, or, in other words, the historical "motility" of factual life and thus of *Dasein*, has not been fulfilled in *Being and Time*: The "enigma of Being" is identical to that of movement, while the latter appears as the movement of the *Geschehen*. What is worth mentioning in this respect is that movement is related to historicity — that of factual life, of *Dasein* or of Being itself — and this link appears to be the ultimate aim of Heidegger's inquiry.

17. *Man and World*, p. 369-371.



## (II)

In the 1923/24 lecture course on *Introduction to the Phenomenological Research*, when Heidegger talks about the Dasein's basic ontological categories, he uses the expression "moments of movement" (*Momente der Bewegung*)<sup>18</sup>. Our claim is that the careful introduction of the theme of movement is Heidegger's real breakthrough to hermeneutic phenomenology, perceived as an "ontology of life" and of "Dasein" — those are Heidegger's own terms in the 1926 lecture course on *The Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*<sup>19</sup> —, well before the introduction of the questioning on time and temporality. The turning point is the question of the meaning of Being (*Seinssinn*), that is, the bringing-forth of an ontological investigation which marks the last Freiburg courses. Facticity is here said to be not a concrete form of the general, but the originary determination of its specific essence as Dasein<sup>20</sup>.

In fact, by asking the question of factual life, Heidegger introduces what we could call the "kinetic" essence of life. The consecutive displacements of the question are actually produced by means of an intense meditation on Aristotle's questioning on Being — in the *Physics*, the *Metaphysics* or the *De Anima* — but also on his practical writings, such as the *Nicomachean Ethics*<sup>21</sup>. From the phenomenology of life in the early Freiburg courses to the hermeneutics of facticity and from there to the ontology of life and that of Dasein in the analyses that coincide with the final drafts of *Being and Time*, the lecture courses between 1922 and 1926 pave the way for existential analy-

18. *Einführung in die Phänomenologische Forschung*, GA 17 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1994), p. 285-287. It is noteworthy that, later on, Heidegger will define language itself in a «kinetic manner», as «that which makes way for everything» (GA 12, p. 191). Cf. «As it unfolds in its core, language shows things and makes them manifest... This suggests that way-making occurs as saying in the realm of showing/manifesting, which is always the realm of beings» (Parvis Emad, «Thinking More Deeply Into the Question of Translation. Essential Translation and the Unfolding of Language», in: *Reading Heidegger. Commemorations*, John Sallis (ed., Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1993, p. 330).

19. GA 22, p. 182.

20. GA 17, p. 289.

21. It is certainly not of minor importance what Heidegger repeatedly claims: Greek ontology is not an ontology of nature and for that reason *kinesis* is to be intrinsically connected to life itself (GA 18, p. 324, 329).





tics. Nevertheless, we claim that their function is far more plurivocal, as it goes far beyond amere preparatory function. The investigation about the actual meaning of life presupposes the ontological founding of truth. That is the reason why the interpretation of the *De Anima*, which has actually started well before, is completed by a close reading of the *Physics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

We take as a starting point the 1921/22 course on *Phenomenological Interpretations to Aristotle. Introduction to the phenomenological Research*<sup>22</sup>. This course forms the basis for the 1922 report to Natorp. Actually, many of the themes elaborated in the report are already developed in detail in the course. The question of movement is one of them. Questions such as the one on the movement of facticity taken to the fundamental phenomenological category of life, or the philosophical research as the completion (*Vollzug*) of life's "motility" have their starting point in the provided in the 1921/22 lecture-course. A major evolution on the way towards the ontologising of facticity is its determination through movement, already announced in the 1921/22 course. It becomes a central theme in the *Natorpbericht*. In the light of the problem of facticity, Aristotle is the fulfillment and the concrete refinement of the philosophy which had gone on before. At the same time, however, Aristotle in his *Physics* gains a principal new basic approach from which ontology and logic stem. The central phenomenon, the explication of which becomes the theme of *Physics*, becomes the being in the How of its being-moved (*das Seiende im Wie seines Bewegtseins*)<sup>23</sup>.

The 1922 report operates here as a bridge between the courses on the phenomenology of life and an ontological questioning, which in his last lecture course in Marbourg Heidegger identifies to the hermeneutics of facticity. This is in a certain sense the ultimate moment of Heidegger's account of a phenomenology of life: its turning into an ontology. Philosophy is "phenomenological (existential, historical cultural) ontology or ontological phenomenology", because it studies being as it appears historically to intentional experience<sup>24</sup>. We are thus

22. The term «Einleitung» serves a particular purpose in this perspective. It indicates the fact of avoiding the systematic as well as the historical approach to the interpretation of Aristotle (*Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, p. 84-86).

23. *Man and World*, p. 373. Cf. GA 18, p. 305, 307.

24. *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, p. 45-46.



in a position to fully appreciate the way in which the introduction of this term contributes to a deepening of Heidegger's ontological investigation into the essence of life transforming it into a hermeneutics — or what is its equivalent — a hermeneutic ontology of life. Facticity, ontology, Being, particular awhileness and Dasein are its main themes<sup>25</sup>. We will focus on the examination of the way in which the theme of *kinesis* makes the transition from phenomenological to hermeneutical phenomenology as an ontology of factual life, as well as the importance of Aristotle's ontology and anthropology for this formulation.

The first part of the 1921/22 course on the *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle. Initiation into Phenomenological Research* develops Aristotle's position within Western tradition, a theme we encounter first in the *Natorpbericht*. What comes forth here is a harsh critique of Aristotle's reduction to the position of an uncritical philosophy or to a "naive metaphysics". Heidegger then turns to the history of Aristotelianism and to the well-known thesis — also supported by Dilthey — on the "becoming-Greek of primal Christianity", the reception of Aristotle by Scholastic tradition and concludes with what would constitute the "fruitful philological-historical research" of Aristotle's writings mentioning Schleiermacher, Trendelenburg and Brentano<sup>26</sup>. In a first time, in order to clarify the idea of what a philosophical inquiry on Aristotle should be, he goes on to examine the very idea of definition in philosophy. In a second time, he talks about the appropriation of a situation of understanding (*Verstehenssituation*) by taking the University<sup>27</sup> as a concrete access-situation (*Zugangssituation*). In a third time, factual life comes to the center of his questioning. The last part of the course is articulated in two sections: the first section treats the fundamental categories of factual life, whereas the second one treats exclusively the factual movement of ruinance (*Ruinanz*). The inquiry starts with a historical exposition, where Aristotle is the key-figure, and a second systematic one, where Aristotle

25. Ibid, p. 77-78; *Ontology. The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, p. 81-82.

26. *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, p. 7-8.

27. On the question of the relationship between life and the University in Heidegger's early courses: M. de Beistegui, *Heidegger and the Political. Dystopias* (London/New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 39-54 and Charles R. Bambach, *Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism* (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1995) p. 203-240.



appears in a very discreet way and in a context that invites a further elaboration<sup>28</sup>.

Thus, the question of movement is present from the very beginning of the course and not only with regard to the more systematic analysis of the categories of factual life. The categories which are to express the motility of factual life are concrete, that is, formal indicative (*formal anzeigend*), and not sheer generalizations of life-phenomena. The latter would lead not to a phenomenological ontology of life but to a metaphysical grasp of it, a philosophy of life "in distance from life (*im Abstand vom Leben*) reducing it to empty concepts<sup>29</sup>. What comes forth in Heidegger's successive attempts to describe life till the definitive formulation of a hermeneutics of facticity is the effort to seize life's own self-movement, its fluidity, to offer an onset of determination, more than its actual captivation in concepts. The language in which this enterprise is rendered attempts to become one with the movement of its object. The "gramma-ontology"<sup>30</sup> in these early courses is meant to be preconceptual, without being in any case metaphorical. The sources for its formulation are various, but some of them come from everyday vocabulary. This essential project has been appropriated and worked out further on since the early Freiburg courses. These earlier discoveries have been incorporated into the project of a phenomenological ontology of life: they actually constitute its very core. In the 1922 report, the question is posed as follows:

"Philosophical research does not need the finery of world-views or the hurried care about not-coming-along-too-late, and yet-still-coming-along, within the confusions of a present moment; this is so, as long as philosophy has understood, on the basis of its apprehended object, that with this object there is entrusted to philosophy the primordial Being-something to be questioned; i.e. as something that becomes visible only in the rigor of research. These conditions are not "logical forms"; they are rather, categorially understood, also already the possibilities of the factual temporalizing of *Existenz*, possibilities which are grasped in their genuine availability"<sup>31</sup>.

28. *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, p. 61.

29. Cf. also GA 18. p. 303-304.

30. Theodor Kisiel's term in *The Genesis of Heidegger's «Being and Time»*, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press 1993, p. 405).

31. *Man and World*, p. 368.



How does this analysis bring forth the question of movement? What does movement have to do with the “formal-indicative” definition of philosophy? This inner connection is directly related to the definition of the latter which needs to be factual. What is the essential element of philosophizing is no other than questionableness (*Fragwürdigkeit*)<sup>32</sup>. It is through this very definition of philosophy that the question of movement is put into perspective: what opposes to philosophy as something “comfortable” and “lazy” (*bequem*) is philosophy as what finds itself in restlessness (*Unruhe*)<sup>33</sup>. This point is highlighted only in the third part of the course which treats of the fundamental categories of life<sup>34</sup>. What is of interest here is that raising the question of philosophy’s restlessness and questionableness brings forth the question of movement and, as a consequence, a return to Aristotle. The way to cease the “restless” nature of philosophy is thought to be the movement of factual life for which Aristotle’s *kinesis* serves as the ontological model<sup>35</sup>. What is proper to restlessness is its uncomplete nature. Restlessness belongs to the realm of possibility — the equivalent of the Aristotelian δύναμις, “the always particular being-able -to-have- available” — which also defines privation (στέρησης). In the last part of the 1922 report, Heidegger remarks:

“The basic category of στέρησης dominates throughout the Aristotelian ontology; but that means that it arises within the explanation of the particular claiming, of a determinately [kind of] movement. Characteristically, the “coming-to-be of the statue from bronze” (in the movement of the dealings of *production*) plays the role of an example within the problematic which is directed towards the κίνησις of the φύσει όντα”<sup>36</sup>.

So, philosophy is a way of engaging oneself in the *kinesis* of life itself, a “way within movedness” (*Bewegtheit*)<sup>37</sup>. Philosophy belongs

32. *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, p. 29-30.

33. On restlessness as an exceptional kind of άκίνησία in Aristotle: GA 18, p. 313-314.

34. *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, p. 131.

35. *Ibid*, p. 70.

36. *Man and World*, op. cit., p. 390; cf. GA 18, p. 297. The second figure of στέρησης, would be the neotestamentary theme of *Darbung* (*carentia/privatio*), which Heidegger draws from his early courses on the phenomenology of religion (p. 90).

37. *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, p. 119.



to the movement of life, it is the genuine, explicit actualization of the tendency towards interpretation which belongs to life's own motility. The repetition of life is philosophy's basic movement. Repetition is here another "kinetic" term with a genuine temporal sense that is going to develop fully later on, in the context of existential analytics. Philosophy itself is defined as the "basic how of life itself, such that repeats it..., brings it back from its falling away, which bringing-back, as radical research, is itself life"<sup>38</sup>. As repetition and "genuine, explicit actualization" which belongs to life's basic movement, philosophical factual interpretation is a continuous battle against life's own factual "ruinance", the forerunner of the "falling prey" in *Being and Time*. Philosophy is a "countermovement to ruinance" (*gegenruinante Bewegtheit*), which accomplishes itself as questionableness. Nevertheless, this opposition doesn't mean that philosophy is exterior to life<sup>39</sup>.

But how does Heidegger proceed in elucidating the fundamental phenomenological categories of life? He follows the rules of formal indication, which he first refers to the "content-meaning" (*Gehaltssinn*) of life, that is the fact of always being linked to "something" (*Etwas*), that is, the world. The second category, with regard this time to relation (*Bezug*), is care/caring (*Sorge/Sorgen*)<sup>40</sup>. Care indicates the way in which life relates to the world. Within the frame of this category grow a number of determinations. From the very beginning, it is clear that care is perceived as a radicalized form of intentionality. It

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38. *Man and World*, p. 367. On repetition as the leading thread of Heidegger's questioning on tradition from the early courses up to *Being and Time*: John Sallis, «Where Does *Being and Time* Begin?», in *Delimitations. Phenomenology and the End of Metaphysics* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1986), p. 102-103.

39. *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, p. 112-113. Heidegger gives an explanation of the specific character of negativity that is proper to ruinance. Its negative essence is not a stop or «bestimmte Stufen und fixierte Haltepunkte» —this would be the dialectic notion of negativity—, but «sie selbst je faktisch in der Bewegtheit sind, und zwar so, dass sie sich in den Weisen der anderen mitbewegt» (154). This «kinetic» characterization of philosophy could be the further clarification of Heidegger's «dia-hermeneutics» as opposed to dialectics; cf. *Ontology. The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, p. 34-36.

40. *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, p. 65. We indicate the roots of this term which could be most likely traced back to the «Bekümmernung» (distressed concern) taken from the courses on the phenomenology of religion. It comes from θλῦσις: Trübsal or the theme of «cura» in the 1921 course



How does this analysis bring forth the question of movement? What does movement have to do with the “formal-indicative” definition of philosophy? This inner connection is directly related to the definition of the latter which needs to be factual. What is the essential element of philosophizing is no other than questionableness (*Fragwürdigkeit*)<sup>32</sup>. It is through this very definition of philosophy that the question of movement is put into perspective: what opposes to philosophy as something “comfortable” and “lazy” (*bequem*) is philosophy as what finds itself in restlessness (*Unruhe*)<sup>33</sup>. This point is highlighted only in the third part of the course which treats of the fundamental categories of life<sup>34</sup>. What is of interest here is that raising the question of philosophy’s restlessness and questionableness brings forth the question of movement and, as a consequence, a return to Aristotle. The way to cease the “restless” nature of philosophy is thought to be the movement of factual life for which Aristotle’s *kinesis* serves as the ontological model<sup>35</sup>. What is proper to restlessness is its uncomplete nature. Restlessness belongs to the realm of possibility — the equivalent of the Aristotelian δύναμις, “the always particular being-able -to-have- available” — which also defines privation (στέρησις). In the last part of the 1922 report, Heidegger remarks:

“The basic category of στέρησις dominates throughout the Aristotelian ontology; but that means that it arises within the explanation of the particular claiming, of a determinately [kind of] movement. Characteristically, the “coming-to-be of the statue from bronze” (in the movement of the dealings of *production*) plays the role of an example within the problematic which is directed towards the κίνησις of the φύσει όντα”<sup>36</sup>.

So, philosophy is a way of engaging oneself in the *kinesis* of life itself, a “way within movedness” (*Bewegtheit*)<sup>37</sup>. Philosophy belongs

32. *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, p. 29-30.

33. On restlessness as an exceptional kind of άκίνησις in Aristotle: GA 18, p. 313-314.

34. *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, p. 131.

35. *Ibid*, p. 70.

36. *Man and World*, op. cit., p. 390; cf. GA 18, p. 297. The second figure of στέρησις, would be the neotestamentary theme of *Darbung* (*carentia/privatio*), which Heidegger draws from his early courses on the phenomenology of religion (p. 90).

37. *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, p. 119.



to the movement of life, it is the genuine, explicit actualization of the tendency towards interpretation which belongs to life's own motility. The repetition of life is philosophy's basic movement. Repetition is here another "kinetic" term with a genuine temporal sense that is going to develop fully later on, in the context of existential analytics. Philosophy itself is defined as the "basic how of life itself, such that repeats it. . . , brings it back from its falling away, which bringing-back, as radical research, is itself life"<sup>38</sup>. As repetition and "genuine, explicit actualization" which belongs to life's basic movement, philosophical factual interpretation is a continuous battle against life's own factual "ruinance", the forerunner of the "falling prey" in *Being and Time*. Philosophy is a "countermovement to ruinance" (*gegenruinante Bewegtheit*), which accomplishes itself as questionableness. Nevertheless, this opposition doesn't mean that philosophy is exterior to life<sup>39</sup>.

But how does Heidegger proceed in elucidating the fundamental phenomenological categories of life? He follows the rules of formal indication, which he first refers to the "content-meaning" (*Gehaltssinn*) of life, that is the fact of always being linked to "something" (*Etwas*), that is, the world. The second category, with regard this time to relation (*Bezug*), is care/caring (*Sorge/Sorgen*)<sup>40</sup>. Care indicates the way in which life relates to the world. Within the frame of this category grow a number of determinations. From the very beginning, it is clear that care is perceived as a radicalized form of intentionality. It

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38. *Man and World*, p. 367. On repetition as the leading thread of Heidegger's questioning on tradition from the early courses up to *Being and Time*: John Sallis, «Where Does *Being and Time* Begin?», in *Delimitations. Phenomenology and the End of Metaphysics* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1986), p. 102-103.

39. *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, p. 112-113. Heidegger gives an explanation of the specific character of negativity that is proper to ruinance. Its negative essence is not a stop or «bestimmte Stufen und fixierte Haltepunkte» —this would be the dialectic notion of negativity—, but «sie selbst je faktisch in der Bewegtheit sind, und zwar so, dass sie sich in den Weisen der anderen mitbewegt» (154). This «kinetic» characterization of philosophy could be the further clarification of Heidegger's «dia-hermeneutics» as opposed to dialectics; cf. *Ontology. The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, p. 34-36.

40. *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, p. 65. We indicate the roots of this term which could be most likely traced back to the «Bekümmernung» (distressed concern) taken from the courses on the phenomenology of religion. It comes from θλῖψις: Trübsal or the theme of «cura» in the 1921 course



is also clear that Heidegger paves the way for the primordial definition of intentionality through the determination of care as a kind of movement, that is through Aristotle: unrest (*Unruhe*) is the fundamental determination of the motility of factual life. And this is the point where Aristotle enters the stage<sup>41</sup>.

After having defined motility as the principal determination of factual life Heidegger turns to the categorial analysis of the phenomenon of movement itself. Every category of caring as the relational meaning of life is constituted by something. "bewegungshaft". His aim is to come close to this phenomenon in a factual, explicative, categorial way, and as a result to seize facticity according to a formal-indicative, categorial manner. The two categories which form the very essence of factual movement are the "shining back" (*Reluzenz*) and the "prestruction" (*Praestruktion*). Every way in which the relational meaning of life occurs is "etwas Bewegungshafte", but "motility" moves itself according to the how of "prestruction" and "shining-back". So, the question is how motility accomplishes itself in the categories of caring. "Shining back" prevails in the movement of life returning to itself, whereas "prestruction" characterizes the "motility" of life that goes over itself toward the world. But this doesn't mean that these two figures of care stand apart. In fact, the inarticulation brings a meaning of motility (*Bewegtheitssinn*) in every particular motility of the category of relational meaning, which is considered in every particular awhileness<sup>42</sup>.

Heidegger goes on with an analysis of motility as categorial determination of the facticity of life. What lies at its root is ruinance as the "fundamental categorial definition of facticity" (*kategoriale Grundbestimmtheit der Faktizität*). Ruinance is the "Bewegungshafte" of the two categories expressing the moving character of caring or what we would call, in the Husserlian phenomenological lexikon, the actualizing meaning (*Vollzugsinn*) of life. Ruinance is the actualizing meaning of care as motility, that is, its meaning of Being

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on *Augustine and the Neoplatonism*. It becomes the basic formal indication of factual life and then of Dasein; it is thus related to «Zeitlichkeit» (1923). In the course on the *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, the «relational meaning» is referred back to movement. This later relation is even more emphasized in the *Natorp-bericht*.

41. *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle* p. 70.

42. *Ibid*, p. 92-93, 95.





(*Seinssinn*)<sup>43</sup>. But now that we have actually touched the very heart of the problem, we have to make all the way back to caring, in order to view the "how" of the actualization of the relational meaning that caring is. The first one is the enhancement of caring as concernness (*Besorgnis*). The second one refers to the kairological characters of ruinance. The specific character of time-relation which is proper to ruinance is the eradication of time (*Zeittilgung*). But *kairos* is a category of time, the relation to "one's own time", the "particular whileness of life", therefore, time is movement or motility, *Bewegtheit*.

We won't develop further the critical question of *kairos* and "particular awhileness", their origins and significance for the evolution of temporality in the early Heidegger. We will just make a remark significant enough to be treated in a brief way. It is through *Jeweiligkeit*, — non-objective time seized in its irreducible particularity, that is kairological time —, that, in the course on *Ontology (Hermeneutics of Facticity)*, the proper temporality (*eigene Zeitlichkeit*) of the *Dasein* will be defined for the first time, in the place of factual life. In fact, the theme of *kairos* is present throughout this analysis. In a certain sense, the reading of existential temporality, operates through the deepening of the theme of "particular awhileness" (or "temporal particularity" *Jeweiligkeit*) of which kairological time is the forerunner. Let us now go briefly to the 1922 report to Paul Natorp.

### (III)

From the very beginning of the report, Heidegger specifies the aim of his analysis. It is a philosophical research that engages itself in the motility of facticity and becomes explicit interpretation of factual life. Philosophical research has to make the ever concrete interpretations of factual life (i.e. the interpretations of caring circumspection and of concerned insight) categorially transparent in their factual temporalizing of life; philosophical research has to make these interpretations transparent with respect to their plans [*Vorhabe*] (into whose basic sense of Being life places itself) and in relation to their preconceptions [*Vorgriff*]. This research is qualified by three main elements, First of all, "a visual stance" (*Blickstand*), that is the object of

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43. Ibid, p. 99-100.



philosophical research that has the "Being character of factual life". It is here, with regard to the "visual stance" that phenomenology comes forth indicating the phenomenal character of life. The structure of the object, a structure which characterizes something as a phenomenon, i.e. full intentionality is no other than that of having the Being-character of factual life. Intentionality, taken simply as Being-related-to, is the first phenomenal character of the basic movement of life (i.e. of caring) which can be brought into relief immediately. Relate phenomenology to the object of philosophical research itself means that phenomenology doesn't simply play a preparatory role, it isn't a philosophical pre-science that sets the conditions of research, but is unconceivable without the central and always newly appropriated basic orientation towards the object of the philosophical problematic itself. In fact, facticity is treated in the first part of the report, but not in an extensive manner. The reason for this is that its account had already taken place in the 1921/22 course. Let us come now to the second constitutive element of philosophical research, that is, its "visual directions" that correspond to the how of its being-interpreted. It is with regard to those that Aristotle is situated within the field of philosophical research. The "visual directions" bring forth its historical character.

It is also with regard to this second point that the necessity of a "destruction" comes forth. For Heidegger back in 1922, the philosophy of today's situation moves within off-shoots of basic experiences which have been temporalized by Greek ethics but also by the Christian perception of the human *Dasein*. Even the anti-Greek and anti-Christian tendencies persist fundamentally within the same "visual directions" and ways of interpreting. Thus, the phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity sees itself as called upon in its hidden motives, unexpressed tendencies, and ways of interpreting and pushed forward by way of a "dismantling return" to the primordial sources of interpretation. The historical dimension of understanding is not a supplement to the understanding as such, its "visual stance" as we called it. On the contrary, the "how" of the research is part of the very essence of "the thematic That-with-respect-to-which (the facticity of life)". "Destruction" belongs to the approach to the *phenomenon* as such. It doesn't simply reveal a fact, that is, that philosophy has a history and that our questioning has to take this fact into consideration. Historicity is intrinsic to philosophical knowledge. Consequently, the phenomenological elucidation of life as a "visual stance" has to be completed and deepened by its he-



hermeneutic grasp, that is, the “destructive” confrontation with the Greek-Christian interpretation of life. At this point, Heidegger reviews a series of most influential figures in the history of philosophy and theology which served as topics in his earlier courses: Saint Paul, Augustine, Jerome, John Damascene, Peter Lombard, Duns Scotus, Gabriel Briel, Gregory of Rimini, Luther, but also Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. This extremely dense enumeration brings him back to Aristotle: “This task can be achieved only if a concrete interpretation of the Aristotelian philosophy is made available; this interpretation must be oriented to the problem of facticity, i.e. according to a radical phenomenological anthropology”<sup>44</sup>.

Hence, what the Scholastic tradition fails to fully appreciate in Aristotle is facticity as the foundation upon which all interpretations should rest. On the contrary, what is announced in Heidegger’s own hermeneutic phenomenology of life is the full consideration of the thematic object in its historical dimension. It is in this analysis that the transition from the motility of life to its ontological determination as being-moved with regard to Aristotle’s radical phenomenological anthropology has its roots. To put it in the terms used by Heidegger later, on if being-moved is the ontological determination of movement, Aristotle is the key figure in this transition. In order for the phenomenology of life to develop into a full understanding of its “Being-meaning”, facticity has to be considered in its moving nature, that is, as “motility”<sup>45</sup>. Through the ontological determination of motility as being-moved, it is the essential character of life that is highlighted. But *kinesis* in Aristotle as a model of ontological appropriation and radicalization presupposed a number of “visual directions”, that is an orientation into historical research. The most critical part of the report is actually dedicated to the task of “destruction” taking as a starting point Aristotle. This consideration breaks with the myth of the object of a research as something autonomous which stands by itself: “To ask only about the “in-self” in general is to misjudge the object-character of what is *historical*. To arrive at relativism and sceptical historicism because of the unavailability of such an “in itself” is only the reverse side of this *same* misjudging”<sup>46</sup>.

44. Ibid, p. 373. Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, «Heidegger and the History of Philosophy», *The Monist*, vol. 64 (1981), p. 435-436.

45. *Ontology - The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, p. 13-14.

46. *Man and World*, p. 375 (author’s emphasis).



What would stand opposite to this "misjudging" would be the consideration of the problem of facticity in the light of Aristotle's radical phenomenological anthropology. And it is at this very point that the question of movement comes forth<sup>47</sup>. "Being-moved" is another term for the Being of life, Being-character: the "Being-in-life". Heidegger poses a number of problems with regard to this matter: first of all, the sense of Dasein within which the interpretation of "Being-in-life" takes place. Second, the "Being-plan" (*Seinsvorhabe*) within which this objectivity stands. Third, the way in which the elucidation of Being takes place and, finally, the phenomenal ground and the basic explicata, that is, the categories of Being operating in this explication. It is once more Aristotle that comes forth to help in this undertaking: define the meaning of Being in Aristotle, Heidegger introduces here, a number of fundamental themes in Aristotle, such as λόγος, οὐσία, εἶδος, ἀρχή, but above all ποίησις: "That which is finished in the *movement* of the dealings of production (ποίησις), that which has arrived at its Being-present-at-hand, available for a use-tendency, is that which is. Being means *Being-produced* and, as something produced, it means something which is significant relative to some tendency of dealings; it means Being-available"<sup>48</sup>.

But ποίησις the way it is described here is ultimately referred to κίνησις. At this point, let us give some brief indications about the third of the elements proper to philosophical research, that is, its actualization in a hermeneutic situation. It is clear from this brief outline that here Aristotle is not only the topic of the analysis but also the meeting point of these elements which more than fixed, stable categories show philosophy in its most dynamic aspect as a "determinate How of factual life", or as Heidegger had put it earlier in his courses, a "way to the motility". Heidegger talks of a "cotemporalization" of life and philosophy but also of an enactment of the fundamental motility of

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47. Ibid, p. 373.

48. Ibid, p. 375. Those I would like to draw attention to the intertwining of two different vocabularies, of having and being, in the 1922 Introduction. The idiom of having is much older and that of being in its primordial figure of being-moved is the one which begins to prevail. Even the having is the «Being of this having» (*das Sein des Habens*). Rudolph Makkreel («The Genesis of Heidegger's phenomenological hermeneutics and the rediscovered «Aristotle Introduction» of 1922», *Man and World*, 23, 1990) argues that the 1922 report marks Heidegger's definitive distancing from intuitive having toward the search for the meaning of Being.



factical life. Movement is present in the first part of the course, preceding the *explication du texte*. Movement is the object of the research, the being-moved proper to facticity, but also the “how” itself of the research. Research is actualized in several movements that have to be taken into consideration. Philosophical research is always on the way<sup>49</sup>. Till this point, the 1922 report retrieves the course. But that is not all. In the context of this analysis, the Being-question takes much more significant dimensions. What was only hinted at in the course, that is, the close link of the Being-meaning of life’s motility to κίνησις is brought forth. This move belongs to the second moment of philosophical investigation, that is, the pursuing of specific “visual directions”. In fact, it requires the consideration of research in its historical nature: The hermeneutic dimension of research is “auf dem Wege der Destruktion”. Heidegger undertakes a brief study of the first three books of the *Physics*. The book on movement par excellence comes last, but the question of movement is also present through the previous analyses. This is apparent in the analysis of the dianoetic virtues in *Nicomachean Ethics*:

“...in φρόνησις there is indicated a doubling of aspects, into which the human being and the Being of life are placed, and which becomes the intellectual-historical destiny of the categorial explication of the sense of being of facticity... For its own part and according to its basic character, this Being is not won explicatively from the Being of human life as such; in its categorial structure, it stems rather from a determinate actualized, *ontological radicalization of the idea of being-that-is-moved*”<sup>50</sup>.

Consequently, movement proves to be critical for the undestading of θεωρεῖν. Even the questioning on truth as disclosedness seems to come from the primordality of movement. All the major categories of *Physics* —ἀρχή, —τύχη, —δύναμις, —ἐνέργεια, ἐντελέχεια— are analuzed in the perspective of movement<sup>51</sup>. *Physics* becomes the intersection

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<sup>49</sup>. *Man and World*, p. 367. On the issue of retrieval and the circular movement of «destruction»: Dennis J. Schmidt, «Beginnings, Origins, Circles, and Spirals», in: *The Ubiquity of the Finite. Hegel, Heidegger, and the Entitlements of Philosophy* (Cambridge Mass.: The MIT Press, 1988), p. 96-105.

<sup>50</sup>. *Man and World*, p. 383 (authoris emphsis).

<sup>51</sup>. *Ibid*, p. 390.



where all these terms converge in the phenomenon of movement in its ontological implications. But we will follow this analysis more closely, by taking as first in-stance the factual, that is, moving, essence of λόγος, with regard to the 1922 *Introduction*, but also to the course on Plato's *Sophist*. Another instance where λόγος is thematized is the 1924/25 course on *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*. As we have already noticed, this course provides us with an intriguing analysis of movement that we didn't have the time to explore. But its analysis of *logos* is also one of its strengths. The reason for choosing to examine this term in relation to the questioning on movement and motility is its importance for the development of Heidegger's questioning. As it is the case with other concepts which make up the terminological apparatus of *Being and Time*, they have been slightly displaced in comparison to what was their treatment in the last Freiburg and first Marburg courses. What is the major element in this displacement is the primordially of the question of temporality. Take for example the winter semester 1925/26 course on *Logic. The Question of Truth*<sup>52</sup>.

The introduction to the course develops the metaphysical concept of Logic and its history, whereas its preliminary part examines Logic in the light of the threat posed by psychologism. The first part of the course treats the question of truth in philosophical logic by exploring the question of *logos*. propositional truth and the "as -structure" are the main themes examined. What makes the difference between this analysis and the ones that have been of interest to us till now? The answer is simple: the priority of the question of temporality. Here Heidegger develops the question of truth and *logos* with reference to his project of a "phenomenological chronology"<sup>53</sup>. By means of this "phenomenological chronology", someone recognizes the temporal character of the "as-structure" (*als-Struktur*). This project is inspired by Kant, thus, the role of transcendental schematism is critical in its unfolding. The course provides us with a thorough analysis of the *Critique of Pure Reason* which concludes with the designation of the proposition as a "making-present" (*Gegenwärtigen*). The course provides us with a reading

52. See in this respect Françoise Dastur's reading of the course, especially with regard to the question of *logos* in *Dire le temps. Esquisse d'une chronologie phénoménologique* (Encre Marine, Toulouse: Encre Marine 1994).

53. *Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 21 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976), p. 198-199.

54. GA 21, p. 409.



of Kantian schematism as well as a critique of it in the name of new interpretation of temporality, that of care. Care here does not have a "kinetic", but a purely temporal character<sup>54</sup>.

#### (IV)

Let us now turn briefly to *Being and Time* to conclude. As we have seen, in 1927, Heidegger relates Dasein's movement (*Bewegtheit*) to historicity determined as the stretching-ahng between life and death. It is on this very point that he arrives at a puzzling yet critical observation. He identifies the "enigma of Being" with that of movement, concluding on the task of a historical deconstructing of the history of philosophy which is yet to come.

This unfinished project goes through a lot of overturnings, shifts and changes. It actually lies at the roots of the overturning of fundamental ontology, already foreshadowed in *Being and Time*. Now moving forward in time, in the conference "On Time and Being", philosophy has formerly conceived Being in terms of *idea*, *energeia*, *actuality*, *will to power*. Hence, as late as 1962, the phenomenologist's task is to conceive philosophy as the event of appropriation (*Ereignis*):

"With the entry of thinking into Appropriation, its own way of concealment proper to it also arrives. Appropriation is in itself expropriation. Thus the lack of destiny of Appropriation does not mean that it has no "movement". Rather it means that the manner or *movement* most proper to Appropriation turning toward us in withdrawal — first, *shows itself as what...is to be thought*"<sup>55</sup>.

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55. *On Time and Being* (London/New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 41 (emphasis mine). Cf. P. Verstraeten: «Le sens de l'*Ereignis* dans *Temps et Etre*», *Les Etudes Philosophiques* (1986), τεύχος 1. T. Sheehan examines Heidegger's designation of Being as movement tracing it back to Aristotle's conception of δύναμις as ἐνέργεια ἀτελής: «we might be able to find the justification for calling the meaning of Being *Ereignis* by investigating the meaning of *dynamis* rather than chasing the word *Ereignis* down the dubious paths of German etymologies.» («On the Way to *Ereignis*: Heidegger's Interpretation of *Physis*») in: *Continental Philosophy in America*, H.J. Silverman / J. Sallis / T.M. Seebohm (ed.), Pittsburg: Duquesne University, 1983), p. 142.

