Strategic fiscal interaction among OECD countries (Journal article)
This paper investigates whether OECD countries compete with each other for mobile factors by using various fiscal (tax-spending) policy instruments. We use a panel dataset of 20 OECD countries over the 1982-2000 period. Results reveal evidence that international capital inflows (FDI) are affected by fiscal policy at home and abroad. Also, there is evidence that domestic capital tax rates react: (i) positively to changes in capital tax rates in neighboring countries, and (ii) negatively to changes in public investment spending in neighboring countries. In contrast, strategic interdependence over public investment spending decisions is not established.
|Institution and School/Department of submitter:||Πανεπιστήμιο Ιωαννίνων. Σχολή Οικονομικών και Κοινωνικών Επιστημών. Τμήμα Οικονομικών Επιστημών|
|Keywords:||capital mobility,tax competition,welfare,municipal tax rates,yardstick competition,british-columbia,public-goods,taxation,policy,governments,politics,growth,economies|
|Link:||<Go to ISI>://000290031500012|
|Appears in Collections:||Άρθρα σε επιστημονικά περιοδικά ( Ανοικτά)|
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